

INTEGRATED **DISARMAMENT,**  
**DEMOBILIZATION AND**  
**REINTEGRATION** STANDARDS

# Foreword

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and those associated with armed groups is a prerequisite for post-conflict stability and recovery. Of course, there can be no substitute for national leadership and the political commitment of warring parties to disarm and demobilize. But in a peacekeeping environment, a successful DDR programme depends heavily on the ability of the United Nations system to plan, manage and implement a coherent and effective DDR strategy.

As a leading partner in this work, the United Nations is well placed to collate knowledge and to develop common standards. These *Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)*, along with their accompanying *Operational Guide to the IDDRS* and *DDR Briefing Note for Senior Managers*, draw upon the accumulated experiences, lessons learnt and best practices of the United Nations system. Developed jointly by staff members from peacekeeping missions, UN country teams and headquarters, they provide guidance and operational tools for all aspects of the DDR process. They are also intended to serve as a repository of new knowledge by means of the UN DDR Resource Centre ([www.unddr.org](http://www.unddr.org)).

I introduced the IDDRS in my report to the General Assembly (A/60/705), and this guidance now forms the substantive basis on which Member States engage with and support DDR programmes. The IDDRS have also been formally adopted by all 15 members of the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, as well as the United Nations Executive Committee on Peace and Security. This means they are the definitive resource for all our staff working on DDR issues, at every level in headquarters, integrated missions and UN country teams, and will be the reference from which all current and future programmes are planned, implemented and reviewed.

As with all guidance documents, the IDDRS need to be tailored to the specific context of our work; they also need to be updated regularly to reflect the latest lessons and needs. I hope that all colleagues and partners working in this vital area will find the IDDRS a useful tool, and I encourage you to provide feedback and comments so that our knowledge in this evolving field can be expanded continuously.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K. Annan', with a stylized flourish at the end.

**Kofi A. Annan**  
United Nations Secretary-General  
December 2006

# Acknowledgements

The creation of the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards (IDDRS) was a collective process. A wide-ranging array of actors, from DDR experts, practitioners, academics and policy-makers were involved at every stage of its development.

The Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR<sup>1</sup> would like to thank the numerous staff members from agencies, departments, funds and programmes, at headquarters and in field and country operations, who participated in the development of these standards.

We would furthermore like to thank the following individuals, to whom the IAWG on DDR is indebted for their valuable and generous input and support: the authors of “DDR: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide”, Colin Gleichmann, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, whose work provided a basis for parts of the IDDRS; Vanessa Farr, who substantively edited the IDDRS; Jane Carroll and Alex Potter, who copy-edited the IDDRS; Richard Jones, who created the design and typesetting elements for the whole document; and Patricia Keays and Sarah Murchison, who both facilitated the IDDRS simulation exercises.

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## Endnotes

- 1 The IAWG is composed of the following UN agencies, funds, departments and programmes: Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Public Information (DPI), International Labour Organization (ILO), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO); and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).



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# 1.10 Introduction to the IDDRS

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 1.10 Introduction to the IDDRS

## Background

Since the late 1980s, the United Nations (UN) has increasingly been called upon to support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes in countries emerging from conflict. In a peacekeeping context, this trend has been part of a move towards complex operations that seek to deal with a wide variety of issues ranging from security to human rights, rule of law, elections and economic governance, rather than traditional peacekeeping where two warring parties were separated by a ceasefire line patrolled by blue-helmeted soldiers.

The changed nature of peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery strategies requires close coordination among UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes. In the past five years alone, DDR has been included in the mandates for multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia and Sudan. Simultaneously, the UN has increased its DDR engagement in non-peacekeeping contexts, namely in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Indonesia (Aceh), Niger, Somalia, Solomon Islands and Uganda.

While the UN has acquired significant experience in the planning and management of DDR programmes, it has yet to establish a collective approach to DDR, or clear and usable policies and guidelines to facilitate coordination and cooperation among UN agencies, departments and programmes. This has resulted in poor coordination and planning and gaps in the implementation of DDR programmes.

## 1. Towards a common UN approach to DDR

In response to this fragmented approach, six UN agencies, departments, funds and programmes came together in 2004 to draft a series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS), i.e., a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for UN-supported DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context. Following workshop discussions and extensive consultations with country-level practitioners from the UN, member states, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and the World Bank, the IDDRS were further developed and a second draft was tested in 2005.

The Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, which was formally established by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security in March 2005 with a mandate to improve the UN performance in DDR, now counts 15 UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes as its members.<sup>1</sup> This first edition of the IDDRS has been jointly developed and approved by all 15 Working Group members.

## 2. What is DDR?

The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is

a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process.

In this regard, DDR lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens, while building national capacity for long-term peace, security and development. It is important to note that DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can, however, help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a recovery and peace-building strategy can proceed.

The official UN definition of each of the stages of DDR is as follows:<sup>2</sup>

#### **DISARMAMENT**

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

#### **DEMOBILIZATION**

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

#### **REINSERTION**

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

#### **REINTEGRATION**

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

### **3. The integrated DDR standards**

The IDDRS have been drafted on the basis of lessons and best practices drawn from the experience of all the departments, agencies, funds and programmes involved to provide

the UN system with a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for the planning, implementation and monitoring of DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context. While the IDDRS were designed with peacekeeping contexts in mind, much of the guidance contained within these standards will also be applicable for non-peacekeeping contexts.

The three main aims of the IDDRS are:

- to give DDR practitioners the opportunity to make informed decisions based on a clear, flexible and in-depth body of guidance across the range of DDR activities;
- to serve as a common foundation for the commencement of integrated operational planning in Headquarters and at the country level;
- to function as a resource for the training of DDR specialists.

### 3.1. IDDRS levels and modules

The standards consist of 23 modules and three submodules divided into five levels:

- Level one consists of the introduction and a glossary to the full IDDRS;
- Level two sets out the strategic concepts of an integrated approach to DDR in a peacekeeping context;
- Level three elaborates on the structures and processes for planning and implementation of DDR at Headquarters and in the field;
- Level four provides considerations, options and tools for carrying out DDR operations;
- Level five covers the UN approach to essential cross-cutting issues, such as gender, youth and children associated with the armed forces and groups, cross-border movements, food assistance, HIV / AIDS and health.

### 3.2. Technical language

The UN uses the concept and abbreviation 'DDR' as an all-inclusive term that includes related activities, such as repatriation, rehabilitation and reconciliation, that aim to achieve sustainable reintegration.

Following a summary, a table of contents and a description of the scope and objectives, each IDDRS module also contains a section on terms, definitions and abbreviations. In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization<sup>3</sup> standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard;
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications; and
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."


A complete list of terms and definitions used in the IDDRS is provided in IDDRS 1.20.

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### 3.3. How to use the IDDRS

Each IDDRS module is intended to serve both as part of the overall IDDRS framework and as a freestanding document. In the published version of the IDDRS, all modules are therefore collected in a ring-binder so that they can easily be taken out and used separately.

Figure 1 IDDRS framework



Since the topics covered in the different modules are interlinked, cross-references are provided throughout the IDDRS where more information on a particular issue can be found in another IDDRS module. Cross-references are clearly marked in the margins of the text.

### **3.4. Supplementary publications and resources**

The Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR has published two supplementary publications to the IDDRS: the *Operational Guide to the IDDRS* and the *DDR Briefing Note for Senior Managers*. The *Operational Guide* is intended to help users navigate the IDDRS by briefly outlining the key guidance in each module. The *Briefing Note for Senior Managers* is intended to facilitate managerial decisions and includes key strategic considerations and their policy implications. Both these publications are available at the UN DDR Resource Centre (<http://www.unddr.org>), which serves as an online platform on DDR and includes regular updates of both the IDDRS and the *Operational Guide*, a document database, training tools, a photo library and video clips.

### **3.5. Updates and feedback**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS are periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

Feedback and comments on the IDDRS are actively encouraged and should be sent to the Secretariat of the Inter-Agency Working Group via the DDR Resource Centre web site.



## Endnotes

- 1 Department of Disarmament Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Public Information, International Labour Organization, International Organization for Migration, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Development Fund for Women, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme, World Health Organization.
- 2 Note of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005.
- 3 A worldwide federation of national bodies from over 130 countries. Its work results in international agreements, which are published as ISO standards and guides. ISO is a non-governmental organization and the standards it develops are voluntary, although some (mainly those concerned with health, safety and environmental aspects) have been adopted by many countries as part of their regulatory framework. A list of ISO standards and guides is given in the *ISO Catalogue*, at <http://www.iso.ch/inform/catinfo/html>.

The IDDRS have been developed to be compatible with ISO standards and guides. Adopting the ISO format and language provides some important advantages, including consistency of layout, use of internationally recognized terminology, and a greater acceptance by international, national and regional organizations who are accustomed to the ISO series of standards and guides.

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## Glossary: Terms and Definitions



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# 1.20

## Glossary: Terms and Definitions

TERM	DEFINITION
Absorption capacity	The ability of a community, economy and/or country to include ex-combatants as active full members of the society. Absorption capacity is often used in relation to the capacities of local communities, but can also refer to social and political reintegration opportunities.
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)	The advisory body that reviews the budgets of peacekeeping missions and makes recommendations to the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee of the General Assembly.
AIDS	Acquired immune deficiency syndrome: the stage of HIV when the immune system is depleted, leaving the body vulnerable to one or more life-threatening diseases.
Ammunition	See 'munition'.
Anti-retrovirals (ARVs)	Broad term for the main type of treatment for HIV and AIDS. ARVs are not a cure.
Arms control	The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions.
Arms exports	The sending of weapons, guns and ammunition from one country to another, often closely monitored and controlled by governments.
Armed forces	The military organization of a State with a legal basis, and supporting institutional infrastructure (salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.).
Armed group	A group that has the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; is not within the formal military structures of a State, State-alliance or intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the State(s) in which it operates.
Asylum	The protection granted by a State on its territory to persons from another State who are fleeing serious danger or persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. A person who is granted asylum is a refugee. Asylum includes a variety of elements, including non-refoulement (for definition, see 'non-refoulement'), permission to remain in the territory of the asylum country and humane standards of treatment.
Asylum seeker	A person whose request or application for refugee status has not been finally decided on by a prospective country of refuge.
Behaviour-change communication (BCC)	A participatory, community-level process aimed at developing positive behaviours; promoting and sustaining individual, community and societal behaviour change; and maintaining appropriate behaviours.

TERM	DEFINITION
Beneficiary/ies	Refers to both individuals and groups who receive indirect benefits through a UN-supported DDR operation or programme. This includes communities in which DDR programme participants resettle, businesses where ex-combatants work as part of the DDR programme, etc.
Border controls	The existence of checks and regulations between countries that control access to and from the country of people, goods and services.
Broker	The natural person or legal entity that carries out a brokering activity; anyone who directly performs an activity defined as a brokering activity in the exercise of their own commercial or legal relations. The acts of natural persons, especially employees, are to be ascribed to the legal entity.
Brokering	Activities that serve to facilitate the transfer of arms between persons in different third countries, insofar as such transfer is furthered through the assistance of a so-called broker. Core brokering activities include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ acquisition of SALW located in one third country for the purpose of transfer to another third country;</li> <li>■ mediation between sellers and buyers of SALW to facilitate the transfer of these arms from one third country to another;</li> <li>■ the indication of an opportunity for such a transaction to the seller or buyer (in particular, the introduction of a seller or buyer in return for a fee or other consideration).</li> </ul>
Business development services (BDS)	A set of 'business services' that include any services that improve the performance of a business and its access to and ability to compete in markets.
Buy-back	The direct link between the surrender of weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives in return for cash. There is a perception that such schemes reward irresponsible armed personnel who may have already harmed society and the innocent civilian population. They also provide the opportunity for an individual to conduct low-level trading in SALW.
Capacity	The strength and ability, which could include knowledge, skill, personnel and resources, to achieve desired objectives.
Capacity-building	Used as a noun, refers to processes and programmes that empower and enable the recipients' independent development. Can also be used as an adjective (e.g., capacity-building activity).
Ceasefire agreement	A binding, non-aggression pact to enable dialogue between conflicting parties.
Child	Any human below the age of 18, unless under the law applicable to the child in a particular country, majority is attained earlier.
Child associated with fighting forces/armed conflict/armed groups/armed forces	The definition commonly applied to children associated with armed forces and groups in prevention, demobilization and reintegration programmes derives from the <i>Cape Town Principles and Best Practices</i> (1997), in which the term 'child soldier' refers to: "Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms."

TERM	DEFINITION
	<p>In his February 2000 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General defined a child soldier “as any person under the age 18 years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capacity and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members, as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage”. The CRC specifies that a child is every human below the age of 18.</p> <p>The term ‘children associated with armed forces and groups’, although more cumbersome, is now used to avoid the perception that the only children of concern are combatant boys. It points out that children eligible for release and reintegration programmes are both those associated with armed forces and groups and those who fled armed forces and groups (often considered as deserters and therefore requiring support and protection), children who were abducted, those forcibly married and those in detention.</p> <p>Access to demobilization does not depend on a child’s level of involvement in armed forces and groups. No distinction is made between combatants and non-combatants for fear of unfair treatment, oversight or exclusion (mainly of girls). Nevertheless, the child’s personal history and activities in the armed conflict can help decide on the kind of support he/she needs in the reintegration phase.</p>
Child demobilization, release, exit from an armed force or group	<p>The term ‘demobilization’ refers to ending a child’s association with armed forces or groups. The terms ‘release’ or ‘exit from an armed force or group’ and ‘children coming or exiting from armed forces and groups’ rather than ‘demobilized children’ are preferred.</p> <p>Child demobilization/release is very brief and involves removing a child from a military or armed group as swiftly as possible. This action may require official documentation (e.g., issuing a demobilization card or official registration in a database for ex-combatants) to confirm that the child has no military status, although formal documentation must be used carefully so that it does not stigmatize an already-vulnerable child.</p>
Child reintegration	<p>According to article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote . . . social reintegration of a child victim of . . . armed conflicts”.</p> <p>Reintegration includes family reunification, mobilizing and enabling the child’s existing care system, medical screening and health care, schooling and/or vocational training, psychosocial support, and social and community-based reintegration. Reintegration programmes need to be sustainable and to take into account children’s aspirations.</p>
Civil society	<p>The three-sector model, which looks at the State as consisting of the government, the market and the citizenry, is a useful starting point to define civil society. In this perspective, civil society constitutes the third sector, existing alongside and interacting with the State and profit-seeking firms. Civil society emerges as a voluntary sector made up of freely and formally associating individuals pursuing non-profit purposes in social movements, religious bodies, women and youth groups, indigenous peoples’ organizations, professional associations, unions, etc.</p>

TERM	DEFINITION
Civil society organization (CSO)	Non-State organization composed of voluntary participants.
Combatant	<p>Based on an analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts, a combatant is a person who:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ is a member of a national army or an irregular military organization; or</li> <li>■ is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or</li> <li>■ is involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or</li> <li>■ holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization; or</li> <li>■ arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or</li> <li>■ having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes.</li> </ul>
Community-based policing (CBP)	CBP involves the police participating in the community and responding to the needs of that community, and the community participating in its own policing and supporting the police. It can further be explained as the police working in partnership with the community; the community thereby participating in its own policing; and the two working together, mobilizing resources to solve problems affecting public safety over the longer term rather than the police, alone, reacting short term to incidents as they occur.
Community disarmament/ Small arms limitation	In the context of peace-building, community disarmament/small arms limitation advocates a change of public attitude toward the possession and use of weapons, as well as the benefits of weapons control measures within the community.
Community involvement	<p>In the context of SALW, the term refers to a process designed to place the needs and priorities of affected communities at the centre of the planning, implementation and monitoring of SALW control and other sectors.</p> <p>Community involvement is based on an exchange of information and involves communities in the decision-making process in order to establish priorities for SALW control. In this way, SALW control aims to be inclusive, community focused and ensure the maximum involvement of all sections of the community. This involvement includes joint planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects.</p> <p>Community involvement also works with communities to develop specific interim safety strategies that encourage individual and community behavioural change. This is designed to reduce the impact of SALW on individuals and communities until such time as the threat is removed.</p>
Community sensitization	Sensitizing a community before, during and after the DDR process is essentially the process of making community members (whether they are ex-combatants or not) aware of the effects and changes DDR creates within the community. For example, it will be important for the community to know that reintegration can be a long-term, challenging process before it leads to stability; that ex-combatants might not readily take on their new livelihoods; that local capacity

TERM	DEFINITION
	building will be an important emphasis for community building, etc. Such messages to the community can be dispersed with media tools, such as television; radio, print and poster campaigns; community town halls, etc., ensuring that a community's specific needs are addressed throughout the DDR process. See also 'sensitization'.
Conflict prevention	Taking measures to try and prevent violent confrontation.
Conflict reduction	<p>Process employed by States with the aim of diffusing tensions and building sustainable peace.</p> <p>Conflict reduction strategies may include programmes designed to build national and local capacity to settle disputes; encouraging the establishment of coordinated conflict prevention policies among international actors, and assisting countries in reducing the spread of arms.</p>
Conflict resolution	<p>Efforts designed to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and strengthen their relationships by building or deepening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact.</p> <p>Conflict resolution is used to reduce the possibility of violence, or to consolidate the cessation of a violent conflict in an attempt to prevent its re-escalation.</p>
Cooperation	The process of combining separate actors (States/members/armies) to work together as a cohesive unit in attaining pre-defined goals.
Coping mechanisms/strategies	The methods by which members of households try to deal with a crisis. For example, at times of severe food insecurity, household members may (1) make greater use than normal of wild foods, (2) plant other crops, (3) seek other sources of income, (4) rely more on gifts and remittances, (5) sell off assets to buy food, or (6) migrate. Coping mechanisms should be discouraged if they lead to disinvestment, if they reduce a household's capacity to recover its long-term capacity to survive, and if they harm the environment. Positive coping mechanisms should be encouraged and strengthened.
Counselling (HIV)	Support generally offered before and after a test in order to help individuals understand their risk behaviour and cope with an HIV-positive result or maintain an HIV-negative status. The counselling service also links individuals to options for treatment, care and support; and provides information on how to stay as healthy as possible and minimize the risk of transmission to others.
Crisis management	Actions undertaken by governments and non-governmental agencies in an attempt to respond to security problems, identify their root causes and build international capacity to prevent conflicts from recurring.
Demilitarization	The complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose. Demilitarization not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as essential to achieving the final result.



TERM	DEFINITION
Demobilization (see also 'Child demobilization')	<b>"Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion" (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).</b>
Dependant	A civilian who depends upon a combatant for his/her livelihood. This can include friends and relatives of the combatant, such as aged men and women, non-mobilized children, and women and girls. Some dependants may also be active members of a fighting force. For the purposes of DDR programming, such persons shall be considered combatants, not dependants.
Destruction	The process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and explosives into an inert state so that they can no longer function as designed.
Detailed field assessment	A detailed field assessment is essential to identify the nature of the problem a DDR programme is to deal with, as well as to provide key indicators for the development of a detailed DDR strategy and its associated components. Detailed field assessments shall be undertaken to ensure that DDR strategies, programmes and implementation plans reflect realities, are well targeted and sustainable, and to assist with their monitoring and evaluation.
Disarmament	<b>"Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes" (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).</b>
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)	<b>A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.</b> Also see separate entries for 'disarmament', 'demobilization' and 'reintegration'.
Disposal	The removal of ammunition and explosives from a stockpile using a variety of methods (that may not necessarily involve destruction). Logistic disposal may or may not require the use of render safe procedures.
Diurnal cycling	The exposure of ammunition and explosives to the temperature changes caused by day, night and change of season.
'Do no harm'	An approach that tries to avoid unintended negative impacts of development and other interventions.
Eligibility criteria	Criteria that establish who will benefit from DDR assistance and who will not. There are five categories of people that should be taken into consideration in DDR programmes: (1) male and female adult combatants; (2) children associated with armed forces and groups; (3) those working in non-combat

TERM	DEFINITION
	<p>roles (including women); (4) ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses; and (5) dependants.</p> <p>When deciding on who will benefit from DDR assistance, planners should be guided by three principles, which include: (1) focusing on improving security. DDR assistance should target groups that pose the greatest risk to peace, while paying careful attentions to laying the foundation for recovery and development; (2) balancing equity with security. Targeted assistance should be balanced against rewarding violence. Fairness should guide eligibility; and (3) achieving flexibility.</p> <p>The eligibility criteria are decided at the beginning of a DDR planning process and determine the cost, scope and duration of the DDR programme in question.</p>
Employability	A combination of skills, knowledge and attitudes that improve a person's ability to secure and retain a job, progress at work and cope with change, secure alternative employment if he/she so wishes or has been laid off, and enter more easily into the labour market at different periods of his/her working life.
Empowerment	Refers to women and men taking control over their lives: setting their own agendas, gaining skills, building self-confidence, solving problems and developing self-reliance. No one can empower another; only the individual can empower herself or himself to make choices or to speak out. However, institutions, including international cooperation agencies, can support processes that can nurture self-empowerment of individuals or groups. Empowerment of recipients, regardless of their gender, should be a central goal of any DDR interventions, and measures must be taken to ensure no particular group is disempowered or excluded through the DDR process.
Evaluation	Evaluation is a management tool. It is a time-bound activity that systematically and objectively assesses the relevance, performance and success of ongoing and completed programmes and projects. Evaluation is carried out selectively, asking and answering specific questions to guide decision makers and/or programme managers. Evaluation determines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme or project.
Exclusion from protection as a refugee	This is provided for in legal provisions under refugee law that deny the benefits of international protection to persons who would otherwise satisfy the criteria for refugee status, including persons in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.
Ex-combatant	A person who has assumed any of the responsibilities or carried out any of the activities mentioned in the definition of 'combatant', and has laid down or surrendered his/her arms with a view to entering a DDR process. Former combatant status may be certified through a demobilisation process by a recognised authority. Spontaneously auto-demobilised individuals, such as deserters, may also be considered ex-combatants if proof of non-combatant status over a period of time can be given.

TERM	DEFINITION
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)	It may also include the rendering safe and/or disposal of such explosive ordnance, which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities of those personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposal. The presence of ammunition and explosives during disarmament operations will inevitably require some degree of EOD response. The level of this response will depend on the condition of the ammunition, its level of deterioration and the way that the local community handles it.
Explosives	Substances or mixtures of substances that, under external influences, are capable of rapidly releasing energy in the form of gases and heat.
False negative/positive	HIV test result that is wrong, either giving a negative result when the person is HIV-positive, or a positive result when the person is HIV-negative.
Finance and Management Support Service (FMSS)	The office in the Office of Mission Support (OMS) in DPKO mandated to provide financial management and support services to peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy operations, and trust funds related to peacekeeping and peacemaking activities from start-up through closure and liquidation.
Food for training (FFT)	Programme in which food is supplied on condition that the recipient attends a training programme.
Food for work (FFW)	FFW projects and activities are those in which food is given as full or part payment for work performed in the context of a supervised work programme.
Food insecurity	A situation where people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development, and an active and healthy life. Food insecurity may be caused by the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution, or inadequate use of food at the household level.
Food security	A situation where all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Note: This definition includes the following three key dimensions of food security: sufficient availability of food; adequate access to food; and appropriate utilization of food.
Foreign former combatant	A person who previously met the definition of a combatant and has since disarmed and genuinely demobilized, but is not a national of the country where he/she finds him-/herself.
Formed police unit (FPU)	A self-contained police unit of 125 officers capable of providing a range of tactical options, including an effective public order function.
Former combatant	See 'ex-combatant'.
Gender	The social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women, men, girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender is part of the broader sociocultural context. Other important criteria

TERM	DEFINITION
	for sociocultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age. The concept of gender also includes the expectations held about the characteristics, aptitudes and likely behaviours of both women and men (femininity and masculinity). The concept of gender is vital, because, when it is applied to social analysis, it reveals how women's subordination (or men's domination) is socially constructed. As such, the subordination can be changed or ended. It is not biologically predetermined, nor is it fixed forever. As with any group, interactions among armed forces and groups, members' roles and responsibilities within the group, and interactions between members of armed forces/groups and policy and decision makers are all heavily influenced by prevailing gender roles and gender relations in society. In fact, gender roles significantly affect the behaviour of individuals even when they are in a sex-segregated environment, such as an all-male cadre.
Gender analysis	The collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated information. Men and women perform different roles in societies and in armed groups and forces. This leads to women and men having different experience, knowledge, talents and needs. Gender analysis explores these differences so that policies, programmes and projects can identify and meet the different needs of men and women. Gender analysis also facilitates the strategic use of distinct knowledge and skills possessed by women and men, which can greatly improve the long-term sustainability of interventions. In the context of DDR, gender analysis should be used to design policies and interventions that will reflect the different roles, capacity and needs of women, men, girls and boys.
Gender balance	The objective of achieving representational numbers of women and men among staff. The shortage of women in leadership roles, as well as extremely low numbers of women peacekeepers and civilian personnel, has contributed to the invisibility of the needs and capacities of women and girls in the DDR process. Achieving gender balance, or at least improving the representation of women in peace operations, has been defined as a strategy for increasing operational capacity on issues related to women, girls, gender equality and mainstreaming.
Gender equality	The equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that women's and men's rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, while recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a women's issue, but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centred development.
Gender equity	The process of being fair to men and women. To ensure fairness, measures must often be put in place to compensate for the historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field. Equity is a means; equality is the result.

TERM	DEFINITION
Gender mainstreaming	Defined by the 52 <sup>nd</sup> Session of ECOSOC in 1997 as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.” Gender mainstreaming emerged as a major strategy for achieving gender equality following the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. In the context of DDR, gender mainstreaming is necessary in order to ensure women and girls receive equitable access to assistance programmes and packages, and it should, therefore, be an essential component of all DDR-related interventions. In order to maximize the impact of gender mainstreaming efforts, these should be complemented with activities that are directly tailored for marginalized segments of the intended beneficiary group.
Gender relations	The social relationships among men, women, girls and boys. Gender relations shape how power is distributed among women, men, girls and boys and how it is translated into different positions in society. Gender relations are generally fluid and vary depending on other social relations, such as class, race, ethnicity, etc.
Gender-aware policies	<p>Policies that utilize gender analysis in their formulation and design, and recognize gender differences in terms of needs, interests, priorities, power and roles. They further recognize that both men and women are active development actors for their community. Gender-aware policies can be further divided into the following three policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Gender-neutral policies use the knowledge of gender differences in a society to reduce biases in development work in order to enable both women and men to meet their practical gender needs.</li> <li>■ Gender-specific policies are based on an understanding of the existing gendered division of resources and responsibilities and gender power relations. These policies use knowledge of gender difference to respond to the practical gender needs of women or men.</li> <li>■ Gender-transformative policies consist of interventions that attempt to transform existing distributions of power and resources to create a more balanced relationship among women, men, girls and boys by responding to their strategic gender needs. These policies can target both sexes together, or separately. Interventions may focus on women’s and/or men’s practical gender needs, but with the objective of creating a conducive environment in which women or men can empower themselves.</li> </ul>
Gender-responsive DDR programmes	Programmes that are planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated in a gender-responsive manner to meet the different needs of female and male ex-combatants, supporters and dependants.
Gender-responsive objectives	Programme and project objectives that are non-discriminatory, equally benefit women and men and aim at correcting gender imbalances.

TERM	DEFINITION
Gendered division of labour	This is the result of how each society divides work between men and women according to what is considered suitable or appropriate to each gender. Attention to the gendered division of labour is essential when determining reintegration opportunities for both male and female ex-combatants, including women and girls associated with armed forces and groups in non-combat roles and dependants.
Harm	Physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Harmful event	Occurrence in which a hazardous situation results in harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Hazard	Potential source of harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Hazardous situation	Circumstance in which people, property or the environment are exposed to one or more hazards (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus, the virus that causes AIDS.
HIV confirmation tests	According to WHO/UNAIDS recommendations, all positive HIV-test results (whether ELISA [enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay] or simple/rapid tests) should be confirmed using a second, different test to confirm accuracy, or two further different rapid tests if laboratory facilities are not available.
HIV counselling	Counselling generally offered before and after an HIV test in order to help individuals understand their risk behaviour and cope with an HIV-positive result or stay HIV-negative. The counselling service also links individuals to options for treatment, care and support, and provides information on how to stay as healthy as possible and how to minimize the risk of transmission to others. Test results shall be confidential. Usually a voluntary counselling and testing service package ensures that: the HIV test is voluntary; pre and post test counselling is offered; informed consent is obtained (agreement to a medical test or procedure after clear explanation of risks and benefits); and HIV tests are performed using approved HIV test kits and following testing protocols.
HIV-negative result	The HIV test did not detect any antibodies in the blood. This either means that the person is not infected with the virus at the time of the test or that he/she is in the 'window period' (i.e., false negative, see above). It does not mean that he/she is immune to the virus.
HIV-positive result	A positive HIV test result means that a person has the HIV antibodies in his/her blood and is infected with HIV. It does not mean that he/she has AIDS.
HIV test	Usually a test for the presence of antibodies. There are two main methods of HIV testing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ HIV ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) test: This is the most efficient test for testing large numbers per day, but requires laboratory facilities with equipment, maintenance staff and a reliable power supply;</li> <li>■ Simple/rapid HIV tests: These do not require special equipment or highly trained staff and are as accurate as ELISA. Rapid tests will usually give results in approximately 30 minutes and are easy to perform. Suitable combinations of three simple/rapid tests are recommended by WHO where facilities for ELISA or ELISA/Western Blot testing are not available.</li> </ul>

TERM	DEFINITION
Host country	A foreign country into whose territory a combatant crosses.
Human capital	The knowledge, skills, competencies and other attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic activity. (Duration of schooling and levels of qualification are the standard measures.)
Human security	Constitutes (1) safety from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease and repression, and (2) protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. Although the scope of human security is vast, it can be divided into seven areas: economic security (freedom from poverty), food security (access to food), health security (access to health care and protection from diseases), environmental security (protection from the danger of environmental pollution), personal security (physical protection against torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, etc.), community security (survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups) and political security (civil and political rights, freedom from political oppression).
Implementation plan	Also known as an operations or action plan, an implementation plan describes the detailed steps necessary to implement programme activities, together with a division of labour and overall time-frame.
Implementing partner	Organizations and agencies that execute programmes and services within UN-supported DDR operations. The presence and capacity of implementing partners varies significantly in different countries and may include national authorities, UN missions and agencies, national and international NGOs, community-based organizations and local businesses.
Incentives	Acts or conditions that encourage the achievement of a goal.
Inconclusive (indeterminate) test	A small percentage of HIV test results are inconclusive. This means that the result is neither positive nor negative. This may be due to a number of factors that are not related to HIV infection, or it can be because of the person is in the early stages of infection when there are insufficient HIV antibodies present to give a positive result. If this happens the test must be repeated.
Incubation period	Time period between first infection by the disease agent and the appearance of disease symptoms. With HIV, this can vary from months to many years.
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a given development or aid factor.
Information, education and communication (IEC)	The development of communication strategies and support materials, based on formative research and designed to impact on levels of knowledge and influence behaviours among specific groups.
Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	The co-operative implementation of policies, structures and processes that support effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations within a peacekeeping environment.
Integration	The implementation of policies and processes, in pursuit of a common strategic aim, that provide mechanisms for mutually beneficial cooperation.

TERM	DEFINITION
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	Persons who have been obliged to flee from their homes “in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (according to the definition in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).
International guarantor	State, international or regional body or organization that plays the role of facilitation and arbitration in negotiations and the implementation of a peace accord.
Internee	A person who falls within the definition of a combatant (see above), who has crossed an international border from a State experiencing armed conflict and is interned by a neutral State whose territory he/she has entered.
Internment	An obligation of a neutral State when foreign former combatants cross into its territory, as provided for under the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Case of War on Land. This rule is considered to have attained customary international law status, so that it is binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to the Hague Convention. It is applicable by analogy also to internal armed conflicts in which combatants from government armed forces or opposition armed groups enter the territory of a neutral State. Internment involves confining foreign combatants who have been separated from civilians in a safe location away from combat zones and providing basic relief and humane treatment. Varying degrees of freedom of movement can be provided, subject to the interning State ensuring that the internees cannot use its territory for participation in hostilities.
Intervention	A process in which an actor enters into the area of another, with or without the consent of the other.
Irregular force	For the purposes of the IDDRS, defined as armed group.
Justice	For the UN, an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at large. It is a concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions, and while its administration usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are equally relevant. The international community has worked to articulate collectively the substantive and procedural requirements for the administration of justice for more than half a century.
Legislative disarmament/small arms control	The national legal regimes that regulate the possession, use and circulation of small arms and light weapons. These may be enforced by the State's security forces.
Livelihood	The capabilities, assets (including both material and social assets) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, and maintain or improve its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base.



TERM	DEFINITION
Mandatory testing	Testing or screening required by federal, state, or local law to compel individuals to submit to HIV testing without informed consent. Within those countries that conduct mandatory testing, it is usually limited to specific ‘populations’ such as categories of health care providers, members of the military, prisoners or people in high-risk situations.
Mercenary	<p>“A mercenary is any person who:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;</li> <li>(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;</li> <li>(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;</li> <li>(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and</li> <li>(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.</li> </ul> <p>A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or</li> <li>(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;</li> </ul> </li> <li>(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise of payment of material compensation;</li> <li>(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;</li> <li>(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and</li> <li>(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken” (International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 1989).</li> </ul>
Militia	A military group that is raised from the civil population to supplement a regular army in an emergency or a rebel group acting in opposition to a regular army. Also see ‘irregular force’.
Millennium Development Goals	<p>The Millennium Development Goals summarize the development goals agreed on at international conferences and world summits during the 1990s. At the end of the decade, world leaders distilled the key goals and targets in the Millennium Declaration (September 2000).</p> <p>The Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved between 1990 and 2015, include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ halving extreme poverty and hunger;</li> <li>■ achieving universal primary education;</li> <li>■ promoting gender equality;</li> <li>■ reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds;</li> <li>■ reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters;</li> </ul>

TERM	DEFINITION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB;</li> <li>■ ensuring environmental sustainability;</li> <li>■ developing a global partnership for development, with targets for aid, trade and debt relief.</li> </ul>
Monitoring	Monitoring is a management tool. It is the systematic oversight of the implementation of an activity that establishes whether input deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted outputs have proceeded according to plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct deficiencies.
National authority	The government department(s), organization(s) or institution(s) in a country responsible for the regulation, management and coordination of DDR activities.
National plan	A comprehensive, short, medium or long-term strategy to bring about the development of a specific issue in a country.
Needs-based approach	An approach that focuses on what people need or are short of and, therefore, on what they should be provided with.
Non-refoulement	A core principle of international law that prohibits States from returning persons in any manner whatsoever to countries or territories in which their lives or freedom may be threatened. It finds expression in refugee law, human rights law and international humanitarian law, is a rule of customary international law, and is therefore binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to specific instruments such as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
Nutritional requirements	AIDS patients usually need a food intake that is 30 percent higher than standard recommended levels.
Operational objective	Specific target set by an organization to achieve a mission. Operational objectives should be precise, ideally quantifiable, and should be achievable with the resources that are likely to become available.
Opportunistic infection (OI)	Infection that occurs when an immune system is weakened, but which might not cause a disease — or be as serious — in a person with a properly functioning immune system.
Participants	All persons who will receive direct assistance through the DDR process, including ex-combatants, women and children associated with fighting forces, and others identified during negotiations of the political framework and planning for a UN-supported DDR process.
Participatory rural assessment (PRA)	Tool designed, in a World Food Programme (WFP) intervention, to assess rural people's perceptions, access to and control over resources, attitudes, benefits, decision-making positions, constraints and degree of involvement.
Peace-building	Process to prevent the resurgence of conflict and to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies. It is a holistic process involving broad-based inter-agency cooperation across a wide range of issues. It includes activities such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces and groups; rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; human rights and elections monitoring; monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police; training in customs and border control procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilization policy and support for landmine removal.

TERM	DEFINITION
Peacekeeping assessed budget	The assessed contribution of Member States to the operations of the UN peacekeeping missions, based on a scale established by the General Assembly.
Peer education	A popular concept that variously refers to an approach, a communication channel, a methodology and/or an intervention strategy. Peer education usually involves training and supporting members of a given group with the same background, experience and values to effect change among members of that group. It is often used to influence knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours at the individual level. However, peer education may also create change at the group or societal level by modifying norms and stimulating collective action that contributes to changes in policies and programmes. Worldwide, peer education is one of the most widely used HIV/AIDS awareness strategies.
Police statute	A law, decree or edict enacted by the relevant authority governing the establishment, functions and organization of a law enforcement agency.
Policy	<p>A set of statements that define the purpose and goals of an organization and the rules, standards and principles of action that govern the way in which the organization aims to achieve these goals.</p> <p>Policy evolves in response to strategic direction and field experience. In turn, it influences the way in which plans are developed, and how resources are mobilized and applied. Policy is prescriptive and compliance is assumed, or at least is encouraged.</p>
Policy development	The process whereby many academic, international and non-governmental organizations provide assistance to governments in developing their strategies and managerial approaches to particular issues, problems or events.
Political stability	A situation where the political system and its actors, rules, cultures and institutions achieve balance and maintain a certain degree of order.
Post-conflict	Can describe the time, period or events taking place in a given State or region that had experienced an outbreak of violence or conflict in its recent past.
Post-exposure prophylaxis/ Post-exposure prevention (PEP)	A short-term antiretroviral treatment that reduce the likelihood of HIV infection after potential exposure to infected body fluids, such as through a needle-stick injury or as a result of rape. The treatment should only be administered by a qualified health care practitioner. It essentially consists of taking high doses of ARVs for 28 days. To be effective, the treatment must start within 2 to 72 hours of the possible exposure; the earlier the treatment is started, the more effective it is. Its success rate varies.
Poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs)	PRSPs are prepared by governments in low-income countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. A PRSP describes the macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes that a country will follow over several years to bring about broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and the associated sources of financing (IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: A Fact Sheet, September 2005, <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm">http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm</a> ).

TERM	DEFINITION
Practical gender needs	What women (or men) perceive as immediate necessities, such as water, shelter, food and security. Practical needs vary according to gendered differences in the division of agricultural labour, reproductive work, etc., in any social context.
Pre-discharge orientation (PDO)	Programmes provided at the point of demobilization to former combatants and their families to better equip them for reinsertion to civil society. This process also provides a valuable opportunity to monitor and manage expectations.
Pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA)	The sources of budgetary support available to the Secretary-General of the UN to establish or expand a peacekeeping operations or special political mission. Certain conditions govern the use of the PMCA, which may include (depending on circumstances) approval from the ACABQ or notification of the President of the Security Council.
Prevention of recruitment, and demobilization and reintegration (PDR)	Child-focused agencies use the term 'prevention of recruitment, and demobilization and reintegration' rather than DDR when referring to child-centred processes.
Prima facie	As appearing at first sight or on first impression; relating to refugees, if someone seems obviously to be a refugee.
Programme	A generic (general) term for a set of activities designed to achieve a specific objective. In order to ensure that a programme's results, outputs and overall outcome are reached, activities are often framed by a strategy, key principles and identified targets. Together, these indicate how the activities will be structured and implemented. Programmes also include a description of all aspects necessary to implement the planned activities, including inputs and resources (staff, equipment, funding, etc.), management arrangements, legal frameworks, partnerships and other risk analysis.
Project	Within each programme there may be several projects, each of which is a separately identified undertaking. A project is an intervention that consists of a set of planned, interrelated activities aimed at achieving defined objectives over a fixed time. A project's activities and objectives are normally given in a project document. This legal agreement binds the signatories to carry out the defined activities and to provide specific resources over a fixed period of time in order to reach agreed objectives.
Protection	All activities that are aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual, in accordance with the letter and spirit of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.
Public information	Information that is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support. The objective of public information within SALW control is to raise general awareness. It is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW problem. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and accurate data it is the most practical means of communicating safety information. In other situations, public information can support community liaison/ involvement.

TERM	DEFINITION
Quick-impact project (QIP)	<p>Quick-impact projects are small, rapidly implemented projects intended to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ help create conditions for durable solutions for refugees and returnees through rapid interventions;</li> <li>■ through community participation, provide for small-scale initial rehabilitation and enable communities to take advantage of development opportunities;</li> <li>■ help strengthen the absorptive capacity of target areas, while meeting urgent community needs (UNHCR, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): A Provisional Guide, Geneva, May 2004).</li> </ul>
Rapid assessment (RA)	<p>Assessment that uses a variety of survey techniques for quick and inexpensive assessment. Rapid assessments tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative, and they depend more on the ability and judgment of the person carrying out the survey than do other research methods that are more rigorous, but also slower and costlier.</p>
Receiving communities	<p>The communities where the ex-combatants will go, live and work. Within this concept, the social network of a small community is referred to, and also the bordering local economy.</p>
Reconstruction	<p>The process of rebuilding the institutions of State that have failed or are failing due to circumstances of war or to systematic destruction through poor governance.</p>
Recovery	<p>A restorative process in relation to the situation prior to the distress. It might entail 'healing', reparation, amelioration and even regeneration.</p>
Recruitment	<p>Includes compulsory, forced and voluntary recruitment into any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group.</p>
Refugee	<p>Defined in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as a person who:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ "Is outside the country of origin;</li> <li>■ Has a well founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and</li> <li>■ Is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution."</li> </ul> <p>In Africa and Latin America, this definition has been extended. The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa also includes as refugees persons fleeing civil disturbances, widespread violence and war. In Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, although not binding, recommends that the definition should also include persons who fled their country "because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order".</p>
Refugee status determination	<p>Legal and administrative procedures undertaken by UNHCR and/or States to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a refugee in accordance with national and international law.</p>

TERM	DEFINITION
Regular forces	Institutionalized armed cadre in organized, structured and trained professional armies, with a legal basis and supporting institutional infrastructure (salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.).
Reinsertion	<b>“Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).</b>
Reintegration	<b>“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).</b>
Reintegration of children	The provision of reintegration support is a right enshrined in article 39 of the CRC: “State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote . . . social reintegration of a child victim of . . . armed conflicts”. Child-centred reintegration is multi-layered and focuses on family reunification; mobilizing and enabling care systems in the community; medical screening and health care, including reproductive health services; schooling and/or vocational training; psychosocial support; and social, cultural and economic support. Socio-economic reintegration is often underestimated in DDR programmes, but should be included in all stages of programming and budgeting, and partner organizations should be involved at the start of the reintegration process to establish strong collaboration structures.
Render safe procedure (RSP)	The application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components to prevent an unacceptable detonation.
Repatriation	The return of an individual to his/her country of citizenship.
Resettlement	The relocation of a refugee to a third country, which is neither the country of citizenship nor the country into which the refugee has fled. Resettlement to a third country is granted by accord of the country of resettlement, and is based on a number of criteria, including legal and physical protection needs, lack of local integration opportunities, medical needs, family reunification needs, protecting survivors of violence and torture, etc.
Residual risk	In the context of disarmament, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove the risks inherent in all collection and destruction activities (adapted from ISO Guide 51:1999).

TERM	DEFINITION
Results-based budgeting (RBB)	A strategic planning framework that focuses on concrete objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement for the allocation of resources. As such, the RBB aims to shift focus from output accounting (i.e., activities) to results-based accountability (indicators of achievements).
Returnee	A refugee who has voluntarily repatriated from a country of asylum to his/her country of origin, after the country of origin has confirmed that its environment is stable and secure and not prone to persecution of any person. Also refers to a person (who could be an internally displaced person [IDP] or ex-combatant) returning to a community/town/village after conflict has ended.
Risk	Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk analysis	Systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the risk (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk assessment	Overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk evaluation (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk evaluation	Process based on risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable risk has been achieved (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
Risk reduction	Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences or both, associated with a particular event or series of events.
Routine opt-in testing	Approach to testing whereby the individual is offered an HIV test as a standard part of a treatment/health check that he/she is about to receive. The individual is informed that he/she has the right to decide whether or not to undergo the test.
Rule of law	A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.
'Safe to move'	A technical assessment, by an appropriately qualified technician or technical officer, of the physical condition and stability of ammunition and explosives prior to any proposed move. Should the ammunition and explosives fail a 'safe to move' inspection, then they must be destroyed on site (i.e., at the place where it is found), or as close as is practically possible, by a qualified EOD team acting under the advice and control of the qualified technician or technical officer who conducted the initial 'safe to move' inspection.
Safety	The degree of freedom from unacceptable risk (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).
SALW awareness programme	A programme of activities carried out with the overall goal of minimizing, and where possible eliminating, the negative consequences of inadequate SALW control by carrying out an appropriate combination of SALW advocacy,

TERM	DEFINITION
	SALW risk education and media operations/public information campaigns, which together work to change behaviours and introduce appropriate alternative ways attitudes over the long term. Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national SALW control initiative will dictate the appropriate type of SALW awareness activities. SALW awareness is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW threat. It may take the form of formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and available data, it is the most practical way of communicating safety information. In other situations it can support community liaison.
SALW advocacy	A programme of activities that aim to raise SALW problems and issues with the general public, the authorities, the media, governments and their institutions to achieve changes at both institutional and/or individual levels. These types of activities also include campaigns highlighting the SALW problems and issues with the aim of encouraging people to surrender weapons. This is generally carried out to support weapons collection programmes.
SALW control	Activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW spread and possession. These activities include cross-border control issues, legislative and regulatory measures, SALW awareness and communications strategies, SALW collection and destruction operations, SALW survey and the management of information and SALW stockpile management.
SALW risk education	<p>A process that encourages the adoption of safer behaviours by at-risk groups and by SALW holders, and which provides the links among affected communities, other SALW components and other sectors. SALW risk education can be implemented as a stand-alone activity, in contexts where no weapons collection is taking place. If an amnesty is to be set up at a later stage, risk education activities will permit an information campaign to take place efficiently, using the networks, systems and methods in place as part of the risk education programme and adapting the content accordingly.</p> <p>SALW risk education is an essential component of SALW control. There are two related and mutually reinforcing components: (1) community involvement; and (2) public education.</p> <p>Generally, SALW risk education programmes can use both approaches, as they reinforce each other. They are not, however, alternatives to each other, nor are they alternatives to eradicating the SALW threat by weapons collection and destruction. The use of those approaches will also depend on whether a weapons collection programme is taking place or not.</p>
SALW survey	A systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent of SALW spread and impact within a region, nation or community in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organisation. The following terms have been used in the past, though the preferred one is as indicated above: 'national assessment', 'base-line assessment' and 'mapping'.



TERM	DEFINITION
Security	An individual's or State's feeling of safety or well-being, protected from attack or violent conflict. OR The control of threat, integrated with an appropriate response capability.
Security sector reform (SSR)	A dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private–military companies (PMCs), correctional services and civil society 'watch-dogs'.
Sensitization	<p>Sensitization within the DDR context refers to creating awareness, positive understanding and behavioural change towards: (1) specific components that are important to DDR planning, implementation and follow-up; and (2) transitional changes for ex-combatants, their dependants and surrounding communities, both during and post-DDR processes. For those who are planning and implementing DDR, sensitization can entail making sure that specific needs of women and children are included within DDR programme planning. It can consist of taking cultural traditions and values into consideration, depending on where the DDR process is taking place.</p> <p>For ex-combatants, their dependants and surrounding communities who are being sensitized, it means being prepared for and made aware of what will happen to them and their communities after being disarmed and demobilized, e.g., taking on new livelihoods, which will change both their lifestyle and environment. Such sensitization processes can occur with a number of tools: training and issue-specific workshops; media tools such as television, radio, print and poster campaigns; peer counselling, etc.</p>
Sentinel surveillance	Surveillance based on selected population samples chosen to represent the relevant experience of particular groups.
Sero-conversion	The period when the blood starts producing detectable antibodies in response to HIV infection.
Sero-positive	Having HIV antibodies; being HIV-positive.
Sex	The biological differences between men and women, which are universal and determined at birth.
Sex-disaggregated data	Data that are collected and presented separately on men and women. The availability of sex-disaggregated data, which would describe the proportion of women, men, girls and boys associated with armed forces and groups, is an essential precondition for building gender-responsive policies and interventions.
Sexually transmitted infection (STI)	Disease that is commonly transmitted through vaginal, oral or anal sex. The presence of an STI is indicative of risk behaviour and also increases the actual risk of contracting HIV.
Small arms and light weapons (SALW)	All lethal conventional weapons and ammunition that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial

TERM	DEFINITION
	logistic and maintenance capability. There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a 'correct' definition has yet to be agreed. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW. For the purposes of the IDDRS series, the above definition will be used.
Small arms capacity assessment (SACA)	The component of SALW survey that collects data on the local resources available to respond to the SALW problem.
Small arms distribution assessment (SADA)	The component of SALW survey that collects data on the type, quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the country or region.
Small arms impact survey (SAIS)	The component of SALW survey that collects data on the impact of SALW on the community and social and economic development.
Small arms limitation	See 'community disarmament'.
Small arms perception survey (SAPS)	The component of SALW survey that collects qualitative and quantitative information, using focus groups, interviews and household surveys, on the attitudes of the local community to SALW and possible interventions.
Social capital	The existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them. The sharing of values and norms does not in itself produce social capital, because the values may be the wrong ones: the norms that produce social capital must substantively include virtues like truth-telling, the meeting of obligations and reciprocity. Note: There are multiple and nuanced definitions of social capital.
Stakeholders	A broad term used to denote all local, national and international actors who have an interest in the outcome of any particular DDR process. This includes participants and beneficiaries, parties to peace accords/political frameworks, national authorities, all UN and partner implementing agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, and regional actors and international political guarantors of the peace process.
Standard	A documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose. IDDRS aim to improve safety and efficiency in DDR operations by encouraging the use of the preferred procedures and practices at both Headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.
STI syndromic management	A cost-effective approach that allows health workers to diagnose sexually transmitted infections on the basis of a patient's history and symptoms, without the need for laboratory analysis. Treatment normally includes the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
Stockpile	In the context of DDR, the term refers to a large accumulated stock of weapons and explosive ordnance.
Stockpile destruction	The physical activities and destructive procedures towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile.

TERM	DEFINITION
Strategic gender needs	Long-term needs, usually not material, and often related to structural changes in society regarding women's status and equity. They include legislation for equal rights, reproductive choice and increased participation in decision-making. The notion of 'strategic gender needs', first coined in 1985 by Maxine Molyneux, helped develop gender planning and policy development tools, such as the Moser Framework, which are currently being used by development institutions around the world. Interventions dealing with strategic gender interests focus on fundamental issues related to women's (or, less often, men's) subordination and gender inequities.
Sustainable livelihoods approach	Approach that tries to ensure that households can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, and maintain and improve their capabilities and assets now and in the future.
Tolerable risk	Risk that is accepted in a given context on the basis of the current values of society (ISO Guide 51: 1999 [E]).
Transition	The period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile ceasefires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity. Thus, peace-building is the area where UN activities in a transition context intersect. Consolidating peace remains the overarching aim of transition.
Transitional justice	Transitional justice comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.
Transparency	Free and open access to information that enables civil society to perform its regulatory function. Transparency is sometimes used as a synonym for accountability in governance.
UN development assistance framework (UNDAF)	UNDAF is the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the UN system at the country level. It provides a collective, coherent and integrated UN system response to national priorities and needs, including PRSPs and equivalent national strategies, within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals and the commitments, goals and targets of the Millennium Declaration and international conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments of the UN system (UN, Common Country Assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework: Guidelines for UN Country Teams, 2004).
Unexploded ordnance (UXO)	Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been dropped, fired, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to be a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material, and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause.

TERM	DEFINITION
Universal precautions	<p>Simple infection control measures that reduce the risk of transmission of blood borne pathogens through exposure to blood or body fluids among patients and health care workers. Under the ‘universal precaution’ principle, blood and body fluids from all persons should be considered as infected with HIV, regardless of the known or supposed status of the person.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Use of new, single-use disposable injection equipment for all injections is highly recommended. Sterilising injection equipment should only be considered if single-use equipment is not available.</li> <li>■ Discard contaminated sharps immediately and without recapping in puncture- and liquid-proof containers that are closed, sealed and destroyed before completely full.</li> <li>■ Document the quality of the sterilization for all medical equipment used for percutaneous procedures.</li> <li>■ Wash hands with soap and water before and after procedures; use protective barriers such as gloves, gowns, aprons, masks and goggles for direct contact with blood and other body fluids.</li> <li>■ Disinfect instruments and other contaminated equipment.</li> <li>■ Handle properly soiled linen with care. Soiled linen should be handled as little as possible. Gloves and leak-proof bags should be used if necessary. Cleaning should occur outside patient areas, using detergent and hot water.</li> </ul>
Verification	Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled (ISO 9000:2000).
Violence	The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or a group or community that either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.
Violence against women/ Gender-based violence	<p>Defined as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private. Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:</p> <p>(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;</p> <p>(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;</p> <p>(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs” (UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 1993).</p>

TERM	DEFINITION
Voluntary contributions	Financial support that Member States pledge (often in a donors' conference) and commit on a case-by-case basis to support programme implementation. Contributions can be made to UN or non-UN trust funds. At times, donors implement their contributions through their own bilateral aid agency or directly through non-government organizations.
Voluntary HIV testing	A client-initiated HIV test whereby the individual chooses to go to a testing facility/provider to find out his/her HIV status.
Voluntary surrender	The physical return on their own accord by an individual(s) or community of SALW to the legal government or an international organization with no further penalty.
Vulnerability	The high probability of exposure to risks and reduced capacity to overcome their negative results. Vulnerability is a result of exposure to risk factors, and of underlying socio-economic processes, which reduce the capacity of populations to cope with risks.
Weapon	Anything used, designed or used or intended for use: (1) in causing death or injury to any person; or (2) for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.
Weapons collection point (WCP)	A temporary, or semi-permanent, location laid out in accordance with the principles of explosive and weapons safety, which is designed to act as a focal point for the surrender of SALW by the civil community.
Weapons in competition for development (WCD)	The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by competing communities in exchange for an agreed proportion of small-scale infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organization or NGO.
Weapons control	Regulation of the possession and use of firearms and other lethal weapons by citizens through legal issuances (e.g., laws, regulations, decrees, etc.).
Weapons in exchange for development (WED; WfD)	The indirect linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in exchange for the provision of sustainable infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organization or NGO.
Weapons in exchange for incentives (WEI)	The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by individuals in exchange for the provision of appropriate materials by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO.
Weapons linked to development (WLD)	The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in return for an increase in ongoing development assistance by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO.
Weapons management	Within the DDR context, weapons management refers to the handling, administration and oversight of surrendered weapons, ammunition and unexploded ordnance (UXO) whether received, disposed of, destroyed or kept in long-term storage. An integral part of managing weapons during the DDR process

TERM	DEFINITION
	<p>is their registration, which should preferably be managed by international and government agencies, and local police, and monitored by international forces. A good inventory list of weapons' serial numbers allows for the effective tracing and tracking of weapons' future usage. During voluntary weapons collections, food or money related incentives are given in order to encourage registration.</p> <p>Alternately, weapons management refers to a national government's administration of its own legal weapons stock. Such administration includes registration, according to national legislation, of the type, number, location and condition of weapons. In addition, a national government's implementation of its transfer controls of weapons, to decrease illicit weapons' flow, and regulations for weapons' export and import authorizations (within existing State responsibilities), also fall under this definition.</p>
Window period	The time period between initial infection with HIV and the body's production of antibodies, which can be up to three months. During this time, an HIV test for antibodies may be negative, even though the person has the virus and can infect others.
Working age	The Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) contains provisions aimed at protecting young persons against hazardous or exploitative activities or conditions of work. It requires the setting not only of a general minimum age for admission to work — which cannot be less than age 15 and, according to its accompanying Recommendation No. 146, should be progressively raised to age 16 — but also of a higher minimum age of 18 for admission to work likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons.
Worst forms of child labour	The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) aims at putting an end to the involvement of all persons under age 18 in the harmful activities it lists. Forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict is listed as one of the worst forms of child labour.
Youth	Within the UN system, young people are identified as those between 15 and 24 years of age. However, this can vary considerably between one context and another. Social, economic and cultural systems define the age limits for the specific roles and responsibilities of children, youth and adults. Conflicts and violence often force youth to assume adult roles such as being parents, breadwinners, caregivers or fighters. Cultural expectations of girls and boys also affect the perception of them as adults, such as the age of marriage, circumcision practices and motherhood. Such expectations can be disturbed by conflict.

# 2.10 The UN Approach to DDR

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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## 2.10 The UN Approach to DDR

### Summary

Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is part of the United Nations (UN) system's multidimensional approach to post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. It is based on a set of principles for planning and implementing integrated DDR processes and concrete mechanisms to guarantee coordination and synergy in these processes among all UN actors. The integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) contained in this document are a record of the UN's knowledge in this field. They show how DDR can contribute to building security, reconstructing the social fabric and developing human capacity, resulting in the establishment of a sustainable, long-term peace-building capacity that continues to function once a UN mission comes to an end.

In the UN, integrated DDR is delivered with the cooperation of agencies, programmes, funds and peacekeeping missions. In a country in which it is implemented, there is a focus on capacity-building at both government and local levels to encourage sustainable national ownership of DDR processes, among other peace-building measures.

Integrated DDR programme strategies are characterized by flexibility, including in funding structures, in order to be able to adapt quickly to the dynamic and often volatile post-conflict environment. The elements of DDR, in whatever combination they are used, are synchronized through integrated coordination mechanisms and carefully monitored and evaluated to improve programmes.

There are certain preconditions for DDR to take place, including: the signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR; trust in the peace process; willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR; and a minimum guarantee of security. To increase security, reducing the number of weapons in circulation remains a central goal of DDR. Disarmament and weapons control is, however, just one element in responding to and addressing the reasons for a conflict and the needs of those who participated in it. Integrated DDR places great emphasis on the long-term humanitarian and developmental impact of sustainable reintegration processes and the effects these have in consolidating long-lasting peace and security.

Reintegration is designed to respond to the different needs of five groups:

- male and female adult combatants;
- children associated with armed forces and groups;
- those working in non-combat roles (including women);
- ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses; and
- dependants.

This requires a thorough understanding of the causes of the conflict in order to design more responsive reintegration packages that deal with the needs of these groups. Attention should be given to both individual beneficiaries and their communities, both of which are recognized as stakeholders in reintegration and ongoing reconstruction efforts.

As far as its essential defining characteristics are concerned, UN-supported DDR aims to be people-centred; flexible, accountable and transparent; nationally owned; integrated; and well planned.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module defines the reasons behind and mandate for integrated DDR, establishes how the UN sees DDR, defines the elements that make up DDR as agreed by the UN General Assembly, explores some of the key strategies used in DDR programmes and defines the UN approach to DDR, which is:

- people-centred;
- flexible, accountable and transparent;
- nationally owned;
- integrated;
- well planned.

Annex B provides an overview of the UN's mandate and the international legal documents that define how DDR programmes normally operate. Individual DDR modules will explain this outline more fully.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in the standard laid down in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the IDDRS series is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and guidelines:

- “a) 'shall' is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

## 3. Introduction: The rationale and mandate for integrated DDR

The Brahimi Report (A/55/305; S/2000/809) of August 2000 stresses the importance of all UN agencies, funds and programmes working with or taking part in UN peace operations working towards the same goal. Because DDR is a multidimensional process that draws on the expertise of a number of actors to support field operations, an integrated approach is vital to ensure that these actors and processes are working in harmony and toward the same end. This in turn requires good, comprehensive and coordinated concepts, policies, structures and processes to guide and implement integrated operations.

This section explains the reasons behind integrated DDR. It draws on the recommendations from operational and post-operational reports from various missions and programmes

over the course of almost 15 years, as well as current learning from reviews of and research on recent and ongoing operations. The findings and conclusions presented here are intended to confirm — but also to challenge — existing conventions about DDR.

As a part of the formal peace-building process in countries emerging from armed conflict, the DDR of armed combatants from both State and non-State armed forces and groups can help establish a climate of confidence and security, which is necessary for recovery activities to begin. The establishment of a DDR process is usually agreed to and defined within a ceasefire, the ending of hostilities or a comprehensive peace agreement. This provides the legally binding political, policy, operational and legal framework for the process. Yet in many post-conflict situations, the parties who have agreed to a ceasefire or peace agreement neither trust each other nor have the capacity to design, plan and implement DDR. A third party such as the UN is therefore often called on to act as a broker to the peace agreement and to provide assistance for the planning and implementation of peace-building processes such as DDR.

Disarmament and demobilization, followed by the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, help to deal with the post-conflict security problems by providing ex-combatants with an alternative to the ways of making a living (livelihoods) and military support networks that they may have relied upon during the conflict, but which are no longer relevant in peacetime. Yet DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can, however, help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a peace-building strategy, including weapons management, security sector reform (SSR), elections and rule of law reform, can proceed.

The UN sees DDR as an early step in a series of peace-building processes. DDR focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and groups; lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens; and builds national capacity for long-term peace, security and development.

DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can, however, help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a peace-building strategy, including weapons management, security sector reform, elections and rule of law reform, can proceed.

## 4. DDR within multidimensional UN peacekeeping

As part of its peacekeeping work, the UN has been involved in DDR processes for over 15 years, amassing considerable experience and knowledge of the coordination, design, implementation, financing and monitoring of DDR programmes. Integrated DDR originates from various parts of the UN's core mandate, as set out in the Charter of the UN, particularly the areas of peace and security, economic and social development, human rights, and humanitarian support. UN departments, agencies, programmes and funds are uniquely able to support integrated DDR processes within multidimensional peacekeeping operations, providing such operations with breadth of scope, neutrality, impartiality and capacity-building through the sharing of technical DDR skills. Annex B provides an overview of the UN's mandate and the international legal documents that define how DDR programmes normally operate within a peacekeeping context.

DDR should also be linked to broader SSR, including judicial, police and military restructuring.

#### 4.1. The concept of DDR

The aim of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development. This view of DDR has several important policy and operational implications:

- DDR is only one of many post-conflict stabilization interventions. It shall therefore be planned and closely coordinated as part of the other broader political and reconstruction efforts that are taking place at the same time;
- DDR processes should deal very thoroughly with all aspects of disarmament and weapons control and management. While a DDR programme is focused on the immediate stabilization of the situation in a country through a disarmament process, longer-term stability can only be achieved through responsible and carefully thought out arms management programmes;
- DDR programmes should support the process of turning combatants into productive citizens. This process starts in the demobilization phase, during which the structures of armed forces and groups are broken down and combatants formally acquire civilian status;
- DDR programmes are designed to achieve sustainable reintegration. On their own, DDR programmes cannot do this. Therefore, DDR shall be linked with the broader processes of national reconstruction and development;
- The ultimate aim of DDR programmes is to prevent a return to violent conflict, i.e., to make peace irreversible. To achieve this, DDR programmes shall encourage trust and confidence and deal with the root causes of conflict;
- DDR is a flexible process that shall be adapted to the unique needs of a particular country (and region). Depending on circumstances, not all of its aspects may be employed in a particular situation, and they may not be carried out in the same order during each operation;
- Finally, the UN shall use the concept and abbreviation 'DDR' as a comprehensive term that includes related activities, such as repatriation, rehabilitation, reconciliation and so on, that aim to achieve reintegration. These activities should therefore be made a part of the overall concept and planning of reintegration processes, where necessary.

#### 4.2. Elements of DDR

The Secretary-General in his May 2005 note to the General Assembly (A/C.5/59/31) defines the elements of DDR as set out in the box below. These definitions are also used for drawing up budgets where UN Member States have agreed to fund the disarmament and demobilization (including reinsertion) phases of DDR from the peacekeeping assessed budget.

##### **DISARMAMENT**

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

### DEMOBILIZATION

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

### REINSERTION

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

### REINTEGRATION

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

## 4.3. DDR strategies

In order to achieve DDR, the UN may employ or support a variety of DDR strategies adapted to suit each context. These may include:

- *Short- and long-term disarmament strategies:* The removal of weapons from combatants is only one aspect of disarmament within DDR. A broad range of short- and long-term activities should accompany this process, including: community-based weapons collection and control programmes; weapons destruction; the (re-)establishment of domestic legal systems to control weapons possession, regulate local weapons production industries, and manage the supply and transportation of weapons; and securing State stockpiles to prevent leakage of arms into society. External measures such as international and regional small arms and light weapons conventions and arms embargoes must be used to devise cooperative regional strategies to control the flow of illicit weapons across borders;
- *Disarmament of ex-combatants:* This is central to creating a secure environment, but it is important not to place undue emphasis on short-term results, such as the quantity of weapons collected or numbers of ex-combatants demobilized. In the past, however, a gap in the operational, programmatic and funding activities divided these two processes from longer-term reintegration plans. The result was frustration and renewed violence among idle, unsupported ex-combatants waiting for the reintegration process to start. Rapid and large-scale disarmament may therefore have negative longer-term consequences for a peace process if reintegration activities do not start immediately;
- *Regulating supply:* While regulating the supply of weapons in circulation is the first step in establishing a comprehensive and effective weapons control programme, it is

also necessary to deal with the fact that people feel they need to own weapons and to reduce demand for such weapons. In order to reduce demand for weapons, DDR programmes should try to understand and deal with the underlying causes of a conflict;

- *Targeted military operations:* If mandated by the Security Council, UN peacekeeping forces can pressurize armed forces and groups into disarming voluntarily through military operations aimed at achieving specific results. Such operations aim to break the hold of armed forces and groups and weaken their structures. They may involve the establishment of UN-enforced weapons-free zones, or cordon-and-search operations to confiscate arms caches;
- *Comprehensive reintegration:* Sustainable reintegration has political, economic and social dimensions, all of which should be included in the overall DDR process. Politically, systems should be established that allow citizens and concerned parties to have their political grievances dealt with through legitimate channels rather than by taking up arms. Such systems should also encourage long-term reconciliation and reconstruction. Political renewal may include creating transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth commission, formal reconciliation measures, writing a new constitution, forming new political parties, holding elections, and building a new judiciary, military and police service:
  - So that they may support themselves and participate in rebuilding the economy, those who took part in the conflict need to be (re)trained and educated. They have to be integrated into an economy that is not based on war. A new social contract (agreement) must be reached among the different types of returnees (refugees, internally displaced persons, ex-combatants), other newcomers and those who stayed behind to collectively deal with crime carried out during the conflict and to rebuild communities. This social contract must be based on participatory democratic principles;
  - Planners must base DDR on an awareness of the root causes of violence and conflict, aim for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration components of the DDR process to work closely together at all times, and plan for the transition to long-term recovery and development. There are many conflict analysis methodologies available to go about this task, and the Joint UN Development Group–Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance Working Group on Transitions has provided guidance for developing an Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4.4. When is DDR appropriate?

Violent conflicts do not always completely stop when a political settlement is reached or a peace agreement is signed. There remains a real danger that violence will flare up again during the immediate post-conflict period, because putting right the political, security, social and economic problems and other root causes of war is a long-term project. This is why, before starting a UN-supported transitional process such as DDR, it must be decided whether demobilization, disarmament and reintegration — as a whole, or in part — is the most appropriate response to a particular situation. If it is decided that DDR *is* appropriate, any operations must be based on an analysis of the root causes and nature of the conflict and post-conflict environment.

The UN is most often involved in supporting the DDR of a combination of armed forces, armed groups and militias, and the mandate for this will form part of the provi-



sions of a ceasefire agreement or comprehensive peace accord. Responsibility for DDR will usually be shared among the UN and the signatories to the peace agreement, with international funding support. In general, there are usually three main situations in which DDR is called for:

- *The downsizing of State armies or armed forces:* Governments may ask for assistance to downsize or restructure their organized, structured and trained professional armies and supporting institutional infrastructure (salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.). In this case, the UN DDR team could provide technical advice and other forms of specialized assistance, e.g., the administration of disarmament and demobilization activities, and the coordination of reintegration. Although a government will usually take the lead in this, the UN may manage military camps or barracks. UN staff may also serve as observers (e.g., as in Cambodia, Rwanda and Kosovo);
- *The disbanding of armed groups and militias:* DDR may also be implemented when there are large numbers of armed groups or militia groups under poor command and control, with no formal organization or structure, that draw on unskilled people (often unemployed youth, and children and women associated with armed forces and groups) for whom little or no military training has been provided.

Administratively, there is little difference between the DDR of armed forces and armed groups. Both require full registration of weapons and personnel, followed by the collection of information, referral and counselling that are needed before effective reintegration programmes can be put in place. However, the risk of failure in situations where most of the combatants are members of irregular armed groups is usually higher, because communities may resist reintegration. Also, leaders may not trust the peace process, and may prevent some of their soldiers from taking part in the DDR process so as to keep a reserve that they can call upon if the peace agreement does not hold and fighting resumes (e.g., as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Sudan);

- *DDR in support of law enforcement:* Finally, DDR can be designed to support law enforcement and the (re-)establishment of legislation controlling arms in a situation of generalized social conflict (e.g., ethnic conflict) involving a large number of armed community-based groups with strong ties to local communities; where people are driven by motives that are not necessarily related to broader political causes; and there is a lack of organization, training or coordination among the groups involved.

This form of DDR is supported by programmes to encourage community disarmament, the establishment of weapons-free zones in exchange for development aid and/or the provision of public amnesty to owners of illegal weapons. Technical assistance may be provided in the form of information technology equipment, identity card production, engineering resources and weapons storage and/or destruction (e.g., as in Papua New Guinea).

#### 4.5. Who is DDR for?

There are five categories of people that should be taken into consideration in DDR programmes:

- 1) male and female adult combatants;
- 2) children associated with armed forces and groups;
- 3) those working in non-combat roles (including women);
- 4) ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses;
- 5) dependants.

While provisions should be made for the inclusion of the first four groups in DDR programmes, the fifth group may, depending on resources and local circumstances, be included in the reintegration phase of DDR. National institutions will generally determine policy on the direct benefits this group will receive during reintegration.

Civilians and civil society groups in communities to which members of the above-mentioned groups will return need to be consulted during the planning and design phase of DDR programmes, as well as informed and supported in order to assist them to receive ex-combatants and their dependants during the reintegration phase. These communities must be given the means to support the sustainable rehabilitation and reintegration of these groups.

While the establishment of security through the management of armed combatants is the primary goal of DDR, specific attention should be given to the needs of those abducted or otherwise involuntarily associated with fighting forces. This applies to women and children in particular.

## 5. What are the key characteristics of DDR?

The basic qualities that characterise UN DDR programmes and activities are discussed in this section. All UN DDR programmes shall be: people-centred; flexible, accountable and transparent; nationally owned; integrated; and well planned.

### 5.1. People-centred

#### 5.1.1. Criteria for participation/eligibility

Determining the criteria that define which people are eligible to participate in DDR, particularly in situations where mainly armed groups are involved, is vital if the aims of DDR are to be achieved. Eligibility criteria must be carefully designed and screening processes must be ready for use in the disarmament and demobilization stages of the DDR process.

DDR programmes are aimed at combatants and people associated with armed forces and groups. These groups may contain many different types of people who have participated in the conflict within a variety of structures — rebel groups, armed gangs, as mercenaries, as members of organized military forces, etc. In order to provide each group with the best assistance, different operational and implementation strategies that deal with their specific needs should be adopted (e.g., separate encampment and specialized reintegration assistance for children, the right kind of medical support for the chronically ill, etc.).

#### 5.1.2. Inclusivity

Non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment are core principles in both the design and implementation of integrated DDR. This means that individuals shall not be discriminated against on the basis of sex, age, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, or other personal characteristics or associations. The principle of non-discrimination is particularly important when establishing eligibility criteria for people to enter DDR programmes. Based on their particular needs, ex-combatants should have access to the same opportunities/benefits regardless of which armed force, armed group or political faction they fought with.

It is likely there will be a need to neutralize potential ‘spoilers’, e.g., by negotiating ‘special packages’ for commanders in order to secure their buy-in to the DDR process and



to ensure that they allow combatants to join the process. This political compromise must be carefully negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

### 5.1.3. Gender equality

While men and boys may have been involved mainly in combat, women and girls are likely to have played many different roles in armed forces and groups, as fighters, supporters, ‘wives’ or sex slaves, messengers, cooks, etc. The design and implementation of DDR programmes should aim to encourage gender equality based on gender-sensitive assessments that take into account these different experiences, roles and responsibilities during and after conflict.

Specific measures must be put in place to ensure the equal participation of women in all stages of DDR — from the negotiation of peace agreements and establishment of national institutions, to the design and implementation of specific programmes and projects (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

5.10 ◀▶

### 5.1.4. Unconditional release and protection of children

The unconditional and immediate release of children associated with armed forces and groups shall be a priority, regardless of the status of peace negotiations and/or the development of a national DDR programme. UN-supported DDR programmes must not be allowed to encourage the recruitment of children into fighting forces in any way, especially by commanders trying to increase the numbers of combatants entering DDR programmes in order to profit from assistance provided to combatants (also see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

5.30 ◀▶

### 5.1.5. Human rights and humanitarian law and principles

A primary objective of DDR is to increase human security. UN-supported DDR processes are therefore based on respect for the principles of international humanitarian law and promote the human rights of both programme participants and the communities into which they integrate. To ensure that the human rights of all persons are respected at all times, mechanisms must be established to minimize reprisal, stigmatization or discrimination. Human dignity is a fundamental principle. It implies that all actions will be taken with the utmost respect for the person, ensuring at all times his/her dignity; this applies equally to children and adults. The need to preserve the dignity and rights of all those in need of humanitarian assistance must guide activities at all times. The requirement to apply humanitarian principles implies an obligation to offer, and the right to receive, humanitarian assistance.

To ensure that the human rights of all persons are respected at all times, mechanisms must be established to minimize reprisal, stigmatization or discrimination.

The UN and its partners should be neutral, transparent and impartial, and should not take sides in any conflict or in political, racial, religious or ideological controversies, or give preferential treatment to different parties taking part in DDR. Neutrality within a rights-based approach should not, however, prevent UN personnel from protesting against or documenting human rights violations or taking some other action (e.g., advocacy, simple presence, political steps, local negotiations, etc.) to prevent them. Where one or more parties or individuals violate agreements and undertakings, the UN can take appropriate remedial action and/or exclude individuals from DDR processes.

Humanitarian aid must be delivered to all those who are suffering, according to their need, and human rights provide the framework on which an assessment of needs is based. Need is decided according to the principle of proportionality (i.e., where resources are not sufficient, priority is always given to those most affected) and the principle of non-discrimination (i.e., no one should be discriminated against on the basis of their sex, age, ethnicity, identity, etc).

‘Do no harm’ is a standard principle against which all DDR interventions shall be evaluated at all times. No false promises should be made; and, ultimately, no individual or community should be made less secure by the return of ex-combatants, or the presence of UN peacekeeping, police or civilian personnel. The establishment of UN-supported prevention, protection and monitoring mechanisms (including systems for ensuring access to justice and police protection, etc.) is essential to prevent and put right sexual and gender-based violence, harassment and intimidation, or any other violation of human rights.

Humanitarian organizations are accountable both to beneficiary communities (for ensuring that needs for assistance and protection are met with dignity) and to donors (for ensuring that assistance is provided for the purpose that they agreed to support). Coordination among organizations is vital. National and local authorities, for their part, are accountable for the protection, safety and care of populations living in areas over which they claim control.

Understanding local customs and traditions is important not only in carrying out humanitarian work, but also in understanding local values and how they connect with internationally recognized human rights. Although local culture and customs vary, human rights are universal no matter the cultural setting, and must be the most important factor. Some interventions require particular sensitivity to local customs. For example, in dealing with survivors of rape, it is important to be aware of how rape and survivors of rape are perceived in the local community in order to best respond to their needs.

Finally, mechanisms must be designed to prevent those who have committed violations of human rights from going unpunished and to ensure that DDR programmes do not operate as a reward system for the worst violators. In many post-conflict situations, there is often a conflict between reconciliation and justice, but efforts must be made to ensure that serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law by ex-combatants and their supporters are dealt with through appropriate national and international legal mechanisms. UN-supported DDR programmes should be clearly linked to local and international mechanisms for achieving justice and the rule of law, including any special tribunals and reconciliation mechanisms that may be established.

## **5.2. Flexible, accountable and transparent**

### **5.2.1. Flexible and context-specific approach**

Each UN or UN-supported DDR programme shall be flexible and designed to take local conditions and needs into account. The series of IDDRS provide DDR practitioners with comprehensive analytical tools and guidelines that will allow them to develop the most appropriate DDR approach possible, but do not provide a simple formula that will apply to every situation.

### **5.2.2. Accountability and transparency**

From the start, in order to build confidence and ensure legitimacy, and to justify financial and technical support by international actors, DDR processes are based on the principles of

accountability and transparency. Post-conflict stabilization and the establishment of immediate security are the overall goals of DDR, but it also takes place in a wider recovery and reconstruction framework. While both short-term and long-term strategies should be developed in the planning phase, due to the dynamic and volatile post-conflict context in which they are designed and implemented, programmes must be flexible and adaptable. Consequently, it will sometimes be necessary to negotiate compromises in order to keep the environment in which the DDR programme operates as stable as possible.

The UN aims to establish transparent mechanisms for the independent monitoring, oversight and evaluation of all DDR operations and financing mechanisms. It also attempts to create an environment in which all stakeholders understand and are accountable for achieving broad programme objectives and implementing the details of the operation, even if circumstances change. Many types of accountability are needed to ensure transparency, including:

- the commitment of the national authorities and the parties to a peace agreement or political framework to honour the agreements they have signed and implement DDR in good faith;
- the accountability of national and international implementing agencies to the four (or five; see section 4.5, above) groups of participants in DDR processes for the professional and timely carrying out of programmes and delivery of services;
- the adherence of all parts of the UN system (missions, departments, agencies, programmes and funds) to IDDRS principles and standards for designing and implementing DDR programmes;
- the commitment of Member States and bilateral partners to provide timely political and financial support to the process.

Although the goal should always be to meet the core programme commitments, setbacks and unforeseen events should be expected. Therefore there is the need for flexibility and contingency planning. It is essential to establish realistic goals and make reasonable promises to those involved, and to explain setbacks to stakeholders and programme participants in order to maintain their confidence and cooperation. Although the UN is not responsible for providing legal guarantees to participants in DDR programmes, it should provide information on all amnesties, protection options and legal guarantees that do exist.

### 5.2.3. Flexible, sustainable and transparent funding arrangements

Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of DDR programmes, flexible funding arrangements are essential. The integrated and multidimensional nature of DDR requires a large initial investment of staff and funds in the start-up phase and sustainable sources of funding throughout the different phases of the programme. Funding mechanisms, including trust funds, pooled funding, etc., and the criteria established for the use of funds must be flexible. Past experience has shown that assigning funds exclusively for specific DDR components (e.g., disarmament and demobilization) or expenditures (e.g., logistics and equipment) sets up an artificial distinction between the different parts of DDR and makes it difficult to implement programmes in an integrated, flexible and dynamic way. The importance of planning and initiating reinsertion and reintegration activities at the start of the DDR process has become increasingly evident, so adequate financing for reintegration needs to be secured in advance. This should help prevent delays or gaps in the programme that could threaten or undermine its credibility and viability (also see IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting).

3.41 ◀▶

### 5.3. Nationally owned

The primary responsibility for the successful outcome of DDR programmes rests with national and local actors, and national stakeholders are responsible for planning, coordinating and running institutions set up to manage different aspects of the peace agreement. However, because national capacity is usually weak in post-conflict settings, it must be systematically developed, as follows:

- *Creating national institutional capacity:* A primary role of the UN is to supply technical assistance, training and financial support to national authorities to establish credible, capable, representative and sustainable national institutions and programmes. Such assistance should be based on an assessment and understanding of the particular contextual realities of transformation and peace-building in which the programme is to be implemented;
- *Finding implementing partners:* Besides national institutions, civil society is a key partner in DDR programmes. The technical capacity and expertise of civil society groups will often need to be rebuilt, particularly when human and financial resources have been reduced by conflict. Doing so will help create a sustaining environment for DDR and ensure the long-term success of the programme;
- *Employing local communities and authorities:* As these play an important role in ensuring the sustainability of DDR programmes, particularly reintegration, their capacities for strategic planning, and programme and/or financial management must be rebuilt. Local authorities and populations, ex-combatants and their dependants must all be involved in the planning, implementation and monitoring of DDR activities so that these activities address the needs of both individuals and the community. Increased local ownership builds support for reintegration and reconciliation efforts and supports other local peace-building and recovery processes.

As this list shows, national ownership involves more than just central government leadership: it includes the participation of a broad range of State and non-State actors at national, provincial and local levels. Within the IDDRS framework, the UN supports the development of a national DDR strategy, not only by representatives of the various parties to the conflict, but also by civil society; and it encourages the active participation of affected communities and groups, particularly those formerly marginalized in DDR and post-conflict reconstruction processes, such as representatives of women's groups, children's advocates, people from minority communities, and people living with disabilities and chronic illness.

In supporting national institutions, the UN, along with key international and regional actors, can help ensure broad national ownership, adherence to international principles, credibility, transparency and accountability (also see IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR).

◀▶ 3.30

### 5.4. Integrated

From the earliest, pre-mission assessment phase and throughout all stages of strategy development, programme planning and implementation, it is essential to encourage integration and unity of effort within the UN system and with national players, and to coordinate the participation of international partners so as to achieve a common objective.

#### 5.4.1. Institutional integration

At present, the planning for the DDR aspects of a peacekeeping mission takes place within the framework of the Inter-Department Mission Task Force (IMTF). Apart from weekly IMTF

meetings, close coordination and joint planning involving desk officers from different departments, agencies, funds and programmes are needed to design and monitor DDR programmes that are being implemented in the field.

The UN is reviewing the need to establish a DDR Headquarters group to provide strategic policy guidance, planning support, training and resource mobilization for DDR staff in the field. While senior managers are responsible for establishing direct links between the IMTF and field personnel to ensure that the joint analysis provides a sound basis for the way in which operations are designed and planned, joint staffing between Headquarters and DDR units in the field facilitates the sharing of specialized expertise and specific delivery capacity, the centralized planning and financing of DDR operations, and the decentralized implementation of different parts of the programme.

The UN should, wherever possible and when in keeping with the mandate of the peacekeeping mission, establish an integrated DDR unit in the mission, which combines the unique skills and specializations of participating agencies, funds and programmes, according to an agreed memorandum of understanding (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures).

Coordination mechanisms shall be established among the UN peacekeeping mission, the UN country team, national counterparts, implementing partners and donors. In-country, an inter-agency coordination mechanism should be put in place and meet regularly to establish DDR strategies, goals and outputs, and to manage operations.

Close coordination should ensure that experiences gained during field operations — monitoring and evaluation results; best practices; lessons learned; and the development of systems, mechanisms and procedures — are returned to Headquarters to be used in decision-making and policy development activities (also see IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks, IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures and IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design).

3.10 ◀▶

2.20 ◀▶

3.10 ◀▶

3.20 ◀▶

#### 5.4.2. Sectoral integration

DDR processes both influence, and are affected by: the military and police in the peacekeeping mission who are responsible for the re-establishment of security, disarmament, cordons and weapons searches; political processes such as national dialogues, elections and constitutional reform; the restructuring and reform of the military and the police; transitional justice mechanisms to deal with war crimes; reform of the judiciary and correctional system; economic recovery and reconstruction, including control over natural resources; national poverty reduction strategies and development plans; and national capacity-building. It is essential that DDR processes work together with these other components of the larger peace-building and recovery process.

#### 5.4.3. Chronological integration

Timing is important in DDR, and the different components of DDR programmes should be properly sequenced in order to be as effective as possible. The timely release of funds must receive careful attention.

#### 5.4.4. National and local integration

Given the limited duration of a peacekeeping mission and the fact that DDR takes place in a limited period of time, transitions must be planned for by building national capacity and



maintaining close contact with the UN country team to ensure the smooth takeover and management of long-term projects when DDR comes to an end.

#### 5.4.5. Regional or geographical integration

The regional causes of the conflict and the political, social and economic interrelationships among neighbouring States sharing insecure borders will present challenges in the implementation of DDR. Managing repatriation, the flow of weapons and the cross-border movement of armed groups require careful coordination among UN agencies, international agencies working in neighbouring countries and the DDR programme team. The return of foreign former combatants and mercenaries may be a particular problem and will require a separate strategy (also see IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

◀▶ 5.40

### 5.5. Well planned

#### 5.5.1. Safety and security

Given that DDR is aimed at groups who are a security risk and is implemented in fragile security environments, both risks and operational security and safety protocols should be decided on before the planning and implementation of activities. These should include the security and safety needs of UN and partner agency personnel involved in DDR operations, DDR participants (who will have many different needs) and members of local communities. Security and other services must be provided either by UN military and/or a UN Police component or national police and security forces. Security concerns should be included in operational plans, and clear criteria established for starting, delaying, suspending or cancelling activities and/or operations should security risks be too high.

#### 5.5.2. Assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation

DDR programmes are designed on the basis of detailed and comprehensive quantitative and qualitative data supported by information management systems to ensure that the data remain up to date, accurate and accessible. In the planning stages, information is gathered on the location of armed forces and groups, the demographics of their members (grouped according to sex and age), their weapons stocks, and the political and conflict dynamics at national and local levels. Surveys of national and local labour market conditions and reintegration opportunities are begun. Regular updating of this information allows for programmes to adapt to changing circumstances (also see IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design and IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR).

◀▶ 3.20

◀▶ 3.30

Internal and external monitoring and evaluation mechanisms must be established from the start to strengthen accountability within DDR programmes, ensure quality in the implementation and delivery of DDR activities and services, and allow for flexibility and adaptation of programmes when required. Monitoring and evaluation also produce lessons learned and best practices that will influence the further development of IDDRS policy and practice (also see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes).

◀▶ 3.50

#### 5.5.3. Public information and community sensitization

Public information, awareness-raising and community sensitization ensure that affected communities and participant groups receive accurate information on DDR programme procedures and benefits. This helps generate broad public support and national ownership,

at the same time as managing expectations and encouraging behavioural change, the demilitarization of hearts and minds, and reconciliation between ex-combatants and war-affected communities. Public information strategies should be drawn up and implemented as early as possible. Messages should be appropriately designed for different audiences and should employ many different and locally appropriate means of communication (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR).

4.60 ◀▶

#### 5.5.4. Transition and exit strategy

DDR processes last for a specific period of time that includes the immediate post-conflict situation, and the transition and early recovery periods. There are, however, many aspects of DDR that need to be continued, although in a different form, after an operation comes to an end: reintegration becomes development, weapons collection becomes weapons control and management, and so on. To ensure a smooth transition from one stage to another, an exit strategy should be defined as soon as possible, and should focus on how DDR processes will seamlessly transform into broader and/or longer-term development strategies such as security sector reform, violence prevention, recovery, peace-building and poverty reduction.

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>IMTF</b>	Inter-Department Mission Task Force
<b>SSR</b>	security sector reform
<b>UN</b>	United Nations



## Annex B: UN documents and legal instruments guiding DDR

### 1. UN documents

Each mission-specific mandate for DDR is established through a unique Security Council resolution, but direction can also be drawn from the following:

- Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2000/10, of 23 March 2000, in which “the Council notes that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be addressed comprehensively so as to facilitate a smooth transition from peace-keeping to peace-building”;
- Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on *Women, Peace and Security*, in which the Council “[e]ncourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants” (para. 13);
- Resolutions 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003) and 1539 (2004) on *Children in Armed Conflict*, in the last of which the Security Council “[r]eiterates its requests to all parties concerned, including UN agencies, funds and programmes as well as financial institutions, to continue to ensure that all children associated with armed forces and groups, as well as issues related to children are systematically include in every disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, taking into account the specific needs and capacities of girls, with a particular emphasis on education, including the monitoring, through, inter alia, schools, of children demobilized in order to prevent re-recruitment” (art. 8);
- A series of statements and resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the *Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* that are relevant to the planning and implementation of DDR programmes.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary-General and other UN bodies provide policy guidance on DDR in a number of reports adopted by the Security Council and General Assembly, including:

- The Secretary-General’s report on *The Role of UN Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, S/2000/101, of 11 February 2000, paras. 2 and 8, in which the Secretary-General lays out the UN’s basic approach to DDR as a key element of stabilization in post-conflict situations to facilitate a society’s transition from conflict to development. He establishes that DDR cannot be viewed as a simple sequence of events, but rather, that each activity forms a continuum whose elements overlap and mutually reinforce each other;
- The *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, A/55/305; S/2000/809, of 21 August 2000, which reaffirms the importance of DDR to the achievement of the UN’s peace-building objectives, the indivisibility of its component parts and the importance of linking DDR programmes to other elements of the peace-building framework, such as the rule of law and democratic governance. In addition, the *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, A/55/502/2000, calls for an integrated or team approach to be taken by the different departments, agencies and programmes of the UN system to achieve peace-building objectives;
- The Secretary-General’s *Study on Women, Peace and Security* (2002), which recommends that the UN system should incorporate the needs and priorities of women and girls as ex-combatants, ‘camp followers’ and families of ex-combatants in the design and implementation of DDR programmes, in order: to ensure the success of such programmes, the participation of women and girls and their full access to benefits; to pay attention to

the specific needs of girl soldiers; to develop programmes on the prevention of domestic violence in the families and communities of ex-combatants; and to recognize the contributions of women and girls in encouraging ex-combatants to lay down their arms;<sup>3</sup>

- The Secretary-General's bulletin on *Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*, ST/SGB/2003/13, of 9 October 2003, which applies to the staff of all UN departments, programmes, funds and agencies, as well as to forces conducting operations under UN command and control, who are prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and who have a particular duty of care towards women and children. The bulletin also establishes standards of conduct and the responsibility of heads of office, mission or department in this regard;
- The *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, of 2 December 2004, which concludes that "[d]emobilization of combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations" (paras. 227, 228), but notes that it is difficult to secure timely funding for DDR operations. The Panel calls for the creation of a standing fund for peace-building to be used to finance the recurrent expenditure of a newly formed government and key agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration;
- The report of the Secretary-General on *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, A/60/705, of 2 March 2006, which discusses the UN's increased engagement in DDR processes as part of complex peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping operations over the last five years, including lessons learned from these operations. The report further discusses the development of the Organisation's new approach to DDR within the United Nations system, based on these lessons learned, which is articulated in the IDDRS.

## 2. International legal framework

The standards and provisions of international law operate both during and after conflict and establish the broad normative framework for peace-building and recovery programmes, including DDR.

Legal regimes with particular relevance to DDR operations include the following:

### International humanitarian law

- The *Geneva Conventions* (1949) and *Additional Protocols* (1977) provide legal definitions of combatants and armed groups, standards for the protection of civilians, and rights to relief for the wounded, sick and children;
- The *International Criminal Court Statute* (1998) establishes individual and command responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

### International human rights law

- The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1978) recognizes the right of all people to self-determination and establishes a range of civil and political rights to be respected without discrimination, including rights of due process and equality before the law, freedom of movement and association, freedom of religion and political opinion, and the right to liberty and security of person;
- The *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1978) establishes rights of individuals and duties of States to provide for the basic needs of all persons without discrimination, including access to employment, education and health care;
- The *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (1984) establishes that torture is prohibited under all circumstances, including a

state of war, internal political instability or other public emergency, regardless of the orders of superiors or public authorities;

- The *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (1979) prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and promotes equal access for men and women to employment, education, and legal, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
- The *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (1989) recognizes the special status of children and establishes their economic, social and cultural rights, as well as States' duty to protect children in a number of settings, including during armed conflict.

#### International refugee law

- The *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (1951) establishes the rights of refugees and duties of States in this regard, including the prohibition of forced repatriation.

#### Statements of international principles and standards

- The *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices* (1997) establishes 8 as the minimum age for recruitment in any form into any armed force or armed group and encourages governments to ratify the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child*, which raises the minimum age for recruitment from 15 to 18 years. Children associated with armed groups and forces are defined as "any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or who has carried arms."

## Endnotes

- 1 <http://www.undg.org>.
- 2 S/1999/957,S/1999/1265,S/2000/1296,S2001/331,S/PRST/2002/6,S/2002/1300,S/PRST/2002/41,  
S/PRST/2003/27.
- 3 <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf>.

# 2.20 Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 2.20 Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks

## Summary

The post-conflict environment in which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) usually take place is often characterized by insecurity and lawlessness, poor or badly functioning economies, and a lack of social services and social cohesion. Integrated DDR programmes shall be designed to deal with the particular characteristics and contexts of the country or region in which they are to be implemented. However, DDR is just one of several post-conflict recovery strategies. As a process that helps to promote both security and development, a DDR programme shall work together with other comprehensive peace-building strategies, including socio-economic recovery programmes, security sector reform (SSR), and programmes to re-establish and strengthen the rule of law. DDR contributes to political stability by building confidence so that parties to a conflict can reject violence and transform their political and organizational structures to meet development objectives. The introduction of equitable and sustainable reintegration opportunities for former combatants can allow individuals and communities to rebuild their livelihoods and assist in restoring the rule of law, improving human security and achieving reconciliation.

As building blocks in the transition from conflict to peace, DDR programmes often occur in phases, throughout the continuum from conflict to ceasefire and the signing of a peace accord, to post-conflict stabilization, transition and recovery, and ultimately, to peace and development. Therefore, achievable DDR goals shall be set by advisers during peace negotiations, DDR staff should be deployed at an early stage, and links established between the DDR programme and SSR and justice and reconciliation efforts. DDR goals must be synchronized from the start with the United Nations (UN) development assistance frameworks (UNDAFs) of partner UN agencies, and should be coordinated with wider recovery and development programmes, such as poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module describes the context in which flexible and responsive DDR programmes are designed and implemented as part of a larger strategy to build sustainable recovery and peace. It discusses the political, social, economic and security dimensions of a post-conflict context in which there are many stakeholders with differing needs, capacities and objectives. It then describes how conflict analysis tools can be used to develop a context-specific integrated DDR strategy. Finally, it provides a general overview of where DDR is situated within a continuum that includes post-conflict stabilization, peace-building and recovery processes initiated by both the UN and other partner organizations.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

### 3. DDR in context

Before a decision can be made to carryout a DDR process, a general analysis of the political dynamics of the conflict, the challenges of post-conflict stabilization and the potential for sustainable peace-building shall be carried out. While the major focus of this module is how to assess the situation in-country, three other analyses must also be made:

- to understand the politics of the region and how they affect broader conflict and stability;
- to measure the level of commitment of international donors to long-term support of DDR;
- to understand the extent to which the UN can exert pressure on and control the damage inflicted on the DDR process by potential ‘spoilers’ within a country and a region, and internationally.

#### 3.1. The political environment

DDR programmes are unlikely to succeed without the firm commitment of the political elites within and outside State structures, commanders of all the armed elements involved,

middle-level commanders, veterans, host communities and civil society organizations in the country in question. At the highest level, this commitment is often demonstrated by the signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement in which the parties undertake to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate their forces.

Within a country, there are two main ways of measuring whether the country is ready for DDR:

- *Do the parties reject violence as a means to achieve political objectives?* To build trust between warring parties so that a negotiated peace settlement can be agreed to and implemented, there must be adequate evidence that violence is no longer an acceptable political tool. This commitment is most often demonstrated by the parties’ willingness to formally disarm and demobilize their forces and control weapons in civilian possession;
- *Do the parties agree to redirect their political and organizational structures to pursue peaceful, development-related aims?* After both internal and inter-State armed conflicts, a broad and long-term change in policy must be made to redirect resources previously used for military purposes towards peaceful construction. A vital first step in this direction

DDR programmes are unlikely to succeed without the firm commitment of the political elites within and outside State structures, commanders of all the armed elements involved, middle-level commanders, veterans, host communities and civil society organizations in the country in question.



is the successful disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants and their reintegration into normal civilian life, where their socio-economic activity can contribute to economic recovery, social reconciliation and the strengthening of the rule of law.

### 3.2. The social environment

Armed conflict destroys the social fabric of a country. It disrupts community networks and traditions, creates and reinforces inequalities, destroys human capacities and social capital, damages infrastructure, increases the transmission of disease (especially HIV/AIDS), and kills and displaces large numbers of people. In the aftermath of conflict, communities remain extremely vulnerable, especially when they have few resources to use for reconstruction.

War and its aftermath affect different members of the population in different ways. Large numbers of young men and boys, and some women and girls, join armed forces, armed groups and militias, where they learn to value violence as an effective way of resolving interpersonal conflict and making a living. Some women and girls develop alternative coping strategies and take on new decision-making responsibilities in the absence of male workers and heads of households. They also become more vulnerable to sexual or gender-based violence, poverty and the ill effects of losing essential social services. The elderly lose the protection and support they expected in their old age and find their authority eroded, especially when their knowledge of traditional means to resolve conflict is replaced by violence and the gun.

While the loss of individuals to war has an extremely negative effect on communities, the return of former combatants after demobilization can do further damage. Ex-combatants, especially when they are young, may have become a 'lost generation', having been deprived of education, employment and training during the conflict period, suffering war trauma, becoming addicted to alcohol and drugs, and dependent on weapons and violence as the only means to make their way in the world. When they lose their military livelihood, they are likely to experience difficulties in adapting to civilian life. Male ex-combatants may engage in anti-social behaviour within their families and communities, contributing to an increase in economic and social — especially sexual — violence. Female ex-combatants and women who were associated with fighting forces, whether voluntarily or by force, may find reintegration difficult due to their being stigmatized for what they have done during the conflict, their inability to readapt to 'traditional' roles in society and their own changed expectations. Children, some of whom may have become parents in the chaos of wartime, may find themselves abandoned, rejected, incapable of making a living and caring for themselves, and ignorant of the community's cultural practices. They, and those in their care, may be easily re-recruited into a next phase of armed conflict, a conflict in a neighbouring country or criminal gangs.

Successful reintegration is essential to minimize the wide-ranging difficulties faced by individuals in the post-conflict period. It can restore social cohesion, strengthen community capacities, and establish the basis for local reconciliation and peace-building so that people can look forward rather than becoming mired in the pain of the past. While national and international support are essential to create the basis for reintegration, it ultimately comes about as a result of sustainable, community-driven efforts. From within

While national and international support are essential to create the basis for reintegration, it ultimately comes about as a result of sustainable, community-driven efforts.

the integrated DDR framework, communities can work out the best solutions to their social problems: a strong relationship and the good will of the community is a vital 'entry point' for any post-conflict reintegration activity, whichever group it is aimed primarily to assist.

Local knowledge is extremely important when planning a DDR programme, especially its reintegration phase. This knowledge may come from the local communities, civil society, the private sector, and government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and may range from knowledge of the groups and factions involved in fighting and their motivations for doing so to knowledge of local reintegration opportunities. Moreover, local leaders and community groups such as women's groups or religious societies can be important allies in the information-sharing and sensitization processes needed to support and encourage DDR, and in helping to persuade people in armed groups and forces to join the DDR process and local communities to accept the return of former combatants into a community.

### **3.3. The economic environment**

The sustainability of social improvements is, however, undermined by poverty. If ex-combatants are to become productive members of their communities, it is important to understand the macro- and microeconomic forces that affect the post-conflict communities into which they hope to reintegrate.

Armed conflict destroys national and local economies, because it reduces productive capacities and livelihoods, while encouraging corruption and the diversion of resources into war. The destruction of infrastructure and the services necessary for economic activity (e.g., transportation and communication networks, electricity supplies and banks) and production (e.g., factories and agricultural systems) leads to a scarcity of goods, loss of livelihoods and widespread unemployment, the collapse of markets, and rampant inflation. Investor confidence also declines. As the ability of the government to run the country deteriorates, its capacity to regulate economic activity is reduced and lucrative black markets emerge, built around illegal economic activities such as smuggling, extortion, price-fixing and racketeering, all of which are usually accompanied by the threat or use of violence.

Unsurprisingly, then, ending hostilities alone may not be enough to improve economic conditions. This is the environment into which, when hostilities end, ex-combatants will be released. From making a living by the gun, they will have to enter the labour market and compete with ordinary civilians for extremely scarce jobs or other ways of making a living. The poor economic situation that exists in most post-conflict situations therefore makes the economic reintegration of ex-combatants an even harder task.

Economic reintegration will therefore only succeed if it is based on an assessment of local conditions and economic opportunities. The integrated DDR approach works on the principle that community-based organizations, training centres, microcredit cooperatives and local NGOs must be supported where they already exist, and established where they do not, to offer training, create employment opportunities and sustain a secure environment in which entrepreneurship can flourish.

### **3.4. The security environment**

Even when there is a formal end to hostilities, the breakdown of law and order and the presence of large numbers of small arms in the country can result in high levels of armed violence that make it extremely difficult for the often limited capacity of the State to restore or maintain law and order. Civilians are the main victims of armed violence in post-conflict


contexts, and high levels of violence can hinder or prevent the delivery of humanitarian and recovery development assistance, thus hampering the establishment or resumption of normal social and economic activities.

A culture of violence among former combatants, police failing to do their job properly or breaking the law themselves in the absence of a properly working judiciary, the lack of other sustainable ways of making a living and the availability of weapons are all factors that can allow violence to dominate the post-conflict setting. Integrated DDR is designed, therefore, to reduce armed violence, in collaboration with other peace-building efforts, including justice and security sector reform.

## 4. DDR in a post-conflict stabilization, transition and recovery continuum

DDR is planned and implemented within a continuum of events that move from active conflict to peace. Different assistance strategies are needed to support the peace-building and recovery process through several main stages, from supporting peace negotiations to conflict resolution, to short-term stabilization and humanitarian relief, after which longer-term recovery, peace-building and development take place.

For clarity, the following diagram shows this sequence of events as if it took place in separate stages: in reality, the phases of the continuum will overlap or run parallel, and there are likely to be reversals and opportunities that will affect DDR and other transitional processes and will therefore have to be responded to. It is therefore necessary to develop contingency plans, especially so that a return to conflict can be prevented or limited, and the security of civilians and DDR staff safeguarded.



Adapted from: *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: a Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, Colin Gleichman, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, 2004, GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC

### 4.1. Conflict and humanitarian relief

During the conflict period, UN efforts will mainly be directed towards humanitarian relief operations and diplomatic efforts to broker a peace agreement. As part of the diplomatic efforts during this period, the UN may support a number of international strategies that will have an impact on DDR. These can include sanctions, arms embargoes, the tracking of weapons and natural resources flowing to and from conflict areas, and so on.

There are a number of activities that can be carried out during this stage to prepare for DDR, even before the post-conflict stabilization period and the establishment of an integrated mission. These include early assessments, discussing different possible ways of dealing with the situation with parties to the conflict, and the development of preliminary DDR planning and resource mobilization strategies.

## 4.2. Ceasefire and peace negotiations

During this phase, the international community usually provides support to the negotiation of peace accords, working with the parties to identify acceptable options, measures and objectives. It is at this stage that a comprehensive vision of transition and peace-building processes can be drawn up. During the negotiations, different political, security, justice and reconciliation objectives and socio-economic processes will be discussed and agreed upon.

The need for, and mandate and goals of DDR will also be defined at this stage. In addition, DDR's relation to the broader peace process, as well as to other key parts of the peace-building and recovery framework, will be decided, e.g., discussions could take place on how disarmament and demobilization will relate to other parts of the security sector such as military restructuring or police reform, and how reintegration is linked to a broader recovery strategy.

During this period, the involvement of DDR technical advisers will support negotiations on the following issues:

- *Policy orientation:* DDR should be discussed in peace negotiations and mandated in the peace agreement, because it can play a central role in establishing trust and confidence in the peace process, demilitarize politics, and provide a means to consolidate the shift to peace and development;
- *Representation in peace negotiations:* In addition to the various parties to the conflict, the UN should support the participation of civil society in peace negotiations, in particular women and others traditionally excluded from peace talks. All aspects of peace negotiations benefit from the broadest representation possible of all those involved, but it is especially important for the success of DDR, since civil society, and women's groups in particular, provide key support and are essential if DDR is to be successful and sustainable;
- *DDR policy and strategy:* When all the parties involved agree that DDR is necessary, the DDR technical adviser should help insert in the language of the peace accord a description of the political and legal frameworks that will allow DDR to function. When possible, specific principles should be agreed upon, such as the verification of numbers of combatants by an independent body; the time-frame for cantonment, if this is relevant; and combatants' eligibility for entry into the DDR process (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament);
- *Implementation schedules and methods:* The specific details of policy and strategy and a realistic implementation schedule should be developed, and the overall methods of approach for DDR should be defined within the framework of the peace accord. Positive but realistic expectations about DDR should be discussed.

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## 4.3. Post-conflict stabilization

In the period immediately following the signing of a peace accord and the launch of transitional programmes and activities, there is often a period of several months during which the UN conducts joint assessments, develops a concept of operations for integrated peacekeeping missions, and begins the deployment of key mission staff and structures (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures). During this period, the UN usually limits itself to the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the initial deployment of peacekeeping troops (either UN or multinational) begins.

Parties to a peace process start to implement agreements during this period, and there is a risk that peace and stability can be threatened or destabilized by localized incidents of

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violence of some kind. In order to ensure a smooth transition from the signing of a peace agreement to the implementation of the DDR provisions included in it, forward planning and the early deployment of DDR teams should begin as soon as possible. Although the setting up of national DDR programmes and operations requires time for adequate consultation, planning and deployment, it is possible to set in place interim (i.e. temporary) DDR measures or programmes to help strengthen the fragile peace and prevent destabilization and localized violence.

In this period, DDR activities are usually focused on early assessments and planning, sensitization and discussions with armed forces and groups, preliminary public information campaigns, and the implementation of emergency disarmament and community reintegration activities, particularly when children remain associated with armed forces or groups or there are abducted women who need to be removed to safety. Key areas where people can receive humanitarian assistance are also opened up at this time.

#### **4.4. Transition and recovery**

The official timetable for a transition and recovery period is usually determined by the peace accord and/or a Security Council resolution. This timetable is generally tied to a process of political transition, including the establishment of a transitional or interim authority or government to lead the country until general elections. The overarching aim of this period is the consolidation of peace, so the most intensive implementation of DDR programmes begins now. Multidimensional processes are put in place, requiring cooperation from the UN's peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development agencies. However, while there may be a formal timetable for transition and recovery, in practice, the process is rarely straightforward or predictable, as it may be affected by occasional skirmishes and high levels of tension.

DDR is often a key part of a political transition, and it may have to be put into operation as a precondition for carrying out other transitional activities, such as the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, justice and security sector reform, the preparation and conduct of elections, and the establishment of national reconciliation mechanisms. DDR must, therefore, be linked into the transition process at both the strategic/political and functional/sectoral levels. The following sections explain how DDR fits in with the other aspects of peace-building and recovery and how to work with the many different stakeholders that are involved.

#### **4.5. Peace and development**

Depending on the post-conflict setting, political transitions may take place faster than the move from recovery to development. When both national and international agencies are able to focus on longer-term development goals (e.g., the achievement of Millennium Development Goals) and the establishment of national development and poverty reduction strategies (e.g., PRSPs), and when normal relations with international financial institutions and bilateral development partners are resumed, the transition period is over. DDR operations should be largely completed at this point. To ensure that DDR achievements are sus-

To ensure that DDR achievements are sustained, programme components must link into longer-term security and development strategies.



tained, programme components must link into longer-term security and development strategies. A longer-term community disarmament and weapons management project should be in place and the reintegration of ex-combatants and other war-affected populations should be given in detail in local and national poverty reduction strategies.

## 5. DDR and other security, peace-building and recovery programmes

By increasing security, DDR helps create a conducive (or ‘enabling’) environment in which other, longer-term reconstruction processes can be effectively and sustainably begun. In this section, the ways in which integrated DDR relates to and links with other peace-building, SSR, humanitarian and socio-economic recovery processes are discussed.

### 5.1. Coordination of assistance

In many post-conflict transitions, the UN plays a central role in coordinating humanitarian and other assistance both before and after the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. The same local and international implementing partners may both deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians and provide support for DDR, so it is important to ensure that planning is coordinated between humanitarian and DDR programmes:

- *Assistance:* It may be necessary to deliver assistance to individuals and groups before they formally enter DDR processes. This can prevent a humanitarian emergency developing and protect local communities from being raided for food and other necessities. However, the delivery of aid before formal disarmament requires the development of specific protocols on protection and access, which must be decided between humanitarian and peacekeeping/security personnel;
- *Cantonment/Assembly areas:* When cantonment and assembly areas are used, partners may be involved in delivering basic assistance to male and female ex-combatants and their dependants, as well as to women associated with armed forces and groups. Some children may still remain with these armed forces/groups, and will need specialized assistance;
- *Reintegration assistance:* While ex-combatants may receive reintegration assistance through DDR programmes, other war-affected people will be assisted by humanitarian agencies. DDR support must be harmonized with the assistance given to other returnees to minimize competition and resentment and ensure that former combatants are not perceived as a ‘special’ group receiving ‘special’ treatment.

### 5.2. Security sector reform

SSR, accompanied by judicial reform, is a central part of transition and recovery strategies, and is vital for the long-term success of DDR activities. Instead of focusing on the security of the State, SSR focuses on human security, i.e., it deals with threats to individual and community well-being. Community-based policing and the introduction of measures to deal with the root causes of violence and conflict, including socio-economic deprivation (e.g., poverty and unemployment), are central strategies of SSR.

SSR supports and assists DDR by providing ways to deal with immediate security concerns and strengthening State institutions to allow them to provide security for the citizens

of the country under proper democratic control. It establishes the basis for DDR within the various legal agreements that deal with the transitional period. Such agreements specify the legal status and entitlements of former members of armed forces and groups in the post-conflict period. Justice, truth and reconciliation commissions, in particular, affect whether individuals are eligible for DDR, since they decide how to treat people who are known to have committed war crimes.

SSR may also allow for the granting of amnesty for both weapons possession and participation in armed conflict to those who voluntarily disarm and demobilize, which increases participation in DDR. (However, while national amnesties may be agreed to, the UN system upholds the principles of international law, and cannot support processes that do not properly deal with serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.)

In turn, DDR assists SSR efforts to improve local security conditions and capacities, because it focuses on creating other ways of making a living for ex-combatants so that they will not resort to violence, and reduces or eliminates armed forces and groups that could pose a threat to the establishment of the rule of law. DDR also begins the process of controlling illegal weapons, which establishes the basis for longer-term legal weapons management strategies, builds the ability of governments to plan and carry out SSR measures and helps return authority on security matters (from maintaining the rule of law to management of the police and army) to the State, where it legitimately belongs.

### **5.3. Conflict prevention and reconciliation**

DDR supports and encourages peace-building and prevents future conflicts by reducing violence and improving security conditions, demobilizing members of armed forces and groups, and providing other ways of making a living to encourage the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. DDR can help create an environment that encourages national dialogue and reconciliation, and supports local capacities to manage the interactions and relations between receiving communities and ex-combatants. Where armed forces or groups preyed on communities, creating mistrust, fear and resentment and the possibility of reprisals or retributions against returning ex-combatants, DDR processes can lay a firm basis for reconciliation to begin.

### **5.4. Economic recovery and development**

Former combatants can help start the process of broader socio-economic recovery and reconstruction if they can be absorbed by communities that benefit from their new skills. While individuals should make some decisions about the type of training they undergo, retraining must suit the ex-combatants' individual needs and circumstances and provide sustainable skills, contribute to economic revitalization and recovery, and form a basis for long-term development. Specifically designed reintegration assistance can directly contribute to the restoration of productive livelihoods, increase professional skills, improve the overall productive capacity and potential of a community, and encourage the economy to grow, while minimizing the divisions between former combatants and everyone else in the community.

Idle former combatants are a real security threat. It may, therefore, be desirable to link reintegration with immediate attempts to rehabilitate and reconstruct damaged infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) in order to provide short-term work in labour-intensive projects. Such work can provide on-the-job skills training to high-risk and vulnerable groups and help the community to recovery and development.

National economic policy decisions, such as the formulation of development plans for specific areas, can be driven by DDR, especially if economic reintegration initiatives are designed together with plans to boost the private sector in order to start and encourage investment, open up markets and create an environment favourable to business. Cooperation with the private sector benefits both parties concerned: ex-combatants provide a supply of labour for the private sector if ways can be found to employ them, and the private sector benefits directly from the increased security brought about when former combatants are redeployed into productive work. In many countries emerging from conflict, national economic policies are designed to stimulate the local economy through financial incentives and to support micro-, small and medium-sized businesses. Sustainable reintegration programmes should be based on these policies.

## 6. DDR in transitional and recovery planning frameworks

As this section explains, DDR takes place within multiple and overlapping frameworks (i.e., plans, policies, strategies, etc.) for peace-building and recovery that involve various national and international stakeholders.

### 6.1. Post-conflict needs assessments and transitional frameworks

While the UN focuses on supporting peace processes and establishing integrated peace-keeping missions, its partners such as the World Bank, bilateral donors and national counterparts carry out post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) and establish transitional results matrices or frameworks (TRMs/TRFs), which establish the ways in which the international community will be involved in recovery in the transition period. DDR programme strategies and outputs must be integrated into these larger strategies.

The following outline shows the relationship between post-conflict assessment and transitional recovery and development planning frameworks involving many groups, organizations and countries:<sup>1</sup>

- PCNAs are multilateral activities carried out by the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank, in collaboration with the national government of the country concerned and with the cooperation of bilateral donors. PCNAs are a new forum for cooperation between the UNDG and the World Bank in post-conflict situations, and are intended to improve the coordination of strategy development and programme planning. The *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations*, developed jointly by UNDG, the UN Development Programme's Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery, and the World Bank, provides detailed guidance on PCNAs;<sup>2</sup>
- A TRM or TRF is developed from a PCNA, in which national priorities and interim results are established for each sector, joint national–international monitoring of the transition process is designed, and transitional support is pledged by donors. (For more details, see UNDG and World Bank, *Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices: Using Results-based Frameworks in Fragile States*.<sup>3</sup>)

### 6.2. National recovery strategies

In addition to projects carried out jointly with international counterparts, national or transitional authorities develop plans to guide national recovery efforts. These detailed strategies



guide government ministries and implementing agencies working in post-conflict reconstruction. DDR programme strategies and outputs must be fully integrated into national strategies, especially those relating to justice and security sector reform, economic recovery, and so on.

### 6.3. Common country assessments/UNDAFs and UN country programmes

The UN country teams shall continue to implement the DDR process once the peacekeeping mission has withdrawn, so DDR components should be designed together with the programming cycles of UN agencies in the field, using the following processes and tools:

- *Common country assessments/UNDAs:*<sup>4</sup> Common country assessments (CCAs) and United Nations development assistance frameworks (UNDAs) lay the groundwork for country programmes and projects supported by UN agencies. A CCA is an analytical process, carried out jointly by the UN and national counterparts, to identify the major development challenges facing the country and provide the rationale for UN operations. In countries emerging from conflict, it complements and expands upon PCNAs and TRFs. The UNDAF links programmes to national priorities, including the Millennium Development Goals;
- *UN country programme documents and action plans:* DDR relies on a number of UN agencies to implement different parts of the programme. This division of labour should be reflected in the development of the country programme documents and action plans through which programmes and projects are implemented to meet the priorities identified in the CCA/UNDAF.

### 6.4. Poverty reduction strategy papers

Reintegration programmes must link seamlessly with long-term poverty reduction and development activities, as outlined in World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF)-sponsored poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). PRSPs were originally conceived by the World Bank and IMF as a requirement for external debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative, but have been adopted by many countries as their central national poverty reduction plan. They are developed through a participatory, country-driven and comprehensive consultative process, so former combatants can also take part in identifying national development priorities. Countries may develop interim PRSPs (I-PRSPs) before they launch full PRSPs without having to give up access to World Bank and IMF assistance such as concessions, resources and interim debt relief, and such I-PRSPs provide a forward-looking and time-bound plan that can provide a basis for drawing up of a full PRSP.

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>CCA</b>	common country assessment
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>I-PRSP</b>	interim poverty reduction strategy paper
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>PCNA</b>	post-conflict needs assessment
<b>PRSP</b>	poverty reduction strategy paper
<b>SSR</b>	security sector reform
<b>TRM/TRF</b>	transitional results matrix/transitional results framework
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDAF</b>	UN development assistance framework
<b>UNDG</b>	UN Development Group

## Endnotes

- 1 <http://www.undg.org>.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid.

# 2.30 Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 2.30 Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners

## Summary

United Nations (UN)-supported disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is people-centred and relies on collaboration among participants and national and international actors to maximise the effectiveness of a DDR process. Participants include male and female adult, youth and child combatants, and others associated with armed forces or groups in non-combat roles. Receiving communities, which may include returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, are also central stakeholders.

National actors who shape the DDR process are: the signatories of the peace agreement, including the military; national and transitional governments, political parties and leaders; armed forces and groups; civil society groups; women's leaders and associations; provincial and local authorities; community-based organizations; the private sector; and the media.

The third group that influences DDR includes international actors such as the UN system, bilateral and multilateral donors, and regional and other international organizations.

The efforts of all of these parties should be coordinated so as to ensure that they work towards a common (shared) vision of peace and security, and channel their resources towards a common goal.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides an overview of the participants, stakeholders and strategic partnerships involved in DDR programmes. It examines the roles and profiles of those involved in a DDR process, whether they be beneficiaries or DDR and other staff involved in the planning and delivery of a DDR programme. Although a broad range of national and international stakeholders are discussed, this is not a complete list, nor are all those mentioned here to be found in every DDR context.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

1.20 ◀▶

### 3. Introduction

A successful integrated DDR processes leads to the transformation of individuals from combatants to civilians and of societies from conflict to peace. These complex changes are brought about by a range of local, national and international actors working in partnership to achieve a common goal — sustainable peace.

### 4. Guiding principles

Relationships among stakeholders, participants, partners and beneficiaries in UN-supported DDR programmes are guided by the principles, key considerations and approaches defined in IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR. The following are of particular importance:

- national and local ownership fostered through participatory approaches to planning, design and implementation;
- prioritizing the development of capacity in national institutions, local communities, implementing partners and participants in the DDR process;
- accountability, transparency, coordination and communication among all stakeholders in all stages of the process;
- non-discriminatory, fair and equitable treatment of participants;
- designing programmes and projects that focus on people and communities rather than weapons.

### 5. Participants and beneficiaries

#### 5.1. Members of armed forces and groups

While the peace agreement will generally state or otherwise indicate which armed forces and groups will participate in DDR, the development of detailed and transparent eligibility criteria for individual combatants to enter into the programme is a priority in the initial as-

essment and planning phase. These criteria should avoid allowing persons to enter the programme simply because they have surrendered weapons or ammunition. Rather, the criteria should be based on tests to determine an individual's membership of an armed force or group. All those who are found to be members of an armed force or group, whether they were involved in active combat or in support roles (such as cooks, porters, messengers, administrators, sex slaves and 'war wives'), shall be considered part of the

armed force or group and therefore shall be included in the DDR programme.

Because a commander may wish to hide the real strength of his/her force, especially the numbers of under-age children who are members, it is important to gain an independent estimate for use as a planning figure. Where field commanders will be largely responsible for 'delivering' their units to DDR sites, field verification teams must include child protection officers and gender advisers who can assist in the identification of groups often excluded by field commanders.

All those who are found to be members of an armed force or group, whether they were involved in active combat or in support roles (such as cooks, porters, messengers, administrators, sex slaves and 'war wives'), shall be considered part of the armed force or group and therefore shall be included in the DDR programme.

When managing a regional conflict, it will probably be necessary to deal with foreign combatants and mercenaries, for whom separate, multinational strategies must be developed (also see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR).

## 5.2. Abductees

Abduction is a broadly practised but largely unrecognized feature of modern conflicts and is a serious violation of humanitarian and human rights law. Male and female youth and children, and adult women are all vulnerable to abduction or forced recruitment by armed forces and groups. They are forced to perform a number of military and non-military support roles and are often exposed to extreme and long-term violence.

The UN shall work for the unconditional release of abductees associated with armed forces and groups at all times — during open conflict, when peace negotiations are under way and before the establishment of a national DDR process. Identification mechanisms for abductees must be a priority, and programmes must be set up to enable abducted persons to decide on return or repatriation options in safety, separately from their captors.

## 5.3. Dependants

Dependants are civilians who rely on a combatant for their livelihood. Because they are civilians, they do not directly participate in the disarmament and demobilization phases of DDR. Where dependants have accompanied armed forces or groups in the field, provisions shall be made for them during disarmament and demobilization — either encampment, or transport to their communities of origin, if they are far from home. As much as possible, dependants should have access to information and counselling to be able to participate in important decisions on resettlement and reintegration options.

Dependants make up a significant number of participants in the reintegration phases of DDR. Criteria for establishing their status shall be developed according to local contexts and social norms, while national institutions will generally determine policy on their direct reintegration benefits. Dependants should be involved in decision-making and management processes when support is provided to an ex-combatant as part of a DDR programme. Evidence shows that including women when support packages are provided has a positive impact on the well-being of the family. As far as possible, dependants should also participate in the planning and delivery of reinsertion and reintegration support programmes. Attention should be given to the needs of particularly vulnerable dependants such as the children of female and girl combatants, widows, orphans, and disabled and chronically ill dependants. Family tracing must be made available to those who have been separated from other members of their family.

## 5.4. Women

In the past, female combatants and supporters of armed forces and groups, and women in general were largely left out of formal DDR processes. They were excluded from participation at peace talks and not represented on national DDR commissions, undercounted in estimations of force size, excluded by field commanders, or overlooked during identification processes by DDR officers who were not trained to identify female combatants or the multiple roles performed by women associated with armed forces and groups. Also, they often chose not to join DDR programmes because of experiences or even just perceptions of insecurity and stigmatization at disarmament and demobilization sites.



It has been found that many women therefore ‘self-demobilized’ without participating in a formal DDR process. By doing so, they went on to face many difficulties when reintegrating into civilian life. Women who have relied on armed forces and groups for employment, to the exclusion of all other social groups, find themselves with neither a community nor a means to make a living after demobilization. Moreover, they may have been victims of serious and repeated sexual and gender-based violence and require specialized health and

psychosocial support services. Furthermore, these same women are often expected to shoulder, unassisted, a large burden of care for ill, disabled, and traumatized male ex-combatants and children associated with armed forces and groups, particularly in contexts where health care and other social infrastructure have been destroyed.

It is vital to ensure that women participate in all stages of DDR, from programme development to implementation, and are taken into account in all stages of the DDR process, through representation in national

It is vital to ensure that women participate in all stages of DDR, from programme development to implementation, and are taken into account in all stages of the DDR process, through representation in national institutions and decision-making bodies, and through the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of DDR.

institutions and decision-making bodies, and through the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of DDR (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

◀▶ 5.10

### 5.5. Youth

While there is no internationally recognized legal definition of ‘youth’, young people associated with armed forces and groups make up an important part of society and can both fuel conflict and support post-conflict reconciliation and recovery. Many young ex-combatants may have been recruited as children, but not demobilized until they were young adults. They have therefore been denied normal socialization by families and communities, they have missed educational and vocational opportunities, and lack basic living skills. The design and delivery of DDR programmes shall consider the particular needs and potential of older children and younger adults associated with armed forces and groups.

DDR programmes designed for youth can also have a positive impact on young people in the community who may be at risk of recruitment by armed forces and groups or organized criminals (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR).

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### 5.6. Children

The recruitment of children into armed forces and groups is a serious violation of human rights and is prohibited under international law. The UN shall promote the unconditional release of children associated with fighting forces at all times, i.e., during open conflict, while peace negotiations are taking place and before the establishment of a national DDR process.

The identification and management of children associated with armed forces and groups may in practice be quite difficult. While the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child establishes 18 as the age of legal majority, concepts and experiences of childhood vary significantly among cultures and communities. Furthermore, children are likely to have taken on adult roles and responsibilities during conflict, either while associated with armed forces and groups or in war-affected communities. Girl children in particular may

be considered adults if they have been ‘married’ during conflict, borne children or taken on responsibilities as heads of household in receiving communities.

Children formerly associated with armed forces and groups are stakeholders and must be carefully consulted when DDR processes are set up. To successfully cater for children’s needs, programme development and implementation should be designed to ensure the participation of all stakeholders, and reintegration strategies must be adapted to meet the different needs, roles and responsibilities of children in each post-conflict situation. To ease their return to civilian life, former child soldiers should be integrated into programmes that benefit all war-affected children (also see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

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### 5.7. Disabled people

Ex-combatants suffering from disability, chronic illness or substance addiction, because of their health status, will not be eligible for integration into new national security forces. They will require specialized DDR assistance and should be given opportunities to participate and have their concerns reflected in decisions dealing with their treatment and reintegration. The capacity for health screening, and particularly for voluntary counselling and testing for HIV/AIDS, should be established in the demobilization stage in order to identify rehabilitation and/or treatment options. Disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants, their families and caregivers, and those with substance addiction will require specialized reintegration assistance, including living and vocational training, and medical and psycho-social support programmes adapted to their specific needs. Institutionalization is not likely to be an option, so priority should be given to community-based care programmes, and capacity built to support independent living (see also IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

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### 5.8. Civilian returnees

Individuals who have been associated with armed forces or groups are not granted refugee status by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to avoid aiding people who have been responsible for human rights violations and war crimes. However, certain ex-combatants, possibly self-demobilized, may be present among refugee and returnee populations. It will be necessary to identify them in consultation with the general local population and with UNHCR and the refugee/IDP or returnee committee, and then to determine whether they are eligible to enter the DDR programme (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament, IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration and IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

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### 5.9. Communities

DDR improves security and supports economic recovery in post-conflict societies. While its initial focus is on individuals in armed forces and groups, it also assists the general population, who benefit from increased security when former combatants are assisted to become productive members of society, and small arms are collected and controlled. Integrated DDR programmes are designed to achieve the goal of returning ex-combatants to civilian communities. Communities, therefore, become a principal partner in DDR programmes, not only as beneficiaries, but also as participants in the planning and implementation of reintegration strategies and as stakeholders in the outcome.

It is important to recognize that, after war, ‘communities’ may be quite unstable and disorganized, having been newly formed as a result of conflict. Although this presents challenges to the sustainability of the reintegration process, it is also an opportunity to bring about change for the better: DDR programmes shall not reconstitute traditional power structures that may have contributed to the outbreak of violent conflict in the first place, but instead shall encourage reconciliation and the inclusion of all stakeholders, through consulting often marginalized groups such as women, youth, minorities, disabled people and so on.

An excellent way of including all members of communities is to ensure that the specifically designed reintegration assistance (training, employment, health services, etc.) needed

by certain groups of ex-combatants is delivered through community-based mechanisms and made available to a range of war-affected populations. Where ex-combatants receive individual reintegration support, this assistance should be limited in time and scope and delivered, as far as possible, through programmes and projects that benefit the broader community: the rehabilitation of infrastructure and other forms of community

Where ex-combatants receive individual reintegration support, this assistance should be limited in time and scope and delivered, as far as possible, through programmes and projects that benefit the broader community.

development could serve this purpose. Through careful sequencing of activities, longer-term assistance to ex-combatants should be phased into the broader community recovery programmes that continue once the work of the DDR operation is finished.

## 6. National actors

### 6.1. Political parties

DDR is one component of the wider peace-building and recovery framework. This framework is often outlined in a peace agreement that lays out the way in which national institutions will manage post-conflict governance, including the respective roles that parties who signed the peace agreement will play in establishing and running national institutions and formulating policy. Because details of policy and institutional mechanisms are often left for further negotiation among the parties or within the transitional government or authority, it is necessary to ensure that DDR is linked to larger peace-building and recovery plans.

To build trust among the parties and the broader public, all key stakeholders in the political process, including those who have not directly participated in armed conflict, should be involved in the development of DDR policy and institutions. The coordinating body for DDR can do this by organizing national and local DDR committees that bring together local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN agencies, civil society organizations (CSOs), and military and administrative authorities to discuss and agree to preparations for DDR.

Although national DDR institutions should be politically neutral, it is important to include major political parties, e.g., through the establishment of an advisory or consultative mechanism, or through informal meetings, seminars and communications strategies when discussing the creation of national DDR structures.

Potential spoilers should be identified early in the assessment phase and strategies developed to win their support. There are a range of individuals and groups who may try

to delay or undermine the DDR process, including: those with a political interest in undermining and derailing post-conflict transition; those with a personal interest in retaining power through the control of armed groups; and those with commercial or criminal interests protected through armed violence and the breakdown in the rule of law.

## 6.2. Governments

National or transitional governments generally lead the establishment of institutions for DDR such as a national commission on DDR (NCDDR). This commission, or its equivalent, must be closely linked with government ministries, which will be responsible for longer-term national recovery and reintegration strategies (also see IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR). DDR must also be connected to other transitional authorities such as ceasefire commissions, reintegration commissions, national economic recovery strategies, truth and reconciliation commissions, etc.

There are three major considerations when dealing with national authorities, and in particular NCDDRs, in post-conflict contexts:

- they can be perceived — rightly or wrongly — to favour one party over another;
- they may reflect a fragile balance of power between previously warring parties, making them weak;
- they may lack the technical expertise and capacity necessary to plan and manage complex DDR processes.

In order to assist in building local capacity, the UN system should assist the NCDDR by seconding to it or otherwise arranging for it to be supported by experts and consultants. The UN system should also play a guiding role to ensure that work plans are implemented and deadlines met. Also, to support the establishment of open, transparent and integrated governance structures for DDR, the UN can support and encourage the broad participation of all parties to the conflict and all parts of society in the national DDR structures.

While it is important to maintain central oversight of national programmes, supporting or establishing provincial and local authorities for the planning and delivery of DDR programmes allows for flexibility and greater responsiveness to regional and local conditions and dynamics, thus improving the chance for effective and sustainable reintegration. However, the decentralization of decision-making authority for DDR can be a source of difficulties in post-conflict States where central government is often trying to consolidate its administrative control over territories in which rebel groups have been operating.

## 6.3. The military

The success of DDR programmes depends on adequate coordination among civilian, police and military institutions, so it is important to include civilian, police and military personnel in the DDR team to facilitate cooperation between the peacekeeping mission and external partners, including UN funds, agencies and programmes, as well as national military authorities. Possible ways of doing this include coordination meetings, the establishment of military liaison officers, and the integration of staff from organizations actively involved in DDR into a single DDR coordinating team. Civil-military cooperation should also take place between the UN blue helmets and the local population (also see IDDRS 4.40 on UN Military Roles and Responsibilities and IDDRS 4.50 on UN Police Roles and Responsibilities).

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#### **6.4. Non-signatory armed groups**

Ideally, the DDR of all armed forces and groups is discussed as part of the peace accord and political agreement, and the different motivations and interests of leaders, field commanders, and members of armed forces and groups are understood before DDR planning begins.

If other forces and groups have not been represented in political processes or formal institutional mechanisms for DDR and/or have not signed the peace accord, a framework must be set up to secure their buy-in and participation. This is particularly important in areas where informal militias and/or criminal gangs have been active in conflict, but are not represented in political processes and negotiations. To avoid disagreements, the framework for inclusion must pay particular attention to the status of individuals in other armed forces and groups. One solution may be to establish a consultative framework for them that works together with the formal forum; another could be to bring in a neutral and respected non-UN body to negotiate with them. When dealing with such groups, UN partners must ensure that they have a mandate to do so. As the mandates of many peacekeeping missions are given in support of a peace agreement, the mission's mandate may be limited to assisting with the DDR of the groups listed in the peace agreement.

#### **6.5. Civil society**

Civil society organizations based in local communities are stakeholders in the policy development and planning phases of DDR, and should be consulted through formal and informal mechanisms. During the implementation phase, they are local partners and service providers. However, international assistance will usually be necessary to build their capacity in networking, strategic planning, programme development, financial management and communications strategies. Such support is one means through which DDR increases capacities within communities for post-conflict peace-building and also for recovery in the broader sense. CSOs are very different and may include NGOs, religious groups, traditional authorities, workers' associations, women's organizations, human rights groups, the private sector and so on. After war, these organizations may be polarized along political, religious or ethnic lines, and may represent specific interests, so their legitimacy and representation should be checked.

Although their capacities may have been weakened by conflict, CSOs can become partners in DDR by providing individual opportunities for reintegration through employment and training as one of many industry and economic recovery strategies. At the local level, partnerships with small businesses support the creation of sustainable reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants and their dependants.

Women's leaders and associations deserve special mention: with the right support and encouragement — both at national and grassroots levels — they can make significant and unique contributions to all phases of the DDR process, from political negotiation and planning to programme design and implementation. UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) states that all departments and agencies of the UN system have a duty to promote the representation and participation of women in all phases of DDR, to remove obstacles to their participation, and to provide alternative forums for their participation, as well as ensuring access to appropriate capacity-building programmes.

#### **6.6. The media**

Like other institutions in post-conflict societies, the capacities, infrastructure and even neutrality of the local and national media will have been reduced. Yet the media are crucial



for the delivery of messages to armed forces and groups, and members of the general public regarding post-conflict reconciliation and peace-building strategies, including the implementation of DDR programmes. A media and communications strategy, including capacity-building, must be deployed early in the DDR planning process to ensure that members of local and national media receive accurate and timely information as the process evolves.

## 7. International actors

### 7.1. The UN system

Where the Secretary-General has appointed a Special Representative (SRSG), the latter will generally have overall responsibility for the UN system in-country, as well as direct responsibility for the UN peacekeeping mission, including the DDR unit. The SRSG may also represent the UN in political negotiations on DDR, overseeing the provision of technical assistance and implementation of UN support operations.

UN specialized agencies, programmes and funds make up a large part of the UN system's operational capacity in countries where integrated peacekeeping missions are established. Several agencies will be present and running programmes before the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, during its operation and after its exit. Together, they make up the UN country team, headed by the UN Resident Coordinator (RC). Where an integrated UN peacekeeping mission has been established, the RC function will generally be assumed by a Deputy SRSG to further strengthen integration of UN efforts in support of its peace-building mandate. This Deputy SRSG normally also functions as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The integrated DDR unit should report to the Deputy SRSG responsible for development and humanitarian affairs so that the UN country team and UN mission activities in support of DDR operations are synchronized (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures).

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### 7.2. The region

Regional actors and neighbouring countries may have been direct or indirect parties to the conflict, and DDR will have an impact on them when foreign combatants are repatriated. Consultation with regional actors and neighbouring countries in the planning phases of DDR will establish the appropriate mechanisms for dealing with such situations (also see IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

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Regional and sub-regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union have been important partners in a number of DDR processes at both political and technical levels. Where missions of these organizations are working alongside UN peace support operations in the same country, the respective roles and responsibilities of each one must be established through clear mandates.

### 7.3. Member States and bilateral partners

Member States and bilateral partners act as guarantors and supporters of political transition processes and as donors for peace-building and recovery programmes, and may even assume responsibilities as primary international sponsors of particular components of DDR and security sector reform processes. When political obstacles are encountered in the

DDR process, bilateral partners can use their diplomatic leverage to remove them, and they can deliver direct DDR assistance through their bilateral cooperation and aid agencies, although this should be coordinated with the wider DDR process.

#### **7.4. Development banks**

Although the mandates of development banks do not generally allow them to support disarmament or other security-related components of DDR programmes, the World Bank and regional development banks have been involved in the financing, programme development and monitoring of a number of DDR programmes. They often provide assistance as a component of broader recovery strategies and financing mechanisms. The World Bank can offer a number of funding mechanisms, including International Development Association loans and credits, and post-conflict grants, and can manage multi-donor trust funds such as the Great Lakes Region Multi-Donor Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.

#### **7.5. International non-governmental organizations**

Several international NGOs have developed experience in managing and implementing various components of DDR programmes (among others, German Agro Action, World Vision, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam and Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit [GTZ]). They are also often engaged in humanitarian and development activities in regions where DDR programmes are being established. To ensure effective collaboration and avoid duplication of international assistance in support of DDR, coordination mechanisms must be established at the central planning level and in the field. Where possible, these should build upon existing coordination structures and mechanisms, such as those established by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or, after a UN peacekeeping operation has been established, under the auspices of the Deputy SRSG who has been designated HC. If international NGOs are implementing partners for DDR, they shall follow the guidelines laid down in the IDDRS and establish appropriate monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

#### **7.6. International corporations**

Where conflict has resulted from competition for natural resources or where their exploitation fuels conflict, there can be direct and/or indirect links between international commercial interests and local armed groups. International corporations can be either supportive or subversive/destructive, so their presence needs to be understood when DDR programmes are designed. International corporations can be constructive through direct support to economic development or employment programmes, or they can sponsor information and sensitization campaigns or special initiatives within a DDR programme. Carrying out surveys and establishing partnerships with international business can gain its support for DDR.

#### **7.7. Research and policy centres**

A number of national and international research centres have made contributions to the development, monitoring and review of past and current DDR programmes, and are a valuable external resource in the design and implementation of new programmes. For further information, please refer to the UN DDR Resource Centre.<sup>1</sup>

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>CSO</b>	civil society organization
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person
<b>NCDDR</b>	national commission on DDR
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>RC</b>	Resident Coordinator
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commissioner for Refugees



## Endnotes

- 1 <http://www.unddr.org>.

# 3.10 Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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## 3.10 Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures

### Summary

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are all complex and sensitively linked processes that demand considerable human and financial resources to plan, implement and monitor. Given the many different actors involved in the various stages of DDR, and the fact that its phases are interdependent, integrated planning, effective coordination and coherent reporting arrangements are essential. Past experiences have highlighted the need for the various actors involved in planning and implementing DDR, and monitoring its impacts, to work together in a complementary way that avoids unnecessary duplication of effort or competition for funds and other resources.

This module provides guidelines for improving inter-agency cooperation in the planning of DDR programmes and operations. The module shows how successful implementation can be achieved through an inclusive process of assessment and analysis that provides the basis for the formulation of a comprehensive programme framework and operational plan. This mechanism is known as the ‘planning cycle’, and originates from both the integrated mission planning process (IMPP) and post-conflict United Nations (UN) country team planning mechanisms.

### 1. Module scope and objectives

This module outlines a general planning process and framework for providing and structuring UN support for national DDR efforts in a peacekeeping environment. This planning process covers the actions carried out by DDR practitioners from the time a conflict or crisis is put on the agenda of the Security Council to the time a peacekeeping mission is formally established by a Security Council resolution, with such a resolution assigning the peacekeeping mission a role in DDR. This module also covers the broader institutional requirements for planning post-mission DDR support. (See IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design for more detailed coverage of the development of DDR programme and implementation frameworks.)

The planning process and requirements given in this module are intended to serve as a general guide. A number of factors will affect the various planning processes, including:

- *The pace and duration of a peace process:* A drawn-out peace process gives the UN, and the international community generally, more time to consult, plan and develop programmes for later implementation (the Sudanese peace process is a good example);
- *Contextual and local realities:* The dynamics and consequences of conflict; the attitudes of the actors and other parties associated with it; and post-conflict social, economic and institutional capacities will affect planning for DDR, and have an impact on the strategic orientation of UN support;
- *National capacities for DDR:* The extent of pre-existing national and institutional capacities in the conflict-affected country to plan and implement DDR will considerably

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affect the nature of UN support and, consequently, planning requirements. Planning for DDR in contexts with weak or non-existent national institutions will differ greatly from planning DDR in contexts with stable and effective national institutions;

- *The role of the UN:* How the role of the UN is defined in general terms, and for DDR specifically, will depend on the extent of responsibility and direct involvement assumed by national actors, and the UN's own capacity to complement and support these efforts. This role definition will directly influence the scope and nature of the UN's engagement in DDR, and hence requirements for planning;
- *Interaction with other international and regional actors:* The presence and need to collaborate with international or regional actors (e.g., the European Union, NATO, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States) with a current or potential role in the management of the conflict will affect the general planning process.

In addition, this module provides guidance on:

- adapting the DDR planning process to the broader framework of mission and UN country team planning in post-conflict contexts;
- linking the UN planning process to national DDR planning processes;
- the chronological stages and sequencing (i.e., the ordering of activities over time) of DDR planning activities;
- the different aspects and products of the planning process, including its political (peace process and Security Council mandate), programmatic/operational and organizational/institutional dimensions;
- the institutional capacities required at both Headquarters and country levels to ensure an efficient and integrated UN planning process.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of the abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the word 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

## 3. Introduction

The ability of the UN to comprehensively and collectively plan its joint response to crisis has evolved considerably over the last decade. Nonetheless, the expansion of complex peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian and peace-building tasks in complex internal conflicts, which often have regional repercussions, continues to demand an even earlier, closer and more structured process of planning among UN entities and partners.

Meeting this demand for more structured planning is essential to delivering better DDR programmes, because DDR is a multisectoral, multi-stakeholder and multi-phase process requiring coordination and adequate links among various post-conflict planning mechanisms. The implementation of DDR programmes often requires difficult compromises and trade-offs among various political, security and development considerations. It also relies very much on establishing an appropriate balance between international involvement and national ownership.

DDR programmes have a better chance of success when the DDR planning process starts early (preferably from the beginning of the peace process), builds on the accumulated experience and expertise of local actors, is based on a solid understanding of the conflict (causes, perpetrators, etc.), and deliberately encourages greater unity of effort among UN agencies and their community of partners.

## 4. Guiding principles

The planning process for the DDR programmes is guided by the principles, key considerations and approaches defined in IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR. Of particular importance are:

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- *Unity of effort:* The achievement of unity of effort and integration is only possible with an inclusive and sound mission planning process involving all relevant UN agencies, departments, funds and programmes at both the Headquarters and field levels. DDR planning takes place within this broader integrated mission planning process;
- *Integration:* The integrated approach to planning tries to develop, to the extent possible:
  - a common framework (i.e., one that everyone involved uses) for developing, managing, funding and implementing a UN DDR strategy within the context of a peace mission;
  - an integrated DDR management structure (unit or section), with the participation of staff from participating UN agencies and primary reporting lines to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) for humanitarian and development affairs. Such an approach should include the co-location of staff, infrastructure and resources, as this allows for increased efficiency and reduced overhead costs, and brings about more responsive planning, implementation and coordination;
  - joint programmes that harness UN country team and mission resources into a single process and results-based approach to putting the DDR strategy into operation and achieving shared objectives;
  - a single framework for managing multiple sources of funding, as well as for co-ordinating funding mechanisms, thus ensuring that resources are used to deal with common priorities and needs;
- *Efficient and effective planning:* At the planning stage, a common DDR strategy and work plan should be developed on the basis of joint assessments and evaluation. This should establish a set of operational objectives, activities and expected results that all UN entities involved in DDR will use as the basis for their programming and implementation activities. A common resource mobilization strategy involving all participating UN entities should be established within the integrated DDR framework in order to prevent duplication, and ensure coordination with donors and national authorities, and coherent and efficient planning.

## 5. Situating DDR within UN and national planning in post-conflict contexts


This section discusses integrated DDR planning in the context of planning for integrated UN peace operations, as well as broader peace-building efforts. These processes are currently under review by the UN system. While references are made to the existing integrated mission planning process (IMPP), the various steps that make up the process of integrated DDR planning (from the start of the crisis to the Security Council mandate) apply to whatever planning process the UN system eventually decides upon to guide its mission planning and peace-building support process. Where possible (and before the establishment of the Peace-building Support Office and the review of the IMPP), specific DDR planning issues are linked to the main phases or stages of mission and UN country team planning, to lay the foundations for integrated DDR planning in the UN system.

At the moment, the planning cycle for integrated peace support missions is centred on the interdepartmental mission task force (IMTF) that is established for each mission. This forum includes representatives from all UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes. The IMTF provides an important link between the activities taking place on the ground and the planning cycle at Headquarters.

Five general phases (stages) of planning for UN mission and post-conflict peace-building support can be identified, which form the basis for defining exactly how the DDR planning process will take place:

- *Phase I: Pre-planning and preparatory assistance;*
- *Phase II: Initial technical assessment and concept of operations;*
- *Phase III: Development of a strategic and policy framework (strategic planning);*
- *Phase IV: Development of a programme and operational framework (operational planning);*
- *Phase V: Continuation and transition planning.*

Because planning time-frames will differ from mission to mission, it is not possible to say how long each phase will take. What is important is the sequence of planning stages, as well as how they correspond to the main stages of transitions from conflict to peace and sustainable development. The diagram below illustrates this:



### 5.1. Phase I: Pre-planning and preparatory assistance

During the pre-planning phase of the UN's involvement in a post-conflict peacekeeping or peace-building context, the identification of an appropriate role for the UN in supporting DDR efforts should be based on timely assessments and analyses of the situation and its requirements. The early identification of potential entry points and strategic options for UN support is essential to ensuring the UN's capacity to respond efficiently and effectively. Integrated preparatory activities and pre-mission planning are vital to the delivery of that capacity. While there is no section/unit at UN Headquarters with the specific role of coordinating integrated DDR planning at present, many of the following DDR pre-planning tasks can and should be coordinated by the lead planning department and key operational agencies of the UN country team. Activities that should be included in a preparatory assistance or pre-planning framework include:

- the development of an initial set of strategic options for or assessments of DDR, and the potential role of the UN in supporting DDR;
- the provision of DDR technical advice to special envoys, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General or country-level UN staff within the context of peace negotiations or UN mediation;
- the secondment of DDR specialists or hiring of private DDR consultants (sometimes funded by interested Member States) to assist during the peace process and provide strategic and policy advice to the UN and relevant national parties at country level for planning purposes;
- the assignment of a UN country team to carry out exploratory DDR assessments and surveys as early as possible. These surveys and assessments include: conflict assessment; combatant needs assessments; the identification of reintegration opportunities; and labour and goods markets assessments;
- assessing the in-country DDR planning and delivery capacity to support any DDR programme that might be set up (both UN and national institutional capacities);
- contacting key donors and other international stakeholders on DDR issues with the aim of defining priorities and methods for information sharing and collaboration;
- the early identification of potential key DDR personnel for the integrated DDR unit.

During the pre-planning phase of the UN's involvement in a post-conflict peacekeeping or peace-building context, the identification of an appropriate role for the UN in supporting DDR efforts should be based on timely assessments and analyses of the situation and its requirements. The early identification of potential entry points and strategic options for UN support is essential to ensuring the UN's capacity to respond efficiently and effectively.

### 5.2. Phase II: Initial technical assessment and concept of operations

Once the UN Security Council has requested the UN Secretary-General to present options for possible further UN involvement in supporting peacekeeping and peace-building in a particular country, planning enters a second stage, focusing on an initial technical assessment of the UN role and the preparation of a concept of operations for submission to the Security Council.



In most cases, this process will be initiated through a multidimensional technical assessment mission fielded by the Secretary-General to develop the UN strategy in a conflict area. In this context, DDR is only one of several components such as political affairs, elections, public information, humanitarian assistance, military, security, civilian police, human rights, rule of law, gender equality, child protection, food security, HIV / AIDS and other health matters, cross-border issues, reconstruction, governance, finance and logistic support.

These multidisciplinary technical assessment missions shall integrate inputs from all relevant UN entities (in particular the UN country team), resulting in a joint UN concept of operations. Initial assessments by country-level agencies, together with pre-existing efforts or initiatives, should be used to provide information on which to base the technical assessment for DDR, which itself should be closely linked with other inter-agency processes established to assess immediate post-conflict needs.

A well-prepared and well-conducted technical assessment should focus on:

- the conditions and requirements for DDR;
- its relation to a peace agreement;
- an assessment of national capacities;
- the identification of options for UN support, including strategic objectives and the UN's operational role;
- the role of DDR within the broader UN peace-building and mission strategy;
- the role of UN support in relation to that of other national and international stakeholders.

This initial technical assessment should be used as a basis for a more in-depth assessment required for programme design (also see IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design). The results of this assessment should provide inputs to the Secretary-General's report and any Security Council resolutions and mission mandates that follow (see Annex B for a reference guide on conducting a DDR assessment mission).

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#### 5.2.1. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

The key output of the planning process at this stage should be a recommendation as to whether DDR is the appropriate response for the conflict at hand and whether the UN is well suited to provide support for the DDR programme in the country concerned. This is contained in a report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, which includes the findings of the technical assessment mission.

#### 5.2.2. Mission mandate on DDR

The report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council sometimes contains proposals for the mandate for peace operation. The following points should be considered when providing inputs to the DDR mandate:

- It shall be consistent with the UN approach to DDR;
- While it is important to stress the national aspect of the DDR programme, it is also necessary to recognize the immediate need to provide capacity-building support to increase or bring about national ownership, and to recognize the political difficulties that may complicate national ownership in a transitional situation.

Time-lines for planning and implementation should be realistic. The Security Council, when it establishes a multidimensional UN mission, may assign DDR responsibilities to the UN. This mandate can be either to directly support the national DDR authorities or to

implement aspects of the DDR programme, especially when national capacities are limited. What is important to note is that the nature of a DDR mandate, if one is given, may differ from the recommended concept of operations, for political and other reasons.

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### 5.3. Phase III: Development of a strategic and policy framework (strategic planning)

The inclusion of DDR as a component of the overall UN integrated mission and peace-building support strategy will require the development of initial strategic objectives for the DDR programme to guide further planning and programme development. DDR practitioners shall be required to identify four key elements to create this framework:

- the overall strategic objectives of UN engagement in DDR in relation to national priorities (see Annex C for an example of how DDR aims may be developed);
- the key DDR tasks of the UN (see Annex C for related DDR tasks that originate from the strategic objectives);
- an initial organizational and institutional framework (see IDDRS 3.42 on Personnel and Staffing for the establishment of the integrated DDR unit and IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR);
- the identification of other national and international stakeholders on DDR and the areas of engagement of each.

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The policy and strategy framework for UN support for DDR should ideally be developed after the establishment of the mission, and at the same time as its actual deployment. Several key issues should be kept in mind in developing such a framework:

- To ensure that this framework adequately reflects country realities and needs with respect to DDR, its development should be a joint effort of mission planners (whether Headquarters- or country-based), DDR staff already deployed and the UN country team;
- Development of the framework should also involve consultations with relevant national counterparts, to ensure that UN engagement is consistent with national planning and frameworks;
- The framework should be harmonized — and integrated — with other UN and national planning frameworks, notably Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) results-based budgeting frameworks, UN work plans and transitional appeals, and post-conflict needs assessment processes.

### 5.4. Phase IV: Development of a programme and operational framework

After establishing a strategic objectives and policy framework for UN support for DDR, the UN should start developing a detailed programmatic and operational framework. Refer to IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design for the programme design process and tools to assist in the development of a DDR operational plan.

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The objective of developing a DDR programme and implementation plan is to provide further details on the activities and operational requirements necessary to achieve DDR goals and the strategy identified in the initial planning for DDR. In the context of integrated

DDR approaches, DDR programmes also provide a common framework for the implementation and management of joint activities among actors in the UN system.

In general, the programme design cycle should consist of three main phases:

- *Detailed field assessments:* A detailed field assessment builds on the initial technical assessment described earlier, and is intended to provide a basis for developing the full DDR programme, as well as the implementation and operational plan. The main issues that should be dealt with in a detailed assessment include:
  - the political, social and economic context and background of the armed conflict;
  - the causes, dynamics and consequences of the armed conflict;
  - the identification of participants, potential partners and others involved;
  - the distribution, availability and proliferation of weapons (primarily small arms and light weapons);
  - the institutional capacities of national stakeholders in areas related to DDR;
  - a survey of socio-economic conditions and the capacity of local communities to absorb ex-combatants and their dependants;
  - preconditions and other factors influencing prospects for DDR;
  - baseline data and performance indicators for programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
- *Detailed programme development and costing of requirements:* A DDR 'programme' is a framework that provides an agreed-upon blueprint (i.e., detailed plan) for how DDR will be put into operation in a given context. It also provides the basis for developing operational or implementation plans that provide time-bound information on how individual DDR tasks and activities will be carried out and who will be responsible for doing this. Designing a comprehensive DDR programme is a time- and labour-intensive process that usually takes place after a peacekeeping mission has been authorized and deployment in the field has started. In most cases, the design of a comprehensive UN programme on DDR should be integrated with the design of the national DDR programme and architecture, and linked to the design of programmes in other related sectors as part of the overall transition and recovery plan;
- *Development of an implementation plan:* Once a programme has been developed, planning instruments should be developed that will aid practitioners (UN, non-UN and national government) to implement the activities and strategies that have been planned. Depending on the scale and scope of a DDR programme, an implementation or operations plan usually consists of four main elements: implementation methods; time-frame; a detailed work plan; and management arrangements.

### 5.5. Phase V: Continuation and transition planning

A DDR strategy and plan should remain flexible so as to be able to deal with changing circumstances and demands at the country level, and should possess a capacity to adapt in order to deal with shortcomings and new opportunities. Continuation planning involves a process of periodic reviews, monitoring and real-time evaluations to measure performance and impact during implementation of the DDR programme, as well as revisions to

programmatic and operational plans to make adjustments to the actual implementation process. A DDR programme does not end with the exit of the peacekeeping mission. While security may be restored, the broader task of linking

A DDR programme does not end with the exit of the peacekeeping mission.

the DDR programme to overall development, i.e., the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants and long-term stability, remains. It is therefore essential that the departure of the peacekeeping mission is planned with the UN country team as early as possible to ensure that capacities are sufficiently built up in the country team for it to assume the full financial, logistic and human resources responsibilities for the continuation of the longer-term aspects of the DDR programme.

A second essential requirement is the building of national capacities to assume full responsibility for the DDR programme, which should begin from the start of the DDR programme.

It is therefore essential that the departure of the peacekeeping mission is planned with the UN country team as early as possible to ensure that capacities are sufficiently built up in the country team for it to assume the full financial, logistic and human resources responsibilities for the continuation of the longer-term aspects of the DDR programme.

## 6. Institutional requirements and methods for planning

The objective of an integrated UN approach to DDR in the context of peace operations is to combine the different experiences, competencies and resources of UN funds, programmes, departments and agencies within a common approach and framework for planning and developing DDR programming, and to ensure a consistent and decentralized approach to implementation.

Achieving the above objective requires sound mission planning involving all relevant UN agencies, departments, funds and programmes at both the Headquarters and field levels. The planning of integrated DDR programmes should be coordinated closely with the broader integrated mission planning and design process, and, ideally, should start before the mandate for the mission is adopted.

Within this framework, the following Headquarters- and country-level institutional requirements are needed to ensure an overall integrated approach to developing, implementing and evaluating DDR programming in the country in which it has been implemented.

### 6.1. Planning structures: Headquarters

The establishment of an interdepartmental mission task force (IMTF) provides a framework within which various UN entities should contribute to the coordination and planning of peace operations, and ensures that institutional and field-level capacities and resources work closely and effectively together to achieve the objectives of a particular mission.

An IMTF subgroup on DDR should be established within this framework to ensure an integrated approach to pre-deployment planning at the Headquarters level (i.e., before a field presence has been established). The key planning functions to be covered by the IMTF DDR subgroup should include the design and planning of integrated staffing structures (as far as possible); agreement on common lines of authority for DDR planning, operations and implementation; institutional division of responsibilities; integrated task management organization; the drawing up of an overall budget; and the inclusion of best practices learned from earlier missions. In the pre-deployment phase, the IMTF subgroups should also act as the institutional focal points and links between Headquarters and field operations.

## 6.2. Field DDR planning structures and processes

### 6.2.1. UN country team DDR task force

To ensure effective and sustainable involvement of the UN country team in integrated DDR programming, a UN country team DDR task force (headed by the DSRSG) and technical working group should be established to manage and supervise the integrated approach, including providing the resources and staff that have been agreed upon, being involved in key strategic decisions, and ensuring adequate liaison with Headquarters-level bodies and processes. Individual members of the UN country team shall be responsible for ensuring that their respective agencies, funds or programmes fulfil the responsibilities and carry out the roles defined in the integrated DDR strategy.

### 6.2.2. Mission DDR steering group

Given the involvement of the different components of the mission in DDR or DDR-related activities, a DDR steering group should also be established within the peacekeeping mission to ensure the exchange of information, joint planning and joint operations. The DSRSG should chair such a steering group. The steering group should include, at the very least, the DSRSG (political/rule of law), force commander, police commissioner, chief of civil affairs, chief of political affairs, chief of public information, chief of administration and chief of the DDR unit.

Given the central role played by the UN country team and Resident Coordinator in coordinating UN activities in the field both before and after peace operations, as well as its continued role after peace operations have come to an end, the UN country team should retain strategic oversight of and responsibility, together with the mission, for putting the integrated DDR approach into operation at the field level.

### 6.2.3. Integrated UN DDR unit

An integrated DDR unit should be established within the peacekeeping mission in order to ensure that planning and implementation of the DDR strategy and programmes is comprehensive and coordinated, and includes all the necessary elements, within the mission and among partners in the field (see Annex C and IDDRS 3.42 on Personnel and Staffing).

Given the important differences among the administrative and financial procedures of different UN Agencies, Departments, Funds and Programmes, as well as their various implementation methods, it is not possible to achieve complete operational/administrative integration. Instead, the goal should be complete integration at the planning level and in the methods of the various entities involved in the mission to ensure efficient and timely coordination of operations within this framework.

An integrated and centralized mechanism for reporting on DDR programme results should be established to compile, consolidate and distribute information and monitor results from the activities of all the UN entities involved.

### 6.2.4. Integrated planning, programming and management

To ensure an integrated approach to DDR programme development and management, all UN entities should participate in and contribute to the various processes involved, in particular, conducting comprehensive technical assessments, the design of a programme strategy, the identification of key outputs and results and the development of integrated management arrangements. Participation in these processes is essential to the identification of how each

UN entity can best contribute, according to its particular expertise, to both the integrated DDR strategy and the precise methods for ensuring the best possible coordination and a joint overall approach.

#### 6.2.5. Joint operations and implementation

A joint — as opposed to fully integrated — approach to DDR operations and implementation should be adopted among all participating UN entities, involving close coordination using a common operational work plan. To maximize coordination, overall authority for coordination and supervision of implementation should be delegated to those UN staff integrated into the DDR programme management structure, while the programme should be implemented by the appropriate agency staff.

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>DSRSG</b>	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>IMPP</b>	integrated mission planning process
<b>IMTF</b>	interdepartmental mission task force
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>UN</b>	United Nations



## Annex B: Guide to conducting a DDR technical assessment mission

This annex provides a guide to the preparation and carrying out of a DDR assessment mission.

### Preparation

In order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is gathered from meetings in the mission area, a great deal of preparatory work should be done before starting the assessment mission.

#### Background information

This will include developing a good understanding of the following:

- the UN approach to DDR issues;
- an overview of the regional conflict map; neighbouring States' political, commercial and security interests, etc.;
- the country situation, including the number and availability of small arms and light weapons;<sup>1</sup>
- existing work being performed by the UN country team and other partners, such as the World Bank and non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
- existing provisions for DDR within current security arrangements or peace agreements signed between parties to the conflict;
- the experience of previous DDR operations (if any) and the role of regional organizations and interested Member States.

#### Meetings

Staff members on a DDR assessment visit should plan to meet with representatives from:

- the parties to the conflict at the political and military levels;
- members of the government;
- civil society (such as political parties, church groups, women's organizations, local NGOs, etc.);
- regional mediators or regional organizations, including monitoring bodies;
- interested Member States supporting the peace process;
- members of the UN country team and international organizations;
- major international NGOs.

### Conduct of the DDR assessment mission

The aim of the assessment mission is to develop an in-depth understanding of the key DDR-related areas, in order to ensure efficient, effective and timely planning and resource mobilization for the DDR programme. The DDR staff member(s) of a DDR assessment mission should develop a good understanding of the following areas:

- the legal framework for the DDR programme, i.e., the peace agreement;
- specifically designated groups that will participate in the DDR programme;



- the DDR planning and implementation context;
- international, regional and national implementing partners;
- methods for implementing the different phases of the DDR programme;
- a public information strategy for distributing information about the DDR programme;
- military/police- and security-related DDR tasks;
- administrative and logistic support requirements.

## **Legal framework**

In most post-conflict situations, a peace agreement provides the legal framework for the implementation of a DDR programme. Many of the terms and conditions of the DDR programme should be specified in the peace agreement: who is to be disarmed; by whom; the time schedule for disarmament; the nature of the programme (disengagement, cantonment, type of reintegration assistance); and institutional arrangements (national and international) to guide and implement the programme.

The assessment mission should decide whether the agreed terms and conditions contained in the legal framework are sufficient or realistic enough to allow successful implementation of the DDR programme. If an assessment mission is carried out before any legal framework has been established, efforts should be made to ensure that there is clarity and agreement on the key DDR issues. Much of the required information may not be contained within the peace agreement. Therefore, the joint assessment mission is an important tool to gather more information in order to structure a UN approach to support the mission DDR programme.

## **Assessing the planning and implementation context**

A key aspect of the assessment mission is to understand the opportunities and problems posed by the unique political/diplomatic, military and socio-economic context in the post-conflict society, and assess their implications for the planning and implementation of the DDR programme.

### **Political and diplomatic factors**

#### **Political will**

A genuine commitment of the parties to the process is vital to the success of DDR. Commitment on the part of the former warring parties, as well as the government and the community at large, is essential to ensure that there is national ownership of the DDR programme. Often, the fact that parties have signed a peace agreement indicating their willingness to be disarmed may not always represent actual intent (at all levels of the armed forces and groups) to do so. A thorough understanding of the (potentially different) levels of commitment to the DDR process will be important in determining the methods by which the international community may apply pressure or offer incentives to encourage cooperation. Different incentive (and disincentive) structures are required for senior-, middle- and lower-level members of an armed force or group. It is also important that political and military commanders (senior- and middle-level) have sufficient command and control over their rank and file to ensure compliance with DDR provisions agreed to and included in the peace agreement.

### Inclusive national framework

An inclusive national framework to provide the political and policy guidance for the national DDR programme is central to two guiding principles of a successful programme: national ownership and inclusiveness. Past DDR programmes have been less successful when carried out entirely by the regional or international actors without the same level of local involvement to move the process forward. However, even when there is national involvement in the DDR programme, it is important to ensure that the framework for DDR brings together a broad spectrum of society to include the former warring parties, government, civil society (including children's and women's advocacy groups) and the private sector, as well as regional and international guarantors of the peace process.

### Transition problems and mediation mechanisms

Post-conflict political transition processes generally experience many difficulties. Problems in any one area of the transition process can have serious implications on the DDR programme.<sup>2</sup> A good understanding of these links and potential problems should allow planners to take the required preventive action to keep the DDR process on track, as well as provide a realistic assessment of the future progress of the DDR programme. This assessment may mean that the start of any DDR activities may have to be delayed until issues that may prevent the full commitment of all the parties involved in the DDR programme have been sorted out. For this reason, mechanisms must be established in the peace agreement to mediate the inevitable differences that will arise among the parties, in order to prevent them from undermining or holding up the planning and implementation of the DDR programme.

### Third-party support

Third-party political, diplomatic and financial support is often one such mediation mechanism that can reduce some of the tensions of post-conflict political transitions. Third-party actors, either influential Member States, or regional or international organizations can also focus their attention on the broader aspects of the DDR programme, such as the regional dimension of the conflict, cross-border trafficking of small arms, foreign combatants and displaced civilians, as well as questions of arms embargoes and moratoriums on the transfer of arms, or other sanctions.

## Security factors

### The security situation

A good understanding of the overall security situation in the country where DDR will take place is essential. Conditions and commitment often vary greatly between the capital and the regions, as well as among regions. This will influence the approach to DDR. The existing security situation is one indicator of how soon and where DDR can start, and should be assessed for all stages of the DDR programme. A situation where combatants can be disarmed and demobilized, but their safety when they return to their areas of reintegration cannot be guaranteed will also be problematic.

### Security and enforcement capacity for DDR

The capacity of local authorities to provide security for commanders and disarmed combatants to carry out voluntary or coercive disarmament must be carefully assessed. A lack of national capacity in these two areas will seriously affect the resources needed by the peacekeeping force. UN military, civilian police and support capacities may be required to

perform this function in the early phase of the peacekeeping mission, while simultaneously developing national capacities to eventually take over from the peacekeeping mission. If this security function is provided by a non-UN multinational force (e.g., an African Union or NATO force), the structure and processes for joint planning and operations must be assessed to ensure that such a force and the peacekeeping mission cooperate and coordinate effectively to implement (or support the implementation of) a coherent DDR programme.

#### Building confidence

Ceasefires, disengagement and voluntary disarmament of forces are important confidence-building measures, which, when carried out by the parties, can have a positive effect on the DDR and wider recovery programme. The international community should, wherever possible, support these initiatives. Also, mechanisms should be put in place to investigate violations of ceasefires, etc., in a transparent manner.

### Socio-economic factors

#### Overall socio-economic conditions

The post-conflict socio-economic condition of the country is a major factor in determining the kind of DDR programme that should be implemented. The level of unemployment, the state of the (formal and informal) economy and the agricultural sector (i.e., access to land, rights and the ability of the country to feed itself), the condition of the country's infrastructure, and the capacity of state institutions to deliver basic services, combined with the length of the conflict, are all factors that should be taken into account when considering the specifics of any demobilization (length and types of programme) and socio-economic (reconciliation, justice issues and types of economic assistance) reintegration programme.

#### Local participation

The role of the receiving communities is central to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. Therefore, close consultation must take place with all levels of the local community about the possible implications of the DDR programme for these communities, and the type of support (economic, reconciliation, etc.) required to reintegrate ex-combatants. This issue of returning ex-combatants to the communities must be assessed together with the overall impact of all the groups of people who will return, including internally displaced persons and refugees.

#### A development approach

DDR programmes can succeed only if there is a strong link with a national recovery programme, which provides not only for political and economic development, but also for a restructuring and reform of the State's security sector and the fostering of national reconciliation. An assessment should ascertain if these factors are being considered and who will be supporting this aspect of post-conflict peace-building.

### Weapons control framework

The weapons control framework is another key element that affects a DDR programme. Constitutional and legislative guarantees for weapons ownership, the import/export of small arms, and the regulation of the national gun industry and private security firms must be considered in terms of how they support or limit the effective implementation of a DDR programme. Equally important are the national administrative infrastructure and enforcement capacity to implement the weapons control framework.

## Arms embargoes

The assessment mission should examine the illicit supply of small arms and light weapons coming into the post-conflict zone. This is often caused by porous borders and weak border-policing capacities. Arms embargoes should be considered as one tool available to deal with illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, thus supporting both DDR and the wider national recovery programme.

## Defining specific groups for DDR

The character, size, composition and location of the groups specifically identified for DDR are among the required details that are often not included in the legal framework, but which are essential to the development and implementation of a DDR programme. In consultation with the parties and other implementing partners on the ground, the assessment mission should develop a detailed picture of:

- *WHO* will be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated;
- *WHAT* weapons are to be collected, destroyed and disposed of;
- *WHERE* in the country the identified groups are situated, and where those being disarmed and demobilized will be resettled or repatriated to;
- *WHEN* DDR will (or can) take place, and in what sequence for which identified groups, including the priority of action for the different identified groups.

It is often difficult to get this information from the former warring parties. Therefore, the UN should find other, independent sources, such as Member States or local or regional agencies, in order to acquire information. Community-based organizations are a particularly useful source of information on armed groups.

Potential targets for disarmament include government armed forces, opposition armed groups, civil defence forces, irregular armed groups and armed individuals. These generally include:

- male and female combatants, and those associated with the fighting groups, such as those performing support roles (voluntarily or because they have been forced to) or who have been abducted;
- child (boys and girls) soldiers, and those associated with the armed forces and groups;
- foreign combatants;
- dependants of combatants.

The end product of this part of the assessment of the armed forces and groups should be a detailed listing of the key features of the armed forces/groups.

## DDR planning and implementation partners

The assessment mission should document the relative capacities of the various potential DDR partners (UN family; other international, regional and national actors) in the mission area that can play a role in implementing (or supporting the implementation of) the DDR programme.

## UN funds, agencies and programmes

UN agencies can perform certain functions needed for DDR. The resources available to the UN agencies in the country in question should be assessed and reflected in discussions at Headquarters level amongst the agencies concerned. The United Nations Development

Programme may already be running a DDR programme in the mission area. This, along with support from other members of the DDR inter-agency forum, will provide the basis for the integrated DDR unit and the expansion of the DDR operation into the peacekeeping mission, if required.

#### International and regional organizations

Other international organizations, such as the World Bank, and other regional actors may be involved in DDR before the arrival of the peacekeeping mission. Their role should also be taken into account in the overall planning and implementation of the DDR programme.

#### Non-governmental organizations

NGOs are usually the major implementing partners of specific DDR activities as part of the overall programme. The various NGOs contain a wide range of expertise, from child protection and gender issues to small arms, they tend to have a more intimate awareness of local culture and are an integral partner in a DDR programme of a peacekeeping mission. The assessment mission should identify the major NGOs that can work with the UN and the government, and should involve them in the planning process at the earliest opportunity.

### Support requirements

Following a review of the extent and nature of the problem and an assessment of the relative capacities of other partners, the assessment mission should determine the DDR support (finance, staffing and logistics) requirements, both in the pre-mandate and establishment phases of the peacekeeping mission.

#### Finance

The amount of money required for the overall DDR programme should be estimated, including what portions are required from the assessed budget and what is to come from voluntary contributions. In the pre-mandate period, the potential of quick-impact projects that can be used to stabilize ex-combatant groups or communities before the formal start of the DDR should be examined. Finance and budgeting processes are detailed in IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting.

#### Staffing

The civilian staff, civilian police and military staff requirements for the planning and implementation of the DDR programme should be estimated, and a deployment sequence for these staff should be drawn up. The integrated DDR unit should contain personnel representing mission components directly related to DDR operations: military; police; logistic support; public information; etc. (integrated DDR personnel and staffing matters are discussed in IDDRS 3.42 on Personnel and Staffing).

The material requirements for DDR should also be estimated, in particular weapons storage facilities, destruction machines and disposal equipment, as well as requirements for the demobilization phase of the operation, including transportation (air and land). Mission and programme support logistics matters are discussed in IDDRS 3.40 on Mission and Programme Support for DDR.

### The structure and content of the joint assessment report

The assessment mission report should be submitted in the following format (Section II on the approach of the UN forms the input into the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council):

◀▶ 3.41

◀▶ 3.42

◀▶ 3.40

- Preface
  - Maps
  - Introduction
  - Background
  - Summary of the report
- Section I: Situation
  - Armed forces and groups
  - Political context
  - Socio-economic context
  - Security context
  - Legal context
  - Lessons learned from previous DDR operations in the region, the country and elsewhere (as relevant)
  - Implications and scenarios for DDR programme
  - Key guiding principles for DDR operations
  - Existing DDR programme in country
- Section II: The UN approach
  - DDR strategy and priorities
  - Support for national processes and institutions
  - Approach to disarmament
  - Approach to demobilization
  - Approach to socio-economic reintegration
  - Approach to children, women and disabled people in the DDR programme
  - Approach to public information
  - Approach to weapons control regimes (internal and external)
  - Approach to funding of the DDR programme
  - Role of the international community
- Section III: Support requirements
  - Budget
  - Staffing
  - Logistics
- Suggested annexes
  - Relevant Security Council resolution authorizing the assessment mission
  - Terms of reference of the multidisciplinary assessment mission
  - List of meetings conducted
  - Summary of armed forces and groups
  - Additional information on weapons flows in the region
  - Information on existing disarmament and reintegration activities
  - Lessons learned and evaluations of past disarmament and demobilization programmes
  - Proposed budget, staffing structure and logistic requirements



## Annex C: Developing the DDR strategic objectives and policy frameworks

### An example of DDR strategic objectives

The UN DDR strategic framework consists of three interrelated strategic policy objectives, and supports the overall UN aim of a stable and peaceful country x, and the accompanying DDR tasks.

#### DDR strategic objective #1

A detailed, realistic and achievable DDR implementation annex in the comprehensive peace agreement.

##### Key tasks

The UN should assist in achieving this aim by providing technical support to the parties at the peace talks to support the development of:

1. Clear and sound DDR approaches for the different identified groups, with a focus on social and economic reintegration;
2. An equal emphasis on vulnerable identified groups (children, women and disabled people) in or associated with the armed forces and groups;
3. A detailed description of the disposition and deployment of armed forces and groups (local and foreign) to be included in the DDR programme;
4. A realistic time-line for the commencement and duration of the DDR programme;
5. Unified national political, policy and operational mechanisms to support the implementation of the DDR programme;
6. A clear division of labour among parties (government and party x) and other implementing partners (DPKO [civilian, military]; UN agencies, funds and programmes; international financial organizations [World Bank]; and local and international NGOs).

#### DDR strategic objective #2

A well-resourced, joint strategic and operational plan for the implementation of DDR in country x.

##### Key tasks

The UN should assist in achieving this aim by providing planning capacities and physical resources to:

1. Establish all-inclusive joint planning mechanisms;
2. Develop a time-phased concept of the DDR operations;
3. Establish division of labour for key DDR tasks;
4. Estimate the broad resource requirements;
5. Start securing voluntary contributions;
6. Start the procurement of DDR items with long lead times;
7. Start the phased recruitment of personnel required from DPKO and other UN agencies;
8. Raise a military component from the armed forces of Member States for DDR activities;
9. Establish an effective public information campaign;
10. Establish programmatic links between the DDR operation and other areas of the mission's work: security sector reform; recovery and reconstruction; etc.;
11. Support the implementation of the established DDR strategy/plan.

### DDR strategic objective #3

A national weapons management programme and a regional strategy to stop the flow of small arms and light weapons into country x.

#### Key tasks

To ensure a comprehensive approach to disarmament, the UN should also focus on the supply side of the weapons issue. In this regard, the UN can provide technical, political (good offices) and diplomatic support to:

- assist the parties to establish and implement necessary weapons management legislation;
- support country x's capacity to implement the UN *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* in 2001 (A/Conf.192/15);
- support regional initiatives to control the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons in the region.



## Endnotes

- 1 A good source for this information is the relevant Small Arms Survey report; see <http://www.small-armssurvey.org>.
- 2 In Liberia, the dispute over the allocation of ministerial positions resulted in the walkout of junior members of the three factions in the first meeting of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in 2003, while uncertainty and disagreement over elections delayed the start of the DDR programme in Côte d'Ivoire.

# 3.20 DDR Programme Design

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates:  
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## 3.20 DDR Programme Design

### Summary

Each programme design cycle, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme design cycle, has three stages: (1) detailed field assessments; (2) detailed programme development and costing of requirements; and (3) development of an implementation plan. Throughout the programme design cycle, it is of the utmost importance to use a flexible approach. While experiencing each stage of the cycle and moving from one stage to the other, it is important to ensure coordination among all the participants and stakeholders involved, especially national stakeholders. A framework that would probably work for integrated DDR programme design is the post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA), which ensures consistency between United Nations (UN) and national objectives, while considering differing approaches to DDR.

Before the detailed programme design cycle can even begin, a comprehensive field needs assessment should be carried out, focusing on areas such as the country's social, economic and political context; possible participants, beneficiaries and partners in the DDR programme; the operational environment; and key priority objectives. This assessment helps to establish important aspects such as positive or negative factors that can affect the outcome of the DDR programme, baseline factors for programme design and identification of institutional capacities for carrying out DDR.

During the second stage of the cycle, key considerations include identifying DDR participants and beneficiaries, as well as performance indicators, such as reintegration opportunities, the security situation, size and organization of the armed forces and groups, socio-economic baselines, the availability and distribution of weapons, etc. Also, methodologies for data collection together with analysis of assessment results (quantitative, qualitative, mass surveys, etc.) need to be decided.

When developing DDR programme documents, the central content should be informed by strategic objectives and outcomes, key principles of intervention, preconditions and, most importantly, a strategic vision and approach. For example, in determining an overall strategic approach to DDR, the following questions should be asked: (1) How will multiple components of DDR programme design reflect the realities and needs of the situation? (2) How will eligibility criteria for entry in the DDR programme be determined? (3) How will DDR activities be organized into phases and in what order will they take place within the recommended programme time-frame? (4) Which key issues are vital to the implementation of the programme? Defining the overall approach to DDR defines how the DDR programme will, ultimately, be put into operation.

When developing the results and budgeting framework, an important consideration should be ensuring that the programme that is designed complies with the peacekeeping results-based budgeting framework, and establishing a sequence of stages for the implementation of the programme.

The final stage of the DDR programme design cycle should include developing planning instruments to aid practitioners (UN, non-UN and government) to implement the activities

and strategies that have been planned. When formulating the sequence of stages for the implementation of the programme, particular attention should be paid to coordinated management arrangements, a detailed work plan, timing and methods of implementation.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides guidance on how to develop a DDR programme. It is therefore the fourth stage of the overall DDR planning cycle, following the assessment of DDR requirements (which forms the basis for the DDR mandate) and the development of a strategic and policy framework for UN support to DDR (which covers key objectives, activities, basic institutional/operational requirements, and links with the joint assessment mission (JAM) and other processes; also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures).

This module does not deal with the actual content of DDR processes (which is covered in IDDRS Levels 4 and 5), but rather describes the methods, procedures and steps necessary for the development of a programme strategy, results framework and operational plan. Assessments are essential to the success or failure of a programme, and not a mere formality.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the word ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

## 3. Introduction

In the past, the quality, consistency and effectiveness of UN support for DDR has suffered as a result of a number of problems, including a narrowly defined ‘operational/logistic’ approach, inadequate attention to the national and local context, and poor coordination between UN actors and other partners in the delivery of DDR support services.

The IDDRS are intended to solve most of these problems. The application of an integrated approach to DDR should go beyond integrated or joint planning and organizational arrangements, and should be supported by an integrated programme and implementation framework for DDR.

In order to do this, the inputs of various agencies need to be defined, organized and placed in sequence within a framework of objectives, results and outputs that together establish how the UN will support each DDR process. The need for an all-inclusive programme and implementation framework is emphasized by the lengthy time-frame of DDR (which in some cases can go beyond the lifespan of a UN peacekeeping mission, necessitating

close cooperation with the UN country team), the multisectoral nature of interventions, the range of sub-processes and stakeholders, and the need to ensure close coordination with national and other DDR-related efforts.

## 4. The programme design cycle

DDR programme and implementation plans are developed so as to provide further details on the activities and operational requirements necessary to achieve DDR goals and carry out the strategy identified in the initial planning of DDR. In the context of integrated DDR approaches, DDR programmes also provide a common framework for the implementation and management of joint activities among actors in the UN system.

In general, the programme design cycle consists of three main stages:

- I: Conducting a detailed field assessment;
- II: Preparing the programme document and budget;
- III: Developing an implementation plan.

Given that the support provided by the UN for DDR forms one part of a larger multi-stakeholder process, the development of a UN programme and implementation framework should be carried out with national and other counterparts, and, as far as possible, should be combined with the development of a national DDR programme.

The development of a UN programme and implementation framework should be carried out with national and other counterparts.

There are several frameworks that can be used to coordinate programme development efforts. One of the most appropriate frameworks is the post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) process, which attempts to define the overall objectives, strategies and activities for a number of different interventions in different sectors, including DDR. The PCNA represents an important mechanism to ensure consistency between UN and national objectives and approaches to DDR, and defines the specific role and contributions of the UN, which can then be fed into the programme development process.

## 5. Stage I: Conducting a detailed field assessment

### 5.1. Objectives

A detailed field assessment builds on assessments and planning for DDR that have been carried out in the pre-planning and technical assessment stages of the planning process (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures). Contributing to the design of the DDR programme, the detailed field assessment:

- deepens understanding of key DDR issues and the broader operating environment;
- verifies information gathered during the technical assessment mission;
- verifies the assumptions on which planning will be based, and defines the overall approach of DDR;
- identifies key priority objectives, issues of concern, and target and performance indicators;

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- identifies operational DDR options and interventions that are precisely targeted, realistic and sustainable.

## 5.2. Planning for an assessment

The following should be considered when planning a detailed field assessment for DDR:

- *Scope:* From the start of DDR, practitioners should determine the geographical area that will be covered by the programme, how long the programme will last, and the level of detail and accuracy needed for its smooth running and financing. The scope and depth of this detailed field assessment will depend on the amount of information gathered in previous assessments, such as the technical assessment mission. The current political and military situation in the country concerned and the amount of access possible to areas where combatants are located should also be carefully considered;
- *Thematic areas of focus:* The detailed field assessment should deepen understanding, analysis and assessments conducted in the pre-mission period. It therefore builds on information gathered on the following thematic areas:
  - political, social and economic context and background;
  - causes, dynamics and consequences of the armed conflict;
  - identification of specific groups, potential partners and others involved in the discussion process;
  - distribution, availability and proliferation of weapons (primarily small arms and light weapons);
  - institutional capacities of national stakeholders in areas related to DDR;
  - survey of socio-economic conditions and local capacities to absorb ex-combatants and their dependants;
  - preconditions and other factors that will influence DDR;
  - baseline data and performance indicators for programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

(Also see Annex B of IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures.);

- *Expertise:* The next step is to identify the DDR expertise required. Assessment teams should be composed of specialists in all aspects of DDR (see IDDRS Level 5 for more information on the different needs that have to be met during a DDR mission). To ensure coherence with the political process and overall objectives of the peacekeeping mandate, the assessment should be led by a member of the UN DDR unit;
- *Local participation:* Where the political situation allows, national and local participation in the assessment should be emphasized to ensure that local analyses of the situation, the needs and appropriate solutions are reflected and included in the DDR programme. There is a need, however, to be aware of local bias, especially in the tense immediate post-conflict environment;
- *Building confidence and managing expectations:* Where possible, detailed field assessments should be linked with preparatory assistance projects and initiatives (e.g., community development programmes and quick-impact projects) to build confidence in and support for the DDR programme. Care must be taken, however, not to raise unrealistic expectations of the DDR programme;
- *Design of the field assessment:* Before starting the assessment, DDR practitioners should:

- identify the research objectives and indicators (what are we assessing?);
- identify the sources and methods for data collection (where are we going to obtain our information?);
- develop appropriate analytical tools and techniques (how are we going to make sense of our data?);
- develop a method for interpreting the findings in a practical way (how are we going to apply the results?);
- *Being flexible:* Thinking about and answering these questions are essential to developing a well-designed approach and work plan that allows for a systematic and well-structured data collection process. Naturally, the approach will change once data collection begins in the field, but this should not in any way reduce its importance as an initial guiding blueprint.

### 5.3. Implementing the assessment

In order to provide structured and precise data (both qualitative and quantitative) for the development of a DDR programme strategy and the accompanying implementation plan, the assessment should collect data on the basis of clear research objectives and indicators.

Assessment objectives and indicators can be divided into two main categories:

- 1) an assessment of the operational environment for DDR (see Annex B for a complete framework for the analysis of a DDR operating environment);
- 2) an assessment of those expected to participate in the DDR programme and of performance indicators (see Annex C for a complete framework for the analysis of DDR participants and beneficiaries, and performance indicators).

#### 5.3.1. Framework for an assessment

An assessment of the DDR operating environment, potential participants, and programme and performance indicators should include the following:

- assessment objectives;
- indicators;
- methodology;
- risks and assumptions.

#### 5.3.2. Assessing the operational environment for DDR: Assessment objectives

The following should be taken into account when analysing the operational environment in which DDR will take place:

- *Identify factors that can positively or negatively affect the outcome of DDR:* A number of legal, political, socio-economic, security, regional and international factors can influence the prospects, effectiveness and sustainability of a DDR programme. Using relevant indicators, these factors need to be identified and mapped in order to clearly define the policy and operational environment, identify key preconditions and foundations, and enable effective threat analysis and the development of strategies to reduce risk;
- *Map baseline indicators to prepare appropriate benchmarks for DDR programme design:* DDR programmes have two general aims: to decrease the overall incidence of (or potential for) armed violence; and to improve the socio-economic conditions and productivity



in host communities. Defining baseline indicators in both these areas (including, for example, the incidence and type of violence and demographic community profiles) can allow the development of appropriate programme strategies and serve as programme design benchmarks;

- *Assess institutional capacities to undertake DDR:* The extent of UN support to a DDR programme will depend on the level of national institutional and other capacities within the government, civil society and communities. Assessing existing capacity in the areas of disarmament/weapons control, demobilization, reintegration and the ability of communities to absorb ex-combatants and their dependants therefore provides key indicators for establishing the extent and scope of UN support for DDR.

### 5.3.3. Assessing the operational environment for DDR: Assessment indicators

Analysis of the objectives should be based on a review of following indicators (factors):

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS (FACTORS)
1. Identify factors that can positively or negatively affect the outcome of DDR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Normative</li> <li>■ Political</li> <li>■ Socio-economic</li> <li>■ Security</li> <li>■ Regional</li> <li>■ International</li> <li>■ Weapons trafficking</li> </ul>
2. Identify baseline factors to prepare appropriate benchmarks for DDR programme design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Level of violence</li> <li>■ Socio-economic</li> </ul>
3. Identify institutional capacities to carry out DDR in the areas listed on the right	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Disarmament/Weapons control</li> <li>■ Demobilization</li> <li>■ Reintegration</li> <li>■ Capacity of communities to absorb ex-combatants and their dependants</li> <li>■ National infrastructures (health, education, etc.)</li> </ul>

### 5.3.4. Identifying DDR participants and beneficiaries, and performance indicators: Assessment objectives

To establish the appropriate performance indicators when analysing the potential participants in the DDR programme, five factors should be considered:

- *The size, organization and deployment of participants:* The size and nature of the DDR programme will depend, to a large extent, on the number, organization and profile of eligible combatants. Collecting data on both command and control, and combatant profiles (military, socio-economic, demographic, location, sex, age, health, and numbers of non-combatant associates and dependants) provides DDR programme designers with a way to accurately assess overall group size, identify client groups, and design the DDR approach according to the specific organization and profile of the armed forces and groups;
- *The availability and distribution of weapons:* The extent to which a DDR programme is able to effectively reduce the availability of weapons in a post-conflict context is determined

to some degree by the accuracy of disarmament/weapons collection targets. In order to set these, it is necessary to estimate the total number of weapons available, as well as their distribution. This information can allow the identification and prioritization of programme participants, help refine incentive schemes to increase the numbers of weapons collected, and be used as a baseline to assess the overall effectiveness of the weapons reduction component of DDR;

- *The reintegration opportunities for the primary participant group:* The sustainable socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, women and children associated with armed forces and groups, and dependants, requires the development of economically viable reintegration options and strategies. The development of reintegration schemes should be based on a thorough understanding of conditions in areas of return/resettlement (including local markets for goods and services, infrastructure and economic needs), as well as an assessment of viable reintegration options;
- *The socio-economic baseline in the country under reconstruction:* DDR programmes should contribute to improving the economic conditions in host communities through increased security, and through programmes that boost employment and economic productivity. Measuring key development indicators before and after DDR programme implementation will help to assess the effectiveness of DDR in meeting these goals;
- *The security situation:* Obtaining data on levels of armed violence, impacts on security (direct/indirect), levels and types of victimization, and local perceptions of security helps to establish a baseline against which to measure changes in the security situation and the contribution of DDR to an overall increase in security.

### 5.3.5. Identifying DDR participants and performance indicators: Assessment indicators

A review of the following indicators should be carried out:

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS (FACTORS)
1. Measure development context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Level of resources in host communities</li> <li>■ Prices of basic commodities</li> <li>■ Levels of employment</li> </ul>
2. Measure security context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Level of armed violence</li> <li>■ Level of victimization</li> <li>■ Perceptions of security</li> </ul>
3. Identify size, organization and deployment of primary participant group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Command and control</li> <li>■ Profile of combatants: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ sex</li> <li>□ age (numbers of children, youth, adults)</li> <li>□ number of disabled</li> <li>□ health status (including chronic illness, HIV/AIDS)</li> <li>□ number of dependants</li> <li>□ number of foreign combatants</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
4. Identify availability and distribution of weapons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Number of weapons individually owned</li> <li>■ Number of weapons collectively owned</li> <li>■ Ammunition stocks</li> </ul>
5. Identify reintegration opportunities for the primary participant group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Potential areas of return</li> <li>■ Opportunities in areas of return, including job creation</li> </ul>

### 5.3.6. Methodologies for data collection

Once the outlines for the assessment have been developed, the next stage should be to decide on the best methods to collect data, some of which are:

- direct observation;
- key informant interviews and focus groups;
- mass surveys;
- participatory assessments;
- market research;
- institutional capacity research;
- sampling.

The best approach is to be flexible and ‘mix and match’ methodologies. Data should be collected from as broad a sample as possible, and particular efforts should be made to include women, younger people (youth) and children. In an unstable context with unreliable or fragmentary data, multiple sources and techniques can be used, and results derived through triangulation or cross-checking of information.

The sections below describe each one of these methodologies for data collection.

#### 5.3.6.1. Direct observation

Several vital types of information can only be collected by direct observation. This can include sighting weapons (recording type, model, serial number, country of manufacture and condition); examining weapons caches and stockpiles (geographic location, distribution, contents and condition of weapons, physical size, etc.); recording information on military installations and forces (location, size, identity, etc.); investigating weapons markets and other commercial transactions (supply and demand, prices, etc.); and recording the effects of small arms (displaced camps and conditions, destruction of infrastructure, types of wounds caused by small arms, etc.). Direct observation may also be a useful technique to obtain information about ‘hidden’ members of armed groups and forces, such as children, abductees and foreign fighters, whose association with the group may not be formally acknowledged.

#### 5.3.6.2. Key informant interviews and focus groups

Interviews and focus groups are essential to obtain information on, for example, command structures, numbers and types of people associated with the group, weaponry, etc., through direct testimony and group discussions. Vital information, e.g., numbers, types and distribution of weapons, as well as on weapons trafficking, children and abductees being held by armed forces and groups and foreign fighters (which some groups may try to conceal), can often be obtained directly from ex-combatants, local authorities or civilians. Although the information given may not be quantitatively precise or reliable, important qualitative conclusions can be drawn from it. Corroboration by multiple sources is a tried and tested method of ensuring the validity of the data (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament, IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR, IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR and IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

#### 5.3.6.3. Mass-based surveys

Surveys can reveal important information, e.g., on trends in weapons availability, possession and distribution among ex-combatants; or information on the extent and nature of armed violence against civilians. The success or failure of a mass-based survey ultimately depends

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on several factors, including the willingness of combatants and civilians to disclose sensitive information, access to affected areas, design and administration of the questionnaire (is it easy to understand and administer?), and the extent to which the sample used in the survey is inclusive and representative.

#### 5.3.6.4. Participatory assessments

Participatory assessments, using the tools and methodology of participatory rural assessment (PRA),<sup>1</sup> is a useful methodology when the real issues and problems are not known to the researcher, and provides a way to avoid the problem of researcher bias in orientation and analysis. It is a particularly useful methodology when working with illiterate people, and can be adapted for use with different ages and sexes. To date, PRA tools have been used in security-related research, e.g.: for a small arms assessment, to explore subjective perceptions of small arms-related insecurity (e.g., what impacts are most felt by civilians?); to obtain overviews of militia organizations and weapons distribution (through social mapping and history time-line exercises); and to identify community perceptions of matters relating to security sector reform (SSR), e.g., policing.

#### 5.3.6.5. Market research

Two sets of market research should be carried out. The first focuses on gathering information relating to small arms. This could include: information on prices and how these have changed over time; identification of companies and other entities involved in weapons production, procurement and distribution; and details on weapons pipelines. This can provide important data on the nature, size and dynamics of the market or trade in small arms. Price information, particularly when collected at different locations within a country, can give insights into supply and demand dynamics that reveal differences in the extent of small arms proliferation and availability. Market research can also be used as a preventive measure by monitoring small arms prices, where a dramatic spike in prices usually indicates an upsurge in demand.

A second set of market research should focus on gathering information on the local economic and employment situation so as to identify opportunities in the job market for reintegrating combatants (also see IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration).

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#### 5.3.6.6. Institutional capacity assessments

An assessment of the national institutional capacity to manage and implement the different aspects of DDR requires an evaluation of existing institutions and systems, human resources, and capacities. Three issues are of particular importance: the examination of existing capacities, as compared with those that are still needed; the efficiency and effectiveness of existing management structures; and the adequacy of legal and regulatory frameworks. This assessment should provide information on institutional capacities for weapons collection and control, institutional coordination, managing and running demobilization camps, managing information flows, and providing support for reintegration planning and implementation.

#### 5.3.6.7. Sampling

Although not a method for collecting or analysing information, sampling is a useful tool for determining the scope, focus and precision of data collection activities, and should be used together with all of the methods described above. Through sampling, general insight on specific DDR issues can be obtained from civilian populations and subgroups (especially armed forces and groups). The key to obtaining valid assumptions through sampling is to ensure that the population sampled is representative, i.e., has characteristics broadly similar

to those of the entire population. The decision whether to use random as opposed to non-random sampling, or stratified as opposed to clustered sampling must be taken after a careful assessment of the context, research needs and amount of diversity in the population that is being studied.

#### 5.3.7. Analysing results: Tools and techniques

Once datasets for different themes or areas have been generated, the next step is to make sense of the results. Several analytical tools and techniques can be used, depending on the degree of accuracy needed and the quality of the data:

- *Qualitative analytical tools* are used to make sense of facts, descriptions and perceptions through comparative analysis, inference, classification and categorization. Such tools help to understand the context; the political, social and historical background; and the details that numbers alone cannot provide;
- *Quantitative analytical tools* (statistical, geometric and financial) are used to calculate trends and distribution, and help to accurately show the size and extent, quantity and dispersion of the factors being studied;
- *Estimation and extrapolation* help to obtain generalized findings or results from sampled data. Given the large geographical areas in which DDR assessments are carried out, estimating and extrapolating based on a representative sample is the only way to obtain an idea of the 'bigger picture';
- *Triangulation* (cross-referencing), or the comparison of results from three different methods or data sources, helps to confirm the validity of data collected in contexts where information is fragmentary, imprecise or unreliable. Although normally used with direct observation and interviewing (where facts are confirmed by using three or more different sources), triangulation can also be applied between different methods, to increase the probability of reaching a reasonably accurate result, and to maximize reliability and validity;
- *Geographic/Demographic mapping*, which draws on all the techniques mentioned above, involves plotting the information gained about participants and beneficiaries geographically (i.e., the way they are spread over a geographical area) or chronologically (over time) to determine their concentration, spread and any changes over time.

## 6. Stage II: Preparing the DDR programme document

Designing a comprehensive DDR programme document is a time- and labour-intensive process that usually takes place after a peacekeeping mission has been authorized, and before deployment in the field has started.

The programme document represents a blueprint for how DDR will be put into operation, and by whom. It is different from an implementation plan (which is often more technical), provides time-lines and information on how individual DDR tasks and activities will be carried out, and assigns responsibilities.

The comprehensive DDR assessment will be the main source of primary data on which to draw when defining programme strategies, targets and so on. The programme design process should also be based on pre-

Designing a comprehensive DDR programme document is a time- and labour-intensive process.

existing assessments and strategy development, most importantly the pre-mandate assessment and concept of operations, and should revalidate, refine and build on these key elements:

- strategic objectives and outcomes;
- key principles of intervention;
- preconditions;
- strategic vision and approach.

The key components of a DDR programme document are shown in the table below:

COMPONENT	DESCRIPTION
Contextual analysis and rationale	Key contextual and situational aspects that influence DDR objectives, overall strategy and targeting
Objectives	Overall goal of DDR that specifies the general outcome it strives to contribute towards and a series of objectives that detail expected outputs for each sub-sector of activity
Guiding principles	Description of factors, considerations and assumptions that are considered important for the overall viability, effectiveness and sustainability of the programme, and therefore help to structure its strategic approach and activities
Preconditions and foundations	Description of issues and factors that should be addressed or incorporated into the design of the DDR programme to ensure its effectiveness and viability
Strategic approach	Description of how DDR will be implemented to achieve the stated objectives and outcomes, including a focus on operational strategies; the sequence of events and the phases in which they will occur; and key strategic elements, including programme scale and scope, targets and beneficiaries, eligibility criteria, incentive schemes, and monitoring and evaluation
Component strategies	Description of detailed implementation strategies for each programme component, including disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, reintegration, repatriation, public awareness/sensitization, weapons control and capacity development
Results and budgeting framework	Logical framework that clearly defines the hierarchy of outputs, activities and inputs necessary to achieve the planned objectives and outcomes of the DDR programme
Implementation methods	Description of how each DDR component will be made operational within the framework of the programme, focusing on the precise sequencing of activities, operational requirements, logistic requirements, links with other mission components, partners, key risks and factors that will decrease these risks
Time-frames	An overview of the time-frame and schedule for implementation of DDR activities
Detailed work plan	A breakdown of all programme activities into tasks, and details of the actors responsible for different operational roles
Management arrangements	Institutional arrangements established to provide strategic guidance, coordination and implementation of the programme



## 6.1. Contextual analysis and rationale

The DDR programme document should be based on an in-depth understanding of the national or local context and the situation in which the programme is to be implemented, as this will shape the objectives, overall strategy and criteria for entry, as follows:

- *General context and problem:* This defines the ‘problem’ of DDR in the specific context in which it will be implemented (levels of violence, provisions in peace accords, lack of alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants, etc.), with a focus on the nature and consequences of the conflict; existing national and local capacities for DDR and SSR; and the broad political, social and economic characteristics of the operating environment;
- *Rationale and justification:* Drawing from the situation analysis, this explains the need for DDR: why the approach suggested is an appropriate and viable response to the identified problem, the antecedents to the problem (i.e., what caused the problem in the first place) and degree of political will for its resolution; and any other factors that provide a compelling argument for undertaking DDR. In addition, the engagement and role of the UN should be specified here;
- *Overview of armed forces and groups:* This section should provide an overview of all armed forces and groups and their key characteristics, e.g., force/group strength, location, organization and structure, political affiliations, type of weaponry, etc. This information should be the basis for developing specifically designed strategies and approaches for the DDR of the armed forces and groups (see Annex D for a sample table of armed forces and groups);
- *Definition of participants and beneficiaries:* Drawing on the comprehensive assessments and profiles of armed groups and forces and levels of violence that are normally included in the framework, this section should identify which armed groups and forces should be prioritized for DDR programmes. This prioritization should be based on their involvement in or potential to cause violence, or otherwise affect security and the peace process. In addition, subgroups that should be given special attention (e.g., special needs groups) should be identified;
- *Socio-economic profile in areas of return:* A general overview of socio-economic conditions in the areas and communities to which ex-combatants will return is important in order to define both the general context of reintegration and specific strategies to ensure effective and sustainable support for it. Such an overview can also provide an indication of how much pre-DDR community recovery and reconstruction assistance will be necessary to improve the communities’ capacity to absorb former combatants and other returning populations, and list potential links to other, either ongoing or planned, reconstruction and development initiatives.

## 6.2. DDR programme objectives

Because the DDR programme document should contain strategies and requirements for a complex and multi-component process, it should be guided by both an overall goal and a series of smaller objectives that clearly define expected outputs in each subsector. While generic (general) objectives exist, they should be adapted to the realities and needs of each context. The set of general and specific objectives outlined in this section make up the overall framework for the DDR programme.

*Example: Objectives of the national DDR programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)*

**General objective:** Contribute to the consolidation of peace, national reconciliation and the socio-economic reconstruction of the country, as well as regional stability.

*Specific objectives:*

- Disarm combatants belonging to the armed groups and forces that will not be integrated into the DRC armed forces or in the police, as foreseen in the DRC peace accords;
- Demobilize the military elements and armed groups not eligible for integration into the DRC armed forces;
- Reintegrate demobilized elements into social and economic life within the framework of community productive systems.

### 6.3. Guiding principles

The guiding principles specify those factors, considerations and assumptions that are considered important for a DDR programme's overall viability, effectiveness and sustainability. These guiding principles must be taken into account when developing the strategic approach and activities. Universal (general) principles (see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR) can be included, but principles that are specific to the operating context and associated requirements should receive priority. Principles can apply to the entire DDR programme, and need not be limited to operational or thematic issues alone; thus they can include political principles (how DDR relates to political processes), institutional principles (how DDR should be structured institutionally) and operational principles (overall strategy, implementation approach, etc.).

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### 6.4. Preconditions and foundations for DDR

This section defines the issues that must be dealt with or included in the design of the DDR programme in order to ensure its effectiveness and viability. These include preconditions (i.e., those factors that must be dealt with or be in place before DDR implementation starts), as well as foundations (i.e., those aspects or factors that must provide the basis for planning and implementing DDR). In general, preconditions and foundations can be divided into those that are vital for the overall viability of DDR and those that can influence the overall efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the process (but which are not vital in determining whether DDR is possible or not).

*Example: Preconditions and foundations for DDR in Liberia*

- A government-driven process of post-conflict reconciliation is developed and implemented in order to shape and define the framework for post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration measures;
- A National Transitional Government is established to run the affairs of the country up until 2006, when a democratically elected government will take office;
- Comprehensive measures to stem and control the influx and possible recycling of weapons by all armed forces and groups and their regional network of contacts are put in place;
- The process of disbandment of armed groups and restructuring of the Liberian security forces is organized and begun;
- A comprehensive national recovery programme and a programme for community reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration are simultaneously developed and



implemented by the government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other UN agencies as a strategy of pre-positioning and providing assistance to all war-affected communities, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This programme will provide the essential drive and broader framework for the post-war recovery effort;

- Other complementary political provisions in the peace agreement are initiated and implemented in support of the overall peace process;
- A complementary community arms collection programme, supported with legislative process outlawing the possession of arms in Liberia, would be started and enforced following the completion of formal disarmament process.

## 6.5. Overall strategic approach to DDR

While the objectives, principles and preconditions/foundations establish the overall design and structure of the DDR programme, a description of the overall strategic approach is essential in order to explain how DDR will be implemented. This section is essential in order to:

- explain how the multiple components of DDR will be designed to reflect realities and needs, thus ensuring efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the overall approach;
- explain how the targets for assisting DDR participants and beneficiaries (number of ex-combatants assisted, etc.) will be met;
- explain how the various components and activities of DDR will be divided into phases and sequenced (planned over time) within the programme time-frame;
- identify issues that are critical to the implementation of the overall programme and provide information on how they will be dealt with.

### 6.5.1. Defining the approach to DDR

The core components of DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) can vary significantly in terms of how they are designed, the activities they involve and how they are implemented. In other words, although the end objective may be similar, DDR varies from country to country. Each DDR process must be adapted to the specific realities and requirements of the country or setting in which it is to be carried out. Important issues that will guide this are, for example, the nature and organization of armed forces and groups, the socio-economic context and national capacities. These need to be defined within the overall strategic approach explaining how DDR is to be put into practice, and how its components will be sequenced and implemented (also see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR).

#### 6.5.1.1. Putting DDR into operation

The specific context in which a DDR programme is to be implemented, the programme requirements and the best way to reach the defined objectives will all affect the way in which a DDR operation is conceptualized. When developing a DDR concept, there is a need to: describe the overall strategic approach; justify why this approach was chosen; describe the activities that the programme will carry out; and lay out the broad operational methods or guidelines for implementing them. In general, there are three strategic approaches that can be taken (also see IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization):

- DDR of conventional armed forces, involving the structured and centralized disarmament and demobilization of formed units in assembly or cantonment areas. This is often linked to their restructuring as part of an SSR process;
- DDR of armed groups, involving a decentralized demobilization process in which individuals are identified, registered and processed; incentives are provided for voluntary disarmament; and reintegration assistance schemes are integrated with broader community-based recovery and reconstruction projects;
- A 'mixed' DDR approach, combining both of the above models, used when participant groups include both armed forces and armed groups;

After a comprehensive assessment of the operational guidelines according to which DDR will be implemented, a model should be created as a basis for planning (see Annexes C and D. Annex E illustrates an approach taken to DDR in the DRC).

In addition to defining how to operationalize the core components of DDR, the overall strategic approach should also describe any other components necessary for an effective and viable DDR process. For the most part, these will be activities that will take throughout the DDR programme and ensure the effectiveness of core DDR components. Some examples are:

- awareness-raising and sensitization (in order to increase local understanding of, and participation in, DDR processes);
- capacity development for national institutions and communities (in contexts where capacities are weak or non-existent);
- weapons control and management (in contexts involving widespread availability of weapons in society);
- repatriation and resettlement (in contexts of massive internal and cross-border displacement);
- local peace-building and reconciliation (in contexts of deep social/ethnic conflict).

#### 6.5.1.2. Sequencing and phasing of DDR

Once the main components of a DDR programme have been identified, an overall strategy for implementation needs to be drawn up. The overall strategy should usually be developed on the basis of operational objectives and targets broken down by time period or programme phase. This enables practitioners to see in broad terms how DDR will be implemented, plan the allocation of resources and other requirements, and coordinate among themselves.

*Example: Sequencing and phasing of DDR operations in Haiti*

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES	PHASES
Overall strategic approach: Two-pronged implementation strategy (initially targeting 2,000 ex-FADH and 4,000 other armed groups), with particular emphasis on period leading to elections	Phase I: Credible deterrence and negotiation (military/ law enforcement ops, police training, negotiations, awareness-raising)
Short-term (end 2005): Reduce no. of high-risk armed elements capable of derailing end-2005 elections	Phase II: Disarmament and demobilization (with grace period, establishment of DD sites and 'reinsertion orientation centres' for ex-FADH)
Medium-term (end 2006): Reduce no. of high-risk armed elements in seven regions and provide viable reintegration options	Phase III: Reintegration, with focus on creating sustainable livelihood options (microgrants, vocational training)
Long-term (end 2006): Reduction in political, economic and social armed violence + strengthening of community peace-building and absorptive capacities in seven regions	Phase IV: Investment in affected communities (local development projects to increase community capacities and consolidate reconciliation processes)

### 6.5.2. Strategic elements of a DDR programme

As programme scale and scope, participants and beneficiaries, eligibility criteria, incentive schemes, and monitoring and evaluation all affect programme design, they should be considered when developing a DDR strategy.

#### 6.5.2.1. Scale and scope

The scale of a DDR programme is determined by the number of beneficiaries and the geographical area the programme covers (most often determined by the size of the country or region where the programme is taking place). These figures determine the complexity, size and resource requirements for the programme, and must be estimated at the programme design stage.

The extent to which a DDR programme directly includes activities that formally belong to other sectors determines its scope or extent (i.e., exactly how much it is going to try and achieve). In the past, DDR programmes focused strictly on the core components of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Today, most DDR programmes include or take account of activities relating to SSR (such as weapons control and regulation), peace-building and reconciliation, and community recovery and reconstruction (also see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR and IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks).

#### 6.5.2.2. DDR participants

The identification of DDR participants affects the size and scope of a DDR programme. DDR participants are usually prioritized according to their political status or by the actual or potential threat to security and stability that they represent. They can include regular armed forces, irregular armed groups, militias and paramilitary groups, self-defence groups, members of private security companies, armed street gangs, vigilance brigades and so forth.

Among the beneficiaries are communities, who stand to benefit the most from improved security; local and state governments; and State structures, which gain from an improved capacity to regulate law and order. Clearly defining DDR beneficiaries determines both the operational role and the expected impacts of programme implementation.

#### 6.5.2.3. Operational role

Another important factor that determines the scope of a DDR programme is the extent of national capacity and the involvement of national and non-UN bodies in the implementation of DDR activities. In a country with a strong national capacity to implement DDR, the UN's operational role (i.e. the extent to which it is involved in directly implementing DDR activities) should be focused more on ensuring adequate coordination than on direct implementation activities. In a country with weak national implementing capacity, the UN's role in implementation should be broader and more operational.

#### 6.5.3.4. Eligibility criteria

Eligibility criteria provide a mechanism for determining who should enter a DDR programme and receive reintegration assistance. This often involves proving combatant status or membership of an armed force or group. It is easier to establish the eligibility of participants to a DDR programme when this involves organized, legal armed forces with members who have an employment contract. When armed groups are involved, however, there will be difficulties in proving combatant status, which increases the risk of admitting

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non-combatants and increasing the number of people who take part in a DDR programme. In such cases, it is important to have strict and well-defined eligibility criteria, which can help to eliminate the risk of non-combatants gaining access to the programme (also see IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization).

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#### 6.5.3.5. Incentive schemes

When targeting armed groups in a DDR programme, their often-weak command and control structures should be taken into account, and it should not be assumed that combatants will obey their commanders' orders to enter DDR programmes. Moreover, there may also be risks or stigma attached to obeying such orders (i.e., fear of reprisals), which discourages people from taking part in the programme. In such cases, incentive schemes, e.g., the offering of individual or collective benefits, may be used to overcome the combatants' concerns and encourage participation. It is important also to note that awareness-raising and public information on the DDR programme can also help towards overcoming combatants' concerns about entering a DDR programme.

Care should be taken to avoid the perception of 'cash for weapons' or weapons buy-back programmes.

Incentives may be directly linked to the disarmament, demobilization or reintegration components of DDR, although care should be taken to avoid the perception of 'cash for weapons' or weapons buy-back programmes when these are linked to the disarmament component. If used, incentives should be taken into consideration in the design of the overall programme strategy.

#### 6.5.3.6. Monitoring and evaluation

The development of baseline data is vital to measuring the overall effectiveness and impact of a DDR programme. Baseline data and indicators are only useful, however, if their collection, distribution, analysis and use are systematically managed. DDR programmes should have a good monitoring and information system that is integrated with the entire DDR programme, allowing for information collected in one component to be available in another, and for easy cross-referencing of information. The early establishment of an information management strategy as part of the overall programme design will ensure that an appropriate monitoring and evaluation system can be developed once the programme is finalized (also see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes).

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## 6.6. DDR strategies

Once the strategic approach for the DDR programme has been designed, detailed implementation strategies should be developed for each programme component. These may be annexed to the original programme document or developed as separate documents. Each strategy should include the following:

- the objective of the component;
- the strategic approach and methods adopted for its implementation;
- an explanation of how key issues and considerations will be dealt with;
- an overview of the implementation process and key activities necessary to achieve the objective.

Issues that should be considered include:

DDR COMPONENT	KEY DESIGN ISSUES
Disarmament (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Establish accurate weapons collection targets</li> <li>■ Plan how to maximize weapons yields (targeting multiple weapons holders)</li> <li>■ Avoid attaching a monetary value to weapons</li> <li>■ Link voluntary weapons surrender with provision of benefits (reintegration and others)</li> <li>■ Explore alternative incentive structures (weapons for development, tools for weapons, etc.) outside the military process</li> <li>■ Ensure adequate controls on weapons registration, storage and destruction</li> <li>■ Deal with longer-term weapons control issues (licensing, import/export, trafficking, etc.)</li> <li>■ Plan how to strengthen national capacities</li> </ul>
Demobilization and reinsertion (also see IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Timing and sequencing of demobilization process</li> <li>■ Adapt the overall approach to context and security environment</li> <li>■ Develop eligibility criteria, considering the needs of different groups</li> <li>■ Deal with registration, profiling and applying eligibility criteria</li> <li>■ Deal with the issue of amnesty for crimes;</li> <li>■ Consider cantonment and decentralized processing arrangements</li> <li>■ Establish socio-economic profiles of participants</li> <li>■ Deal with the needs of women and children associated with armed forces and groups, and dependants</li> <li>■ Provide a transitional living allowance</li> <li>■ Set up information, counselling and referral services</li> <li>■ Deal with plans for repatriation and resettlement</li> <li>■ Deal with transport options</li> </ul>
Reintegration (also see IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Determine market structures and community absorption capacities</li> <li>■ Ensure sustainability of reintegration schemes</li> <li>■ Link reintegration with broader economic recovery and development processes</li> <li>■ Develop mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation</li> <li>■ Adapt reintegration schemes to different contexts and participants profiles</li> <li>■ Ensure adequate facilities for vocational/professional training</li> <li>■ Pay attention to vulnerable groups (women and children associated with armed forces and groups, youth, people with disabilities, etc.)</li> <li>■ Plan how to sensitize communities to and involve them in reintegration</li> <li>■ Develop 'mixed' reintegration/community development projects</li> </ul>
Awareness-raising and sensitization (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Determine requirements for developing a nationwide public awareness strategy on the objectives and goals of DDR and definitions of participants and assistance</li> <li>■ Plan sensitization and dialogue for encouraging increased participation, discussion and mobilization at local and community levels for DDR</li> <li>■ Decide on role of awareness-raising and sensitization as vehicle for transmitting key messages on violence and weapons use and advocating non-violent alternatives</li> </ul>

◀ ▶ 4.10

◀ ▶ 4.20

◀ ▶ 4.30

◀ ▶ 4.60

Capacity development  
(also see IDDRS 3.30 on  
National Institutions for DDR)

- Develop understanding of distinction between national ownership and national capacity for coordination and implementation
- Design requirements for ensuring transparency and efficiency in the DDR process
- Deal with the need to foster broad national participation, and not just government, in DDR processes, which is crucial to an equitable and legitimate process
- Decide on relevance of a credible 'neutral third-party role' for the UN in DDR processes and implications for national ownership and capacity requirements
- Identify most relevant areas for capacity development in the area of DDR, taking into account transitional nature of DDR structures and longer-term need to strengthen law and order, as well as development coordination capacities

3.30 ◀▶

## 6.7. Ensuring cross-programme links with broader transition and recovery frameworks

In most cases, the development of DDR programmes happens at the same time as the development of programmes in other sectors such as rule of law, SSR, reintegration and recovery, and peace-building. The DDR programmes should be linked, as far as possible, to these other processes so that each process supports and strengthens the others and helps integrate DDR into the broader framework for international assistance. DDR should be viewed as a component of a larger strategy to achieve post-conflict objectives and goals. Other processes to which DDR programme could be linked include JAM/PCNA activities, and the development of a common country assessment/UN development assessment framework and poverty reduction strategy paper (also see IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks).

2.20 ◀▶

## 7. Developing the results and budgeting framework

A key part of programme design is the development of a logical framework that clearly defines the hierarchy of outputs, activities and inputs necessary to achieve the objectives and outcomes that are being aimed at. In line with the shift towards results-based programming, such logical frameworks should focus on determining how to achieve the planned outcomes within the time that has been made available. This approach ensures coordination and programme implementation, and provides a framework for monitoring and evaluating performance and impact.

When DDR is conducted in an integrated peacekeeping context, two complementary results-based frameworks should be used: a general results framework containing the main outputs, inputs and activities of the overall DDR programme; and a framework specifically designed for DDR activities that will be funded from mission assessed funds as part of the overall mission planning process. Naturally, the two are complementary and should contain common elements.

### 7.1. General results framework

The general results framework for a DDR programme should consist of the following elements (but not necessarily all of them) (see also Annex F for a general results framework for DDR that was used in Liberia):



- *Specific objectives and component outcomes:* For each component of a DDR programme (i.e., disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, reintegration, etc.), the main or longer-term strategic objectives should be clearly defined, together with the outcomes the UN is supporting. These provide a strategic framework for organizing and anchoring relevant activities and outputs;
- *Baseline data:* For each specific objective, the initial starting point should be briefly described. In the absence of hard quantitative baseline data, give a qualitative description of the current situation. Defining the baseline is a critical part of monitoring and evaluating the performance and impact of programmes;
- *Indicative activities:* For each objective, a list of indicative activities should be provided in order to give a sense of the range and kind of activities that need to be implemented so as to achieve the expected outputs and objectives. For the general results framework, these do not need to be complete or highly detailed, but they must be sufficient to provide a sense of the underlying strategy, scope and range of actions that will be implemented;
- *Intervals:* Activities and priority outputs should have precise time-lines (preferably specific dates). For each of these dates, indicate the expected level of result that should be achieved. This should allow an overview of how each relevant component of the programme is expected to progress over time and what has to be achieved by what date;
- *Targets and monitoring indicators:* For each activity there should be an observable target, objectively verifiable and useful as a monitoring indicator. These indicators will vary depending on the activity, and they do not always have to be quantitative. For example, 'reduction in perceptions of violence' is as useful as '15 percent of ex-combatants successfully reintegrated';
- *Inputs:* For each activity or output there should be an indication of inputs and their costs. General cost categories should be used to identify the essential requirements, which can include staff, infrastructure, equipment, operating expenses, service contracts, grants, consultancies, etc.

## 7.2. Peacekeeping results-based budgeting framework

The results-based budgeting (RBB) framework is the main budgetary planning tool used by the UN Secretariat and peacekeeping missions, and is part of the Secretary-General's programme of reform and vision of a more results-oriented organization.

An important feature of RBB is the definition of expected results at the beginning of the planning and budget cycle, before the programme is implemented. Thus RBB aims to shift focus from output accounting (i.e., activities) to results-based accountability (i.e., indicators of achievements). RBB is therefore not simply an administrative process, but a strategic planning tool, improving the clarity of programmes, and bringing about a common understanding and better communication between Member States and programme managers to improve results. Results-based management is intended to be a dynamic process, providing feedback throughout the full programme cycle: planning, programming, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation. Since it was introduced, RBB has continued to evolve in order to better fulfil its role as a strategic planning tool for the UN.

RBB has four main components:

- the *DDR objective statement*, serving as the basis for developing programme activities and identifying benchmarks for success;

- *indicators of achievement*, which measure performance, justify the resource requirements and are linked to outputs;
- *outputs*, listing the activities that will be conducted in order to achieve the objective;
- *external factors*, identifying factors outside of the programme manager's control that may have an impact on programme performance.

### 7.2.1. Developing an RBB framework

This section is intended to assist DDR programme managers in the field to develop RBB frameworks for submission to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which will serve as the basis for cost estimates. Mission budget officers who are specialized in the development of RBB frameworks should be able to assist with the development of this tool.

#### 7.2.1.1. The DDR objective statement

The DDR objective statement draws its legal foundation from Security Council mission mandates. It is important to note that the DDR objective will not be fully achieved in the lifetime of the peacekeeping mission, although certain activities such as the (limited) physical disarmament of combatants may be completed. Other important aspects of DDR such as reintegration, the establishment of the legal framework, and the technical and logistic capacity to deal with small arms and light weapons often extend beyond the duration of a peacekeeping mission. In this regard, the objective statement must reflect the contribution of the peacekeeping mission to the 'progress towards' the DDR objective. An example of a DDR objective statement is as follows:

“Progress towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of armed forces and groups, including meeting the specific needs of women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and destruction.”

#### 7.2.1.2. Indicators of achievement

The targeted achievement should include no more than five clear and measurable indicators, and baseline information from which increases/decreases in the baseline variables are measured.

#### 7.2.1.3. Outputs

When developing the DDR outputs for an RBB framework, programme managers should take the following into account: (1) specific references to the implementation time-frame should be included; (2) DDR technical assistance or advice needs should be further defined to specify what that means in practice and, if possible, quantified (e.g., workshops, training programmes, legislative models, draft work plans); (3) participants in DDR programmes or recipients of the mission's efforts should be included in the output description; and (4) when describing these outputs, the verb should be placed before the output definition (e.g., 'Destroyed 9,000 weapons'; 'Chaired 10 community sensitization meetings').

#### 7.2.1.4. External factors

When developing the external factors of the DDR RBB framework, programme managers are requested to identify those factors that are outside the control of the DDR unit. These should not repeat the factors that make up the indicators of achievement.

For an example of an RBB framework for DDR in Sudan, see Annex G; also see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes.



## 8. Stage III: Developing an implementation plan

Once a programme has been prepared, planning instruments should be developed that will aid practitioners (UN, non-UN and the national government) to implement the planned activities and strategies. An actions or operations plan usually consists of four main elements:

- *Implementation methods:* This consists of a narrative description of how each DDR component will be made operational within the framework of the programme, focusing on the precise sequencing of activities, operational requirements, logistic requirements, links with other mission components, key risks and factors that will reduce these risks. This section can be used by practitioners to guide implementation and operations and provide an overall framework for the other components of the operational and action plan;
- *Timing:* There should be an overview of the time-frame and schedule for implementation of DDR activities for each component of the programme, which provides an overall picture of the phasing and sequencing of programme implementation. This will provide practitioners with a quick overview of the activities, which is important for defining and planning resource requirements and allocations. An example of a time-frame is included in Annex H;
- *Detailed work plan:* A detailed work plan should also be included in the operational plan. It should break all programme activities down into their various tasks, and indicate who is responsible for different operational roles. The main categories of such a work plan should include:
  - the activities to be implemented;
  - a detailed description of individual tasks;
  - the required inputs (human, material, financial);
  - the actor responsible for funding each task;
  - the actor responsible for logistic support;
  - the actor responsible for staffing;
  - the actor responsible for coordination/supervision;
  - the actor responsible for implementation;
  - the expected time-frame for implementation of task.

The work plan should be considered a dynamic document that should be updated periodically and used to guide DDR planners and practitioners on programme implementation on a day-to-day basis. A generic work plan is included in Annex I;

- *Management arrangements:* This section should detail the institutional arrangements established to provide strategic guidance, coordination and implementation of the programme (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures and IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes).

## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Detailed field assessment:** A detailed field assessment is essential to identify the nature of the problem a DDR programme is to deal with, as well as to provide key indicators for the development of a detailed DDR strategy and its associated components. Detailed field assessments shall be undertaken to ensure that DDR strategies, programmes and implementation plans reflect realities, are well targeted and sustainable, and to assist with their monitoring and evaluation.

**Implementation plan:** Also known as an operations or action plan, an implementation plan describes the detailed steps necessary to implement programme activities, together with a division of labour and overall time-frame.

**Programme:** A generic (general) term for a set of activities designed to achieve a specific objective. In order to ensure that a programme's results, outputs and overall outcome are reached, activities are often framed by a strategy, key principles and identified targets. Together, these indicate how the activities will be structured and implemented. Programmes also include a description of all aspects necessary to implement the planned activities, including inputs and resources (staff, equipment, funding, etc.), management arrangements, legal frameworks, partnerships and other risk analysis.

**Project:** Within each programme there may be several projects, each of which is a separately identified undertaking. A project is an intervention that consists of a set of planned, inter-related activities aimed at achieving defined objectives over a fixed time. A project's activities and objectives are normally given in a project document. This legal agreement binds the signatories to carry out the defined activities and to provide specific resources over a fixed period of time in order to reach agreed objectives.

### Abbreviations

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
HDR	human development report
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
IDP	internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JAM	joint assessment mission
MIS	management information system
PCNA	post-conflict needs assessment
PRA	participatory rural assessment
NCDDR	national commission on DDR
QIP	quick-impact project
RBB	results-based budgeting
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme

<b>UNICEF</b>	UN Children's Fund
<b>UNSC</b>	UN Security Council
<b>UNSG</b>	UN Secretary-General
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## Annex B: Framework for assessing the operational environment for DDR

OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS	METHODOLOGY	RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Identify factors that can positively or negatively affect the outcome of DDR (pre-/post-intervention)	<b>Normative:</b> Existence of a formal peace agreement; existence of a national legal framework for DDR (national commission on DDR — NCDDR); existence of written agreement by executive to commit to DDR; existence of an amnesty law; existence of a firearm registration/regulation law; UN Security Council resolutions	Review of activities and programme documents; key informant interviews	Peace agreement is considered legitimate by all parties; political will is adequate; the NCDDR is recognized and credible; firearm legislation is robust or sufficient
	<b>Political:</b> Existence of a legitimate government; constitutional or executive provisions for 'power-sharing' arrangements; clearly defined and registered prospective participants (and existence of excluded spoilers); number of weeks/months/years since the 'formal' end of hostilities; number and 'success rate' of previous DDR efforts; date of planned elections	Review of activities and programme documents; key informant interviews with host government and non-state actor leadership	Government and electoral process are considered legitimate by all parties; excluded parties are weak/impotent/unable to continue fighting; previous DDR activities were not entirely unsuccessful
	<b>Socio-economic:</b> Overall socio-economic condition in areas of coverage; quality of and access to public services; existence of and distribution of legitimate private sector activities in 'host' areas; rate of employment (formal and informal); status of macro-economic planning/forecasting; inflation/exchange rates; distribution of economic activity (e.g., agriculture, manufacturing, informal, etc.)	Review of activities, programme documents, UNDP human development reports, World Bank and regional bank reports, and chamber of commerce assessments; key informant interviews	Recovery assistance is stable and does not cause price shocks or rapid vertical/horizontal exclusion; fiscal and monetary policy is rational and appropriate; adequate funds are made available for the transition during the post-conflict period
	<b>Security:</b> Quality of and distribution of policing services; quality of and distribution of private security services; a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or multilateral security presence	Review of activities, programme documents, UNDP human development reports (HDRs), scholarly literature; key informant interviews with DPKO, national police and defence	Policing and defence needs are adequate to contain security risks; police/military are considered credible; Chapter VI or VII mandate for UN peacekeepers
	<b>Regional:</b> Distribution of refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) settlements/camps in neighbouring countries; presence of 'militarized' refugee/IDP settlements/camps; rate/frequency of arms trafficking across borders; rate/frequency of cross-border activities by prospective beneficiary group; timing and 'success rate' of DDR activities in neighbouring countries	Review of UN activities in neighbouring countries, NGO/research reports, INTERPOL, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, DPKO, and UN Security Council/UN Secretary-General (UNSC/UNSG) reports; investigative research; key informant interviews	Refugee and IDP settlements/camps are not overtly militarized; arms trafficking does not surge in the post-conflict period; DDR activities in neighbouring countries do not trigger new sources of weapons

	<p><b>International:</b> Existence of a donor cooperation framework; existence of pledged resources; funding for DDR from assessed UN budget; existence of complementary or parallel recovery activities; pledged host government resources to DDR; rate of debt servicing and repayment schedule</p>	<p>Review of activities and programme documents; key informant interviews with UN, World Bank/International Monetary Fund, bilateral donor and host government officials</p>	<p>Donors meet pledges; resources are adequate for needs; DDR does not lead political process; DDR is not considered a 'development' programme; DDR is not held up because of debt repayments; DDR is not stopped part-way</p>
	<p><b>Weapons trafficking:</b> Profile of actors involved in weapons transfers/trafficking; identified weapons markets; weapons proliferation patterns and key transit routes; time-series price and supply/demand analysis of market dynamics; size, frequency and distribution of weapons market transactions; weapons market structures (suppliers and dealers, forms and methods of payment, trafficking networks)</p>	<p>Key informant interviews and focus groups with participants and beneficiaries; semi-structured interviews with leadership and rank and file; consultations with private sector representatives and private security company representatives; review of intelligence and police documentation; consultations with regional experts; small-scale household surveys where appropriate; key informant interviews and focus groups with border and customs officials; consultations with shipping and transport company representatives; key informant interviews with peacekeeping officials</p>	<p>Participants or others are prepared to be interviewed; sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data</p>
<p>2. Identify baseline factors to prepare appropriate benchmarks for DDR</p>	<p><b>Violence:</b> Frequency of criminal victimization (homicide, assault, theft per 1,000); proportion of victimization involving firearms (per 1,000); demographic profile of perpetrators/victims (e.g., age, gender, occupation); distribution of criminal victimization (e.g., by municipality); typology of perpetrators (e.g., by incident); proportion of civilians who have 'access' to humanitarian services</p>	<p>Review of country indicator tables, NGO/research reports, INTERPOL, International Crime Victim Survey, World Health Organization (WHO), UNSC/UNSG and HDR/World Bank reports; investigative research; key informant interviews</p>	<p>Violence rates have declined in real/perceived terms since the peace agreement/election; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data</p>
	<p><b>Social and economic:</b> Existence of and distribution of public services (number of clinics, schools, vocational institutes, credit facilities, transport networks) in prospective 'host' communities (relative to other communities); employment rates in 'host' communities; demographic profile of 'host' communities (e.g., age quintiles, gender); subsistence food production profiles in 'host' communities; number of international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in 'host' communities; rate of public/private sector investment in 'host' communities</p>	<p>Review of country indicator tables, NGO/research reports, HDR/World Bank reports, and UN Population Fund; UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) site visits; key informant interviews</p>	<p>Socio-economic indicators are rising, or at least stabilizing; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data</p>

3. Identify institutional capacities to undertake DDR	<b>Disarmament/Weapons control:</b> Existence of infrastructure and capacities for secure weapons collection, registration, transportation and temporary storage; adequate arrangements and infrastructure for secure weapons stockpiling; technical capacity and equipment for destruction and disposal of weapons; existence of legislation and mechanisms for registration and management of firearms; existence of IT services to manage information on firearm licensing and registration; existence of training and sensitization programmes for responsible firearm use	Site inspections and consultations with relevant host government departments and policing authorities, consultations with UN agencies (e.g., UNDP, United Nations Office for Project Services, International Organization for Migration [IOM], International Labour Organization [ILO], DPKO)	Sites are accessible; disarmament is a component of the peace agreement; parties are prepared to disarm; financing exists for disarmament; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Demobilization:</b> Existence of infrastructure for cantoning and servicing prospective participants; presence of specialized services for female participants (toilets, sleeping barracks, sensitization initiatives, human resources officers, monitoring systems); existence of 'secure' sites and funding for procurement of goods and services; existence of IT services to begin counselling and referral; existence of reliable registration forms/cards; adequate funding and capacity for quick-impact projects; adequate funding and capacity for supplementary benefits for dependants	Site inspections and consultations with relevant host government departments, defence services and policing authorities; consultations with relevant UN agencies (e.g., UNDP, IOM, UN Children's Fund [UNICEF], UN Development Fund for Women and others)	Sites are accessible; demobilization is a component of the peace agreement; parties accept the conditions of demobilization; communication strategies effectively disseminate the terms of DDR; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Reintegration:</b> Existence of a national agency to manage and provide reinsertion assistance (transitional allowances, health services, transportation, etc.); existence of adequate transportation/reinsertion facilities; existence of ongoing counselling and referral services; existence of memorandum of understanding/terms of reference for vocational/apprenticeship or other training services; existence of monitoring and evaluation mechanism	Site inspections and consultations with host government executive and relevant authorities; key informant interviews with UN agencies, bilateral donors and others	Sites are accessible; reintegration funding is provided from the assessed budget; adequate funding in relation to the task is provided; an NCDDR or related body exists to ensure government ownership; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Community absorption capacity:</b> Existence of adequate educational/vocational, commercial, agricultural, banking/credit facilities to absorb anticipated caseload in 'host' communities; existence of adequate and legitimate policing/security facilities in 'host' communities in relation to perceived threat; capacities in place to ensure 'reconciliation' activities in 'host' communities	Site inspections and consultations with central and line ministry authorities; consultations with local 'leaders' or approximate authorities; small-scale focus groups with a purposive sample of 'host' community members; consultations with participants and beneficiaries on a case-by-case basis	Sites are accessible; 'host' communities are prepared to accept returning combatants; security guarantees are legitimate and credible; funding for QIPs is made available; adequate numbers of agencies and departments exist to carry out projects; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data

	(either formal or informal according to need); adequate quick-impact projects (QIPs) for reintegration in 'host' communities, as appropriate		
	<b>Other:</b> Existence of 'specialized' services for disabled, HIV-positive, traumatized, elderly, single female-headed household and child beneficiaries in 'host' communities (or as appropriate); and facilities for family reunification	Consultations with WHO/Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, relevant government departments (ministry of health), UNICEF, Save the Children, local NGOs and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Adequate funding is made available for specialized services; ICRC is operational; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data

## Annex C: Framework for identifying DDR target and performance indicators

OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS	METHODOLOGY	RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Identify base-line to measure development context (pre-/post- intervention)	<b>Resources:</b> Average income (or proxies — housing-construction materials, assets, livestock ownership) of host communities; average literacy/education levels of host communities; access to basic services (electricity, water, public utilities)	Review of past World Bank/ regional bank household surveys, census data, relevant government department reports and Save the Children/ILO/UNDP studies; on-site consultations; household surveys (Note: Depending on funding)	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Markets and prices:</b> Price data on basic commodities (rice/flour, cooking oil, kerosene/fuel, meat); price data on firearm value	Review of past World Bank/ regional bank household surveys, census data, police data, relevant government department reports, and Save the Children/ILO/UNDP studies; on-site consultations; focus group surveys administered by women in 'host' communities	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Preferences:</b> Motivations for participation in armed violence of 'beneficiaries' and 'host' community members; number of new associations between host community/beneficiaries; levels of trust pre-/post-intervention	On-site consultations; review of police data; focus group surveys administered by women in 'host' communities or by the DDR unit	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
2. Identify base-line to measure security context (pre-/post-intervention)	<b>Armed violence:</b> (Individual) average mortality/morbidity rate of host communities; average firearm homicide, blade and burn rates (per 1,000) of host communities; average firearm injury, blade and burn rates (per 1,000) of host communities; (collective) degree and causes of forced displacement; destruction of social services and access to basic entitlements; decline in economic productivity and market access; loss of social cohesion/militarization of social interaction; impact of insecurity on humanitarian assistance and access	Police records; public health records; externally commissioned epidemiological surveys; small-scale surveys administered by DDR section	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; adequately trained epidemiologists are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Victimization:</b> Average armed assault, intimidation, harassment, rape and theft rates (per 1,000) of host communities	Police records; public health records; small-scale victimization survey (pre-/post-); focus groups administered by DDR unit	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Perception-based:</b> Perception of 'security' in host communities — particularly gender-/sexual-based violence, mobility, access to markets, incidence of shootings/aggression by participants	Participatory focus groups; small-scale victimization/opinion surveys administered by DDR unit	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; adequately trained PRA and rapid assessment specialists are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data



3. Identify size, organization and deployment of primary target group (pre-/post-intervention)	<b>Command and control:</b> Existence of clear leadership positions in armed forces and groups; existence of 'official' rank designations (general, colonel, private); profile of organizational units (e.g., platoon, company, etc.) and geographical deployment; voluntary enclosure in barracks; clear recruitment, training and (internal) discipline regimes	Key informant interviews and focus groups with participants; semi-structured interviews with leadership and rank and file; interviews with former members; review of defence and police documents; consultations with regional experts	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Combatant profile:</b> Number of combatants ('active', reserve, militia); age profile of combatants; employment, educational and familial profile of combatants; deployment profile of combatants	Key informant interviews and focus groups with participants; participants' small-scale survey; review of data processed through management information system (MIS); review of armed forces/groups 'lists' provided as part of the 'peace agreement'; review of old lists from previous DDR activities; self-identification and self-selection methods	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Gender profile:</b> Number of male and female combatants; types of tasks for combatants by gender	Key informant interviews and focus groups with female participants and male rank and file	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Child/Youth profile:</b> Number of child/youth combatants; types of tasks for combatants by age; types of rank for combatants by age	Key informant interviews and focus groups with child/youth beneficiaries/participants and female/male rank and file; review of UNICEF documents and hospital records	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Disabled profile:</b> Number of disabled combatants; types and distribution of physical/psychosocial injuries	Key informant interviews and focus groups with leadership and rank and file; review of hospital records; consultations with surgeons/physicians on site	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Dependant profile:</b> Number of dependants per combatant; distribution of dependants per combatant; income and socio-economic profile of dependants	Key informant interviews and focus groups with participants; review of data processed via MIS; focus groups with a representative sample of the caseload	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
4. Identify availability and distribution of weapons (pre-/post- intervention)	<b>Collective/Individual ownership:</b> Average number of weapons per combatant; types/quality of weapons held by combatants; clear control over individual/collective weapons; evidence of experience in the storage and maintenance of weapons; motivations for weapons ownership; geographical distribution and concentration of weapons; evidence of weapons transfers from armed forces and groups to non-combatants	Key informant interviews and focus groups with participants; semi-structured interviews with leadership and rank and file; interviews with former members; review of defence and police documents; consultations with regional experts	Beneficiaries or others are prepared to be interviewed; sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data

5. Identify reintegration opportunities for the primary target group (pre-/post-intervention)	<b>Identification and assessment of areas of return or resettlement:</b> Local demand for goods and services; demand for skilled and unskilled labour; identification of economic reintegration opportunities; availability of social and business-related services; identification of required services critical to reintegration; assessment of general population needs in relation to reintegration and possible links	Site inspections and consultations with host government executive and relevant authorities; consultations with local 'leaders' or approximate authorities; small-scale focus groups with a purposive sample of 'host' community members	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data
	<b>Socio-economic assessments and identification of economic opportunities:</b> Identification of dynamic economic sectors and possible reintegration opportunities; availability of other reintegration opportunities; identification of possible public–private partnerships; identification of existing infrastructure to facilitate economic activity and possible bottlenecks; availability of business development services and further requirements; availability of specialized training providers and institutions; assessment of general training capacities at local level; identification of relevant recovery and development initiatives that could be linked with reintegration process	Site inspections and consultations with host government executive and relevant authorities; consultations with local 'leaders' or approximate authorities; small-scale focus groups with a purposive sample of 'host' community members; labour and other economic studies at local level; review of UN and other initiatives in the target areas	Sites are accessible; appropriate data are available; resources are made available to collect baseline data

## Annex D: Sample matrix for profiling armed forces and groups (taken from DRC DDR programme)

NAME	DESIG.	ORIGIN	SUBGROUPS/ ORGANIZATION	EST. FORCE STRENGTH
CONGOLESE ARMED FORCES				
Forces Armées Congolaises	FAC	DRC		
Armée de Libération Congolaise/ Mouvement de Libération du Congo	ALC/MLC	DRC		6,500– 7,500 <sup>3</sup> /20,000 <sup>4</sup>
Armée Nationale Congolaise/Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Démocratie — Goma	ANC/RCD- G	DRC		42,672 <sup>5</sup>
Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Démocratie — Mouvement de Libération	RCD-ML	DRC		8,000 <sup>6</sup>
Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Démocratie — National	RCD-N	DRC		
Mayi-Mayi	–	DRC	GENERAL	20,000–30,000
			Virunga mayi-mayi	unknown
			Group of Padiri	6,000
			Group of Dunia	4,000–5,000
			Mudundu 40/FRDKI	4,000
			MLAZ/FURNAC	unknown
			Col. Rubaruba Zabuloni	unknown
Ex-Forces Armées Zaïroises in Republic of Congo	Ex-FAZ	DRC	DSP units	1,500 <sup>7</sup>
'Ethnic' militias		DRC	Hema militia	unknown
			Lendu/N’Giti militia	unknown
			Banyamulenge militias	unknown
FOREIGN ARMED GROUPS				
Armée de Libération du Rwanda (composed of ex-FAR and Interahamwe)	ALiR	Rwanda	ALiR I	4,000–6,000
			ALiR II	4,000–6,000
Rwandan Patriotic Army	RPA	Rwanda		25,000 <sup>8</sup>
Ugandan People’s Defence Forces	UPDF	Uganda		2,100–3,000 <sup>9</sup>
Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie/Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie	FDD/ CNDD	Burundi		3,000–4,000
Forces Nationales de la Libération/Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu	FNL/ PALIPE- HUTU	Burundi		unknown <sup>10</sup>
Allied Democratic Forces	ADF	Uganda		200–300

PROFILE	GEO. DISTRIBUTION	RELEVANT ACCORDS <sup>2</sup>
	Government-controlled territory	LCA, SCA
	Equator province and western fringe of Orientale province	LCA, SCA
	Orientale province (Kisangani and hinterlands), North Kivu (as far as Goma), South Kivu, and Katanga province (as far as Kalemie)	LCA, SCA
	Central Orientale province, Ituri region, and northern North Kivu (Butembo)	LCA, SCA
	Central Orientale province	LCA, SCA
Local groups forming large fluid alliances, no military training, though some ex-FAZ and ex-FAC. Political alliances different depending on group in question	North and South Kivus, Maniema, and parts of Orientale and Equator provinces	None to date
	North Kivu (environs of Butembo)	
	North Kivu (Masisi and Walikale) and South Kivu (Shabunda, Bunyakiri, Walungu, Mwenga and Uvira)	
	South Kivu (Fizi, Uvira) and Maniema province (Kindu/Kalemie)	
	South Kivu (Walungu, Mwenga, Shabunda, Kabare, Uvira)	
	South Kivu (Moleta, Uvira, and Fizi) and Maniema province (Kindu/Kalemie)	
	South Kivu (Kagomba)	
Entire units (former DSP), where they have been hired by RoC government as mercenaries	Brazzaville, with scattered numbers along Congo and Oubangi rivers in the north	None to date
Opposed local groups, supplied by same sources	Orientale province (Ituri region)	None to date
Local groups, some incorporated in RCD forces	South Kivu	None to date
Divided into Division Arbre/Yaoundé and Division Beor/Douala	South Kivu (Shabunda-Fizi-Kabambare axis), North Kivu (Masisi-Walikale axis), and Maniema province	LCA, DRA
One division with three brigades, with possible second division	South Kivu and Katanga (HQ in Lubumbashi) provinces	
		LCA, DRA
	Ituri region	LCA
	South Kivu and Katanga provinces (shores of Lake Tanganyika)	LCA
	South Kivu	LCA
	Ruwenzori Mountains (border with Uganda)	LCA

## Annex E: A 'mixed' DDR strategy for dealing with armed forces and groups in DRC

	ARMED FORCES/GROUPS	
DDR components:	Foreign armed groups (as per Lusaka Accords (A) 9.1)	Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC)
Demobilization	Cantonment, on-site screening, discharge and registration with participation of DRC, Rwanda and Joint Military Commission (JMC). Provision of transitional livelihood benefits.	Screening, registration and demobilization carried out in barracks for those not to be included in new National Army. Provision of severance payment.
Disarmament	Collective disarmament upon arrival in cantonment sites.	Disarmament in barracks by military authorities.
Repatriation	Repatriation to country of origin or third country, depending on choice, and on basis of DRC–Rwanda peace accord, monitored by third party.	Not applicable
Resettlement	Resettlement in communities agreed upon by DRC authorities.	Voluntary resettlement to community of origin or other destination on basis of absorptive capacity of destination communities.
Reintegration	Special referral and employment matching services, oriented either to concentration in one region, or scattered distribution further afield.	Referral to available employment and income-generating opportunities, as well as professional and vocational training.

National armed groups (MLC, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, RCD-N)	Irregular forces (Mayi-Mayi, local defence forces, etc.)	Former combatants and deserters (ex-FAZ, ex-FAC, etc.), including those in neighbouring countries.
Cantonment or decentralized screening/registration, depending on group fragmentation, dispersal, and logistic/security possibilities, for those not slated for inclusion in new National Army. Provision of transitional livelihood benefits.	Direct entry into reintegration schemes based on employment opportunities created by community recovery and reconstruction projects.	Screening/Registration using combination of assembly areas (for urban concentrations) and mobile units (where combatants are geographically dispersed). Provision of transitional livelihood benefits.
Collective disarmament at cantonment sites, or voluntary surrender of weapons following registration in case of no cantonment, in exchange for priority access to reintegration assistance.	Voluntary weapons surrender in exchange for priority access to reintegration assistance (Congo-Brazzaville model), or 'weapons in exchange for development' approach.	Identification and collection of individual and cached weapons (where relevant), in exchange for priority access to repatriation/reintegration assistance.
Not applicable	Not applicable	Repatriation to DRC on basis of relevant accords (e.g., RoC–DRC), monitored and implemented by third party.
Voluntary resettlement to community of origin or other destination on basis of absorptive capacity of destination communities.	Not applicable	Resettlement upon demand to community of origin or other destination.
Referral and employment matching to employment and income-generating opportunities, as well as professional and vocational training.	Employment and income-generating opportunities created by community recovery and reconstruction projects.	Referral and employment matching to employment and income-generating opportunities, as well as professional and vocational training.

## Annex F: Results framework for Liberia DDRR programme

INTERVENTION LOGIC	INDICATORS
<b>OVERALL OBJECTIVES</b> To contribute to the consolidation of peace, national security, reconciliation and development through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society.	Three years after demobilization, 35,000 ex-combatants settle in their communities and the majority participate in civil society and engage in economic activities along with other groups and do not pose threat to national security.
<b>PROJECT GOALS</b> To facilitate an environment where ex-combatants are able to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into communities of choice and have access to social and economic reintegration opportunities.	Three years after demobilization, sufficient numbers of ex-combatants are economically active or are engaged in subsistence activities and the majority have settled in their communities of choice.

INTERVENTION LOGIC	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	INDICATORS
<b>RESULT ONE</b> Combatants are disarmed and weapons are disposed of.	Carry out a national information and sensitization campaign.	Ex-combatants and the population at large are aware of the disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) programme.
	Combatants hand their weapons in at cantonments for storage and subsequent disposal.	The disarmament of combatants contributes effectively to an improvement in security.
	Collect, disable, store and destroy all weapons and munitions handed in.	
	Register, verify and report on the equipment disposal process.	
<b>RESULT TWO</b> Combatants are registered and verified for participation in the DDRR programme.	Register and certify the eligibility of participants for the programme.	Ex-combatants use their personal identity card to access reintegration services provided by the National Commission on DDRR and their progress can be tracked.
	Issue eligible participants with personal identification card.	
	Collect socio-economic data as part of the registration process.	Socio-economic data collected are used to design effective reintegration interventions.
	Carry out medical checks.	Ex-combatants are aware of their health profile.
	Select vulnerable groups for tailored programmes and separate cantonment.	Vulnerable groups are placed in appropriate programmes or are able to access appropriate services.
<b>RESULT THREE</b> Ex-combatants return to their areas of choice and are provided with means for immediate subsistence.	Provide ex-combatants with temporary lodging, food and medical services.	Ex-combatants settle in communities of origin or preference.
	Provide ex-combatants with pre-discharge orientation services.	Ex-combatants are aware of the reintegration opportunities available to them and have reasonable expectations for the immediate future.
	Provide ex-combatants with part of reinsertion safety-net allowance.	Ex-combatants are able to subsist in the immediate future.
	Provide ex-combatant with transportation support to their destinations of choice.	Ex-combatants arrive in their areas of choice.

<b>RESULT FOUR</b> Ex-combatants are received into and contribute to the development of their communities.	Initiate measures of reconciliation with the participation of ex-combatants and community members.	Ex-combatants are socially reintegrated and participate in community social and traditional events.
	Promote ceremonial and traditional rites activities in support of reconciliation and acceptance.	Ex-combatants are accepted as active members of their communities.
	Promote measures in the communities with a mix of ex-combatants and community members.	Ex-combatants extend their social network beyond their ex-military circle and improve their perception of personal security.
	Promote civic education with the participation of the ex-combatants and community members.	Rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants contribute to national reconciliation and conflict prevention.
	Promote traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution.	Social tension and conflict between ex-combatants and their communities reduced.
<b>RESULT FIVE</b> Ex-combatants are able to engage in economic activities.	Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access market-related basic skills training.	The majority of ex-combatants are economically reintegrated.
	Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access apprenticeship schemes.	Ex-combatants access opportunities generated.
	Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access further education.	
	Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access credit/grants and skills for microbusiness development.	
	Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access opportunities in public and community-based development projects.	
	Vulnerable groupings are provided with opportunities to access tailored programmes for economic participation.	



## Annex G: Results-based budgeting for DDR in Sudan

OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS OF ACHIEVEMENT
4.2. Progress towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of armed forces and groups, including meeting the specific needs of women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and destruction.	<p>4.2.1. Government of National Unity adopts legislation establishing national and sub-national DDR institutions, and related weapons control laws.</p> <p>4.2.2. Establishment of national and sub-national DDR authorities.</p> <p>4.2.3. Development of a national DDR programme.</p> <p>4.2.4. 34,000 members of armed groups participate in disarmament, demobilization and community-based reintegration programmes, including children released to return to their families.</p>
OUTPUTS	
<p>Provide technical support (advice and programme development support) to the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), the Northern and Southern DDR commissions and their field structures, in collaboration with international financial institutions, international development organizations, NGOs and donors, in the development and implementation of a national DDR programme for all armed groups;</p> <p>Provide technical support (advice and programme development support) to assist the government in strengthening its capacity (legal, institutional, technical and physical) in the areas of weapons collection, control, management and destruction;</p> <p>Conduct 10 training courses on DDR and weapons control for the military and civilian authorities;</p> <p>Collect, store and destroy 34,000 weapons, as part of the DDR programme (planning assumption to be refined by small arms baseline survey);</p> <p>Conduct on behalf of the Government of National Unity, in partnership with international research institutions, a small arms survey, economic and market surveys, verification of the size of the DDR caseload and eligibility criteria to support the planning of a comprehensive DDR programme in Sudan;</p> <p>Develop options (eligibility criteria, encampment options and integration in civil administration) for force-reduction process for the Government of National Unity;</p> <p>Prepare contingency plans to disarm and demobilize 15,000 allied militia forces, including provision of related services such as feeding, clothing, civic education, medical, profiling and counselling, education, training and employment referral, transitional safety allowance, training materials;</p> <p>Disarm and demobilize 5,000 members of special group (women, disabled people and veterans), including provision of related services such as feeding, clothing, civic education, medical, profiling and counselling, education, training and employment referral, transitional safety allowance, training materials;</p> <p>Negotiate and secure the release of 14,000 (UNICEF estimate) children associated with the fighting forces, and facilitate their return to their families;</p> <p>Develop, coordinate and implement reinsertion support at the community level for 34,000 armed individuals, in collaboration with the national DDR institutions, other UN funds, programmes and agencies. Community-based DDR projects include: transitional support programmes, labour-intensive public works, microenterprise support, training and short-term education support;</p> <p>Develop, coordinate and implement community-based weapons for quick-impact projects in xx communities in Sudan;</p> <p>Develop and implement a DDR and small arms sensitization and community mobilization programme in districts of Sudan, <i>inter alia</i>, to develop consensus and support for the national DDR programme at national, regional and local levels, in particular to encourage the participation of women in the DDR programme;</p> <p>Organize 10 regional workshops with Sudanese military and civilian authorities on DDR;</p> <p>Organization of bi-weekly meetings with bilateral and multilateral donors on coordination of support to the DDR programme;</p> <p>Conduct training in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention for 200 representatives from the military, government ministries, NGOs, civil society and other UN agencies in order to mainstream HIV/AIDS in the national DDR programme.</p>	

## Annex H: Implementation time-frame for DDR in Haiti

	ACTIVITIES	2005				2006			
		JAN.	MAR.	JUN.	DEC.	JAN.	MAR.	JUN.	DEC.
Policy, planning and implementation mechanisms established	Development of national commission on DDR (NCDDR) and circulation of DDR programme document								
	Presentation of final DDR Plan to heads of UN agencies, sectoral tables and interim government								
	Establishment of implementation plan ToRs with heads of UN agencies								
	UN heads of agencies complete and deliver final implementation plans								
	Project Approval Committee (PAC), joint inspection unit (JIU) and sectoral table review and sign-off on implementation plan								
	Monitoring and evaluation benchmarks established								
National sensitization campaign launched	Design information and outreach programme								
Security sector reform strategy coordinated	Coordinate DDR and policing sectoral tables under security sector reform umbrella								
	Develop Haitian National Police (HNP) training, community outreach and firearm regulation strategies								
DDR support is in place and resources mobilized	DDR pool mechanism established								
	Presentation of final implementation strategy to UN, donors and international agencies								
	Initial funding is made available to carry out first stage of DDR								
	Site inspections for 6 Regional Orientation Centres (ROCs) and pre-positioning of required resources								
	Disarmament sites for 30-day grace period sites identified in designated communities								
DDR section fully operational	DDR section team and UN Volunteers (UNVs) recruited								
	Field coordination operational								
	DDR section personnel trained, resourced and operating								
	DDR section personnel deployed and 7 Regional Offices (ROs) functional								
	NCDDR operational and PAC, JIU and other units functional								

Minimum conditions created for DDR to take place	Arrest of key gang leaders and establishment of a 'secured' environment in 'high-risk' designated communities								
	Promotion of community policing in affected designated communities								
	Successful negotiations with designated armed groups								
	Effective public awareness campaigns launched with public understanding of DDR programme (radio programmes, print media, forums)								
Key implementation systems and procedures are designed	Operations manuals and protocol on DDR prepared								
	Management information system (MIS)/ Counselling and Referral System (CRS) installed and operational								
	Screening systems installed and operational								
	Voluntary disarmament sites established								
	Significant number of ROC and RO sites established								
	Design and approve reinsertion								
	Information, Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) training and referral systems in place								
	Medical screening and special assistance functional								
	Programme benefits payment system functional								
	All forms (registration, arms control, socio-economic profiling, medical screening) and pre-tests prepared								
	Quick-impact projects (QIPs) and 'stop-gap' community rehabilitation projects identified and project proposals prepared								
	UN agencies sensitized, DDR section staff, and others prepared								
	Detailed security, financial and logistic assessments and protocol undertaken for selected sites								
Small arms reduction and reinsertion benefits provided to participants	Full functioning of premises and capacities for ROCs								
	Weapons collection and destruction sites operational (voluntary disarmament and destruction, 30-day grace periods introduced)								

	Storage and stockpile containers operational and secure								
	Registration of beneficiaries in designated communities								
	Community rehabilitation project work for designated groups								
	ICRS career counselling facilities fully functioning								
	Socio-economic profiling conducted								
	Contracted niche market assessments								
	QIPs and 'stop-gaps' undertaken								
	Provision of specialized assistance for vulnerable groups								
Key implementation systems and procedures are operational	'High-risk' armed groups fully engaged in the DDR process								
	Significant numbers of 'at risk' armed groups continue to enter into the DDR process								
	ICRS reintegration follow-up proceeds with significant job opportunities for 'high-risk' groups in home communities								
	ICRS reintegration follow-up proceeds with significant job opportunities for 'at risk' groups in home communities								
Reintegration assistance provided to stakeholders	Four training streams operational								
	Four services streams operational								
	Reintegration assistance provided								
	Reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance to affected communities								
Affected communities receive investment and support	Joint community committees formed (former armed group leaders and local leadership)								
	Conflict resolution training and interventions carried out								
	Capacity-building exercises and training for community-based organizations (CBOs), NGOs and local leaders								
	Participation of returning former military and former armed group members in QIP community infrastructure projects								
	Promotion and funding of youth associations, inter-community recreational and sporting activities								
Ongoing evaluation	Monitoring and evaluation, independent evaluations								

## Annex I: Generic (typical) DDR work plan template

TASKS	DETAILS	REQUIRED INPUTS	RESPONSIBLE					Time-frame
			Funding	Logistic support	Staffing	Coordination/Supervision	Implementation	
Institutions	Establishment of national framework							
	Provision of financial/logistic support for national framework							
	Establishment of DDR planning cell in mission							
	Establishment of implementation framework							
	Provision of financial/staffing/logistic support for implementation framework							
Finance	Establishment of trust fund							
	Financial management of trust fund							
	Costing of the DDR programme							
	Resource mobilization							
Training	Provision of training for those responsible for implementing DDR programme							
Information and sensitization	Implementation of the information and sensitization campaign:							
	for leaders of two parties							
	for veterans, mid-level commanders							
	for rank and file							
	for regular military							
	for militia							
	for community							
Voluntary surrender of weapons	Establishment of a pre-DDR weapons policy/programme							
	Procurement and secure delivery of weapons destruction machines, storage containers, explosives for destruction of ammunition and explosives							

	Weapons collection and registration							
	Weapons storage							
	Weapons destruction							
	Weapons disposal							
	Registration of combatants							
	Support to combatants							
	Support to dependants of combatants							
	Security for combatants, dependants, community							
Disarmament	Identification of disarmament sites							
	Procurement and secure delivery of weapons destruction machines, storage containers, explosives for destruction of ammunition and explosives							
	Establishment of disarmament sites							
	Establishment of weapons collection, storage, destruction and disposal facilities at disarmament sites							
	Transportation of weapons from disarmament sites to final disposal destination							
	Disarmament of combatants							
	Registration of weapons							
	Storage							
	Destruction							
	Disposal							
	Transportation of disarmed combatants to demobilization site							
Demobilization	Identification of sites							
	Identification of requirements for setting up of site							
	Procurement of equipment and cantonment sites requirements							

	Delivery of equipment and requirements							
	Physical establishment of cantonment sites							
	Hiring of camp management							
	Contracting of service providers to run camps							
	Provision of external security for cantonment sites							
	Provision of internal security for cantonment sites							
	Reception and registration of disarmed combatants							
	Establishment of management information system							
	Socio-economic profiling of ex-combatants							
	Medical screening of ex-combatants							
	Implementation of demobilization programme for adult male ex-combatants							
	Implementation of demobilization programme for adult female ex-combatants							
	Implementation of demobilization programme for women and children associated with armed forces and groups							
	Implementation of support programme for dependants							
	Payment of transition support allowance to dependants							
	Transportation of disarmed ex-combatants to area of resettlement							
	Tracking of demobilized ex-combatants							
	Establishment of interim care centres for child ex-combatants							

	Implementation of demobilization programme for child ex-combatants							
	Establishment of network of service centres for ex-combatants							
	Appointment of service providers to run demobilization programmes in service centres							
	Preparation of community for reception of returnees							
Reinsertion	Community-based reconciliation programmes							
	Provision of information, counselling and referral services							
	Provision of food assistance							
	Distribution of reinsertion kits and/or transitional livelihood assistance packages							
	Implementation of temporary 'food for work' activities in areas of return							
	Rehabilitation of key infrastructures and basic services in areas of return							
	Identification and implementation of stop-gap projects							
	Implementation of stop-gap projects							
Economic reintegration	Vocational training programmes							
	Creation of labour-intensive employment opportunities							
	Provision of information, referral and counselling services							
	Education programmes							
	Employment information and referral programmes							
	Agricultural assistance programmes							



	Microenterprises support programmes							
	Support for economic reintegration of demobilized women							
Social reintegration	Family tracing for children							
	Support for the integration of women into society							
	Sensitization, civic education and peace education							
Medical and economic rehabilitation	Provision for disabled ex-combatants							
Political reintegration	Political negotiations for the repatriation of foreign ex-combatants							

## Endnotes

- 1 PRA uses group animation and exercises to obtain information. Using PRA methods, local people carry out the data collection and analysis, with outsiders assisting with the process rather than controlling it. This approach brings about shared learning between local people and outsiders; emphasizes local knowledge; and enables local people to make their own appraisal, analysis and plans. PRA was originally developed so as to enable development practitioners, government officials and local people to work together to plan context-appropriate programmes. PRA-type exercises can also be used in other contexts such as in planning for DDR.
- 2 LCA – Lusaka Ceasefire Accords, 1999; SCA – Sun City Accord, April 2002; DRA – DRC/Rwanda Accords, July 2002.
- 3 UNDP D3 report, 2001.
- 4 DRC authorities.
- 5 Privileged source.
- 6 Unverified information.
- 7 UNDP/IOM registration records.
- 8 UNDP D3 report, 2001.
- 9 Government of Uganda sources, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).
- 10 FNL estimated at 3,000 men (UNDP D3 report), located mainly in Burundi.

# 3.30 National Institutions for DDR

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#### **NOTE**

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# 3.30 National Institutions for DDR

## Summary

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes have increasingly relied on national institutions to ensure their success and sustainability. This module discusses three main issues related to national institutions:

- 1) mandates and legal frameworks;
- 2) structures and functions; and
- 3) coordination with international DDR structures and processes.

The mandates and legal frameworks of national institutions will vary according to the nature of the DDR programme, the approach that is adopted, the division of responsibilities with international partners and the administrative structures found in the country. It is important to ensure that national and international mandates for DDR are clear and coherent, and that a clear division of labour is established. Mandates and basic principles, institutional mechanisms, time-frames and eligibility criteria should be defined in the peace accord, and national authorities should establish the appropriate framework for DDR through legislation, decrees or executive orders.

The structures of national institutions will also vary depending on the political and institutional context in which they are created. They should nevertheless reflect the security, social and economic dimensions of the DDR process in question by including broad representation across a number of government ministries, civil society organizations and the private sector.

In addition, national institutions should adequately function at three different levels:

- the policy/strategic level through the establishment of a national commission on DDR;
- the planning and technical levels through the creation of a national technical planning and coordination body; and
- the implementation/operational level through a joint implementation unit and field/regional offices.

There will be generally a range of national and international partners engaged in implementation of different components of the national DDR programme.

Coordination with international DDR structures and processes should be also ensured at the policy, planning and operational levels. The success and sustainability of a DDR programme depend on the ability of international expertise to complement and support a nationally led process. A UN strategy in support of DDR should therefore take into account not only the context in which DDR takes place, but also the existing capacity of national and local actors to develop, manage and implement DDR.

Areas of support for national institutions are: institutional capacity development; legal frameworks; policy, planning and implementation; financial management; material and logistic assistance; training for national staff; and community development and empowerment.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides United Nations (UN) DDR policy makers and practitioners with guidance on the structures, roles and responsibilities of national counterparts for DDR, their relationships with the UN and the legal frameworks within which they operate. It also provides guidance on how the UN should define its role, the scope of support it should offer to national structures and institutions, and capacity development.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

The term ‘a national framework for DDR’ describes the political, legal, programmatic/policy and institutional framework, resources and capacities established to structure and guide national engagement with a DDR process. The implementation of DDR requires multiple stakeholders; therefore, participants in the establishment and implementation of a national DDR framework include not only the government, but also all parties to the peace agreement, civil society, and all other national and local stakeholders.

## 3. Introduction

UN-supported DDR aims to be people-centred, flexible, accountable and transparent, nationally owned, integrated and well planned. Within the UN, integrated DDR is delivered with the cooperation of agencies, programmes, funds and peacekeeping missions.

In a country in which it is implemented, there is a focus on capacity-building at both government and local levels to achieve sustainable national ownership of DDR, among other peace-building measures. Certain conditions should be in place for DDR to proceed: these include the signing of a negotiated peace agreement, which provides a legal framework for DDR; trust in the peace process; transparency; the willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR; and a minimum guarantee of security. This module focuses on how to create and sustain these conditions.

## 4. Guiding principles

The principles guiding the development of national DDR frameworks, as well as the principles of UN engagement with, and support to, national institutions and stakeholders, are outlined in IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR. Here, they are discussed in more detail.

## 4.1. National ownership

National ownership is essential for the success and sustainability of DDR programmes, and supporting national institutions is a core principle of the UN. However, in the past, too many DDR programmes were overly controlled by external actors who did not make enough effort to establish true partnership with national institutions and local authorities, producing programmes that were insufficiently adapted to the dynamics of local conflicts, unsupportive of the capacities of local institutions and unresponsive to the needs of local populations.

While the UN system may be called upon to provide strategic, technical, operational and financial support to DDR, national and local actors — who are ultimately responsible for the peace, security and development of their own communities and nations — should lead the process. When the UN supports DDR, it also aims to increase the capacities of governments, implementing partners, communities and participants, and to assist them as they take ownership of the process: the promotion of national ownership is therefore a principle that guides both policy and the operational design of DDR programmes carried out with UN support.

## 4.2. Inclusivity

Another core principle in the establishment and support of national institutions is the inclusion of all stakeholders. National ownership is both broader and deeper than central government leadership: it requires the participation of a range of state and non-state actors at national, provincial and local levels. National DDR institutions should include all parties to the conflict, as well as representatives of civil society and the private sector. The international community should play a role in supporting the development of capacities in civil society and at local levels to enable them to participate in DDR processes (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

National ownership is both broader and deeper than central government leadership: it requires the participation of a range of state and non-state actors at national, provincial and local levels.

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## 4.3. Accountability and transparency

Accountability and transparency are important principles for all national institutions. DDR institutions should adopt and encourage/support these values in order to:

- build confidence among the parties to the DDR process;
- establish the legitimacy of the process with the general population and local communities;
- ensure continued financial and technical support from international actors.

Accountability mechanisms should be established for the monitoring, oversight and evaluation of processes through both internal and external review. Transparency should be also supported through a broad communications strategy that raises awareness of the principles and details of the programme (also see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes and IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR).

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4.60 ◀▶ ■

## 5. Mandates and legal frameworks for national engagement with DDR

The mandates and legal frameworks established for national DDR institutions will vary according to the nature of the DDR process to be carried out and the approach adopted, the division of responsibilities with international partners, and the administrative structures of the state itself. All stakeholders should agree to the establishment of the mandate and legal framework (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).

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The national and international mandates for DDR should be clear and coherent.

### 5.1. Establishing clear and coherent national and international mandates

The national and international mandates for DDR should be clear and coherent. A clear

division of responsibilities should be established in the different levels of programme co-ordination and for different programme components. This can be done through:

- supporting international experts to provide technical advice on DDR to parties to the peace negotiations;
- incorporating national authorities into inter-agency assessment missions to ensure that national policies and strategies are reflected in the Secretary-General's report and Security Council mandates for UN peace-support operations;
- discussing national and international roles, responsibilities and functions within the framework of an agreed common DDR plan or programme;
- providing technical advice to national authorities on the design and development of legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms and national programmes for DDR;
- establishing mechanisms for the joint implementation and coordination of DDR programmes and activities at the policy, planning and operational levels.

### 5.2. Political frameworks and peace accord provisions

When parties to a conflict have concluded a peace accord or political agreement, provisions should have been included in it on the establishment of a legal framework for the DDR process. Mandates and basic principles, institutional mechanisms, time-frames and eligibility criteria should all be defined. As the programme starts, institutional mechanisms and programme details should be elaborated further through the adoption of national legislation or executive decree(s).

### 5.3. National legislative framework

In addition to the provisions of the peace accord, national authorities should develop legal instruments (legislation, decree[s] or executive order[s]) that establish the appropriate legal framework for DDR. These should include, but are not limited to, the following:

- a letter of demobilization policy, which establishes the intent of national authorities to carry out a process of demobilization and reduction of armed forces and groups, indicating the total numbers to be demobilized, how this process will be carried out and under whose authority, and links to other national processes, particularly the reform and restructuring of the security sector;



- legislation, decree(s) or executive order(s) establishing the national institutional framework for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the DDR process. This legislation should include articles or separate instruments relating to:
  - a national political body representing different parties to the process, ministries responsible for the programme and civil society. This legal instrument should establish the body's mandate for political coordination, policy direction and general oversight of the DDR programme. It should also establish the specific composition of the body, frequency of meetings, responsible authority (usually the prime minister or president) and reporting lines to technical coordination and implementation mechanisms;
  - a technical planning and coordination body responsible for the technical design and implementation of the DDR programme. This legal instrument should specify the body's different technical units/directions and overall management structure, as well as functional links to implementation mechanisms;
  - operational and implementation mechanisms at national, provincial and local levels. Legal provisions should specify the institutions, international and local partners responsible for delivering different components of the DDR programme. It should also define financial management and reporting structures within the national programme;
  - an institution or unit responsible for the financial management and oversight of the DDR programme, funds received from national accounts, bilateral and multi-lateral donors, and contracts and procurement. This unit may be housed within a national institution or entrusted to an international partner. Often a joint national–international management and oversight system is established, particularly where donor funds are being received.

The national DDR programme itself should be formally approved or adopted through legislation, executive order or decree. Programme principles and policies regarding eligibility criteria, definition of target groups, benefits structures and time-frame, as well as programme integration within other processes such as security sector reform (SSR), transitional justice and election timetables, should be identified through this process.

#### 5.4. Integrated peace-building and recovery framework

DDR is a component of larger peace-building and recovery strategies. For this reason, national DDR efforts should be linked with other national initiatives and processes, including SSR, transitional justice mechanisms, the electoral process, economic reconstruction and recovery (also see IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks and IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).

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##### 5.4.1. Transitional justice and amnesty provisions

Through the establishment of amnesties and transitional justice programmes, as part of the broader peace-building process, parties attempt to deal with crimes and violations in the conflict period, while promoting reconciliation and drawing a line between the period of conflict and a more peaceful future. Transitional justice processes vary widely from place to place, depending on the historical circumstances and root causes of the conflict. They try to balance justice and truth with national reconciliation, and may include amnesty provisions

for those involved in political and armed struggles. Generally, truth commissions are temporary fact-finding bodies that investigate human rights abuses within a certain period, and they present findings and recommendations to the government. They assist post-conflict communities to establish facts about what went on during the conflict period. Some truth commissions include a reconciliation component to support dialogue between factions within the community.

In addition to national efforts, international criminal tribunals may be established to prosecute and hold accountable people who committed serious crimes. While national justice systems may also wish to prosecute wrongdoers, they may not be capable of doing so, owing to lack of capacity or will.

During the negotiation of peace accords and political agreements, parties may make their involvement in DDR programmes conditional on the provision of amnesties for carrying weapons or less serious crimes. These amnesties will generally absolve (pardon) participants who conducted a political and armed struggle, and free them from prosecution. While amnesties may be agreed for violations of national law, the UN system is obliged to uphold the principles of international law, and shall therefore not support DDR processes that do not properly deal with serious violations such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.<sup>1</sup> However, the UN should support the establishment of transitional justice processes to properly deal with such violations. Proper links should be created with DDR and the broader SSR process.

#### 5.4.2. Citizenship and nationality laws

In conflicts where ethnicity, religion or other identities have been causes of the conflict, there are often questions of citizenship or nationality that need to be resolved as part of the peace process. The resolution of these issues are likely to affect parties' willingness to engage in other parts of the larger peace-building framework, including elections, DDR and the restructuring of security forces (also see IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

◀ ▶ 5.40

#### 5.4.3. Weapons control and management

A national legal regime for weapons control and management establishes conditions for the lawful acquisition, trade, possession and use of arms by state authorities and citizens. Provisional laws or decrees governing weapons control and management are often introduced during periods of post-conflict transition (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and IDDRS 4.11 on SALW Control, Security and Development).

◀ ▶ 4.10

◀ ▶ 4.11

#### 5.4.4. Rule of law and justice reform

According to the Secretary-General's report on *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, 'rule of law' refers to a "principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency".<sup>2</sup>

However, the rule of law often breaks down during long periods of conflict; or a lack of justice, or manipulation of the justice system by authorities or political groups may be

one of the causes of conflict. Some parties may be reluctant to participate in DDR when the rule of law has broken down and where their personal safety is not properly protected. Re-establishing the rule of law and carrying out justice reform are often essential aspects of a larger peace-building strategy. DDR should contribute to strengthening the rule of law by disarming armed forces and groups, who afterwards become subject to regular criminal justice systems.

#### 5.4.5. Restructuring of armed forces

DDR is generally linked to the restructuring of armed forces and SSR as part of a broader peace-building framework. Agreement between the parties on the new mandate, structures, composition and powers of national security forces is often a condition for their entry into a formal DDR process. As a result, the planning and design of the DDR programme needs to be closely linked to the SSR process to ensure coherence on such issues as vetting of ex-combatants (to establish eligibility for integration into the reformed security forces) and establishing the legal status and entitlements of demobilized ex-combatants, including pensions and health care benefits.

## 6. Structures and functions of national institutions

The architecture of national DDR institutions will vary depending on the political and institutional context in which they are created. The following generic (general) model represents a basic outline of structures and functions for a national DDR institutional framework, and lays out the structure of relationships with UN integrated missions and international coordination mechanisms. While the basic functions of national DDR institutions will be similar in most cases, the organization of institutional structures and their relation to international actors will vary widely from country to country.

### 6.1. Integrated approach


Integration is not only a principle for UN support to DDR, but also for the establishment of national institutions. The form of national institutions should reflect the security, economic and social dimensions of the DDR process. To achieve this, national institutions should include broad representation across a number of government ministries. Although the composition of national institutions for DDR will vary according to the particular government structures of different countries, the following institutions are generally represented at the level of policy and planning of national DDR institutions:

- the executive (the presidency and/or prime minister's office);
- the ministries of defence and interior (national security);
- the ministries of planning and finance;
- the ministries of labour, employment and industry;
- the ministries of agriculture and natural resources;
- the ministries of social welfare, status of women and protection of children;
- human rights and national reconciliation agencies;
- electoral authorities.

As well as representation of the various agencies and ministries of government, it is important to include representatives of civil society and the private sector in DDR policy and strategic coordination mechanisms.

## 6.2. Model for a national DDR institutional framework

The following diagram presents a schematic overview of links among national and international DDR mechanisms at policy, planning and implementation levels (see Annexes B–D for examples from Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone).



### 6.3. Policy/Strategic level

#### 6.3.1. National DDR commission

A national DDR policy body representing key national and international stakeholders should be set up under a government or transitional authority established through peace accords, or under the authority of the president or prime minister. This body meets periodically to perform the following main functions:

- to provide political coordination and policy direction for the national DDR programme;
- to coordinate all government institutions and international agencies in support of the national DDR programme;
- to ensure coordination of national DDR programme with other components of the national peace-building and recovery process;
- to ensure oversight of the agency(ies) responsible for the design and implementation of the national DDR programme;
- to review progress reports and financial statements;
- to approve annual/quarterly work plans.

The precise composition of this policy body will vary; however, the following are generally represented:

- government ministries and agencies responsible for components of DDR (including national women's councils or agencies, and agencies responsible for youth and children);
- representatives of parties to the peace accord/political agreement;
- representatives of the UN, regional organizations and donors;
- representatives of civil society and the private sector.

#### 6.3.2. International coordination and assistance

Depending on whether a UN mission has been established, support is provided for the development of national policies and strategies through the offices of the UN Resident Coordinator, or upon appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)/Deputy SRSG (DSRSG). When there is a UN Security Council mandate, the SRSG will be responsible for the coordination of international support to the peace-building and transition process, including DDR. When the UN has a mandate to support national DDR institutions, the SRSG/DSRSG may be invited to chair or co-chair the national commission on DDR (NCDDR), particularly if there is a need for neutral arbitration.

### 6.4. Planning and technical levels

#### 6.4.1. National DDR agency

A national technical planning and coordination body, responsible for the design and implementation of the DDR programme, should be established. The national coordinator/director of this body oversees the day-to-day management of the DDR programme and ensures regular reporting to the NCDDR. The main functions of the national DDR agency include:

- the design of the DDR programme, including conducting assessments, collecting baseline data, establishing indicators and targets, and defining eligibility criteria for the inclusion of individuals in DDR activities;

- planning of DDR programme activities, including the establishment of information management systems, and monitoring and evaluations procedures;
- oversight of the joint implementation unit (JIU) for DDR programme implementation.

Directed by a national coordinator / director, the staff of the national DDR agency should include programme managers and technical experts (including those seconded from national ministries) and international technical experts (these may include advisers from the UN system and/or the mission's DDR unit) (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).

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#### 6.4.2. International technical coordination committee

An international technical coordination committee provides a forum for consultation, co-ordination and joint planning between national and international partners at the technical level of DDR programme development and implementation. This committee should meet regularly to review technical issues related to national DDR programme planning and implementation.

Participation in the technical coordination committee will vary a great deal, depending on which international actors are present in a country. The committee should include technical experts from the national DDR agency and from those multilateral and bilateral agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with operations or activities that have a direct or indirect impact on the national DDR programme (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).

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#### 6.4.3. Project approval committee

A project approval committee (PAC) can be established to ensure transparency in the use of donor resources for DDR by implementing partners, i.e., to review and approve applications by national and international NGOs or agencies for funding for projects. Its role does not include oversight of either the regular operating budget for national DDR institutions or programmes (monitored by the independent financial management unit), or the activities of the UN mission's DDR unit. The PAC will generally include representatives of donors, the national DDR agency and the UN mission/agencies (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners and IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting.)

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◀▶ 3.41

### 6.5. Implementation/Operational level

Operational and implementation mechanisms should be established at national, provincial and local levels. These mechanisms should operate under the supervision of the technical coordination and planning body.

#### 6.5.1. Joint implementation unit

The JIU is the operational arm of a national DDR agency, responsible for the implementation of a national DDR programme under the direction of the national coordinator, and ultimately accountable to the NCDDR. The organization of a JIU will vary depending on the priorities and implementation methods of particular national DDR programmes. It should be organized by a functional unit that is designed to integrate the sectors and cross-cutting components of a national DDR programme, which may include:



- disarmament and demobilization;
- reintegration;
- child protection, youth, gender, cross-border, food, health and HIV/AIDS advisers;
- public information and community sensitization;
- monitoring and evaluation.

Other functional units may be established according to the design and needs of particular DDR programmes.

#### 6.5.2. Independent financial management unit

Given the size and sensitivities of resource allocation to large DDR operations, an independent financial management, contracts and procurement unit for the national DDR programme should be established. This unit may be housed within the national DDR institution or entrusted to an international partner. A joint national–international management and oversight system may be established, particularly when donors are contributing significant funds for DDR. This unit should be responsible for the following:

- establishing standards and procedures for financial management and accounting, contracts, and procurement of goods and services for the DDR programme;
- mobilizing and managing national and international funds received for DDR programme activities;
- reviewing and approving budgets for DDR programme activities;
- establishing a reporting system and preparing financial reports and audits as required (also see IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting).

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#### 6.5.3. Regional/Field offices

Depending on the geographic concentration of DDR programme activities (whether these are to take place throughout the country or are limited to particular regions) and on the way in which the administrative structures in the country are organized, regional or provincial coordination should be facilitated through the establishment of DDR field offices. Field offices should report directly to the JIU, which provides technical support and project oversight. Field offices should be responsible for:

- supporting disarmament and demobilization process and regional centres;
- developing regional reintegration strategies;
- coordinating DDR information and sensitization campaigns in areas of intervention;
- establishing information, counselling and referral systems;
- establishing information/communication networks and a database of local implementation partners;
- maintaining the database, and monitoring reintegration projects and opportunities;
- establishing management and reporting systems for programme funds.

Advisory mechanisms at regional or provincial level may also be established to ensure the broad participation of all stakeholders in the design and delivery of provincial strategies.

At the local level, DDR committees or advisory councils should be established to ensure community participation in identifying reintegration opportunities, designing programmes and facilitating the reintegration of ex-combatants and dependants within the community. These councils or committees should include representatives of local and traditional authorities; NGOs and community-based associations, including women's and children's rights

groups; and representatives of ex-combatants, women associated with armed groups and forces, child former combatants, disabled people and dependants.

#### 6.5.4. Implementing agencies/partners

There will generally be a range of national and international partners engaged in the implementation of different components of the national DDR programme. These will vary significantly depending on the presence and capabilities of government agencies, local authorities and community-based organizations; UN agencies; and national and international NGOs located near DDR operations. The activities of implementing partners should be coordinated by regional/field offices that report to the JIU of a national DDR agency (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).

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## 7. Coordination of national and international DDR structures and processes

National and international DDR structures and processes should, as far as possible, be jointly developed and coordinated at the policy, planning and operational levels, as explained below. The planning of UN missions and national DDR institutions has not always been

The success and sustainability of a DDR programme depend on the ability of international expertise and resources to complement and support nationally led processes.

sufficiently integrated, reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of both. The success and sustainability of a DDR programme depend on the ability of international expertise and resources to complement and support nationally led processes.

A key factor in close coordination is the early consultation of national authorities and parties to the DDR process during UN assessment missions and mission planning

processes. International DDR expertise, political support and technical assistance should also be available from the earliest point in the peace process through the establishment of national institutions and programmes.

### 7.1. Policy/Strategic level

Coordination of national and international efforts at the policy/strategic level will vary a great deal, depending on the dynamics of the conflict, the parties to the peace process and the role/mandate of the UN in support of peace-building and recovery, including DDR. However, coordination (and where possible, integration) of national and international efforts will be essential at the following points:

- ensuring national and local stakeholder participation in UN assessment and mission planning exercises (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures). National stakeholders should be consulted and, where possible, participate fully in the initial planning phases of international support for DDR;
- providing international support for the establishment of an NCDDR or political oversight mechanisms;

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- coordinating bilateral and multilateral actors to ensure a coherent message on DDR and to support national institutions.

## 7.2. Planning and technical levels

Coordination of national and international efforts at the planning and technical levels is important to ensure that the national DDR programme and UN support for DDR operations work together in an integrated and coherent way. It is important to ensure coordination at the following points:

- in national DDR programme development;
- in the development of DDR programmes of UN mission and agencies;
- in technical coordination with bilateral partners and NGOs.

## 7.3. Implementation/Operational level

Coordination between the national DDR agency and UN mission/system at the operational level should be established through the following:

- the establishment of a JIU with mixed national/international staff;
- the provision of international technical assistance for implementation;
- the coordination of national and international implementing agencies/partners.

# 8. The role of international assistance

The DDR of ex-combatants in countries emerging from conflict is complex and involves many different activities. Flexibility and a sound analysis of local needs and contexts are the most essential requirements for designing a UN strategy in support of DDR. It is important to establish the context in which DDR is taking place and the existing capacities of national and local actors to develop, manage and implement DDR operations.

The UN recognizes that a genuine, effective and broad national ownership of the DDR process is important for the successful implementation of the disarmament and demobilization process, and that this is essential for the sustainability of the reintegration of ex-combatants into post-conflict society. The UN should work to encourage genuine, effective and broad national ownership at all phases of the DDR programme, wherever possible.

## 8.1. Considerations in defining the role of the UN

The UN approach to the planning, management and monitoring of DDR programmes in a peacekeeping environment should be informed by the following factors:

- *Strength and legitimacy of governments:* Post-conflict governments and their attendant bureaucracies may vary widely in terms of their strength and viability; their legitimacy in the eyes of the population; their level of existing capacities for programme development and management; the territorial extent and scope of government authority; and the degree to which the State has a monopoly over the means of violence in its territory. Taken together, these will affect the degree to which a given government can take effective ownership of and responsibility for DDR;

- *Technical capacities and knowledge:* Even when post-conflict governments are legitimate and capable, they may lack the specific technical knowledge that is needed to link DDR to a national reconstruction plan and SSR;
- *Participation of civil society:* In many post-conflict situations, civil society may have been repressed or marginalized and lack access to political decision-making processes. The representation of civil society at all levels in the body politic is essential, and the UN should support the participation and engagement of civil society in DDR processes wherever possible. Possible roles may include involvement in the policy development process (and particularly its link with transitional justice and equity issues); assistance with the identification of people associated with armed groups and forces, especially women and children; and implementing (particularly focusing on the involvement of local communities) and monitoring the effectiveness of DDR programmes.

#### 8.1.1. Letter of agreement

The national stakeholders and the UN should establish a letter of agreement where the government and relevant national stakeholders outline their respective roles and responsibilities; establish commitments to DDR according to international standards; establish links to SSR (including plans for future military size and budget, military unification, and restructuring, where relevant); and outline humanitarian activities and reconstruction/recovery efforts.

### 8.2. Areas of UN support

UN support to national efforts take place in the following areas (the actual degree of UN engagement should be determined on the basis of the considerations outlined above):

- *Political/Strategic support:* In order for the international community to provide political support to the DDR process, it is essential to understand the dynamics of both the conflict and the post-conflict period. By carrying out a stakeholder analysis (as part of a larger conflict assessment process), it will be possible to better understand the dynamics among national actors, and to identify DDR supporters and potential spoilers;
- *Institutional capacity development:* It is important that capacity development strategies are established jointly with national authorities at the start of international involvement in DDR to ensure that the parties themselves take ownership of and responsibility for the success of the process. The UN system should play an important role in supporting the development of national and local capacities for DDR through providing technical assistance, establishing partnership arrangements with national institutions, and providing training and capacity-building to local implementing partners;
- *Support for the establishment of legal frameworks:* A key area in which international expertise can support the development of national capacities is in the drawing up of legal frameworks for DDR and related processes of SSR and weapons management. The UN system should draw on experiences from a range of political and legal systems, and assist national authorities in drafting appropriate legislation and legal instruments;
- *Technical assistance for policy and planning:* Through the provision of technical assistance, the UN system should provide direct support to the development of national DDR policy and programmes. It is important to ensure, however, that this assistance is provided through partnership or mentoring arrangements that allow for knowledge and skills transfers to national staff, and to avoid situations where international experts

take direct responsibility for programme functions within national institutions. When several international institutions are providing technical assistance to national authorities, it is important to ensure that this assistance is coordinated and coherent;

- *Direct support for implementation and financial management:* The UN system may also be called upon, either by Security Council mandate or at the request of national authorities, to provide direct support for the implementation of certain components of a DDR programme, including the financial management of resources for DDR. A memorandum of understanding should be established between the UN and national authorities that defines the precise area of responsibility for programme delivery, mechanisms for co-ordination with local partners and clear reporting responsibilities;
- *Material/Logistic support:* In the post-conflict period, many national institutions lack both material and human resources. The UN system should provide material and logistic support to national DDR institutions and implementing agencies, particularly in the areas of: information and communications technology and equipment; transportation; rehabilitation, design and management of DDR sites, transit centres and other facilities; the establishment of information management and referral systems; and the procurement of basic goods for reinsertion kits, among others (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament, IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization and IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration);
- *Training programmes for national staff:* The UN system should further support capacity development through the provision of training. There are a number of different training methodologies, including the provision of courses or seminars, training of trainers, on-the-job or continuous training, and exchanges with experts from other national DDR institutions. Although shortage of time and money may limit the training options that can be offered, it is important that the approach chosen builds skills through a continuous process of capacity development that transfers skills to local actors;
- *Support to local capacity development and community empowerment:* Through local capacity development and community empowerment, the UN system should support local ownership of DDR processes and programmes. Since the success of the DDR process depends largely on the reintegration of individuals at the community level, it is important to ensure that capacity development efforts are not restricted to assisting national authorities, but include direct support to communities in areas of reintegration. In particular, international agencies can help to build local capacities for participation in assessment and planning processes, project and financial management, reporting, and evaluation.

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## Annex A: Abbreviations

### Abbreviations used in the module

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
JIU	joint implementation unit
NCDDR	national commission on DDR
NGO	non-governmental organization
PAC	project approval committee
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations


### Abbreviations used in the annexes

A&L	administration and logistics
AU	African Union
CBO	community-based organization
CIVPOL	UN Civilian Police
DEX	Direct Execution
DD/D&D	disarmament and demobilization
DDRRP	disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FMPU	Financial Management and Procurement Unit
GOL	Government of Liberia
HNP	Haitian National Police
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	international non-governmental organization
I&S	information and sensitization
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti
MIS	management information system
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoU	memorandum of understanding
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NCDDRR	National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
R&R	reinsertion and reintegration
TCC	Technical Coordination Committee
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNMIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Liberia
<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>UNV</b>	United Nations Volunteer
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## Annex B: National institutional framework: Haiti

### Proposed institutional structure (Haiti)



NCDHR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Prime minister</li> <li>■ Relevant ministries</li> <li>■ Executive secretary</li> <li>■ SRSG – observer status</li> <li>■ UN agencies – observer status</li> <li>■ Donor reps. – observer status</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Defines DDR strategy and policy</li> <li>■ Overall coordination and supervision of DDR</li> <li>■ Resource mobilization</li> <li>■ Approval of annual operational plan</li> </ul>
Technical Working Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Govt. technical reps.</li> <li>■ MINUSTAH/UNDP experts (DDR, military, CIVPOL)</li> <li>■ HNP liaison</li> <li>■ UNOPS</li> <li>■ UNICEF</li> <li>■ ILO</li> <li>■ Other UN agencies</li> <li>■ International/National NGOs</li> <li>■ Civil society</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Technical coordination and planning</li> <li>■ Defines implementation procedures and modalities</li> <li>■ Monitoring of implementation</li> <li>■ Approval of annual operational plan</li> </ul>
PAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Govt reps.</li> <li>■ MINUSTAH/UNDP rep.</li> <li>■ Donors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Project evaluation/approval</li> <li>■ Allocation of funds</li> <li>■ Financial monitoring</li> </ul>
JIU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Executive secretary</li> <li>■ Executive secretary's management team</li> <li>■ MINUSTAH/UNDP DDR section head office</li> <li>■ Other executing partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Manage DDR regional offices</li> <li>■ Operational planning coordination of DDR activities throughout Haiti</li> </ul>
Regional Offices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ MINUSTAH/UNDP section staff</li> <li>■ MINUSTAH civil affairs section staff</li> <li>■ Govt. staffing</li> <li>■ Other executing partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Operational planning and activities for region</li> <li>■ Reporting</li> <li>■ Monitoring and evaluation</li> </ul>
Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ International/National NGOs implementing partners</li> <li>■ Community-based organizations</li> <li>■ UN agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Implementation of activities</li> <li>■ Provision of services</li> </ul>
Bureau de Gestion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Three senior govt. managers</li> <li>■ Management and support staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Management of ex-FAd'H DDR</li> <li>■ Screening of ex-FAd'H members w/ international panel</li> <li>■ Coordination of Ex-FAd'H disarmament process through regional offices</li> </ul>

## Annex C: Liberia DDR programme: Strategy and implementation modalities


Prepared by the Draft Interim Secretariat (Comprising UNDP, UNMIL, World Bank, USAID, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, World Vision)

Monrovia, 31 October 2003

Excerpts: pp. 17–24

### Implementation modalities

#### Institutional arrangements



#### The national commission

The programme will be implemented under the guidance and supervision of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), a temporary institution established by the peace agreement August 2003. The NCDDRR will consist of representatives from relevant National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) agencies, the Government of Liberia (GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL).

The NCDDRR will:

- provide policy guidance to the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU);
- formulate the strategy and co-ordinate all government institutions in support of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme (DDRRP);




- identify problems related to programme implementation and impact; and
- undertake all measures necessary for their quick and effective solution. During start-up, the NCDDRR will hold at least monthly meetings, but extraordinary meetings can be called if necessary.

The NCDDRR will be supported by a Secretary, who will be responsible for:

- reporting to the NCDDRR on the activities of the JIU with regard to the DDRR process;
- promoting programme activities as well as managing relationships with external key stakeholders;
- assisting the JIU with necessary support and facilitation required to secure the political commitment of the leadership of the various fighting groups in order to implement the DDRR programme;
- participating in the various committees of the JIU – particularly with the Technical Coordination Committee and the Project Approval Committee (PAC);
- providing general oversight of the DDRR process on behalf of the NCDDRR committee and preparing reports to the committee.

## Joint Implementation Unit

### Structure



### Function

In order to ensure rapid implementation that will protect the credibility of the programme, a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), headed by a Programme and Policy Adviser, will carry out the planning and implementation of the day-to-day operation and execution of the

programme. The JIU will be an interdisciplinary and interdepartmental entity composed of four units dealing with:

- **disarmament and demobilization:** staffed with expertise from the UNMIL comprising a disarmament and demobilization expert, demobilization officers and field officers, as well as qualified national staff;
- **rehabilitation and reintegration:** staffed with expertise from the UNDP and other relevant agencies consisting of reintegration operation experts and national experts in vocational training and small enterprise development, employment creation and apprenticeship promotion, agriculture and food production;
- **monitoring and evaluation:** staffed by technical assistance from the UNDP including a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) expert, and national staff as systems analyst, programmer and M&E field monitors as well as short-term data entry clerks; and
- **information and sensitization:** staffed with expertise from UNMIL and OCHA including specialists in public information development and dissemination, social adaptation programmes in the area of civic education, psychosocial counselling, community-based reconciliation and peace-building measures.

Accountable to the NCDDRR, the JIU will be responsible for ensuring:

- the planning and implementation of the individual programme components in collaboration with other government departments, NGOs and donors;
- the transparent and accountable administration of the programme (including procurement and disbursements); and
- monitoring and evaluation.

The institutional capacity of the JIU will be ensured through rigorous selection of staff, payment consistent with the quality of outputs required, and staff training where appropriate. Technical assistance will be contracted on the basis of specific terms of reference for providing a management information system (MIS) and financial management as well as the implementation of specific programme components.

The various units of the JIU will be assigned with expertise from UN agencies as follows:

- the UNMIL DDR team will be deployed for the DD Unit in the JIU;
- programme and policy coordination, MIS and reintegration will be assigned to the team from the UNDP; and
- UNMIL and OCHA will handle the Information and Sensitization Unit.

This arrangement will enhance the capacity of the JIU as well as reducing the overall staffing cost for the programme, while ensuring continuity in programme development in the event of the completion of the mandate of the mission. Each unit will be supported with national staff recruited to understudy the international staff of the JIU.

A Programme and Policy Co-ordinator will manage and coordinate an internal management team comprising the heads of units of the JIU, and will report to the Office of the SRSG or to his or her designate in matters relating to the implementation of the programme.

All implementing partners such as bilateral agencies, international and local NGOs will undertake their responsibilities in full compliance with programme guidelines and under the supervision of the JIU in respect of contracts entered into with the JIU of the NCDDRR.

## DDRR field offices

In addition to the central office in Monrovia, the JIU will establish five small DDRR field offices based on where ex-combatants are concentrated. The field offices will be co-located with the UNMIL field offices.

Each DDRR field office will comprise a reintegration officer and up to four referral and counselling officers, all familiar with the local socio-political environment. The reintegration officers will be UN Volunteers (UNVs) recruited for this purpose and support with national staff. In addition, each DDRR field office will have an administration and accounting officer, who will report directly to the financial manager of the Direct Execution (DEX) for administering reinsertion and reintegration assistance.

In order to reinforce the capacity at the local level, each DDRR field office will have a UNV as the reintegration or DDRR officer working with various local staff.

The field offices will be responsible for:

- information and counselling;
- administration of reintegration assistance under the different programme components;
- monitoring and evaluation;
- co-ordination with traditional/religious leaders, and maintaining linkages and coordination with other community-based reconstruction and rehabilitation interventions;
- sensitizing the local population;
- assisting in programme implementation;
- identifying and solving local problems related to ex-combatant reintegration; and
- reporting on the progress and impact of the programme to the JIU in Monrovia.

On the basis of the settlement pattern of ex-combatants, additional referral and counselling officers may be recruited.

## Roles and functions of the military units

A military liaison office will be created to facilitate co-operation with UNMIL and the DD Unit for all security-related aspects of the programme. Within the overall mandates given to them by their respective institutions, UNMIL is expected to perform the following functions within the DDRR programme:

- provide relevant input and information as well as security assistance and advice with regard to the selection of potential sites for disarmament and demobilization;
- provide technical input with regard to the process of disarmament, registration, documentation and screening of potential candidates for demobilization;
- develop and install systems for arms control and advise on a larger legislative framework to monitor and control arms recycling;
- monitor and verify the conformity of the DDR process according to recognized and acceptable standards;
- assume responsibility for effecting disarmament of combatants, maintain a pertinent registry of surrendered weaponry and conduct pre-demobilization screening and evaluation; and
- ensure the destruction of all weapons surrendered.

## Role of implementing partners and selection criteria

A considerable part of the programme implementation will be contracted out to local and international NGOs as well as in partnership with various UN agencies, line ministries, private sector institutions and community-based structures.

Implementing agencies will be selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- **Track record and technical capacity.** The agency must demonstrate a track record of technical and functional expertise in its chosen area of participation for not less than four years;
- **Financial management capacity.** It needs to demonstrate a proven record of sound financial management and/or the capacity to pre-finance initial project costs. It must provide audited financial record for the past three years;
- **Management capacity.** The agency must demonstrate sound management capability in respect of the programme delivery structure and expertise.

The implementing agency will be expected to adhere to the policy guidelines with regard to camp management and other operational regulations. It will be accountable to the JIU in matters of technical and financial issues related to its contractual obligations.

### Monitoring and evaluation

The programme comprises three separate but highly related processes, namely the military process of selecting and assembling combatants for demobilization and the civilian process of discharge, reinsertion and reintegration.

How soldiers are demobilized affects the reinsertion and reintegration processes. At each phase:

- the administration of assistance has to be accounted for;
- weapons collected need to be classified and analysed;
- beneficiaries of reintegration assistance need to be tracked; and
- the quality of services provided during the implementation of the programme needs to be assessed.

To plan, monitor and evaluate the processes, a management information system (MIS) regarding the discharged ex-combatants is required and will contain the following components:

- a database on the basic socio-economic profile of ex-combatants;
- a database on disarmament and weapons classification;
- a database of tracking benefit administration such as on payments of the settling-in package, training scholarships and employment subsidies to the ex-combatants; and
- a database on the programme's financial flows.

The MIS depends on the satisfactory performance of all those involved in the collection and processing of information. There is, therefore, a need for extensive training of enumerators, country staff and headquarters staff. Particular emphasis will be given to the fact that the MIS is a system not only of control but also of assistance. Consequently, a constant two-way flow of information between the DDRR field offices and the JIU will be ensured throughout programme implementation.

The MIS will provide a useful tool for planning and implementing demobilization. In connection with the reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants, the system is indispensable to the JIU in efficiently discharging its duties in planning and budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The system serves multiple functions and users. It is also updated from multiple data sources.

The MIS may be conceived as comprising several simple databases that are logically linked together using a unique identifier (ID number). An MIS expert will be recruited to

design, install and run the programme start-up. To keep the overheads of maintaining the system to a minimum, a self-updating and checking mechanism will be put in place.

## **DEX Unit**

### **Management of the DDRR Trust Fund**

Fundamental principles for the management of the DDRR Trust Fund are based on transparency and openness with a clear separation between the policy /allocation aspects of the DDRR Trust Fund operations and the fiduciary/administrative responsibility.

The Trust Fund will be administered by UNDP in accordance with the terms of reference of the Trust Fund. In this capacity, the UNDP will establish and maintain appropriate records and accounts to identify the contributions to the Fund, the commitments to be financed out of the Fund and the receipt and disbursement of funds.

The DEX Unit will be established and will be composed of UNDP staff with the overall responsibility for financial management and procurement for the programme. The DEX Unit will monitor expenditures related to the activities financed under the Trust Fund. The responsibilities of the DEX Unit will include procurement of goods, services and other items, screening and recommending UNDP's approval and payment, and monitoring all expenditures financed by the funds. UNDP will finance the cost of the DEX Unit from its own proper resources; therefore, all contributions will go towards direct costs of the DDRR programme.

### **Modalities of administration and administrative charges**

The UNDP, as the administrator of the DDRR Trust Fund, will be responsible for all disbursements in conformity with its own regulations, rules and procedures and consistent with the allocations and decisions made by the project approval and review committee of the JIU of the NCDDRR as well as the broader priorities set in consultation with the NCDDRR and the donor community.

The UNDP will strive for maximum efficiency and effectiveness in administering the DDRR Trust Fund while promoting sound financial management and accountability to ensure that all required fiduciary and administrative cost elements are adequately funded.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

A sound, independent monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the entire Fund will be established as well as adequate external audits.

### **Reporting and auditing**

Appropriate progress reports will be forwarded to the donors on a monthly basis covering general progress on implementation, financial reports on income and expenditure. The progress reporting will be the prime responsibility of the UNDP Resident Representative in Monrovia. However, the reports will also be submitted to the donors through UNDP Headquarters in New York to the relevant permanent missions to the United Nations. These progress reports will include the status of intended outputs, achievements and progress on the programme.

On an annual basis, UNDP will provide financial reports on income and expenditure of the Trust Fund to donors, in accordance with UNDP's financial regulations and rules.

An annual financial statement will be prepared for the Fund showing income and expenditures as of 31 December of every year and shall be submitted by the 30 June, i.e., six months after.

Contributions made available will be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules and directives of UNDP. Should an audit report of the Board of Auditors of UNDP to its governing body contain observations relevant to the contributions, such information will be available to the donor(s).

### **Technical Coordination Committee**

A Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) will be established by the JIU to consult and inform external programme partners on critical issues of planning and programme development with regard to the DDRR programme. This will provide a broad forum for technical and strategic consultation in support of rational programming for all the DDRR activities.

The responsibilities of the TCC will be to:


- identify strategic, operational and technical issues that may have an impact on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process;
- develop technical standards, guidelines, and operating principles, which will be adhered to by all involved in the implementation of specific DDRR activities;
- provide the framework for securing the support of key partners with regard to input to planning and implementing disarmament and demobilization activities as well as the reintegration process;
- provide the basis for operational planning and consensus on issues relating to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and
- on a regular basis identify key policy issues that need to be resolved by the policy committee and provide policy options to the NCDDRR for consideration.

The membership of the TCC will be based on invitation by the JIU and consist of relevant programme staff from agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, WHO, EU, USAID, UNMIL, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), OCHA and other appropriate agencies. Relevant NTGL agencies could be invited for participation when necessary. The TCC will be constituted on a relevant sector basis such as disarmament and demobilization and reintegration, and it will meet fortnightly or as and when required. The membership and participation will vary according to the relevant sector.

### **Project Approval Committee**

A Project Approval Committee (PAC) will be established to ensure transparency in the use of donor resources. The PAC will be responsible for the review and approval of projects submitted by the implementing partners (i.e., international and national NGOs, etc.) to the JIU of the NCDDRRP. Financial resources from the assessed budget of the mission would be processed outside this framework. The members of the PAC will comprise one representative each from the EU, USAID, UNDP, UNMIL, UNICEF and NTGL.

## Annex D: DDR institutional framework: Sierra Leone



Source: Comninos, Stelios, Aki Stavrou and Brian Stewart, *Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR)*, NCDDR, Freetown, 2002, p. 33.

## Endnotes

- 1 See *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*, report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/2004/616, 3 August 2004.
- 2 Ibid., p. 4.



# 3.40 Mission and Programme Support for DDR

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 3.40 Mission and Programme Support for DDR

## Summary

The base of a well-functioning integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme is the strength of its logistic, financial and administrative performance. If the multifunctional support capabilities, both within and outside peacekeeping missions, operate efficiently, then planning and delivery of logistic support to a DDR programme are more effective.

The three central components of DDR logistic requirements include: equipment and services; finance and budgeting; and personnel. Depending on the DDR programme in question, many support services might be necessary in the area of equipment and services, e.g. living and working accommodation, communications, air transport, etc. Details regarding finance and budgeting, and personnel logistics for an integrated DDR unit are described in IDDRS 3.41 and 3.42.

Logistic support in a peacekeeping mission provides a number of options. Within an integrated mission support structure, logistic support is available for civilian staffing, finances and a range of elements such as transportation, medical services and information technology. In a multidimensional operation, DDR is just one of the components requiring specific logistic needs. Some of the other components may include military and civilian headquarters staff and their functions, or military observers and their activities.

When the DDR unit of a mission states its logistic requirements, the delivery of the supplies/services requested all depends on the quality of information provided to logistics planners by DDR managers. Some of the important information DDR managers need to provide to logistics planners well ahead of time are the estimated total number of ex-combatants, broken down by sex, age, disability or illness, parties/groups and locations/sectors. Also, a time-line of the DDR programme is especially helpful.

DDR managers must also be aware of long lead times for acquisition of services and materials, as procurement tends to slow down the process. It is also recommended that a list of priority equipment and services, which can be funded by voluntary contributions, is made. Each category of logistic resources (civilian, commercial, military) has distinct advantages and disadvantages, which are largely dependent upon how hostile the operating environment is and the cost.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides practitioners with an overview of the integrated mission support concept and explains the planning and delivery of logistic support to a DDR programme. A more detailed treatment of the finance and budgeting aspects of DDR programmes are provided in IDDRS 3.41, while IDDRS 3.42 deals with the issue of personnel and staffing in an integrated DDR unit.

3.42 ◀ ▶ ■ 3.41 ◀ ▶

3.42 ▶ ▶ ■ 3.41 ◀ ▶

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A gives a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the word 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

## 3. Introduction

The effectiveness and responsiveness of a DDR programme relies on the administrative, logistic and financial support it gets from the peacekeeping mission, United Nations (UN) agencies, funds and programmes. DDR is multidimensional and involves multiple actors; as a result, different support capabilities, within and outside the peacekeeping mission, should not be seen in isolation, but should be dealt with together in an integrated way as far as possible to provide maximum flexibility and responsiveness in the implementation of the DDR programme.

## 4. Guiding principles

The planning of the logistic support for DDR programmes is guided by the principles, key considerations and approaches outlined in IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR; in particular:

- *unity of effort* in the planning and implementation of support for all phases of the DDR programme, bearing in mind that different UN (and other) actors have a role to play in support of the DDR programme;
- *accountability, transparency and flexibility* in using the most appropriate support mechanisms available to ensure an efficient and effective DDR programme, from the funding through to logistic support, bearing in mind that DDR activities may not occur sequentially (i.e., one after the other);
- *a people-centred approach*, by catering for the different and specific needs (such as dietary, medical and gender-specific requirements) of the participants and beneficiaries of the DDR programme;
- *means of ensuring safety and security*, which is a major consideration, as reliable estimates of the size and extent of the DDR operation may not be available; contingency planning must therefore also be included in logistics planning.

## 5. DDR logistic requirements

### 5.1. Equipment and services

Depending on the specific character of the DDR programme, some or all of the following support services may be required:

- living accommodation;
- camp construction material, including outsourcing of construction and management;
- fire prevention and precautions, and fire-fighting equipment;
- working accommodation;
- office furniture;
- office equipment and supplies;
- communications;
- information technology;
- medical services capable of responding to different needs;
- movement control;
- surface transport;
- air transport;
- water;
- food rations; food preparation and supply arrangements;
- fuel;
- general services such as janitorial, waste disposal, etc.;
- security;
- management information software, identity card machines;
- weapons destruction equipment.

## 5.2. Finance and budgeting

DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context are funded from a combination of the peacekeeping-assessed budget and voluntary sources, which could come from UN-managed trust funds, World Bank trust funds and direct bilateral support (also see IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting).

3.41 ◀▶

## 5.3. Personnel

The UN takes an integrated approach to DDR, which is reflected in the effort to establish a single integrated DDR unit in the field. The aim of this integrated unit is to facilitate joint planning to ensure the effective and efficient decentralization of the many DDR tasks (also see IDDRS 3.42 on Personnel and Staffing).

The UN takes an integrated approach to DDR, which is reflected in the effort to establish a single integrated DDR unit in the field. The aim of this integrated unit is to facilitate joint planning.

3.42 ◀▶

# 6. Logistic support in a peacekeeping mission

Note that unless otherwise specified, guidelines in this section refer to logistics issues under the direct management of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), or funded through assessed contributions to a peacekeeping mission budget. Other UN agencies, funds and programmes will in most cases need to comply with the rules and procedures governing operations, logistics and the financing of their activities.

## 6.1. Integrated mission support

In a peacekeeping mission, integrated support is provided. This includes civilian staffing, different logistic elements (such as logistics planning, transportation, supply, engineering,


communications and information technology, medical services and general services) and finances, which are all considered together to develop the mission support strategy (see figure 1). A peacekeeping mission adopts this general approach for the delivery of logistic support to all mandated programmes, although it also caters to the specific needs of the DDR programme.

## 6.2. A multidimensional operation

DDR is one component of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. Other components may include:

- mission civilian substantive staff and the staff of political, humanitarian, human rights, public information, etc., programmes;
- military and civilian police headquarters staff and their functions;
- military observers and their activities;
- military contingents and their operations;
- civilian police officers and their activities;
- formed police units and their operations;
- UN support staffs;
- other UN agencies, programmes and funds, as mandated.

Figure 1 **Mission support**



## 6.3. DDR statement of requirements

The quality and timeliness of DDR logistic support to a peacekeeping mission depend on the quality and timeliness of information provided by DDR planners and managers to logistics planners. DDR programme managers need to state the logistic requirements that fall under the direct managerial or financial scope of the peacekeeping mission and DPKO. In addition, the logistic requirements have to be submitted to the Division of Administration as early as possible to ensure timely logistic support. Some of the more important elements are listed below as a guideline:

- estimated total number of ex-combatants, broken down according to sex, age, disability or illness, parties/groups and locations/sectors;
- estimated total number of weapons, broken down according to type of weapon, ammunition, explosives, etc.;
- time-line of the entire programme, showing start/completion of activities;
- allocation of resources, materials and services included in the assessed budget;
- names of all participating UN entities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other implementing partners, with their focal points and telephone numbers/email addresses;
- forums/meetings and other coordination mechanisms where Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) participation is requested;
- requirement of office premises, office furniture, office equipment and related services, with locations;
- ground transport requirements — types and quantities;
- air transport requirements;
- communications requirements, including identity card machines;
- medical support requirements;
- number and location of various disarmament sites, camps, cantonments and other facilities;
- layout of each site, camp/cantonment with specifications, including:
  - camp/site management structure with designations and responsibilities of officials;
  - number and type of combatants, and their sex and age;
  - number and type of all categories of staff, including NGOs' staff, expected in the camp;
  - nature of activities to be conducted in the site/camp and special requirements for rations storage, distribution of insertion benefits, etc.;
  - security considerations and requirements;
  - preferred type of construction;
  - services/amenities provided by NGOs;
  - camp services to be provided by the mission, as well as any other specific requirements;
  - dietary restrictions/considerations;
  - fire-fighting equipment;
  - camp evacuation standard operating procedures;
  - policy on employment of ex-combatants as labourers in camp construction.

The quality and timeliness of DDR logistic support to a peacekeeping mission depend on the quality and timeliness of information provided by DDR planners and managers to logistics planners.

#### 6.4. Long lead time items

For procurement funded from the mission budget (assessed contributions), DDR managers must recognize and build into their planning estimates of the lead times for the acquisition of services and materials. Typical lead times for common equipment/commodities, exclusive of processing and shipping time, are given below:

Prefabricated buildings	30–90 days
Telephone PABX	45–60 days
Generating sets	60 days
Refrigerators	60 days
Desktop computers	60 days
Material handling equipment	60–120 days
Satellite earth station	65–125 day
Fuel pump (150 litre)	90 days
Fuel bladder (6,000 gallon)	90 days
Light vehicles	90–140 days
Mobile deployment telecom system (MDTS)	120 days
4x4 vehicles	120 days
Fuel management equipment	120 days
Logistic support vehicles	120–360 days

In principle, programme managers should attempt to get all logistic requirements for UN support to DDR funded out of the regular mission budget. Also, they should identify a (small) number of priority pieces of equipment and services that could be funded from voluntary contributions (which often have the ability to procure locally and with shorter lead times) on a reimbursable basis. The procurement of equipment and services in this way should be carried out according to the rules and regulations of individual agencies.

### 6.5. Options for the provision of logistic support for DDR activities

The range of logistic support provided to a programme or activity will normally include a combination of UN civilian, commercial and military resources. Each of these elements has distinct advantages and disadvantages:

- UN civilian support under direct UN control is easily adjusted to programme-specific requirements, and can operate in all but the most hostile environment; however, it takes time to assemble the required personnel and equipment, and to establish the necessary organization;
- Commercial support comes fully staffed and equipped, but it takes time to put the appropriate contractual arrangements in place, and commercial support cannot always be relied on to operate in hostile conditions;
- Military support can operate in the most hostile environments, can be mobilized relatively quickly (depending on the troop-contributing country) and comes fully staffed and equipped. However, military support lacks continuity, because of the need to rotate personnel every 6–12 months. It can also be expensive.

### 6.6. Support management structures and processes

This section outlines the management structure, and the planning and delivery of logistic support in a peacekeeping mission. These structures apply to the components of a DDR programme managed directly by DPKO or funded from the regular mission budget.



### 6.6.1. Chief administrative officer

Within a UN peacekeeping mission, the chief administrative officer (CAO) (or director of administration — DOA) is the sole financially accountable officer (for the assessed budget), and is responsible for the provision of all administrative and logistic support to all mission components. The senior mission management determines the priorities for programmes and their activities. It is the responsibility of the CAO/DOA to turn these priorities into plans, resource allocations, tasks, and coordination and monitoring arrangements.

### 6.6.2. Integrated support services

A joint civilian–military management structure, known as integrated support services (ISS), reviews and prioritizes all requests for logistic support in accordance with the mission's objectives and priorities, and allocates the most suitable civilian, commercial or military support resource to meet the requirements in the most effective and economic manner. A diagram of a typical ISS structure is given in Annex B.

### 6.6.3. Joint Logistics Operations Centre

The day-to-day planning, analysis, coordination and tasking of all requests for logistic support are handled by the JLOC; see Annex B). The JLOC is also the mission's single point of contact for the coordination of logistics issues with non-DPKO actors such as NGOs or other UN agencies, funds and programmes. All requests for logistic support should be channelled through the JLOC for appropriate prioritization and tasking.

For the JLOC to effectively plan and deliver logistic support to a DDR programme, it is essential that the DDR management team keeps the JLOC informed of its future support requirements during the planning stage and that it provides the JLOC with the programme operational plan before the DDR operation starts, keeping in view the lead times for design, acquisition, packaging and delivery of logistic services.

The DDR operational plan needs to describe what is needed to achieve its planned activities, as follows:


- physical resources: space, supplies, equipment;
- human resources: international, national (local, national professional officers), UN volunteers;
- services;
- supplies;
- partnerships/links with implementing partners;
- time-lines.

The Joint Logistics Operations Centre is the mission's single point of contact for the coordination of logistics issues with non-DPKO actors such as NGOs or other UN agencies, funds and programmes. All requests for logistic support should be channelled through the JLOC for appropriate prioritization and tasking.

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>CAO</b>	chief administrative officer
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>DOA</b>	director of administration
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>ISS</b>	integrated support services
<b>JLOC</b>	Joint Logistics Operations Centre
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>UN</b>	United Nations

## Annex B: Mission-level logistic support organization



# 3.41 Financing and Budgeting

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### NOTE

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 3.41

## Financing and Budgeting

### Summary

The system of funding of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme varies according to the different involvement of international actors. When the World Bank (with its Multi-Donor Trustfund) plays a leading role in supporting a national DDR programme, funding is normally provided for all demobilization and reintegration activities, while additional World Bank International Development Association (IDA) loans are also provided. In these instances, funding comes from a single source and is largely guaranteed.

In instances where the United Nations (UN) takes the lead, several sources of funding may be brought together to support a national DDR programme. Funds may include contributions from the peacekeeping assessed budget; core funding from the budgets of UN agencies, funds and programmes; voluntary contributions from donors to a UN-managed trust fund; bilateral support from a Member State to the national programme; and contributions from the World Bank.

In a peacekeeping context, funding may come from some or all of the above funding sources. In this situation, a good understanding of the policies and procedures governing the employment and management of financial support from these different sources is vital to the success of the DDR programme.

Since several international actors are involved, it is important to be aware of important DDR funding requirements, resource mobilization options, funding mechanisms and financial management structures for DDR programming. Within DDR funding requirements, for example, creating an integrated DDR plan, investing heavily in the reintegration phase and increasing accountability by using the results-based budgeting (RBB) process can contribute to the success and long-term sustainability of a DDR programme.

When budgeting for DDR programmes, being aware of the various funding sources available is especially helpful. The peacekeeping assessed budget process, which covers military, personnel and operational costs, is vital to DDR programming within the UN peacekeeping context. Both in and outside the UN system, rapid response funds are available. External sources of funding include voluntary donor contributions, the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), government grants and agency in-kind contributions.

Once funds have been committed to DDR programmes, there are different funding mechanisms that can be used and various financial management structures for DDR programmes that can be created. Suitable to an integrated DDR plan is the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), which is the normal UN inter-agency planning, coordination and resource mobilization mechanism for the response to a crisis. Transitional appeals, Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and international donors' conferences usually involve governments and are applicable to the conflict phase. In the case of RBB, programme budgeting that is defined by clear objectives, indicators of achievement, outputs and influence of external factors helps to make funds more sustainable. Effective financial management

structures for DDR programmes are based on a coherent system for ensuring flexible and sustainable financing for DDR activities. Such a coherent structure is guided by, among other factors, a coordinated arrangement for the funding of DDR activities and an agreed framework for joint DDR coordination, monitoring and evaluation.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

The aim of this module is to provide DDR practitioners in Headquarters and the field, in peacekeeping missions as well as field-based UN agencies, funds and programmes with a good understanding of:

- the major DDR activities that need to be considered and their associated cost;
- the planning and budgetary framework used for DDR programming in a peacekeeping environment;
- potential sources of funding for DDR programmes, relevant policies guiding their use and the key actors that play an important role in funding DDR programmes;
- the financial mechanisms and frameworks used for DDR fund and programmes management.

Specifically, the module outlines the policies and procedures for the mobilization, management and allocation of funds for DDR programmes, from planning to implementation. It provides substantive information about the budgeting process used in a peacekeeping mission (including the RBB framework) and UN country team. It also discusses the funding mechanisms available to support the launch and implementation of DDR programmes and ensure coordination with other stakeholders involved in the funding of DDR programmes. Finally, it outlines suggestions about how the UN's financial resources for DDR can be managed as part of the broader framework for DDR, defining national and international responsibilities and roles, and mechanisms for collective decision-making.

The module does not deal with the specific policies and procedures of World Bank funding of DDR programmes. It should be read together with the module on planning of integrated DDR (IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures), the module on programme design (IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design), which provides guidance on developing cost-efficient and effective DDR programmes, and the module on national institutions (IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR), which specifies the role of national institutions in DDR.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the word 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

### 3. Introduction

The primary purpose of DDR is to build the conditions for sustainable reintegration and reconciliation at the community level. Therefore, both early, adequate and sustainable funding and effective and transparent financial management arrangements are vital to the success of DDR programmes. Funding and financial management must be combined with cost-efficient and effective DDR programme strategies that both increase immediate security and contribute to the longer-term reintegration of ex-combatants. Strategies containing poorly conceived eligibility criteria, a focus on individual combatants, up-front cash incentives, weapons buy-back schemes and hastily planned reintegration programmes must be avoided. They are both a financial drain and will not help to achieve the purpose of DDR.

Early, adequate and sustainable funding and effective and transparent financial management arrangements are vital to the success of DDR programmes.

Programme managers should be aware that the reliance on multiple sources and mechanisms for funding DDR in a peacekeeping environment has several implications:

- First, most programmes experience a gap of about a year from the time funds are pledged at a donors' conference to the time they are received. Payment may be further delayed if there is a lack of donor confidence in the peace process or in the implementation of the peace agreement;
- Second, the peacekeeping assessed budget is a predictable and reliable source of funding, but a lack of knowledge about what can or cannot be carried out with this source of funding, lack of clarity about the budgetary process and late submissions have all limited the contributions of the peacekeeping assessed budget to the full DDR programme;
- Third, the multiple funding sources have, on occasion, resulted in poorly planned and unsynchronized resource mobilization activities and unnecessary duplication of administrative structures. This has led to further confusion among DDR planners and implementers, diminished donor confidence in the DDR programme and, as a result, increased unwillingness to contribute the required funds.

### 4. Guiding principles

The following principles should guide the resource mobilization and financial management of DDR programmes:

#### 4.1. Integrated DDR plan

The funding strategy of the UN for a DDR programme should be based on an integrated DDR plan and strategy that show the division of labour and relationships among different national and local stakeholders, and UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes. The planning process to develop the integrated plan should include the relevant national stakeholders, UN partners, implementing local and international partners (wherever possible), donors and other actors such as the World Bank. The integrated DDR plan shall also define programme and resource management arrangements, and the roles and responsibilities of key national and international stakeholders.



#### **4.2. Harmonization with other post-conflict planning mechanisms**

Planning and budgeting for DDR shall also be harmonized with other assessment, planning and financing mechanisms that are established to manage and allocate financial resources for transition and recovery needs.

#### **4.3. Funding DDR as an indivisible process**

DDR practitioners and donors shall recognize the indivisible character of DDR. Sufficient funds must be secured to finance the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities for an individual participant and his/her receiving community before the UN should consider starting the disarmament process.

#### **4.4. Minimizing duplication**

The UN must avoid duplicative, high-cost administrative structures for fund management in-country, as well as unnecessary duplication in programmes for ex-combatants and those associated with the armed forces and groups.

#### **4.5. Investing in reintegration**

The UN system should ensure that adequate, timely funding is allocated for the reintegration component of the programme. Additional investments into community level services to assist and support reintegration and reconciliation (such as community security initiatives) should be planned and harmonized with the investments of the UN system and bilateral and multilateral actors working on reintegrating internally displaced persons and refugees.

#### **4.6. Flexibility and worst-case planning estimates**

Wherever possible, cost estimates should be based on thorough assessments and surveys. In the absence of concrete information, the UN shall make the assumptions/estimates needed in order to carry out planning and budgeting for a DDR programme. The planning and budgetary process shall take into account realistic worst-case scenarios and build in sufficient financial flexibility to deal with potential identified political and security contingencies that may affect DDR.





#### **4.7. Accountability**

The UN, together with relevant bilateral or multilateral partners, shall establish rigorous oversight mechanisms at the national and international levels to ensure a high degree of accuracy in monitoring and evaluation, transparency, and accountability. These tools ensure that the use of funds meets the programme objectives and conforms to both the financial rules and regulations of the UN (in the case of the assessed budget) and those of donors contributing funds to the DDR programme.

## Section I: DDR funding requirements and budgeting

### 5. Funding requirements

The matrix below identifies the main DDR activities from the negotiation of the peace process to the implementation of the programme, the main activities that may take place in each phase of the process, and possible resource requirements and sources of funding. This list provides a general example of the processes involved, and other issues may have to be included, depending on the requirements of a particular DDR mission.

PHASE	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	POSSIBLE FUNDING SOURCE
Peace negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ DDR technical advice</li> <li>■ Assessments and surveys</li> <li>■ Country visits</li> <li>■ DDR training/capacity development</li> </ul>	 Bilateral support, agency preparatory funding, voluntary contributions to trust funds
Pre-mission planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Establish coordination and planning mechanisms for international community in-country</li> <li>■ Establish contacts with network of local partners (civil society groups, private sector, non-governmental organizations [NGOs])</li> <li>■ Increase personnel and logistics to support DDR planning</li> <li>■ Capacity-building of national institutions</li> <li>■ Post-conflict needs analysis</li> <li>■ Technical assessment mission (before mandate from Security Council)</li> </ul>	 Bilateral support, agency preparatory funding, voluntary contributions to trust funds  Pre-mandate commitment authority from peacekeeping assessed budget
Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Arms and ammunition data collection plan and programme</li> <li>■ Weapons collection, registration, transportation, secure storage and destruction</li> <li>■ Stockpile management plan and programme</li> <li>■ Legal framework for arms, ammunition and explosives</li> <li>■ Community arms collection programmes (from planning to implementation)</li> </ul>	 Peacekeeping assessed budget
Demobilization: Processing phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ In-bound transportation</li> <li>■ Registration</li> <li>■ Socio-economic profiling</li> <li>■ Health screening</li> <li>■ Civic education</li> <li>■ Discharge orientation</li> <li>■ Out-bound transportation (repatriation and resettlement)</li> </ul>	 Peacekeeping assessed budget, voluntary contributions, agency in-kind contributions

<b>Demobilization: Reinsertion phase (up to a year for each combatant)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Transitional safety allowances</li> <li>■ Food</li> <li>■ Non-food item support</li> <li>■ Clothes</li> <li>■ Short-term education and training</li> <li>■ Short-term employment</li> <li>■ Tools</li> <li>■ Medical services</li> </ul>	Peacekeeping assessed budget, voluntary contributions, agency in-kind contributions
<b>Reintegration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Professional/vocational training</li> <li>■ Long-term education, accelerated learning</li> <li>■ Employment counselling and referral</li> <li>■ Job placement</li> <li>■ Financing of microenterprises</li> <li>■ Induction into uniformed services</li> <li>■ Family tracing and reunification, interim care services for children associated with armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Community support for reintegration of women associated with armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Reconciliation activities</li> </ul>	Voluntary contributions, bilateral programmes
<b>Awareness-raising and sensitization, and advocacy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Radio</li> <li>■ Print</li> <li>■ Local theatre groups</li> <li>■ Advocacy, publication information and social mobilization to raise awareness about children and women associated with armed forces and groups</li> </ul>	Peacekeeping assessed budget, voluntary contributions, bilateral programmes

## 6. Budgeting for DDR during programme development

The design of DDR budgets should follow the basic template for results-based budgeting (RBB) in use by the UN system as international standards (also see IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design). Annex D.1 gives suggestions on how to develop an RBB framework, while Annex D.2 provides an example from Sudan.

When drawing up the budget in the programme development process, the following considerations should be taken into account:

- It is necessary to accurately cost programme requirements during the assessment/programme design phase in consultation with all key stakeholders (particularly national authorities, main donors and partners);
- The costing of DDR activities should be carried out within a single framework (i.e., covering all aspects of DDR, and all phases of mission planning and programme development), including a common results-based matrix with corresponding funding sources.

This framework should fit in with, and be linked to, other funding frameworks (CAP, joint assessment missions, PCNA processes, etc.). Annexes B.1 provides an example of the results-focused transition framework (RFTF) on DDR from Liberia, while Annex B.2 shows integrated DDR programme planning in Sudan;

- Budgeting for funding UN DDR activities should be carried out with a clear understanding of the division between national and international implementation responsibilities, and should be closely coordinated with the development and funding of the national DDR framework;
- A donors' group or forum should be established during the programme development phase to ensure adequate and sustainable participation and engagement of donors in DDR;
- As far as possible, the identification of funding needs, sources and methods should be integrated with broader post-conflict recovery strategy and funding frameworks (including management and governance structures).

Most important for DDR programme budgeting within the UN system is the peacekeeping assessed budget process. While other funding sources are available, the peacekeeping assessed budget process requires complex planning considerations for DDR programmes in the peacekeeping context.

### 6.1. The peacekeeping assessed budget of the UN

The peacekeeping assessed budget of the UN is an important source of funding for DDR programmes. It is normally established for one year and covers the three major categories of expenses. These are:

- military costs (troops, military observers and equipment);
- personnel costs (international and local staff members, consultants, etc.);
- operational costs (logistics and limited programme implementation costs).

#### 6.1.1. Elements of budgeting for DDR

Budgeting for DDR activities, using the peacekeeping assessed budget, must be guided by two elements:

- *The Secretary-General's DDR definitions:* In May 2005, the Secretary-General standardized the DDR definitions to be used by all peacekeeping missions in their budget submissions, in his note to the General Assembly (A/C.5/59/31);

#### DISARMAMENT

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

#### DEMOBILIZATION

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may comprise the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

## REINSERTION

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to a year.

## REINTEGRATION

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

- *General Assembly resolution A/RES/59/296*: Following the note of the Secretary-General on DDR definitions, the General Assembly in resolution A/RES/59/296 recognized that a reinsertion period of one year is an integral part of the demobilization phase of the programme, and agreed to finance reinsertion activities for demobilized combatants for up to that period. (For the remaining text of resolution A/RES/59/296, please see Annex C.)

### 6.1.2. Categories that may be funded by the peacekeeping assessed budget


Guided by the Secretary-General's definitions and resolution A/RES/59/296 of the General Assembly, below is a list of the categories that may be funded by the peacekeeping assessed budget:

NAME	DESCRIPTION
Peacekeeping assessed budget	<p>Covers the following categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Personnel costs (international and local staff members, consultants, etc.)</li><li>■ Equipment for the disarmament and demobilization sites</li><li>■ Infrastructure and logistics</li><li>■ Operational costs for disarmament and demobilization</li><li>■ Transportation (air and ground)</li><li>■ Rations (food supply)</li><li>■ Civilian clothing and other non-food items</li><li>■ Small arms control projects</li><li>■ DDR training</li><li>■ Quick-impact projects</li><li>■ Public information activities in support of the DDR programme</li><li>■ Reinsertion support for the demobilization of combatants for up to one year after disarmament</li></ul>

## 7. The peacekeeping budgeting process

This section outlines the typical process for developing the budget for a peacekeeping mission and describes the RBB methodology used in DPKO missions for the preparation and submission of budgets to the General Assembly. (Note: With the exception of new missions, the budget cycle for all peacekeeping budgets is from 1 July to 30 June of the following year.)

### Stage I: Developing strategic assumptions and draft mission plan (time-frame)




SRSG = Special Representative of the Secretary-General

### Stage II: Developing the results-based framework and draft mission budget (time-frame)




CAO = chief administrative officer

### Stage III: Submission of RBB and mission budget to first draft of the mission budget (time-frame)




USG = Under-Secretary-General; OPPBA = Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts

#### **Stage IV: Presentation of the draft budget to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and adoption of financial resolution by the General Assembly (time-frame)**



#### **Stage V: Presentation of the draft budget to the ACABQ (time-frame)**



## **Section II: Resource mobilization**

This section provides an overview of the main sources of funding used for DDR, as well as the types of activities they can finance. The section also illustrates how different funds and funding sources can be used within an overall phased plan for funding DDR.

### **8. Sources of funding**

In general, five funding sources are used to finance DDR activities. These are:

- the peacekeeping assessed budget of the UN;
- rapid response (emergency) funds;
- voluntary contributions from donors;
- government grants, government loans and credits;
- agency cost-sharing.

An outline of the peacekeeping assessed budget process of the UN is given at the end of Section I. Next to the peacekeeping assessed budget, rapid response funds are another vital source of funding for DDR programming.

### **9. Rapid response funds**

There are several sources of funds that can be accessed relatively quickly to fund urgent requirements and emergencies: they can be used to fund specific activities needed to develop and launch DDR activities. The funds provide up-front capacities and resources in the immedi-

ate post-conflict period that cannot be covered by voluntary contributions, owing to delays in funds being disbursed and often lengthy procedures for authorization and disbursement. These funds often have flexible management arrangements, can be quickly disbursed, and can help the peacekeeping assessed budget to deal with strategic priorities immediately preceding, and during, the development and launch of DDR programmes. These sources of funding include the following:

### 9.1. UNDP crisis prevention and recovery funds

The UN Development Programme (UNDP), through both its core funds for emergency situations (known as TRAC 1.1.3) and its Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR/TTF), can provide limited seed funding for developing and launching DDR programmes in the immediate pre-mandate and mission deployment period, and for providing technical and capacity-development assistance to parties engaged in peace negotiations:<sup>1</sup>

NAME	DESCRIPTION
UNDP Conflict Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR/TTF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ It was established in March 2000 to enable UNDP to better respond to the urgent needs of countries in crisis.</li> <li>■ It aims to mobilize thematic, more flexible funding that can be used for immediate crisis response, as well as for strategic investment into prevention and recovery programmes.</li> <li>■ The TTF has several features that can come into play during crisis situations: (1) rapid disbursement and flexible programming instruments; (2) availability of the whole range of UNDP executing modalities, including Direct Execution; and (3) use of management fee charges against the TTF for strengthening field-level implementation capacity.</li> </ul>
UNDP 'TRAC 1.1.3' funds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ TRAC 1.1.3 resources are available to finance initiatives that aim at crisis prevention or reducing the severity of a crisis.</li> <li>■ They are also used to increase the capacity of the UN country team by supporting the Resident Coordinator in responding to sudden disasters.</li> <li>■ TRAC 1.1.3 resources also serve as catalytic or seed funding (i.e., to fund the early stages of the UN response to a crisis) to coordinate emergency response in the event of a sudden crisis, and to mobilize and secure additional resources for dealing with crisis prevention, recovery, or disaster-related issues.</li> <li>■ The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery provides policy and programme advisory services to country offices in CPR situations.</li> </ul>



## 9.2. European Commission Rapid Reaction Mechanism<sup>2</sup>

The European Commission (EC) Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is designed to allow the European Union (EU) to respond urgently to the needs of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects of technological or natural disasters.

NAME	DESCRIPTION
European Commission (EC) Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Its purpose is to support measures aimed at safeguarding or re-establishing the conditions under which the partner countries of the EC can pursue their long-term development goals.</li><li>■ The RRM may be triggered in situations of “crisis or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilize the country”. (<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/index.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/index.htm</a>)</li><li>■ The RRM can be used in all areas of intervention that come under EU competence, with the exception of humanitarian assistance.</li><li>■ There is no geographical restriction.</li></ul>

## 9.3. World Bank Post-Conflict Fund<sup>3</sup>

The World Bank Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) supports planning, piloting and analysing of DDR activities by funding governments and partner organizations doing this work. The emphasis is on speed and flexibility without sacrificing quality.

NAME	DESCRIPTION
World Bank Post-Conflict Fund (PCF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ The aim of the PCF is to provide earlier and broader World Bank assistance to conflict-affected countries.</li><li>■ Grants are focused on the restoration of the lives and livelihoods of war-affected populations.</li><li>■ A wide range of entities can apply for PCF grants, including governments, regional and international bodies, transitional authorities, NGOs, universities and other civil society institutions.</li><li>■ Grants can range from \$25,000 to \$1 million, and in multi-year programmes may exceed \$1 million.</li></ul>

## 10. Voluntary (donor) contributions

Voluntary contributions from UN Member States are the main source of financing for DDR programmes, and in particular reintegration activities. Contributions can originate from various sources, including foreign affairs ministries, overseas development assistance funds and defence ministries, among others. Key donors that usually provide financing for DDR,

as well as security sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict recovery initiatives, include the following countries, together with their respective bilateral aid agencies and specialized mechanisms for funding post-conflict and transition priorities:

Voluntary contributions from UN Member States are the main source of financing for DDR programmes, and in particular reintegration activities.

Norway (Transitional Budget Line)	Germany (German Technical Cooperation Agency [GTZ])
Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency)	Switzerland
United Kingdom (Department for International Development [DFID] Conflict-prevention Pools)	Netherlands (Dutch Stability Fund)
Canada (Department of Foreign and International Trade/ Canadian IDA [CIDA])	Belgium
Japan (Trust Fund for Human Security)	Italy
United States of America (United States Agency for International Development [USAID] Office of Transition Initiatives )	Denmark (Interim Transitional Assistance Funds)

### 10.1. The World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)

The World Bank manages a regional DDR programme for the Greater Lakes Region in Central Africa, which can work closely with the UN in supporting national DDR programmes in peacekeeping missions.

<b>World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The MDRP is made up of two separate but complementary sources of funding: World Bank IDA funds of up to \$150 million and a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) of \$350 million.</li> <li>■ World Bank IDA only finances national programmes.</li> <li>■ The MDTF may finance: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ demobilization of government and irregular forces (i.e., armed forces and groups) engaged in the conflict(s);</li> <li>□ temporary reinsertion benefits to ex-combatants;</li> <li>□ social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants, including specifically identified groups;</li> <li>□ special projects for demobilization and/or reintegration implemented by UN agencies or NGOs;</li> <li>□ special regional activities;</li> <li>□ monitoring of the overall programme.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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## 10.2. Government grants

Although most post-conflict governments lack institutional capacity to carry out DDR, many (such as Sierra Leone) contribute towards the cost of domestic DDR programmes, given their importance as a national priority. Although these funds are not generally used to finance UN-implemented activities and operations, they play a key role in establishing and making operational national DDR institutions and programmes, while helping to generate a meaningful sense of national ownership of the process.

## 10.3. Agency in-kind contributions

For some activities in a DDR programme, certain UN agencies might be in a position to provide in-kind contributions, particularly when these activities correspond to or consist of priorities and goals in their general programming and assistance strategy. Such in-kind contributions could include, for instance, the provision of food assistance to ex-combatants during their cantonment in the demobilization stage, medical health screening, or HIV / AIDS counselling and sensitization. The availability and provision of these contributions for DDR programming should be discussed, identified and agreed upon during the programme design/planning phase, and the agencies in question should be active participants in the overall integrated approach to DDR. Traditional types of in-kind contributions include:

- security and protection services (military) — mainly outside of DDR in peacekeeping missions;
- construction of basic infrastructure;
- logistics and transport;
- food assistance to ex-combatants and dependants;
- child-specific assistance;
- shelter, clothes and other basic subsistence needs;
- health assistance;
- HIV / AIDS screening and testing;
- public information services;
- counselling;
- employment creation in existing development projects.

## 11. Overview of phased DDR funding requirements

A key element of a resource mobilization strategy is to focus on different donors and funding sources, depending on what range of activities they can fund at different phases in the DDR programme cycle.

Some types of funding (particularly emergency response funding) are particularly useful in the initial planning and launch phase of DDR programmes, owing to their immediate availability, quick disbursement and flexibility, while other types of funding (voluntary contributions or loans) are more applicable for financing long-term reintegration assistance, owing to their slower disbursement, often of larger amounts, and their ability to finance multi-year arrangements.

Annex E illustrates how different sources and kinds of funds could be utilized within an overall phased approach to implementing DDR programmes. This type of planning could form a vital component of a resource mobilization strategy and allow the establishment of clear goals.

## Section III: Funding and Financial Management of DDR

### 12. Standard funding mechanisms

The UN system uses a number of different funding mechanisms and frameworks to mobilize financial resources in crisis and post-conflict contexts, covering all stages of the relief-to-development continuum, and including the mission period. For the purposes of financing DDR, the following mechanisms and instruments should be considered:

MECHANISM	DESCRIPTION
<b>Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The CAP is the normal, inter-agency planning, coordination and resource mobilization mechanism for the humanitarian response to a crisis, managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (see <a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">http://www.reliefweb.int</a>).</li> <li>■ The advantages of the CAP are that it is often developed, and financed, during the crisis period or immediately following the end of hostilities, providing a limited means to obtain up-front funds for DDR ahead of the main disbursement of voluntary contributions.</li> <li>■ Funding is agency-specific.</li> <li>■ Certain aspects of DDR (such as demobilization and reinsertion activities) could be included in this framework.</li> <li>■ Projects should be framed in a way that makes clear that the projects link to and support humanitarian objectives and institutions.</li> </ul>
<b>Transitional appeals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Transitional appeals are developed in a post-conflict country where a major PCNA has not been planned or carried out.</li> <li>■ They focus on both the humanitarian and immediate post-conflict needs and the transition needs linked to longer-term requirements for sustainable peace and development.</li> <li>■ National government is given a larger role in design and implementation.</li> <li>■ Transitional appeals are more rapid and flexible than a full-blown donors' conference based on a full PCNA.</li> </ul>
<b>Post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) and international donor's conferences</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The PCNA is a development-oriented process led by the national authorities and supported by the international community.</li> <li>■ The aim of the PCNA is to define the short-term (12–24 months) and potentially medium-term (24–60 months) recovery priorities and their financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term (5–10 years) vision or goal.</li> <li>■ International donors' conferences are built around the PCNA document, generally prepared by the UN and World Bank, against which individual donors make their pledges.</li> <li>■ Donors are free to choose the implementation mechanisms.</li> <li>■ This should be the main source of reintegration funding.</li> <li>■ National and international communities establish the necessary structures to govern and manage voluntary funds received.</li> </ul>

## 12.1. Results-based budgeting for DDR in a peacekeeping environment

The results-based budgeting (RBB) framework is the primary budgetary planning tool used by the UN Secretariat and peacekeeping missions, and is part of the Secretary-General's programme of reform and vision of a more results-oriented organization.

A significant feature of RBB is the defining of expected results at the beginning of the planning and budget cycle, *before* implementation. Thus RBB aims to shift focus from output accounting (i.e., activities) to results-based accountability (i.e., indicators of achievements). RBB is not simply an administrative process, but a *strategic planning tool*, improving the clarity of programmes, bringing about a common understanding and better communication between Member States and programme managers about the desired results. Results-based management is intended to be a dynamic process, providing feedback throughout the full programme cycle: in planning, programming, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation. Since its inception, RBB has continued to evolve in order to better fulfil its role as a strategic planning tool for the UN. (See Annex D.1 for an overview of the RBB framework development and Annex D.2 for an example from Sudan.)

RBB has four main components:

- *Objective*: Serving as the basis for developing programme activities and identifying benchmarks for success;
- *Indicators of achievement*: Measuring performance, justifying the resource requirements and linking them to outputs;
- *Outputs*: Listing the activities that will be conducted in order to achieve the objective;
- *External factors*: Identifying factors outside the control of the programme manager that may affect programme performance.

## 13. Financial management

Integrated DDR programmes should develop, to the extent possible, a single structure for managing and coordinating:

- the receipt of funds from various funding sources and mechanisms;
- the allocation of funds to specific projects, activities and implementing partners;
- adequate monitoring, oversight and reporting on the use of funds.

In order to achieve these goals, the structure should ideally:

- include a coordinated arrangement for the funding of DDR activities that would be administered by either the UN or jointly with another organization such as the World Bank, with an agreed structure for joint coordination, monitoring and evaluation;
- establish a direct link with integrated DDR planning and programming frameworks;
- include all key stakeholders on DDR, while ensuring the primacy of national ownership;
- bring together within one framework all available sources of funding, as well as related methods (including trust funds and pass-through arrangements, for instance), in order to establish a well-coordinated and coherent system for ensuring flexible and sustainable financing of DDR activities.

### 13.1. National role and coordination

The establishment of a financial and management structure for funding DDR should clearly reflect the primacy of national ownership and responsibility, the extent of direct national

implementation and fund management, and the nature of UN support. In this sense, a DDR funding structure should not be exclusively oriented towards UN management and implementation, but rather be planned as an 'open' architecture to enable national and other international actors to meaningfully participate in the DDR process. As a part of the process of ensuring national participation, meaningful national ownership should be reflected in the leadership role that national stakeholders should play in the coordination mechanisms established within the overall financial and management structure.

### 13.2. Institutional and management structures

The core elements of a DDR financial and management structure should ideally include the following:

- a *steering committee* to provide overall strategic guidance and policy direction on DDR financing; ensure coherence with DDR strategy, priorities and programming framework; and ensure adequate coordination among key stakeholders (national actors, donors, UN agencies, the World Bank and other partners);
- a *coordination committee* to coordinate the overall programme of activities to be financed through the funding structure, monitor coherence of programme activities and funding structure objectives, and ensure that the programmes are coordinated with broader frameworks and processes (e.g., recovery and SSR), as well as the overall national programme and other initiatives taking place at the same time;
- a *technical committee* to provide general technical advice, carry out technical review of funding proposals and eligibility, and provide recommendations on the suitability of funding. The technical committee should include UN technical advisers, national representatives, donors and the chair of the steering committee;
- a *project approval committee* to examine and approve eligible funding proposals submitted to the DDR funding structure, provide strategic guidance on the use of funds, and ensure coherence and coordination between the funding structure and national priorities;
- a *secretariat* to support the work of the committee through informational, administrative and secretarial responsibilities. The secretariat should also ensure adequate and consistent reporting on activities financed by the funding structure, as well as overall financial tracking. In certain cases, the secretariat could also be tasked with management of financial services such as procurement and contracting.

### 13.3. Administration of funds

The organization responsible for the administration of funds is responsible for establishing and maintaining appropriate records and accounts to identify financial contributions to funds and arrangements established within the funding structure, as well as to identify the commitments to be financed out of the contributions, and the receipt and disbursement of these funds, in accordance with specified arrangements.

If multiple mechanisms are established to manage receipt of funds (such as two separate trust funds covering different funding areas or funding sources), multiple administrative agents (AAs) will be required. To avoid confusion, the same standards and criteria for allocating, monitoring and reporting funds should be adopted.

### 13.4. Linking parallel funding mechanisms

Given the complexity and scope of DDR interventions, as well as the range of stakeholders involved, parallel initiatives, both UN and non-UN, are inevitable. Links shall be created between the national and UN DDR frameworks to ensure that these do not duplicate or otherwise affect overall coherence. The basic requirement of good coordination between integrated and parallel processes is an agreement on common strategic, planning and policy frameworks, which should be based on national policy priorities, if they exist. Structurally, stakeholders involved in parallel initiatives should participate on the steering and coordination committees of the DDR funding structure, even though the actual administration and management of funds takes place outside this framework. This will avoid duplication of efforts and ensure a link to operational coordination, and enable the development of an aggregated/consolidated overall budget and work plan for DDR. Normal parallel funding mechanisms include the following:

- *Mission financing*: Although the UN peacekeeping mission is a key component of the overall UN integrated structure for DDR, its main funding mechanism (assessed contributions) is managed directly by the mission itself in coordination with DPKO Headquarters, and cannot be integrated fully into the DDR funding structure. For this reason, it should be considered a parallel funding mechanism, even though the DDR funding structure decides how funds are used and managed;
- *Parallel agency funds*: Certain agencies might have programmes that could support DDR activities (e.g., food assistance for ex-combatants as part of a broader food assistance programme), or even DDR projects that fall outside the overall integrated programme framework;
- *Bilateral assistance funds*: Some donors, particularly those whose bilateral aid agencies are active on post-conflict and/or DDR issues (such as USAID, DFID, CIDA, etc.) might choose to finance programmes that are parallel to integrated efforts, and which are directly implemented by national or sub-national partners. In this context, it is important to ensure that these donors are active participants in DDR and the funding structures involved, and to ensure adequate operational coordination (particularly to ensure that the intended geographic areas and beneficiaries are covered by the programme).

### 13.5. Fund management mechanisms and methods

Mechanisms for receiving and managing funds include the following:

#### 13.5.1. Pooled funding

Under this option, participating UN organizations pool funds together within one UN organization, chosen jointly by the coordination committee of the DDR financial management structure, which will assume the responsibility of administering the funds. This organization, known as the administrative agent (AA), will support the partners authorized to manage and implement the joint programme of activities identified for these funds. Programme and financial accountability for the UN support to the joint programme will rest with the AA. This fund management option is likely to be the most effective and efficient when participating UN organizations work for the same results with a common national or sub-national partner (e.g., department, provincial office, NGO) and/or in the same geographical area (see Annex D.1).



### 13.5.2. Pass-through funding

If the integrated DDR programme is made operational through an association between activities and projects to be implemented and/or managed by identified UN agencies or other partners, funding can still be channelled through a central mechanism. If the donor(s) and participating UN organizations agree to channel the funds through one participating UN organization, then the pass-through method is used. In such a case, the AA would be jointly selected by the DDR coordination committee. Programmatic and financial accountability should then rest with the participating organizations and (sub-)national partners that are managing their respective components of the joint programme. This approach has the advantage of allowing funding of DDR on the basis of an agreed-upon division of labour within the UN system (see Annex D.2).

### 13.5.3. Cost-sharing

Cost-sharing is a procedure for receiving and managing funds for objectives, activities and results within a specific project or programme managed by a single UN agency. Given the relatively higher transaction costs involved in these arrangements, cost-sharing should be used exclusively for: specialized projects not foreseen in the initial programme document; smaller projects for implementation before the main funding mechanisms are established; funding with special arrangements; and projects that serve as a bridge to other processes and programmes and, therefore, require different management arrangements. Although funding is tied to specific projects and UN agencies in this method, its use should nonetheless be governed by the DDR coordination committee and the applicable criteria, procedures and reporting requirements.

### 13.5.4. Trust funds

A trust fund is a mechanism used to receive and manage donor funds to achieve a broad aim as opposed to carrying out a specific project. As such, it is established as a separate accounting entity with a designated trust fund manager (an AA, in this case), as well as a governance structure that decides on the allocation of received funding, and is responsible for monitoring and evaluating how funds have been used. When located within an overall funding structure, these structures would be linked or merged with the coordination committee and its respective subsidiary organs. In general, funds channeled through a trust fund are not initially allocated to a particular project and can therefore later be allocated to specific projects or activities working to achieve the broad aim of the programme, based on the discretion of the DDR funding structure and the programme of work the trust fund is supposed to support, which can be a part of the overall DDR programme (e.g., covering reintegration activities specifically).

In the area of DDR, both the UN (through UNDP) and the World Bank have established and managed trust funds. Experience has shown that the use of trust funds for DDR offers several advantages, including:

- the ability to rapidly mobilize and disburse voluntary funding (especially where up-front financing is available);
- decentralized decision-making and management systems (where trust funds are country-specific);
- the capacity to ensure broad national oversight and ownership, through national leadership of the trust fund governance structure;



- the capacity to ensure sustainability and continuity (by not being linked to the operational presence of any one organization);
- unified donor coordination and funding structures so that gaps and duplication in funding, and inconsistency in policy advice, are avoided;
- implementation and funding methods that create transparency and accountability and bring about efficient and prompt delivery.

### **13.6. Fund allocation criteria**

Funds will be allocated on the basis of a set of criteria dealing with programme objectives, activities and results, among others, which will be used by the technical and project appraisal committees when they consider individual requests for funding by UN agencies and other implementing partners. Criteria can vary depending on the funding mechanism (e.g., a reintegration trust fund will consider only those proposals directly centred on reintegration). Generic categories of criteria can include:

- links to the general thematic sector and/or programme objective(s);
- the capacity and demonstrated results of the proposing organization;
- the strength of the technical proposal;
- cost-efficiency;
- the involvement of national and local stakeholders;
- the results that can be achieved.

### **13.7. Coordination of planning, monitoring and reporting**

In order to ensure that the DDR funding structure reflects the overall strategic direction and substantive content of the integrated DDR programme, all funding decisions and criteria should be based, as far as possible, on the planning, results, and monitoring and evaluation frameworks of the DDR programme and action plan. For this reason, DDR planning and programme officers should participate at all levels of the fund management structure, and the same information management systems should be used. Changes to programme strategy should be immediately reflected in the way in which the funding structure is organized and approved by the key stakeholders involved. With respect to financial monitoring and reporting, the members of the funding facility secretariat should maintain close links with the monitoring and evaluation staff of the integrated DDR section, and use the same methodologies, frameworks and mechanisms as much as possible.

## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ):** The advisory body that reviews the budgets of peacekeeping missions and makes recommendations to the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee of the General Assembly

**Peacekeeping assessed budget:** The assessed financial contribution of Member States to the operating of the UN peacekeeping missions, based on a scale established by the General Assembly.

**Results-based budgeting (RBB):** A strategic planning framework that focuses on concrete objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement for the allocation of resources. As such, the RBB aims to shift focus from output accounting (i.e., activities) to results-based accountability (indicators of achievements).

**Voluntary contributions:** This is a form of financial support that Member States pledge (often in a donors' conference) and commit on a case-by-case basis to support programme implementation. Contributions can be made to UN or non-UN trust funds. At times, donors implement their contributions through their own bilateral aid agency or directly through NGOs.

### Abbreviations

AA	administrative agent
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPR/TTF	Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
IDA	International Development Association
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NGO	non-governmental organization
PCF	Post-Conflict Fund
PCNA	post-conflict needs assessment
RBB	results-based budgeting
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism (of the EC)
RFTF	results-focused transition framework
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	security sector reform
TTF	Thematic Trust Fund
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## Annex B: Sample budget frameworks

### B.1: Results-focused transition framework (RFTF) on DDR (used in Liberia)

DDR KEY PRIORITIES, OUTCOMES, BENCHMARKS AND FUNDING REQUIREMENTS, 2004–2005*														
Months	January–June '04		July–December '04		Total '04		January–June '05		July–December '05		Total 2005		Total '04–'05	
	Qualitative	\$ (mln.)	Qualitative	\$ (mln.)	\$ (mln.)	\$ (mln.)	Qualitative	\$ (mln.)	Qualitative	\$ (mln.)	\$ (mln.)	\$ (mln.)	\$ (mln.)	
Priority 1: Disarmament and demobilization														
I. Outcome	21,000 combatants disarmed and demobilized**		32,000 combatants disarmed and demobilized**											
II. Progress benchmark	(1) 30,000 weapons collected; (2) 21,000 ID cards printed		(1) 50,000 weapons collected; (2) 32,000 ID cards printed											
III. Financial requirements														
a) Capital investments		4,838,063		7,257,095	12,095,158			0		0	0		12,095,158	
b) Incremental recurrent expenditures		0		0	0			0		0	0		0	
c) Technical assistance		0		0	0			0		0	0		0	
Total financial requirements: Priority 1		4,838,063		7,257,095	12,095,158			0		0	0		12,095,158	
Priority 2: Reintegration														
I. Outcome	21,000 ex-combatants discharged and admitted into economic reintegration assistance programmes		32,000 ex-combatants discharged and admitted into economic reintegration assistance programmes				13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated		13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated					

II. Progress benchmark	(1) 21,000 ex-combatants received full TSA; (2) 21,000 ex-combatants validated and verified for reintegration assistance	(1) 21,000 ex-combatants received full TSA; (2) 21,000 ex-combatants validated and verified for reintegration assistance	9,665,526	16,109,211	13,000 ex-combatants received economic reintegration assistance	11,401,974	22,803,947	38,913,158
III: Financial requirements								
a) Capital investments	6,443,684	6,443,684	0	0	13,000 ex-combatants received economic reintegration assistance	11,401,974	22,803,947	38,913,158
b) Incremental recurrent expenditures	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
c) Technical assistance	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Total financial requirements: Priority 2	6,443,684	6,443,684	9,665,526	16,109,211		11,401,974	22,803,947	38,913,158

### Priority 3: Child ex-combatants

I. Outcome	8,400 child ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized	12,600 child ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized; 10,500 reunified and/or reintegrated	10,500 child ex-combatants reunified and/or reintegrated	10,500 child ex-combatants processed in Interim Care Centres	836,842	836,842	4,044,737
II. Progress benchmark	8,400 ID cards printed and discharge certificate issued	12,600 ID cards printed and discharge certificate issued; 10,500 child ex-combatants processed in Interim Care Centres					
III: Financial requirements							
a) Capital investments	1,283,158	1,283,158	1,924,737	3,207,895	836,842	836,842	4,044,737

b) Incremental recurrent expenditures	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c) Technical assistance	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total financial requirements: Priority 3	1,283,158		1,924,737	3,207,895	836,842													836,842	4,044,737

#### Priority 4:

##### Disabled ex-combatants

I. Outcome	550 disabled ex-combatants given access to medical and rehabilitation assistance	850 disabled ex-combatants given access to medical and rehabilitation assistance																	
II. Progress benchmark	550 disabled ex-combatants issued with ID cards to access assistance	850 disabled ex-combatants issued with ID cards to access assistance																	
III: Financial requirements																			
a) Capital investments	285,921		428,882	714,803	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	714,803
b) Incremental recurrent expenditures	0		0	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c) Technical assistance	0		0	0	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total financial requirements: Priority 4	285,921		428,882	714,803	0					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	714,803

**Priority 5:  
Information and sensitization**

I. Outcome	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process	53,000 ex-combatant and communities at large informed about DDR process
II. Progress benchmark	(1) 21,000 pamphlets distributed; (2) daily radio broadcasts	(1) 32,000 pamphlets distributed; (2) daily radio broadcasts	(1) daily radio broadcasts; (2) 5 DDR Field Offices provide counselling services	(1) daily radio broadcasts; (2) 5 DDR Field Offices provide counselling services	(1) daily radio broadcasts; (2) 5 DDR Field Offices provide counselling services	(1) daily radio broadcasts; (2) 5 DDR Field Offices provide counselling services	(1) daily radio broadcasts; (2) 5 DDR Field Offices provide counselling services	(1) daily radio broadcasts; (2) 5 DDR Field Offices provide counselling services	(1) daily radio broadcasts; (2) 5 DDR Field Offices provide counselling services
III: Financial requirements									
a) Capital investments	184,803	184,803	369,605	369,605	97,632	97,632	195,263	195,263	564,868
b) Incremental recurrent expenditures	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c) Technical assistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total financial requirements: Priority 5	184,803	184,803	369,605	369,605	97,632	97,632	195,263	195,263	564,868

**Priority 6:  
Coordination and management**

I. Outcome	21,000 ex-combatant processed according to joint implementation plan	32,000 ex-combatant processed according to joint implementation plan	13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated according to programme implementation schedule	13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated according to programme implementation schedule	13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated according to programme implementation schedule	13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated according to programme implementation schedule	13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated according to programme implementation schedule	13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated according to programme implementation schedule	13,000 ex-combatants reintegrated according to programme implementation schedule
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II. Progress benchmark	(1) Joint Implementation Unit established; (2) 5 County DDR offices established; (3) 10 Referral Counsellors deployed	(1) 53,000 ex-combatants received full TSA; (2) 53,000 ex-combatants validated and verified for reintegration assistance				13,000 ex-combatants received economic reintegration assistance				
III: Financial requirements										
a) Capital investments	320,500		320,500				0			320,500
b) Incremental recurrent expenditures	1,212,589		1,212,589	2,425,177	1,175,089		1,175,089	2,350,177		4,775,355
c) Technical assistance	0		0	0	0		0	0		0
Total financial requirements: Priority 6	1,533,089		1,212,589	2,745,677	1,175,089		1,175,089	2,350,177		5,095,855
<b>Total financial requirements</b>	<b>14,568,718</b>		<b>20,673,631</b>	<b>35,242,348</b>	<b>13,511,536</b>		<b>12,674,694</b>	<b>26,186,230</b>		<b>61,428,578</b>
a) Capital investments	13,356,129		19,461,042	32,817,171	12,336,447		11,499,605	23,836,053		56,653,224
b) Incremental recurrent expenditures	1,212,589		1,212,589	2,425,177	1,175,089		1,175,089	2,350,177		4,775,355
c) Technical assistance	0		0	0	0		0	0		0
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>14,568,718</b>		<b>20,673,631</b>	<b>35,242,348</b>	<b>13,511,536</b>		<b>12,674,694</b>	<b>26,186,230</b>		<b>61,428,578</b>

\* The overall DDRR programme is a three-year programme, and will therefore continue beyond the time-frame of the needs assessment, which implies that the total requirements are larger than presented in this needs assessment. The total needs of the DDRR programme are estimated to amount to \$75 million.

\*\* The number of ex-combatants includes child ex-combatants, disabled ex-combatants and women ex-combatants.

## B.2: Examples of integrated DDR programme planning (used in Sudan)

CONSOLIDATED PROGRAMME BUDGET IDDRP - WORKING DRAFT, MAY 2005			
Description (category)	Budget: July 2005–December 2006		Proposed Japanese contribution
	M/M	in \$	in \$
<b>I. Personnel</b>			
National directorates and programme staff compensation			
Head of State Office (9 @ \$650 p/m)	17	99,450	
Head of Field Office (10 @ \$500 p/m)	15	75,000	
Reintegration Officer (45 @ \$400 p/m)	18	324,000	
IT Officers (19 @ \$400 p/m)	15	114,000	
Finance Officer (19 @ \$400 p/m)	15	114,000	
Supervisors (40 @ \$400 p/m)	12	192,000	
International Technical Advisers			
Chief Technical Advisers (6 @ \$10,500 p/m)	17	1,071,000	
Reintegration Advisers (12 @ \$8,200 p/m)	17	1,477,000	
Supervisors (6 @ \$8,200 p/m)	14	688,800	
Consultants (8 @ \$12,000 p/m)		96,000	
Activity total		4,251,250	
<b>II. Directorates' capacity-building</b>			
Building/Rehabilitation of offices			
(11 State Offices x \$45,000; 25 Field Offices x \$28,000)		1,195,000	
DDR Commissions Secretariat support		570,000	
Activity total		1,195,000	
<b>III. Children associated with armed forces and groups (17,000 children)</b>			
Demobilization and removal of children		5,155,000	801,650
Tracing and reunification		1,850,000	347,000
Reintegration*		16,135,000	2,281,000
UNICEF staff		3,600,000	240,000
UNICEF programme support		5,232,576	330,269
Activity total		31,972,576	3,999,919



#### IV. Women associated with armed forces and groups (target group 5,600): Gender and women and security

Assessments and public awareness		290,000	160,382
Registration, screening, counselling and reinsertion support		840,000	237,334
Reintegration support		3,360,000	1,052,000
Support to gender issues in DDR		350,000	521,430
Activity total		4,840,000	1,971,146

#### V. Disabled ex-combatants (target group 9,500)

Registration, screening and counselling		1,710,000	
Disability support and referral		2,090,000	
Economic reintegration support		5,700,000	
Activity total		9,500,000	

#### VI. Disarmament, and arms reduction and control

ARC guiding principles and plans		29,200	
Arms and ammunition data collection plan and programme		177,200	
Verification of disarmament for other armed groups (OAG)		184,400	
Civil society network and steering committee (north and south)		20,000	4,200
Baseline information gathering plan and programme		228,100	72,660
Public information and community awareness plan and campaigns		221,000	156,713
Interim arms control measures plans and programmes*		2,392,000	1,423,800
Stockpile management plan and programme		50,000	
Legal framework for arms, ammunition and explosives (consultant)		34,729	34,729
Border strengthening plan and programme		45,000	
Popular defence forces arms collection and QIP		2,123,184	2,123,184
Popular defence forces arms registration in transitional areas and cross-lines pastoralist community conflict management		211,916	211,916
Explosive ordnance disposal and mobile weapons destruction: 5 sites		500,000	
Activity total		6,216,729	4,027,202

**VII. Community Security Fund (15,100 vouchers @ \$200 + 180 community microprojects @ \$5,000)**

Youth at risk programmes		920,000	
Reconciliation and dispute resolution		400,000	
Community policing and support services		750,000	
Women and security activities		600,000	
Communications and infrastructure		1,850,000	
Activity total		4,520,000	

**VIII. Equipment**

Vehicle 4x4 (1 per State Office, total 11)		500,000	
Motorcycles (\$6,000 each x 2 x 25 Field Offices)		300,000	
Computers, printers, copier, palms, GPS and scanners		684,000	
V SAT and Thuraya		288,000	
Generators, stabilisers, solar panels		360,000	
Activity total		2,132,000	

**IX. Operational support**

Operational costs (\$27,000 per office)		972,000	
Activity total		972,000	
<b>Total</b>		<b>65,599,555</b>	<b>9,998,267</b>

\* Note: Would be implemented under the Security for Development Fund support component.

## Annex C: Excerpt from General Assembly resolution A/RES/59/296

*Takes note* of the note by the Secretary-General (definitions);<sup>4</sup>

*Notes* that reinsertion activities are part of the disarmament and demobilization process, as outlined in the note by the Secretary-General;

*Emphasizes* that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are a critical part of peace processes and integrated peacekeeping operations, as mandated by the Security Council, and supports strengthening the coordination of those programmes in an integrated approach;

*Stresses* the importance of a clear description of respective roles of peacekeeping missions and all other relevant actors;

*Also stresses* the need for strengthened cooperation and coordination between the various actors within and outside the United Nations system to ensure effective use of resources and coherence on the ground in implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes;

*Requests* the Secretary-General, when submitting future budget proposals containing mandated resource requirements for disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion, to provide clear information on these components and associated post and non-post costs;

*Notes* that the components used by the Secretary-General for budgeting for disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion activities are set out in the note by the Secretary-General, recognizing ongoing discussions on these concepts;

*Notes also* the intention of the Secretary-General to submit integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session;

## Annex D.1: Developing an RBB framework

*DDR objective statement.* The DDR objective statement draws its legal foundation from Security Council mission mandates. It is important to note that the DDR objective will not be fully achieved in the lifetime of the peacekeeping mission, although certain specific activities such as the (limited) physical disarmament of combatants may be completed. Other important aspects of DDR such as reintegration, establishment of the legal framework, and the technical and logistic capacity to destroy or make safe small arms and light weapons all extend beyond the duration of a peacekeeping mission. In this regard, the objective statement must reflect the contribution of the peacekeeping mission to the ‘progress towards’ the DDR objective.

### **SAMPLE DDR OBJECTIVE STATEMENT**

‘Progress towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of armed forces and groups, including meeting the specific needs of women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and destruction’

*Indicators of achievement.* The targeted achievement should include the following dimensions: (1) include no more than five clear and measurable indicators; (2) in the first year of a DDR programme, the most important indicators of achievement should relate to the political will of the government to develop and implement the DDR programme; and (3) include baseline information from which increases/decreases are measured.

### **SAMPLE SET OF DDR INDICATORS OF ACHIEVEMENT**

- ‘Transitional Government of National Unity adopts legislation establishing national and sub-national DDR institutions, and related weapons control law’
- ‘Establishment of national and sub-national DDR authorities’
- ‘Development of a national DDR programme’
- ‘34,000 members of armed forces and groups participate in disarmament, demobilization and community-based reintegration programmes, including 14,000 children released to return to their families’
- ‘Destroyed 4,000 of an estimated 20,000 weapons established in a small arms baseline survey conducted in January 2005’

*Outputs.* When developing the DDR outputs for an RBB framework, programme managers should bear in mind the following considerations: (1) specific references to the time-frame for implementation should be included; (2) DDR technical assistance or advice needs should be further defined to specify what that means in practice and, if possible, quantified (e.g., workshops, training programmes, legislative models, draft work plans); (3) the beneficiaries or recipients of the mission’s efforts should be included in the output description; and (4) the verb should precede the output definition (e.g., *Destroyed* 9,000 weapons; *Chaired* 10 community sensitization meetings).

### **SAMPLE SET OF DDR OUTPUTS**

- ‘Provided technical support (advice and programme development support) to the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), regional DDR commissions and their field structures, in collaboration with international financial institutions, international development organizations, non-governmental organizations and donors, in the development and implementation of a national DDR programme for all armed forces and groups’

- 'Provided technical support (advice and programme development support) to assist the government in strengthening its capacity (legal, institutional, technical and physical) in the areas of weapons collection, control, management and destruction'
- 'Conducted 10 training courses on DDR and weapons control for the military and civilian authorities in the first 6 months of the mission mandate'
- 'Supported the DDR institutions to collect, store, control and destroy (where applicable and necessary) weapons, as part of the DDR programme'
- 'Conducted with the DDR institutions and in partnership with international research institutions, small arms survey, economic and market surveys, verification of the size of the DDR caseload and eligibility criteria to support the planning of a comprehensive DDR programme in x'
- 'Developed options (eligibility criteria, encampment options and integration in civil administration) for force reduction process for the government of national unity'
- 'Disarmed and demobilized 15,000 allied militia forces, including provided related services such as feeding, clothing, civic education, medical profiling and counselling, education, training and employment referral, transitional safety allowance, training material'
- 'Disarmed and demobilized 5,000 members of special groups (women, disabled and veterans), including provided related services such as feeding, clothing, civic education, medical, profiling and counselling, education, training and employment referral, transitional safety allowance, training material'
- 'Negotiated and secured the release of 14,000 (UNICEF estimate) children associated with the armed forces and groups, and facilitated their return to their families within 12 months of the mission's mandate'
- 'Developed, coordinated and implemented reinsertion support at the community level for 34,000 armed individuals, as well as individuals associated with the armed forces and groups (women and children), in collaboration with the national DDR institutions, and other UN funds, programmes and agencies. Community-based DDR projects include: transitional support programmes; labour-intensive public works; microenterprise support; training; and short-term education support'
- 'Developed, coordinated and implemented community-based weapons for quick-impact projects programmes in 40 communities in x'
- 'Developed and implemented a DDR and small arms sensitization and community mobilization programme in 6 counties of x, inter alia, to develop consensus and support for the national DDR programme at national, regional and local levels, and in particular to encourage the participation of women in the DDR programme'
- 'Organized 10 regional workshops on DDR with x's military and civilian authorities'

*External factors.* When developing the external factors of the DDR RBB framework, programme managers are requested to identify those factors that are outside the control of the DDR unit. These should not repeat the factors that have been included in the indicators of achievement.

#### **SAMPLE SET OF EXTERNAL FACTORS**

- 'Political commitment on the part of the parties to the peace agreement to implement the programme' [rather than 'Transitional Government of National Unity adopts legislation establishing national and sub-national DDR institutions, and related weapons control laws' — which was stated as an indicator of achievement above]
- 'Commitment of non-signatories to the peace process to support the DDR programme'
- 'Timely and adequate funding support from voluntary sources'

## Annex D.2: RBB for DDR in Sudan


OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS OF ACHIEVEMENT
4.2 Progress towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of armed forces and groups, including meeting the specific needs of women and children associated with such forces and groups, as well as weapons control and destruction	<p>4.2.1 Government of National Unity adopts legislation establishing national and subnational DDR institutions, and related weapons control laws</p> <p>4.2.2 Establishment of national and subnational DDR authorities</p> <p>4.2.3 Development of a national DDR programme</p> <p>4.2.4 34,000 members of armed groups participate in disarmament, demobilization and community-based reintegration programmes, including children released to return to their families</p>
OUTPUTS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Provide technical support (advice and programme development support) to the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), the Northern and Southern DDR commissions and their field structures, in collaboration with international financial institutions, international development organizations, non-governmental organizations and donors, in the development and implementation of a national DDR programme for all armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Provide technical support (advice and programme development support) to assist the government in strengthening its capacity (legal, institutional, technical and physical) in the areas of weapons collection, control, management and destruction</li> <li>■ Conduct 10 training courses on DDR and weapons control for the military and civilian authorities</li> <li>■ Collect, store and destroy 34,000 weapons, as part of the DDR programme (planning assumption to be refined by small arms baseline survey)</li> <li>■ Conduct on behalf of the Government of National Unity, in partnership with international research institutions, small arms survey, economic and market surveys, verification of the size of the DDR caseload and eligibility criteria to support the planning of a comprehensive DDR programme in Sudan</li> <li>■ Develop options (eligibility criteria, encampment options and integration in civil administration) for force reduction process for the Government of National Unity</li> <li>■ Prepare contingency plans to disarm and demobilize 15,000 allied militia forces, including provide related services such as feeding, clothing civic education, medical, profiling and counselling, education, training and employment referral, transitional safety allowance, and training material</li> <li>■ Disarm and demobilize 5,000 members of special groups (women, disabled and veterans), including provide related services such as feeding, clothing, civic education, medical, profiling and counselling, education, training and employment referral, transitional safety allowance, and training material</li> <li>■ Negotiate and secure the release of 14,000 (UNICEF estimate) children associated with armed forces and groups, and facilitate their return to their families</li> <li>■ Develop, coordinate and implement reinsertion support at the community level for 34,000 armed individuals, in collaboration with the national DDR institutions, and other United Nations funds, programmes and agencies. Community-based DDR projects include: transitional support programmes; labour intensive public works; microenterprise support; training; and short-term education support</li> <li>■ Develop, coordinate and implement community-based weapons for quick impact projects programmes in xx communities in Sudan.</li> <li>■ Develop and implement a DDR and small arms sensitization and community mobilization programme in xx districts (to be confirmed by mission) of Sudan, inter alia, to develop consensus and support for the national DDR programme at national, regional and local levels, and in particular to encourage the participation of women in the DDR programme</li> <li>■ Organize 10 regional workshops with Sudanese military and civilian authorities on DDR</li> <li>■ Organize biweekly meetings with bilateral and multilateral donors on coordination of support to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme</li> <li>■ Conduct training in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention for 200 representatives from the military, government ministries, NGOs, civil society and other United Nations agencies in order to mainstream HIV/AIDS in the national DDR programme</li> </ul>	

## Annex E: Phased funding requirements for DDR

	YEAR 1				YEAR 2				YEAR 3				YEAR 4			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Peace negotiations	3	3														
Pre-mission planning	Peace agreement signed		2	2												
Programme development			3	3	3	3										
Disarmament component		Mission mandated			Mission deployed		1	1	1	1						
Demobilization							6	6	6	6	6	6				
							1	1	1	1	1	1				
Reinsertion							3	1	1	4	4	4				
Reintegration							3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
										5	5	5	5	5	5	5
National capacity development				3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
							5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Awareness-raising/sensitization						6	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Reconciliation/peace-building										4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Community-based disarmament									1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
									3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Operations					1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

- 1. Assessed contributions
- 2. Pre-mandate commitment authority
- 3. Rapid-response funds
- 4. Voluntary contributions
- 5. Loans and credits
- 6. Agency in-kind contributions

## Annex F: Overview of institutional and management arrangements for funding





## Endnotes

- 1 For more information, see <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/>.
- 2 For more information, see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/rrm/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/index.htm).
- 3 For more information, see <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/ThePostConflictFund>.
- 4 A/C.5/59/31.

# 3.42 Personnel and Staffing

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 3.42 Personnel and Staffing

## Summary

Creating an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) unit requires paying careful attention to a set of multidimensional components and principles. The main components of an integrated DDR unit are: political and programme management; overall DDR planning and coordination; monitoring and evaluation; public information and sensitization; administrative and financial management; and setting up and running regional DDR offices. Each of these components has specific requirements for appropriate and well-trained personnel.

As the process of DDR includes numerous cross-cutting issues, personnel in an integrated DDR unit include individuals from varying work sectors and specialities. Therefore, the selection and maintenance of integrated DDR unit personnel, based on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is defined by the following principles: joint management of the DDR unit (in this case, management by a peacekeeping mission chief and UNDP chief); secondment of an administrative and finance cell by UNDP; secondment of staff from other United Nations (UN) entities assisted by project support staff to fulfil the range of needs for an integrated DDR unit; and, finally, continuous links with other parts of the peacekeeping mission for the development of a joint DDR planning and programming approach.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

The aim of this module is to explain:

- the role of an integrated DDR unit in a peacekeeping mission;
- personnel requirements of the DDR unit;
- the recruitment and deployment process;
- training opportunities for DDR practitioners.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of the abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.

1.20 ◀▶

- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

### 3. Introduction

The success of a DDR strategy depends to a great extent on the timely selection and appointment of qualified, experienced and appropriately trained personnel deployed in a coherent DDR organizational structure.

To ensure maximum cooperation (and minimize duplication) among the many UN agencies, funds and programmes working on DDR, the UN adopts an integrated approach towards the establishment of a DDR unit.

### 4. Guiding principles

The design of the personnel structure, and the deployment and management of personnel in the integrated unit and how they relate to others working in DDR are guided by the principles, key considerations and approaches defined in IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR. Of particular importance are:

- *Unity of effort:* The peacekeeping mission, UN agencies, funds and programmes should work together at all stages of the DDR programme — from planning to implementation to evaluation — to ensure that the programme is successful. An appropriate joint planning and coordination mechanism must be established as early as possible to ensure cooperation among all UN partners that may be involved in any aspect of the DDR programme;
- *Integration:* Wherever possible, and when consistent with the mandate of the Security Council, the peacekeeping mission and the UN agencies, funds and programmes shall support an integrated DDR unit, which brings together the expertise, planning and coordination capacities of the various UN entities.

### 5. The aim of the integrated unit

The aim of establishing an integrated unit is to ensure joint planning and coordination, and effective and efficient decentralized implementation. The integrated DDR unit also employs the particular skills and expertise of the different UN entities to ensure flexibility, responsiveness, expertise and success for the DDR programme.

#### 5.1. Components of the integrated DDR unit

The integrated DDR unit, in general terms, should fulfil the following functions:

- *Political and programme management:* The chief and deputy chief of the integrated DDR unit are responsible for the overall political and programme management. Both the chief and his/her deputy will work to ensure that the DDR programme supports the overall peace process and mission objectives, and that there is close cooperation and collaboration with national stakeholders and other implementing partners, such as

other UN entities, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the donor community;

- *Overall DDR planning and coordination:* This component of the DDR unit is responsible for the overall development of the DDR programme. Seconded personnel from UN agencies, funds and programmes will work in this section to contribute to the joint planning and coordination of the DDR programme. Attached military and police personnel from within the mission will also form part of this component;
- *Disarmament and demobilization:* This component will be responsible for the overall implementation and management of all aspects of the disarmament and demobilization phases of the DDR programme. This includes short-term disarmament activities, such as weapons collection and registration, but also longer-term disarmament activities that support the establishment of a legal regime for the control of small arms and light weapons, and other community weapons collection initiatives. Where mandated, this component will coordinate with the military to assist in the destruction of weapons, ammunition and unexploded ordnance;
- *Reintegration:* This component plans the economic and social reintegration strategies. It also plans the reinsertion programme to ensure consistency and coherence with the overall reintegration strategy. It needs to work closely with other parts of the mission facilitating the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees;
- *Monitoring and evaluation:* This component is responsible for setting up and monitoring indicators to measure the achievements in all phases of the DDR programme. It also conducts DDR-related surveys such as small arms baseline surveys, profiling of participants and beneficiaries, mapping of economic opportunities, etc.;
- *Public information and sensitization:* This component works to develop the public information and sensitization strategy for the DDR programme. It draws on the direct support of the public information unit in the peacekeeping mission, but also employs other information dissemination personnel within the mission, such as the military, police and civil affairs officers, as well as local mechanisms such as theatre groups, administrative structures, etc.;
- *Administrative and financial management:* This is a small component of the unit, which may be seconded from an integrating UN entity to support the programme delivery aspect of the DDR unit. Its role is to utilize the administrative and financial capacities of the UN country office;
- *Regional DDR offices:* These are the regional implementing components of the DDR unit, which would implement programmes at the local level in close cooperation with the other regionalized components of civil affairs, military, police, etc.

## 5.2. Principles of integration

DPKO and UNDP are in the process of developing an MoU on the establishment of an integrated DDR unit in a peacekeeping mission. For the time being, the following principles shall guide the establishment of the integrated DDR unit:

- *Joint management of the DDR unit:* The chief of the DDR unit shall come from the peacekeeping mission. His/Her post shall be funded from the peacekeeping assessed budget. The deputy chief of the integrated DDR unit shall be seconded from UNDP, although the peacekeeping mission will provide him/her with administrative and

logistic support for him/her to perform his/her function as deputy chief of the DDR unit. Such integration allows the DDR unit to use the particular skills of both the mission and the country office, maximizing existing local knowledge and ensuring a smooth transition on DDR-related issues when the mandate of the peacekeeping mission ends;

- *Administrative and finance cell from UNDP:* UNDP shall second a small administrative and finance cell from its country office to support the programme delivery aspects of the DDR component. The principles of secondment use for the deputy chief of the DDR unit shall apply;
- *Secondment of staff from other UN entities:* In order to maximize coherence and coordination on DDR between missions and UN agencies, staff members from other agencies may be seconded to specific posts in the integrated DDR unit. Use of this method ensures the active engagement and participation of UN agencies in strategic policy decisions and coordination of UN DDR activities (including both mission operational support and programme implementation). The integration and co-location of UN agency staff in this structure are essential, given the complex and highly operational nature of DDR. Decisions on secondment shall be made at the earliest stages of planning to ensure that the proper budgetary support is secure to support the integrated DDR unit and the seconded personnel;
- *Project support units:* Core UN agency staff seconded to the integrated DDR unit may be complemented by additional project support staff located in project support units (PSUs) in order to provide capacity (programme, monitoring, operations, finance) for implementing key elements of UN assistance within the national planning and programme framework for DDR. The PSU will also be responsible for ensuring links and coordination with other agency programme areas (particularly in rule of law and security sector reform). Additional PSUs managed by other UN agencies can also be established, depending on the implementation/operational role attributed to them;
- *Links with other parts of the peacekeeping mission:* The integrated DDR unit shall be closely linked with other parts of the peacekeeping mission, in particular the military and the police, to ensure a 'joined-up' approach to the DDR programme.

### 5.3. Personnel requirements of the DDR unit

In line with the wide-ranging functions of the integrated DDR unit, the list below gives typical (generic) appointments that may be made in a DDR unit.

Regardless of the size of the DDR programme, appointments of staff concerned with joint planning and coordination will remain largely the same, although they need to be consistent with the specific DDR mandate provided by the Security Council.

The regional offices and the personnel requirement in these offices will differ, however, according to the size of the DDR programme. The list below provides an example of a relatively large mission DDR unit appointment list, which may be adapted to suit mission-specific needs.

#### INTEGRATED DDR UNIT: TYPICAL (GENERIC) APPOINTMENTS

##### Integrated DDR management and coordination section

1 x P5	Chief, DDR unit (policy director and unit management)
1 x P4	Deputy Chief, DDR (programme coordinator)
1 x Lt.-Colonel	DDR operations support (military adviser and plans officer)

1 x P3	DDR logistics officer (detached to Joint Operations Centre [JOC])
1 x P2	DDR Joint Logistics Operations Centre (logistic support and coordination)
1 x GS	administrative assistant
1 x NS	administrative clerk
2 x NS	driver/interpreter

#### **Disarmament and weapons control section**

1 x Lt.-Colonel	DDR logistics officer (coordinator of military observers)
1 x Major	DDR engineer technician (collection and destruction)
1 x Major	DDR security
1 x P3	DDR officer (weapons management officer)

#### **Demobilization and camp management section**

1 x P3	DDR officer (camp coordinator)
1 x P2	DDR officer (demobilization programme manager)
1 x UNV	DDR officer (camp records management)

#### **Social and economic reintegration section**

1 x P4	DDR economic reintegration manager
1 x P3	DDR social reintegration manager
1 x P3–P2	DDR gender officer (specific needs advice and programme coordinator)
1 x P2	DDR children officer (specific needs advice and programme coordinator)
1 x P3	DDR IDP/repatriation officer (specific needs advice and programme coordinator)
1 x P2	DDR HIV/AIDS officer (specific needs advice and programme coordinator)
1 x NPO	DDR logistics officer (national programme liaison)
1 x NS	administrative assistant
1 x NS	driver/interpreter

#### **Community relations and sensitization section**

1 x P3	public information officer (public information and sensitization)
1 x UNV	DDR information (public information and sensitization)
1 x NPO	DDR community liaison (community relations and sensitization assistant)

#### **Administration and finance section**

1 x P3	DDR administrative officer (administration and financial manager)
1 x UNV	administrative assistant (programme account coordinator)
1 x NS	administrative clerk

#### **Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) section**

1 x P3	MIS officer (management information systems)
1 x UNV	DDR M&E officer (section/programme M&E)
1 x NP	administrative assistant (registration and documentation M&E)

#### **DDR regional office (field section)**

1 x P3	DDR coordinator (regional coordinator)
1 x P2	DDR officer (reintegration)
1 x UNV	DDR officer (disarmament)
1 x UNV	DDR officer (regional public information and sensitization)
1 x NPO	DDR officer (community registration and liaison)
2 x NP	administrative assistant/interpreters
2 x NS	drivers/interpreters



## 6. Recruitment and deployment process

Given the breadth and scope of DDR activities, staff members may come from a number of sources such as:

- peacekeeping missions;
- UN agencies, funds and programmes;
- UN Headquarters;
- UN volunteer system;
- other international organizations (World Bank, European Union, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, etc.);
- local and international NGOs;
- the private sector.

### 6.1. Personnel Management and Support Service

The Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS) in the Office of Mission Support is responsible for the recruitment and deployment of staff in a peacekeeping mission, with the exception of staff seconded from UN agencies (who will follow their own recruitment procedures).

### 6.2. Recruitment process

The typical recruitment process for a staff member in the mission is as follows:

- candidate applies on line to a generic vacancy announcement in the Galaxy system (<http://www.jobs.un.org>);
- PMSS screens applications to select candidates who meet all the requirements of the post, and includes them in a roster of candidates for that occupational group/level;
- mission chief civilian personnel officer identifies the vacancy and requests recruitment action from PMSS;
- PMSS makes available to the mission rosters of pre-screened and technically cleared candidates;
- mission programme manager interviews candidates and recommends selection;
- PMSS commences recruitment action (e.g., reference checks, offer of appointment, medical clearance, travel arrangements, etc.).

### 6.3. Generic job descriptions

Below is a list of appointments for which generic job descriptions are available; these can be found in the annexes as shown.

Chief, DDR Unit	(Annex C.1)
Deputy Chief, DDR Unit	(Annex C.2)
Senior Military DDR Officer	(Annex C.3)
DDR Field Officer	(Annex C.4)
DDR Field Officer (UNV)	(Annex C.5)
DDR Programme Officer (UNV)	(Annex C.6)
DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (UNV)	(Annex C.7)

DDR Officer (International)	(Annex C.8)
Reintegration Officer (International)	(Annex C.9)
DDR Field Coordination Officer (National)	(Annex C.10)
Small Arms and Light Weapons Officer	(Annex C.11)
DDR Gender Officer	(Annex C.12)
DDR HIV / AIDS Officer	(Annex C.13)

#### 6.4. Staff induction plan

At the planning stages of the mission, the DDR programme manager should develop the staff induction plan for the DDR unit. The staff induction plan specifies the recruitment and deployment priorities for the personnel in the DDR unit, who will be hired at different times during the mission start-up period. The plan will assist the mission support component to recruit and deploy the appropriate personnel at the required time. The following template may be used in the development of the staff induction plan:

	Pre-mandate	Mandate	Mandate +30 days	Mandate +60 days	Mandate +90 days	Mandate +120 days
Mission headquarters						
Regional office 1						
Regional office 2						
Regional office 3						

## 7. DDR training strategy

A training strategy will be developed as soon as possible to assist staff members at every level in the DDR unit to advance their professional knowledge of DDR, and assist them to gain access to the more general leadership and management training available through the civilian training and development section.


### 7.1. Current DDR training courses

DDR training courses may be found on the UN DDR Resource Centre Web site: <http://www.unddr.org>.

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person
<b>M&amp;E</b>	monitoring and evaluation
<b>MoU</b>	memorandum of understanding
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>PMSS</b>	Personnel Management and Support Service
<b>PSU</b>	project support unit
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme

## Annex B: Example of a peacekeeping mission structure



## Annex C: Generic job descriptions for integrated DDR unit

### Annex C.1: Chief, DDR Unit (D1–P5)

Draft generic job profile

*Chief, DDR Unit (D1–P5)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent normally reports directly to the Deputy SRSG (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator).

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Deputy SRSG (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator), the Chief of the DDR Unit is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- provide effective leadership and ensure the overall management of the DDR Unit in all its components;
- provide strategic vision and guidance to the DDR Unit and its staff;
- coordinate activities among international and national partners on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;
- develop frameworks and policies to integrate civil society in the development and implementation of DDR activities;
- account to the national disarmament commission on matters of policy as well as periodic updates with regard to the process of disarmament and reintegration;
- advise the Deputy SRSG (Humanitarian and Development Component) on various aspects of DDR and recommend appropriate action;
- advise and assist the government on DDR policy and operations;
- coordinate and integrate activities with other components of the mission on DDR, notably communications and public information, legal affairs, policy/planning, civilian police and the military component;
- develop resource mobilization strategy and ensure coordination with donors, including the private sector;
- be responsible for the mission's DDR programme page in the UN DDR Resource Centre to ensure up-to-date information is presented to the international community.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

#### Competencies

**Vision:** Identifies and defines strategic direction for the unit's work programme; ability to recognize requirements and translate requirements into programmes and services that achieve objectives and goals.

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations; strong negotiating skills; proven critical thinking skills.

**Leadership:** Proven ability to provide effective leadership and transfer advice and knowledge to staff at all levels and from different national and cultural backgrounds.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes and services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Excellent communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options, concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Excellent interpersonal skills and the ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

#### Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree (Masters or equivalent) in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields.

**Experience:** Minimum of 10 years of progressively responsible professional experience in peacekeeping and peace-building operations in the field of DDR of ex-combatants, including extensive experience in working on small arms reduction programmes. Detailed knowledge of development process and post-conflict related issues particularly on the DDR process. Additional experience in developing support strategies for IDPs, refugees, disaffected populations, children and women in post-conflict situations will be valuable.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

### Annex C.2: Deputy Chief, DDR Unit (P5–P4)

#### Draft generic job profile

##### *Deputy Chief, DDR Unit (P5–P4)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent reports directly to the Deputy SRSG (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator). In most cases, the staff member filling this post would be seconded and paid for by UNDP. For duration of his/her secondment as Deputy Chief, he/she will receive administrative and logistic support from the peacekeeping mission.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the Deputy Chief is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- assist Chief of DDR Unit in the overall management of the DDR Unit in all its components;
- support Chief of DDR Unit in the overall day-to-day supervision of staff and field operations;
- support Chief of DDR Unit in the identification and development of synergies and partnerships with other actors (national and international) at the strategic, technical and operational levels;
- support Chief of DDR Unit in resource mobilization and ensure coordination with donors, including the private sector;
- provide technical advice and support to the national disarmament commission and programme as necessary;
- act as the programmatic linkage to the work of the UN country team on the broader reintegration and development issues of peace-building;
- provide overall coordination and financial responsibility for the programming and implementation of UNDP funds for disarmament and reintegration;
- oversee the development and coordination of the implementation of a comprehensive socio-economic reintegration framework for members of armed forces and groups taking advantage of existing or planned recovery and reconstruction plans;
- oversee the development and coordination of the implementation of a comprehensive national capacity development support strategy focusing on weapons control, management, stockpiling and destruction;
- support Chief of DDR Unit in all other areas necessary for the success of DDR activities.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

### Competencies

**Vision:** Identifies and defines strategic direction for the unit's work programme; ability to recognize requirements and translate requirements into programmes and services that achieve objectives and goals.

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations; strong negotiating skills; proven critical thinking skills.

**Leadership:** Proven ability to provide effective leadership and transfer advice and knowledge to staff at all levels and from different national and cultural backgrounds.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes and services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Excellent communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely, conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Excellent interpersonal skills and the ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

#### Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree (Masters or equivalent) in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields.

**Experience:** Minimum of 10 years of progressively responsible professional experience in peacekeeping and peace-building operations in the field of DDR of ex-combatants, including extensive experience in working on small arms reduction programmes. Detailed knowledge of development process and post-conflict related issues, particularly on the DDR process. Additional experience in developing support strategies for IDPs, refugees, disaffected populations, children and women in post-conflict situations will be valuable.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

### Annex C.3: Senior Military DDR Officer

#### Draft generic job profile

##### *Senior Military DDR Officer (Lieutenant-Colonel/Colonel)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the Senior Military DDR Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- support the overall DDR plan, specifically in the strategic, functional and operational areas relating to disarmament and demobilization;
- direct and supervise all military personnel appointed to the DDR Unit;
- ensure direct liaison and coordination between DDR operations and the military headquarters, specifically the Joint Operations Centre;
- ensure accurate and timely reporting of security matters, particularly those likely to affect DDR tasks;
- provide direct liaison, advice and expertise to the Force Commander relating to DDR matters;
- assist Chief of DDR Unit in the preparation and planning of the DDR strategy, providing military advice, coordination between sub-units and civilian agencies;
- liaise with other mission military elements, as well as national military commanders and, where appropriate, those in national DDR bodies;
- supervise the development of appropriate mechanisms and systems for the registration and tracking of weapons collection, registration, storage and disposal/destruction, etc.;



- coordinate and facilitate the use of mission forces for the potential construction or development of DDR facilities — camps, reception centres, pick-up points, etc. As required, facilitate security of such locations;
- assist in the coordination and development of DDR Unit mechanisms for receiving and recording group profile information, liaise on this subject with the military information unit;
- liaise with military operations for the deployment of military observers in support of DDR tasks;
- be prepared to support security sector reform linkages and activities in future mission planning;
- undertake such other tasks as may be reasonably requested by the Force Commander and Chief of DDR Unit in relation to DDR activities.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

### Competencies

**Professionalism:** Should be formally staff trained and command qualified. Ideally experienced in other peacekeeping operations, specifically in relation to DDR activities. The selected candidate should be well acquainted with regional and subregional conflict/political issues and ideally have knowledge of the specific mission background.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective command and supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support. Must be capable of working within a multi-agency integrated team. The candidate would benefit from CIMIC experience and should have an understanding of the nature, capacities and limitations of non-UN agencies, NGOs, etc.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness, sound judgement and decision-making skills.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Excellent and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Excellent interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

### Qualifications

**Education and work experience:** Graduate of Military Command and Staff College. A minimum of 15 years of progressive responsibility in military command appointments, preferably to include peacekeeping and peace-building operations in the field of DDR of

ex-combatants. Detailed knowledge of development process and post-conflict related issues, particularly on the DDR process.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

#### **Annex C.4: DDR Field Officer (P4–P3)**

Draft generic job profile

*DDR Field Officer (P4–P3)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the DDR Field Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- be in charge of the overall planning and implementation of the DDR programme in his/her regional area of responsibility;
- act as officer in charge of all DDR staff members in the regional office, including the administration and management of funds allocated to achieve DDR programme in the region;
- be responsible for the day-to-day coordination of DDR operations with other mission components in the regional office and other UN entities;
- identify and develop synergies and partnerships with other actors (national and international) in his/her area of responsibility;
- provide technical advice and support to regional and local DDR commissions and offices, as appropriate;
- be responsible for regular reporting on the situation pertaining to the armed forces and groups in his/her area of responsibility and progress on the implementation of the DDR strategy. Prepare and contribute to the preparation of various reports and documents.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

#### **Competencies**

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

### Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Experience:** Minimum of five years of substantial experience working on post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

## Annex C.5: DDR Field Officer (UNV)

### Draft generic job profile

#### *DDR Field Officer (UNV)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within the limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Regional DDR Officer, the DDR Field Officer (UNV) is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- assist the DDR Field Officer in the planning and implementation of one aspect of the DDR programme in his/her regional area of responsibility;
- be responsible for the day-to-day coordination of DDR operations with other mission components in the regional office and other UN entities on the specific area of responsibility;
- identify and develop synergies and partnerships with other actors (national and international) in his/her area of responsibility;

- provide technical advice and support to regional and local DDR commissions and offices, as appropriate;
- be responsible for regular reporting on the situation pertaining to the armed forces and groups in his/her area of responsibility and progress on the implementation of the DDR strategy. Prepare and contribute to the preparation of various reports and documents.

## Competencies

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

## Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of three years of substantial experience working on post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

## Annex C.6: DDR Programme Officer (UNV)

### Draft generic job profile

#### *DDR Programme Officer (UNV)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit and DDR Field Coordinator, the DDR Programme Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- work with local authorities and civil society organizations to facilitate and implement all aspects of the DDR programme
- represent the DDR Unit in mission internal regional meetings;
- work closely with DDR partners at the regional level to facilitate collection, safe storage and accountable collection of small arms and light weapons. Ensure efficient, accountable and transparent management of all field facilities pertaining to community-specific DDR projects;
- plan and support activities at the regional level pertaining to the community arms collection and development including: (1) capacity-building; (2) sensitization and public awareness-raising on the dangers of illicit weapons circulating in the community; (3) implementation of community project;
- monitor, evaluate and report on all field project activities; monitor and guide field staff working in the project, including the coordination of sensitization and arms collection activities undertaken by Field Assistants at regional level;
- ensure proper handling of project equipment and accountability of all project resources.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

#### Competencies

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

## Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of five years of substantial experience working on post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues. Experience with local development, microcredit and participatory approaches essential.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

## Annex C.7: DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (P2–UNV)

### Draft generic job profile

#### *DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (P2–UNV)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- develop monitoring and evaluation criteria for all aspects of disarmament and reintegration activities, as well as an overall strategy and monitoring calendar;
- establish baselines for monitoring and evaluation purposes in the areas related to disarmament and reintegration, working in close collaboration with the disarmament and reintegration officers, to allow for effective evaluations of programme impact;
- undertake periodic reviews of disarmament and reintegration activities to assess effectiveness, efficiency, achievement of results and compliance with procedures;
- develop a field manual on standards and procedures for use by local partners and executing agencies, and organize training;
- undertake periodic field visits to inspect the provision of reinsertion benefits and the implementation of reintegration projects, and reporting;
- develop recommendations on ongoing and future activities, lessons learned, modifications to implementation strategies and arrangements with partners.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

## Competencies

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.



**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

#### Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of three years of substantial experience working on post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues. Experience in results-oriented programming and monitoring and evaluation.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

### Annex C.8: DDR Officer (P4–P3, International)

#### Draft generic job profile

##### *DDR Officer (P4–P3, International)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the DDR Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- support the Chief and Deputy Chief of the DDR Unit in operational planning for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including developing the policies and programmes, as well as implementation targets and work plans;

- undertake negotiations with armed forces and groups in order to create conditions for their entrance into the DDR programme;
- undertake and organize risk and threat assessments, target group profiles, political factors, security, and other factors affecting operations;
- undertake planning of weapons collection activities, in conjunction with the military component of the peacekeeping mission;
- undertake planning and management of the demobilization phase of the programme, which may include camp management, as well as short-term transitional support to demobilized combatants;
- provide support for the development of joint programming frameworks on reintegration with the government and partner organizations, taking advantage of opportunities and synergies with economic recovery and community development programmes;
- assist in the development of criteria for the selection of partners (local and international) for the implementation of reinsertion and reintegration activities;
- liaise with other national and international actors on activities and initiatives related to reinsertion and reintegration;
- supervise the development of appropriate mechanisms and systems for the registration and tracking of beneficiaries for reinsertion and reintegration, as well as mapping of socio-economic opportunities in other development projects, employment possibilities, etc.;
- coordinate and facilitate the participation of local communities in the planning and implementation of reintegration assistance, using existing capacities at the local level and in close synergy with economic recovery and local development initiatives;
- liaise closely with organizations and partners to develop assistance programmes for vulnerable groups, e.g., women and children;
- facilitate the mobilization and organization of networks of local partners around the goals of socio-economic reintegration and economic recovery, involving local NGOs, community-based organizations, private sector enterprises, and local authorities (communal and municipal);
- supervise the undertaking of studies to determine reinsertion and reintegration benefits and implementation modalities;
- ensure good coordination and information sharing with implementation partners and other organizations, as well as with other relevant sections of the mission;
- ensure that DDR activities are well integrated and coordinated with the activities of other mission components (particularly communication and public information, mission analysis, political, military and police components);
- perform a liaison function with other national and international actors in matters related to DDR;
- support development of appropriate legal frameworks on disarmament and weapons control.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

### Competencies

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.



**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

#### Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of five years of substantial experience working on post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues. Experience with local development, microcredit and participatory approaches essential.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

### **Annex C.9: Reintegration Officer (P4–P3, International)**

#### Draft generic job profile

##### *Reintegration Officer (P4–P3, International)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the Reintegration Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- support the development of the registration, reinsertion and reintegration component of the disarmament and reintegration programme, including overall framework, imple-

mentation strategy, and operational modalities, respecting national programme priorities and targets;

- supervise field office personnel on work related to reinsertion and reintegration;
- assist in the development of criteria for the selection of partners (local and international) for the implementation of reinsertion and reintegration activities;
- liaise with other national and international actors on activities and initiatives related to reinsertion and reintegration;
- supervise the development of appropriate mechanisms and systems for the registration and tracking of beneficiaries for reinsertion and reintegration, as well as mapping of socio-economic opportunities in other development projects, employment possibilities, etc.;
- coordinate and facilitate the participation of local communities in the planning and implementation of reintegration assistance, using existing capacities at the local level and in close synergy with economic recovery and local development initiatives;
- liaise closely with organizations and partners to develop assistance programmes for vulnerable groups, e.g., women and children;
- facilitate the mobilization and organization of networks of local partners around the goals of socio-economic reintegration and economic recovery, involving local NGOs, community-based organizations, private sector enterprises and local authorities (communal and municipal);
- supervise the undertaking of studies to determine reinsertion and reintegration benefits and implementation modalities.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

### Competencies

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs;

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

## Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of five years of substantial experience working on post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues. Experience with local development, microcredit and participatory approaches essential.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

## Annex C.10: DDR Field Coordination Officer (National)

### Draft generic job profile

#### *DDR Field Coordination Officer (National)*

Under the overall supervision of the Chief of DDR Unit and working closely with the DDR Officer, the Field Coordination Officer carries out the work, information feedback and coordination of field rehabilitation and reintegration activities. The Field Coordination Officer will improve field supervision, sensitization, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. He/she will also assist in strengthening the working relationships of DDR staff with other peacekeeping mission substantive sections in the field. He/she will also endeavour to strengthen, coordination and collaboration with government offices, the national commission on DDR (NCDDR), international NGOs, NGOs (implementing partners) and other UN agencies working on reintegration in order to unify reintegration activities. The Field Coordination Officer will liaise closely with the DDR Officer/Reintegration Officer and undertake the following duties:

- assist and advise DDR Unit in areas within his/her remit;
- provide direction and support to field staff and activities;
- carry out monitoring, risk assessment and reporting in relation to the environment and practices that bear on the security of staff in the field (physical security, accommodation, programme fiscal and procurement practices, transport and communications);
- support the efficient implementation of all DDR coordination projects;
- develop and sustain optimal information feedback, in both directions, between the field and Headquarters;
- support the DDR Unit in the collection of programme performance information, progress and impact assessment;
- collect the quantitative and qualitative information on programme implementation;
- carry out follow-up monitoring visits on activities of implementing partners and regional offices;
- liaise with ex-combatants, beneficiaries, implementing partners and referral officer for proper sensitization and reinforcement of the programme;
- create efficient early warning alert system and rapid response mechanisms for 'hot spot' development;
- ensure DDR coordination programmes complement each other and are implemented efficiently;

- support liaison with the NCDDR and other agencies in relation to the reintegration of ex-combatants, CAAFG, WAAFG and war-affected people in the field;
- provide guidance and on-the-ground support to reintegration officers ;
- liaise with Military Observers, Reintegration Unit and UN Police in accordance with the terms of reference;
- liaise and coordinate with civil affairs section in matters of mutual interest;
- carry out any other duties as directed by the DDR Unit.

### **Annex C.11: Small Arms and Light Weapons Officer (P3–P4)**

#### **Draft generic Job Profile**

##### *Small Arms and Light Weapons Officer (P4–P3)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the Small Arms and Light Weapons Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission’s mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- formulate and implement, within the DDR programme, a small arms and light weapons (SALW) reduction and control project for the country in support of the peace process;
- coordinate SALW reduction and control activities taking place in the country and among the parties, the national government, civil society and the donor community;
- provide substantive technical inputs and advice to the Chief of the DDR Unit and the national authorities for the development of national legal instruments for the control of SALW;
- undertake broad consultations with relevant stakeholders through inclusive and participatory processes through community-based violence and weapons reduction programme;
- manage the collection of data on SALW stocks during the disengagement and DDR processes;
- develop targeted training programmes for national institutions on SALW;
- liaise closely with the gender and HIV/AIDS adviser in the mission or these capacities seconded to the DDR Unit by UN entities to ensure that gender issues are adequately reflected in policy, legislation, programming and resource mobilization, and develop strategies for involvement of women in small arms management and control activities;
  - ensure timely and effective delivery of project inputs and outputs;
  - undertake continuous monitoring of project activities; produce top-level progress and briefing reports;
- support efforts in resource mobilization and development of strategic partnerships with multiple donors and agencies.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

## Competencies

**Vision:** An in-depth understanding of the unit's strategic direction and ability to transform it into a results-oriented work programme.

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

**Leadership:** Proven ability to provide effective leadership and transfer advice and knowledge staff at all levels and from different national and cultural backgrounds.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness, sound judgement and decision-making skills.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Excellent and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Excellent interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

**Negotiation skills:** Effective negotiating skills and ability to work with others to reach mutually benefiting and lasting understanding.

## Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of five years of substantial experience working on post-conflict, progressive national and international experience and knowledge in development work, with specific focus on disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and small arms control programmes. An understanding of the literature on DDR and security sector reform.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

## Annex C.12: DDR Gender Officer (P3–P2)

### Draft generic job profile

#### *DDR Gender Officer (P3–P2)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official in charge of DDR activities in a field location. This staff member is expected to be seconded from a UN specialized agency working on mainstreaming gender issues in post-conflict peace-building, and is expected to work closely with the Gender Adviser of the peace-keeping mission.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the DDR Gender Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- ensure the full integration of gender through all DDR processes (including small arms) in the DDR programme;
- provide close coordination and technical support to national institutions for DDR, particularly Offices of Gender, Special Groups and Reintegration;
- provide support to decision-making and programme formulation on the DDR programme to ensure that gender issues are fully integrated and that the programme promotes equal involvement and access of women;
- undertake ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the DDR process to ensure application of principles of gender sensitivity as stated in the peace agreement;
- provide support to policy development in all areas of DDR to ensure integration of gender;
- develop mechanisms to support the equal access and involvement of female combatants in the DDR process;
- take the lead in development of advocacy strategies to gain commitment from key actors on gender issues within DDR;
- support national parties in coordinating the profiling, documentation and dissemination of data and issues relating to the presence and role of women and girls associated with the armed forces and groups, and militias;
- review the differing needs of male and female ex-combatants during community-based reintegration, including analysis of reintegration opportunities and constraints, and advocate for these needs to be taken into account in DDR and community-based reintegration programming;
- prepare and provide briefing notes and guidance for relevant actors, including national partners, UN agencies, international NGOs, donors and others, on gender in the context of DDR;
- provide technical support and advice on gender to national partners on policy development related to DDR and human security;
- develop tools and other practical guides for the implementation of gender within DDR and human security frameworks;
- assist in the development of capacity-building activities for the national offices drawing on lessons learned on gender and DDR in the region, and facilitating regional resource networks on these issues;



- participate in field missions and assessments related to human security and DDR to advise on gender issues.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

### Competencies

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating positions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

### Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of five years of substantial experience working on gender issues in post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

## Annex C.13: DDR HIV/AIDS Officer (P3–P2)

Draft generic job profile

*DDR HIV/AIDS Officer (P3–P2)*

**Organizational setting and reporting relationship:** These positions are located in peace operations. Depending on the organizational structure of the mission and location of the post, the incumbent may report directly to the Chief of the DDR Unit or to a senior official

in charge of DDR activities in a field location. This staff member is expected to be seconded from a UN specialized agency working on mainstreaming activities to deal with the HIV / AIDS issue in post-conflict peace-building, and is expected to work closely with the HIV / AIDS adviser of the peacekeeping mission.

**Accountabilities:** Within limits of delegated authority and under the supervision of the Chief of the DDR Unit, the DDR HIV / AIDS Officer is responsible for the following duties:

(These functions are generic and may vary depending on the mission's mandate. Therefore, incumbents may carry out most, but not all, of the functions listed.)

- ensure the full integration of activities to address the HIV / AIDS issue through all phases of the DDR programme;
- provide close coordination and technical support to national institutions for DDR, particularly offices of HIV / AIDS reintegration;
- support national parties in coordinating the profiling, documentation and dissemination of data and issues relating to the presence and role of women and girls associated with the armed forces and groups;
- document and disseminate data and issues relating to HIV / AIDS as well as the factors fuelling the epidemic in the armed forces and groups;
- prepare and provide briefing notes and guidance for relevant actors including national partners, UN agencies, international NGOs, donors and others on gender and HIV / AIDS in the context of DDR;
- provide technical support and advice on HIV / AIDS to national partners on policy development related to DDR and human security;
- develop tools and other practical guides for the implementation of HIV / AIDS strategies within DDR and human security frameworks;
- generate effective results-oriented partnerships among different partners, civil society and community-based actors to implement a consolidated response to HIV / AIDS within the framework of the DDR programme.

Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

### Competencies

**Professionalism:** Proven expertise in area of assignment; in-depth understanding of and an ability to evaluate international political situations in that area; experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

**Managing performance:** Proven effective supervisory skills; ability to mentor staff and provide guidance and support.

**Planning and organizing:** Proven ability to establish priorities and to plan, organize, coordinate and monitor own work plan and provide advice and guidance to others; in-depth understanding of division's strategic direction; resourcefulness.

**Judgement/Decision-making:** Demonstrated sound judgement in resolving issues/problems; ability to proactively seek and recommend sound policy initiatives.

**Creativity:** Ability to actively seek to improve programmes/services, offer new and different options to solve problems/meet client needs.

**Communications:** Well-developed and effective communication (verbal and written) skills, including ability to prepare reports and conduct presentations by clearly formulating posi-



tions on issues, articulating options concisely conveying maximum necessary information, making and defending recommendations; diplomacy and tact; ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials.

**Teamwork:** Proven interpersonal skills; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

#### Qualifications

**Education:** Advanced university degree in social sciences, management, economics, business administration, international development or other relevant fields. A relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience in related areas may be accepted in lieu of the advanced degree.

**Work experience:** Minimum of five years of substantial experience working on gender issues in post-conflict, crisis and economic recovery issues.

**Languages:** Fluency in oral and written English and/or French, depending on the working language of the mission; knowledge of a second UN official language may be a requirement for a specific post.

# 3.50 Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 3.50 Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes

## Summary

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has been one of the weakest areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme management in the past, partly due to a lack of proper planning, a standardized M&E framework, and human and financial resources specifically dedicated to M&E. Past experiences have highlighted the need for more effective M&E in order to develop an effective, efficient and sustainable DDR programme that will achieve the objectives of improving stability and security.

M&E is an essential management tool and provides a chance to track progress, improve activities, objectively verify the outcomes and impact of a programme, and learn lessons that can be fed into future programmes and policies. This module outlines standards for improving inter-agency cooperation in designing and conducting effective M&E. It further shows how M&E can be planned and implemented effectively through a creation of a DDR-specific M&E work plan, which consists of a plan for data collection, data analysis and reporting. It also provides some generic M&E indicators within a results-management framework, which can be modified and adapted to each programme and project.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

These guidelines cover the basic M&E procedures for integrated DDR programmes. The purpose of these guidelines is to establish standards for managing the implementation of integrated DDR projects and to provide guidance on how to perform M&E in a way that will make project management more effective, lead to follow-up and make reporting more consistent.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

1.20 ◀▶

### 3. Introduction

Traditionally, M&E in DDR programmes has focused on assessing inputs and implementation processes. Today, the focus is on assessing how various factors contribute to or detract from the achievement of the proposed outcomes and programme objectives, and measuring the effectiveness of outputs, partnerships, policy advice and dialogue, advocacy, and brokering/coordination. The main objectives of results-oriented M&E are to:

- increase organizational and development learning;
- ensure informed decision-making;
- support genuine accountability and ensure quality control;
- contribute to the further development of best practice and policy;
- build country capacities, especially in M&E.

In order to enable programme managers to improve strategies, programmes and other activities, M&E aims to generate information in several key areas to allow the measurement of:

- *programme performance*, which indicates whether programme implementation is proceeding in accordance with the programme plan and budget;
- *programme effectiveness*, which answers such questions as whether and to what extent the programme has achieved its objectives, and on what external conditions it depends;
- *programme efficiency*, which determines whether programme outputs and outcomes were produced in the most economical way, i.e., by maximizing outputs and/or minimizing inputs.

### 4. Guiding principles

When developing an M&E strategy as part of the overall process of programme development, several important principles are relevant for DDR:

- Planners shall ensure that baseline data (data that describes the problem or situation before the intervention and which can be used to later provide a point of comparison) and relevant performance indicators are built into the programme development process itself. Baseline data are best collected within the framework of the comprehensive assessments that are carried out before the programme is developed, while performance indicators are defined in relation to both baseline data and the outputs, activities and outcomes that are expected;
- The development of an M&E strategy and framework for a DDR programme is essential in order to develop a systematic approach for collecting, processing, and using data and results;
- M&E should use information and data from the regular information collection mechanisms and reports, as well as periodic measurement of key indicators;
- Monitoring and data collection should be an integral component of the information management system for the DDR process, and as such should be made widely available to key DDR staff and stakeholders for consultation;
- M&E plans specifying the frequency and type of reviews and evaluations should be a part of the overall DDR work planning process;
- A distinction should be made between the evaluation of UN support for national DDR (i.e., the UN DDR programme itself) and the overall national DDR effort, given

the focus on measuring the overall effectiveness and impact of UN inputs on DDR, as opposed to the overall effectiveness and impact of DDR at the national level;

- All integrated DDR sections should make provision for the necessary staff, equipment and other requirements to ensure that M&E is adequately dealt with and carried out, independently of other DDR activities, using resources that are specifically allocated to this purpose.

## 5. Developing an M&E strategy and framework for DDR

M&E is far more than periodic assessments of performance. Particularly with complex processes like DDR, with its diversity of activities and multitude of partners, M&E plays an important role in ensuring constant quality control of activities and processes, and it also provides a mechanism for periodic evaluations of performance in order to adapt strategies and deal with the problems and bottlenecks that inevitably arise. Because of the political importance of DDR, and its potential impacts (both positive and negative) on both security and prospects for development, impact assessments are essential to ensuring that DDR contributes to the overall goal of improving stability and security in a particular country.

M&E is far more than periodic assessments of performance. Particularly with complex processes like DDR, with its diversity of activities and multitude of partners, M&E plays an important role in ensuring constant quality control of activities and processes, and it also provides a mechanism for periodic evaluations of performance in order to adapt strategies and deal with the problems and bottlenecks that inevitably arise.

The definition of a comprehensive strategy and framework for DDR is a vital part of the overall programme implementation process. Although strategies will differ a great deal in different contexts, key guiding questions that should be asked when designing an effective framework for M&E include:

- What objectives should an M&E strategy and framework measure?
- What elements should go into a work plan for reporting, monitoring and evaluating performance and results?
- What key indicators are important in such a framework?
- What information management systems are necessary to ensure timely capture of appropriate data and information?
- How can the results of M&E be integrated into programme implementation and used to control quality and adapt processes?

The following section discusses these and other key elements involved in the development of an M&E work plan and strategy.

### 5.1. M&E and results-based management

M&E is an essential part of the results-based approach to implementing and managing programmes. It allows for the measurement of progress made towards achieving outcomes and outputs, and assesses the overall impact of programme on security and stability. In the context of DDR, M&E is particularly important, because it helps keep track of a complex

In the context of DDR, M&E is particularly important, because it helps keep track of a complex range of outcomes and outputs in different components of the DDR mission, and assesses how each contributes towards achieving the goal of improved stability and security.

range of outcomes and outputs in different components of the DDR mission, and assesses how each contributes towards achieving the goal of improved stability and security. M&E also gives a longitudinal assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the strategies, mechanisms and processes carried out in DDR.

For the purposes of integrated DDR, M&E can be divided into two levels related to the results-based framework:

- measurement of the performance of DDR programmes in achieving outcomes and outputs throughout its various components generated by a set of activities: disarmament (e.g., number of weapons collected and destroyed); demobilization (number of ex-combatants screened, processed and assisted); and reintegration (number of ex-combatants reintegrated and communities assisted);
- measurement of the outcomes of DDR programmes in contributing towards an overall goal. This can include reductions in levels of violence in society, increased stability and security, and consolidation of peace processes. It is difficult, however, to determine the impact of DDR on broader society without isolating it from other processes and initiatives (e.g., peace-building, security sector reform [SSR]) that also have an impact.

Table 1 **Differences between monitoring and evaluation**

	MONITORING	EVALUATION
<b>Objective</b>	To track changes from baseline conditions to desired outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To validate the outcomes and objectives that were achieved</li> <li>■ To determine how and why outcomes and objectives were or were not achieved</li> </ul>
<b>Focus</b>	Measures the outputs of projects, programmes, partnerships, and assistance activities, and their contribution to outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Compares planned with intended outcome achievement</li> <li>■ Focuses on how and why outputs and strategies contributed to achievement of outcomes</li> <li>■ Focuses on questions of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact</li> </ul>
<b>Methodology</b>	Tracks and assesses performance and process (progress towards outcomes) through analysis and comparison of indicators over time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Evaluates achievement of outcomes by comparing indicators before and after the intervention</li> <li>■ Relies on monitoring data on information from external sources</li> <li>■ Time-bound, periodic, in-depth</li> </ul>
<b>Carried out by</b>	Continuous and systematic by programme managers, project managers and key partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Internal evaluators, external evaluators and partners</li> </ul>
<b>Use</b>	Alerts managers to problems in performance, provides options for corrective actions and helps demonstrate accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Provides managers with strategy and policy options</li> <li>■ Provides basis for learning and demonstrates accountability</li> </ul>

Source: Adapted from UNDP, *Who Are the Question-makers? A Participatory Evaluation Handbook*, UNDP, New York, 1997

## 5.2. Integrating M&E in programme development and implementation

Provisions for M&E, and in particular the key elements of a strategy and framework, should be integrated into the programme development and implementation process from the beginning. This should occur in the following ways:

- Performance indicators relevant for M&E should be identified, together with the development of a baseline study and indicators framework for the comprehensive assessment, as well as the results framework for the DDR programme itself (see IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design for advice on the development of a results framework);
- Requirements for establishing and implementing an M&E system should be taken into consideration during the identification of programme requirements, including dedicated staff, material and information management systems;
- Key aspects of the M&E system and activities should be developed and harmonized with the overall programme implementation cycle and included in the corresponding work plans;
- Programme implementation methods should be designed to permit the analysis and incorporation of M&E results into planning and coordination of activities in order to provide programmes with the capacity to modify the implementation approach based on M&E results and lessons learned.

3.20 ◀▶

## 5.3. The M&E work plan

An M&E work plan can be integrated into general or specific programme implementation work plans, or can be designed separately. In general, implementing and supervising the implementation of such a work plan is the basic responsibility of the M&E officer responsible for this process.

Key elements of an M&E work plan include the following, which are usually arranged in the form of a matrix:

Table 2 **M&E work plan matrix**

WORK PLAN COMPONENT	DESCRIPTION
1. Report type	Category of M&E instrument used (for monitoring) for daily, monthly or quarterly progress reports; annual reports; field visit reports; etc; and (for evaluation) periodic internal evaluations, mid-term evaluations, terminal evaluations and ex-post evaluations, among others
2. Objective	Describes the purpose of the monitoring or evaluation tool used, referring to how the results will be used, including review and improvement of performance, ensuring conformity with procedures, generating lessons learned, investigating serious problems, etc.
3. Frequency	Explains how often, or at what point in programme implementation, a monitoring or evaluation tool is used
4. Outputs covered	Description of the project outputs measured by the M&E instrument. In general, monitoring measures outputs and outcomes of specific activities (e.g., number of weapons collected, number of ex-combatants discharged, etc.), while evaluations measure overall impact and effectiveness of the overall DDR programme or individual components, such as disarmament
5. Definition of indicators	Describes the indicators used to measure performance for an M&E tool (see below for a description of indicators)
6. Information sources and data collection methods	Describes the information collection mechanisms used to gather information on specific indicators, e.g., field surveys, registration data, field visits, review of documentation, etc.
7. Responsibility	Defines the person or unit responsible for managing and implementing each M&E tool



### 5.3.1. M&E tracking systems

Given the potentially large number of reports and documents generated by M&E activities, the development and maintenance of a report-tracking system is essential in order to provide a 'history' of M&E results and make them accessible to managers. This provides the DDR programme with institutional memory that can be drawn from to monitor progress and ensure that emerging best practices and problems are identified.

## 5.4. Development of M&E indicators

Indicators are variables (i.e., factors that can change, e.g., number of weapons collected) that should be measured to reveal progress (or lack thereof) towards the achievement of objectives, outcomes or outputs, and should provide information on what has been achieved in either quantitative or qualitative terms, or changes over time. In order for indicators to be meaningful, measurement must be made against a baseline, or baseline data, both of which are collected either in the context of the pre-programme comprehensive assessment or during programme implementation. In general, most indicators should be developed together with the definition of programme activities, outputs, outcomes, objectives and goals. In general, indicators can be classified as follows:

- *Performance indicator:* A particular characteristic or dimension used to measure intended changes defined by a programme results framework. Performance indicators are used to observe progress and to measure actual outputs and outcomes compared to those that were expected. They indicate 'how', 'whether' or 'to what extent' a unit is progressing towards its objectives, rather than 'why' or 'why not' such progress is being made. Performance indicators are usually expressed in quantifiable terms, and should be objective and measurable (e.g., numeric values, percentages, scores and indices);
- *Impact indicator:* A variable or set of variables used to measure the overall and long-term impact of an intervention, i.e., overall changes in the environment that DDR aims to influence. Impact indicators often use a composite set (or group) of indicators, each of which provides information on the size, sustainability and consequences of a change brought about by a DDR intervention. Such indicators can include both quantitative variables (e.g., change in homicide levels or incidence of violence) or qualitative variables (e.g., behavioural change among reintegrated ex-combatants, social cohesion, etc.). Impact indicators depend on comprehensive and reliable baseline data, and should be as specific as possible in order to isolate the impact of DDR on complex social and economic dynamics from other factors and processes;
- *Proxy indicators:* Cost, complexity and/or the timeliness of data collection may prevent a result from being measured directly. In this case, proxy indicators — which are variables that substitute for others that are difficult to measure directly — may reveal performance trends and make managers aware of potential problems or areas of success. This is often the case for outcomes in behavioural change, social cohesion and other results that are difficult to measure.

### 5.4.1. Balanced scorecards

The balanced scorecard is a useful tool for capturing key indicators for M&E activities. It lists the main indicators used to measure progress in the implementation of different programme components, as well as overall effectiveness. Annex B provides an example of a balanced scorecard used in the Afghanistan DDR programme.

## 6. Monitoring

Monitoring is the systematic oversight of the implementation of an activity, and establishes the extent to which input deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted outputs are proceeding according to the actual plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct deficiencies. The application of monitoring mechanisms and tools, the reporting of outcomes, and subsequent adjustments in the implementation process are an integral part of the programme cycle and a key management tool.

### 6.1. Monitoring mechanisms and tools

Three types of monitoring mechanisms and tools can be identified, which should be planned as part of the overall M&E work plan:

- *reporting/analysis*, which entails obtaining and analysing documentation from the project that provides information on progress;
- *validation*, which involves checking or verifying whether or not the reported progress is accurate;
- *participation*, which involves obtaining feedback from partners and participants on progress and proposed actions.

The table below lists the different types of monitoring mechanisms and tools according to these categories, while Annex C provides illustrations of monitoring tools used for DDR in Afghanistan.

Table 3 **Monitoring tools and mechanisms**

REPORTING AND ANALYSIS	VALIDATION	PARTICIPATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Annual project report</li><li>■ Progress and/or quarterly reports</li><li>■ Work plans</li><li>■ Project/programme delivery reports</li><li>■ Combined delivery reports</li><li>■ Substantive project documentation</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Field visits</li><li>■ Spot-check visits</li><li>■ External assessments/monitoring</li><li>■ Client surveys</li><li>■ Evaluations</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>■ Outcome groups</li><li>■ Steering committee mechanisms</li><li>■ Stakeholder meetings</li><li>■ Focus group meetings</li><li>■ Annual review</li></ul>

Source: UNDP *Evaluation Handbook*

### 6.2. Monitoring indicators<sup>1</sup>

Although the definition of monitoring indicators will differ a great deal according to both the context in which DDR is implemented and the DDR strategy and components, certain generic (general or typical) indicators should be identified that can guide DDR managers to establish monitoring mechanisms and systems. These indicators should aim to measure performance in terms of outcomes and outputs, effectiveness in achieving programme objectives, and the efficiency of the performance by which outcomes and outputs are achieved (i.e., in relation to inputs). (See IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, Annex D, sec. 4 for gender-related and female-specific monitoring and evaluation indicators.) These indicators can be divided to address the main components of DDR, as follows:

5.10 ◀▶

Table 4 **Generic monitoring indicators**

DDR COMPONENT	GENERIC INDICATORS
<b>Disarmament</b> Baseline should include estimated total weapons available in relation to total ex-combatant pool	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ % of weapons collected from ex-combatants</li> <li>■ Quality and condition of weapons</li> <li>■ % of weapons disabled upon collection</li> <li>■ % of weapons destroyed</li> <li>■ % ratio of weapons surrendered to ex-combatants registered</li> <li>■ % of weapons surrendered by armed groups versus civilians</li> <li>■ % of weapons remaining outside possession of ex-combatants</li> <li>■ Market prices and values for weapons</li> <li>■ Number of disarmament sites and facilities for storage and destruction</li> </ul>
<b>Demobilization</b> Baseline should include total number of eligible combatants and existence of formal military structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Number of demobilization facilities established</li> <li>■ Number of ex-combatants demobilized per demobilization facility</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants successfully demobilized over time</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants demobilized in different geographic locations over time</li> <li>■ Inclusivity and reach of the process, categorized by sex and age of ex-combatants</li> <li>■ Level and type of security incidents in demobilization camps</li> <li>■ Average length of stay versus total processing time for demobilization</li> <li>■ Cost of demobilization facilities versus processed caseload</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants fully registered, profiled and provided with necessary documentation</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants meeting formal eligibility and screening criteria</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants receiving transitional assistance in demobilization facilities (health, food, living allowance, etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>Reintegration</b> Baseline should include economic, social and security conditions in areas of return	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ % of ex-combatants receiving skills and vocational training</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants receiving no further support beyond training</li> <li>■ Average length of time spent in training courses</li> <li>■ Patterns of resettlement of ex-combatants in areas of return</li> <li>■ Perceptions of host communities of ex-combatants and reintegration</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants receiving employment creation assistance (into new or existing jobs)</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants receiving assistance to establish individual or small-group projects (e.g., microenterprises)</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants integrated into local or community-based development projects</li> <li>■ Incidence of violence in areas of return</li> <li>■ Existence and degree of community mobilization to manage and facilitate reintegration of ex-combatants in areas of return</li> <li>■ % of ex-combatants achieving results in their reintegration activity over time</li> <li>■ % of special needs groups provided with reintegration assistance</li> <li>■ % of special needs reintegration projects succeeding relative to other reintegration projects over time</li> </ul>
<b>Sensitization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Popular opinion polls on DDR</li> <li>■ Number and scope of sensitization activities at national level</li> <li>■ Inclusivity, by age, sex and location, of sensitization activities</li> <li>■ Number of reports on DDR in national and local media</li> <li>■ % of host communities targeted for sensitization activities</li> <li>■ Degree of local community participation and mobilization in sensitization activities</li> <li>■ Number of national and local non-governmental organizations voluntarily participating in awareness-raising and sensitization</li> <li>■ Degree of comprehension among ex-combatants of the DDR process</li> <li>■ Perceptions of ex-combatants among national and local populations</li> <li>■ Ex-combatants' attitudes to livelihoods and reintegration</li> </ul>

### 6.3. Use of monitoring results

In general, the results of monitoring activities and tools should be used in three different ways to improve overall programme effectiveness and increase the achievement of objectives and goals:

- *Programme management:* Monitoring outputs and outcomes for specific components or activities can provide important information about whether programme implementation is proceeding in accordance with the programme plan and budget. If results indicate that implementation is 'off course', these results provide DDR management with information on what corrective action needs to be taken in order to bring implementation back into conformity with the overall programme implementation strategy and work plan. These results are therefore an important management tool;
- *Revision of programme strategy:* Monitoring results can also provide information on the relevance or effectiveness of an existing strategy or course of action to produce specific outcomes or achieve key objectives. In certain cases, such results can demonstrate that a given course of action is not producing the intended outcomes and can provide DDR managers with an opportunity to reformulate or revise specific implementation strategies and approaches, and make the corresponding changes to the programme work plan. Examples include types of reintegration assistance that are not viable or appropriate to the local context, and that can be corrected before many other ex-combatants enter similar schemes;
- *Use of resources:* Monitoring results can provide important indications about the efficiency with which resources are used to implement activities and achieve outcomes. Given the large scale and number of activities and sub-projects involved in DDR, overall cost-effectiveness is an essential element in ensuring that DDR programmes achieve their overall objectives. In this regard, accurate and timely monitoring can enable programme managers to develop more cost-effective or efficient uses and distribution of resources.

## 7. Evaluations

As described earlier, evaluations are a method of systematically and objectively assessing the relevance, efficiency, sustainability, effectiveness and impact of ongoing and completed programmes and projects. Evaluation is carried out selectively to answer questions that will guide decision makers and/or programme managers. It is a valuable strategic management tool enabling DDR managers and policy makers to assess the overall role and impact of DDR in a post-conflict setting, make strategic decisions, generate important lessons for future programmes and contribute to the refinement of international policy.

### 7.1. Establishing evaluation scope

The scope or extent of an evaluation, which determines the range and type of indicators or factors that will be measured and analysed, should be directly linked to the objectives and purpose of the evaluation process, and how its results, conclusions and proposals will be used. In general, the scope of an evaluation varies between evaluations that focus primarily on 'impacts' and those that focus on broader 'outcomes':

- *Outcome evaluations:* These focus on examining how a set of related projects, programmes and strategies brought about an anticipated outcome. DDR programmes, for instance, contribute to the consolidation of peace and security, but they are not the sole programme or factor that explains progress in achieving (or not achieving) this outcome, owing to the role of other programmes (SSR, police training, peace-building activities, etc.). Outcome evaluations define the specific contribution made by DDR to achieving this goal, or explain how DDR programmes interrelated with other processes to achieve the outcome. In this regard, outcome evaluations are primarily designed for broad comparative or strategic policy purposes. Example of an objective: “to contribute to the consolidation of peace, national security, reconciliation and development through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society”;
- *Impact evaluations:* These focus on the overall, longer-term impact, whether intended or unintended, of a programme. Impact evaluations can focus on the direct impacts of a DDR programme — e.g., its ability to successfully demobilize entire armies and decrease the potential for a return to conflict — and its indirect impact in helping to increase economic productivity at the local level, or in attracting ex-combatants from neighbouring countries where other conflicts are occurring. An example of an objective of a DDR programme is: “to facilitate the development and environment in which ex-combatants are able to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into their communities of choice and have access to social and economic reintegration opportunities”.

## 7.2. Timing and objectives of evaluations

In general, evaluations should be carried out at key points in the programme implementation cycle in order to achieve related yet distinct objectives. Four main categories or types of evaluations can be identified:

- *Formative internal evaluations* are primarily conducted in the early phase of programme implementation in order to assess early hypotheses and working assumptions, analyse outcomes from pilot interventions and activities, or verify the viability or relevance of a strategy or set of intended outputs. Such evaluations are valuable mechanisms that allow implementation strategies to be corrected early on in the programme implementation process by identifying potential problems. This type of evaluation is particularly important for DDR processes, given their complex strategic arrangements and the many different sub-processes involved. Most formative internal evaluations can be carried out internally by the M&E officer or unit within a DDR section;
- *Mid-term evaluations* are similar to formative internal evaluations, but are usually more comprehensive and strategic in their scope and focus, as opposed to the more diagnostic function of the formative type. Mid-term evaluations are usually intended to provide an assessment of the performance and outcomes of a DDR process for stakeholders, partners and donors, and to enable policy makers to assess the overall role of DDR in the broader post-conflict context. Mid-term evaluations can also include early assessments of the overall contribution of a DDR process to achieving broader post-conflict goals;
- *Terminal evaluations* are usually carried out at the end of the programme cycle, and are designed to evaluate the overall outcomes and effectiveness of a DDR strategy and programme, the degree to which their main aims were achieved, and their overall effectiveness in contributing to broader goals. Terminal evaluations usually also try to

answer a number of key questions regarding the overall strategic approach and focus of the programme, mainly its relevance, efficiency, sustainability and effectiveness;

- *Ex-post evaluations* are usually carried out some time (usually several years) after the end of a DDR programme in order to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of the programme, mainly the sustainability of its activities and positive outcomes (e.g., the extent to which ex-combatants remain productively engaged in alternatives to violence or military activity) or its direct and indirect impacts on security conditions, prospects for peace-building, and consequences for economic productivity and development. Ex-post evaluations of DDR programmes can also form part of larger impact evaluations to assess the overall effectiveness of a post-conflict recovery strategy. Both terminal and ex-post evaluations are valuable mechanisms for identifying key lessons learned and best practice for further policy development and the design of future DDR programmes.

### 7.3. Selection of results and indicators for evaluation

Given the broad scope of DDR programmes, and the differences in strategies, objectives and context, it is difficult to identify specific or generic (i.e., general) results or indicators for evaluating DDR programmes. A more meaningful approach is to identify the various types of impacts or issues to be analysed, and to construct composite (i.e., a group of) indicators as part of an overall methodological approach to evaluating the programme. The following factors usually form the basis from which an evaluation's focus is defined:

- *Relevance* describes the extent to which the objectives of a programme or project remain valid and pertinent (relevant) as originally planned, or as modified owing to changing circumstances within the immediate context and external environment of that programme or project. Relevance can also include the suitability of a particular strategy or approach for dealing with a specific problem or issue. A DDR-specific evaluation could focus on the relevance of cantonment-based demobilization strategies, for instance, in comparison with other approaches (e.g., decentralized registration of combatants) that perhaps could have more effectively achieved the same objectives;
- *Sustainability* involves the success of a strategy in continuing to achieve its initial objectives even after the end of a programme, i.e., whether it has a long-lasting effect. In a DDR programme, this is most important in determining the long-term viability and effectiveness of reintegration assistance and the extent to which it ensures that ex-combatants remain in civilian life and do not return to military or violence-based livelihoods. Indicators in such a methodology include the viability of alternative economic livelihoods, behavioural change among ex-combatants, and so forth;
- *Impact* includes the immediate and long-term consequences of an intervention on the place in which it is implemented, and on the lives of those who are assisted or who benefit from the programme. Evaluating the impact of DDR includes focusing on the immediate social and economic effects of the return of ex-combatants and their integration into social and economic life, and the attitudes of communities and the specific direct or indirect effects of these on the lives of individuals;
- *Effectiveness* measures the extent to which a programme has been successful in achieving its key objectives. The measurement of effectiveness can be quite specific (e.g., the success of a DDR programme in demobilizing and reintegrating the majority of ex-combatants) or can be defined in broad or strategic terms (e.g., the extent to which a DDR programme has lowered political tensions, reduced levels of insecurity or improved the well-being of host communities);



- *Efficiency* refers to how well a given DDR programme and strategy transformed inputs into results and outputs. This is a different way of focusing on the impact of a programme, because it places more emphasis on how economically resources were used to achieve specific outcomes. In certain cases, a DDR programme might have been successful in demobilizing and reintegrating a significant number of ex-combatants, and improving the welfare of host communities, but used up a disproportionately large share of resources that could have been better used to assist other groups that were not covered by the programme. In such a case, a lack of programme efficiency limited the potential scope of its impact.

#### 7.4. Use of evaluation results

In general, the results and conclusions of evaluations should be used in several important and strategic ways:

- A key function of evaluations is to enable practitioners and programme managers to identify, capture and disseminate lessons learned from programme implementation. This can have an immediate operational benefit, as these lessons can be ‘fed back’ to the programme implementation process, but it can also contribute to the body of lessons learned on DDR at regional and global levels;
- Evaluations can also provide important mechanisms for identifying and institutionalizing best practice by identifying effective models, strategies and techniques that can be applied in other contexts; innovative approaches to dealing with outstanding problems; or linking DDR to other processes such as local peace-building, access to justice, and so forth;
- Evaluation results also enable practitioners and managers to refine and further develop their programme strategy. This is particularly useful when programmes are designed to be implemented in phases, which allows for the assessment and identification of problems and best practice at the end of each phase, which can then be fed into later phases;
- Evaluations also contribute to discussions between policy makers and practitioners on the further development of international and regional policies on DDR, by providing them with information and analyses that influence the way key policy issues can be dealt with and decisions reached. Evaluations can provide invaluable support to the elaboration of future policy frameworks for DDR.

#### 7.5. Planning evaluations

The complexity of DDR and the specific skills needed for in-depth and comprehensive evaluations usually means that this activity should be carried out by specialized, contracted external actors or partners. Because an external team will be brought in, it is essential to draw up precise terms of reference for the carrying out of the evaluation, and to be clear about how the overall objective and coverage of issues will be defined/expressed. An evaluation terms of reference document includes the following sections:

- *Introduction:* Contains a brief description of the rationale and focus of the evaluation (outcome, programme, project, series of interventions by several partners, etc.);
- *Objectives:* Describes the purpose of the evaluation, e.g., “to analyse strategic programmatic and policy dimensions”;

- *Scope*: Defines which issues, subjects and areas the evaluation will cover, and the period of the programme's life it will examine;
- *Expected results*: Defines what results the evaluation is expected to produce (e.g., findings, recommendations, lessons learned, rating on performance, an 'action item' list, etc.);
- *Methodology or approach*: Defines how data is collected and analysed for the evaluation;
- *Evaluation team*: Defines the composition of the staff involved and their areas of expertise;
- *Management arrangements*: Defines how the evaluation will be managed and organized, and how interactions with the DDR programme management will be structured.



## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Evaluation** is a management tool. It is a time-bound activity that systematically and objectively assesses the relevance, performance and success of ongoing and completed programmes and projects. Evaluation is carried out selectively, asking and answering specific questions to guide decision makers and/or programme managers. Evaluation determines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme or project.

**Monitoring** is a management tool. It is the systematic oversight of the implementation of an activity that establishes whether input deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted outputs have proceeded according to plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct deficiencies.

### Abbreviations

ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANBP	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme
C	combatant
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
HW	heavy weapon
IP	implementation partner
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
RVC	regional verification committee
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations
XC	ex-combatant

## Annex B: Balanced scorecard for DDR in Afghanistan

OBJECTIVE	INDICATOR
<b>LONG-TERM OUTCOMES</b>	
Break down the complex web of existing divisive and destructive power structures and dependencies	■ No. of instances of factional fighting per quarter
	■ No. of explosives attacks (bomb, suicide, improvised explosive device, grenade, rocket) per quarter
<b>SHORT-TERM OUTCOMES</b>	
Sustainable reintegration of up to 100,000 ex-combatants (XCs) into civilian life	■ No. of XCs finishing reintegration programmes
	■ % of XCs finishing reintegration programmes compared to XCs demobilized
	■ No. of XCs working in civilian professions and police/Afghanistan National Army (ANA) for a minimum of 6 months after completion of reintegration package
	■ % of XCs working in civilian professions and police/ANA for a minimum of 6 months after completion of reintegration package compared with XCs demobilized
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	
<b>VERIFICATION</b>	
Agreement on combatants (Cs) to be demobilized	■ No. of Cs Ministry of Defence submits to Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) for demobilization
Verification of submitted lists	■ No. of Cs verified by regional verification committee (RVCs)
	■ % of submitted names verified by RVCs
<b>DISARMAMENT</b>	
Disarmament of combatants	■ No. of Cs disarmed
	■ No./Type of weapons received by ANBP
Community-based disarmament	■ No. of weapons volunteered
<b>HEAVY WEAPONS CANTONEMENT</b>	
Heavy weapons (HWs) cantoned before presidential elections October 2006	■ No. of HWs surveyed
	■ % of weapons surveyed and cantoned
	■ % of corps with 100% of HWs cantoned <sup>2</sup>
<b>DEMOBILIZATION</b>	
Demobilization of combatants	■ No. of combatants decommissioned
	■ % of Cs who are officers
	■ % of XCs disarmed but not demobilized
Decommissioning of military formations	■ % of targeted units decommissioned
	■ % of targeted formations only downsized
	■ No. of targeted formations declared non-compliant
<b>REINTEGRATION OF XCs</b>	
Provide timely reintegration programmes for up to 100,000 XCs	■ No. of XCs entering reintegration programmes <sup>3</sup>
	■ % of XCs who demobilized but did not appear for reintegration
	■ % of demobilized XCs declining reintegration package
	■ % of XCs temporarily in wage labour
	■ Average no. of days between demobilization and start of reintegration programmes
	■ % choosing agriculture programme
	■ % choosing vocational training programme
	■ % choosing small business programme
	■ % choosing demining programme
	■ % choosing ANA and police
	■ % choosing contracting teams programme
	■ % of reintegration drop-outs <sup>4</sup>
	■ No. of new employment positions filled by ex-soldiers and officers

Provide interim support to XCs	■	% of XCs provided with interim wage labour
Provide support to under-aged XCs	■	No. of under-aged XCs processed
<b>REINTEGRATION OF COMMANDERS</b>		
	■	No. of commander profiles completed <sup>5</sup>
<b>ANBP PERFORMANCE</b>		
<b>HUMAN RESOURCES</b>		
Level of staffing	■	No. of total ANBP staff employed
Nationalization of ANBP staff	■	% of international staff relative to total staff
Decentralization of ANBP staff	■	% of total staff based in regional offices
<b>IMPLEMENTATION PARTNERS (IPs)</b>		
	■	No. of active contracts with IPs
	■	\$ committed to IPs
	■	% of IP reports currently delayed
	■	Average no. of days IP reports are delayed
	■	Average score of quality of IP reports
<b>REGIONAL OFFICE</b>		
Effective monitoring of XCs	■	Ratio of monitoring sheets to total caseload in regional office
<b>PUBLIC INFORMATION</b>		
Generate international interest in ANBP	■	No. of hits on <a href="http://www.undpafg.org">http://www.undpafg.org</a>
<b>INPUTS</b>		
Programme fully funded	■	Overall funds pledged for ANBP
	■	Funds received so far
	■	% of funds received compared with funds pledged
Current expenses	■	Total expenses in \$ millions
Monthly expenses	■	Monthly expenses in \$ millions
Operating expenses	■	% of monthly operational expenses
Average cost per XC	■	Average cost per XC for reintegration package in \$

## Annex C: Examples of monitoring mechanisms for DDR in Afghanistan

### MONTHLY REPORTS

Monthly reports must summarize the particulars of each former combatant, and list components of reintegration packages, such as toolkits, agricultural packages and training materials. They must summarize the type of support provided, and the location of the training or implementation site. Monthly reports must be submitted together with a financial report and invoices. Where direct inputs were delivered to former combatants, these need to be listed with either signature or fingerprints of former combatants from the caseload list affirming receipt of inputs.

Monthly reports are descriptive reports, and should include five elements:

- tracking table for ex-combatants;
- activities and accomplishments;
- problems encountered and lessons learned;
- planning ahead;
- financial report with invoices attached.

### QUARTERLY REPORTS

The quarterly report is more detailed than the monthly report. In addition to the consolidated numerical facts, this report is supposed to present some qualitative aspects as well.

The quarterly report should include a detailed description of methods of implementation, the procedures for internal M&E, and details about cooperation with other organizations.

Quarterly reports are descriptive reports, and should include seven elements:

- assessment of IMPACT;
- assessment of RELEVANCE;
- assessment of EFFECTIVENESS;
- assessment of EFFICIENCY;
- assessment of APPROPRIATENESS;
- assessment of ATTRACTIVENESS and QUALITY;
- analysis of BEST PRACTICES.

### FINAL REPORTS

The final report is far more detailed than the monthly or quarterly report. It summarizes and analyses the cumulative information over the period covered by the contract. The focus of the final report is on the overall impact of the project, and on lessons learned for a possible similar operation in the future. The final report should cover the following areas:

- assessment of IMPACT and SUSTAINABILITY;
- assessment of RELEVANCE;
- assessment of EFFECTIVENESS;
- assessment of EFFICIENCY;
- assessment of APPROPRIATENESS;
- assessment of ATTRACTIVENESS and QUALITY;
- analysis of BEST PRACTICES;
- contribution to CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT.

Source: ANBP programme, Afghanistan

## Endnotes

- 1 The term 'ex-combatants' in each indicator include supporters and those associated with armed forces and groups. Indicators for reintegration also include dependants.
- 2 Total number of corps: 11.
- 3 No. of XCs who started the reintegration package (excluding those who are in temporary wage labour and those who chose not to participate).
- 4 Number of XCs who started but did not finish the reintegration package.
- 5 Includes deputy commanders and chief of staff of corps and divisions.

# 4.10 Disarmament

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#### NOTE

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 4.10 Disarmament

## Summary

Generally understood as the 'act of reducing or depriving of arms', disarmament is usually regarded as the first step of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. The removal of weapons, ammunition and explosives is a highly symbolic act in the ending of an individual's active role as a combatant. Disarmament also contributes to establishing a secure environment and paves the way for demobilization and reintegration to take place.

The disarmament component of a DDR programme needs to be comprehensive, effective, efficient and safe. It should be designed to reinforce countrywide security and be planned in coordination with wider peace-building and recovery efforts. The disarmament carried out within a DDR programme is only one aspect of a new national arms control management system, and should support future internal arms control and reduction measures (small arms and light weapons [SALW] control).

The disarmament component of a DDR programme should usually consist of four main phases: (1) information collection and operational planning; (2) weapons collection or retrieval operations; (3) stockpile management; and (4) destruction. The disarmament component of a DDR programme shall be shaped by four guiding principles: national sovereignty, armed violence reduction, safety and capacity development.

This IDDRS provides guidance on how to plan and implement effective disarmament within a wider DDR programme, including the operational methodology. To be most effective, this methodology should be included during the strategic, operational and detailed mission-planning phases of programme development. The technical threat and risks will have a major influence on the future success or failure of a programme, and therefore the appropriate expertise must be involved from the beginning. The financial costs of this operational methodology are low when compared with total DDR programme costs, yet they have the potential for high impact on the success of a DDR programme.

The handling of weapons, ammunition and explosives by unqualified or untrained individuals or groups will always result in danger, and therefore this IDDRS also examines the concepts of risk and hazards during disarmament operations.

The removal of weapons, ammunition and explosives is a highly symbolic act in the ending of an individual's active role as a combatant.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module establishes the guiding principles and operational methodology for the safe, effective and efficient planning and conduct of the disarmament component in support of a DDR programme or operation.

To be most effective, it is important that this methodology is included during the strategic, operational and detailed mission planning phases of programme development. Any



DDR programme faces many threats and risks, all of which will have a significant influence on the future success or failure of a programme, and therefore, the appropriate expertise must be involved from the beginning, to avoid as many of these risks/threats as possible. The financial costs of this operational methodology are low when compared with total DDR programme costs, yet they have a very powerful effect on the success of a DDR programme.

## 1.1. References

A list of normative references is given in Annex B. Normative references are important documents to which mention is made in this standard, and which form part of the provisions of this standard.

A list of informative references that provide valuable background information on disarmament operations in support of DDR programmes is given in Annex C in the form of a bibliography.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms and definitions used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and guidelines.

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications, which are to be adopted in order to satisfy the standard in full.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

The term ‘national authority’ refers to the government department(s),<sup>1</sup> organization(s) or institution(s) in each country whose function it is to regulate, manage and coordinate DDR activities.

The term ‘disarmament’ refers to the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants, and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament should also include the development of responsible national arms management programmes.

## 3. Introduction

Disarmament is generally understood to be the ‘act of reducing or depriving of arms’, and as such is applicable to all weapons systems, ammunition and explosives, including nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological and conventional systems. This module, however, will only look at disarmament involving conventional weapon systems and ammunition, as it applies during DDR operations, programmes or activities.

The importance of comprehensive disarmament during DDR programmes cannot be overstated. The presence of easily accessible weapons poses a major threat, especially in a fragile post-conflict security environment, and undermines recovery and development.

The disarmament component of a DDR programme needs to be comprehensive, effective, efficient and safe. It should be specifically designed to respond and adapt to the security environment and be planned in coherence with wider peace-building and recovery efforts. Disarmament is primarily aimed at reducing or controlling the number of weapons held by combatants before demobilization. The surrendered weapons should be collected, registered, stored and then either destroyed or, by prior arrangement with key stakeholders, redistributed to the new government for use by the national security forces (e.g., police or military). However, the disarmament carried out within a DDR programme is only one aspect of a new national arms control management system, and should support future internal arms control and reduction measures (including SALW control). While the disarmament component of a DDR programme should initially focus on former combatants, future measures to deal with the control of legal and illegal civilian possession, national stockpiles and security force possession should also be examined at the appropriate time. These measures should not be put in place before the demobilization phase.

Disarmament is usually regarded as the first step of a DDR process, as the removal of weapons, ammunition and explosives is a highly symbolic act that signifies the ending of an individual's active role as a combatant. Disarmament is also essential to maintaining a secure environment in which demobilization and reintegration can take place as part of a long-term peace-building strategy.

The disarmament component of a DDR programme should usually consist of four main phases:

- information collection and operational planning;
- weapons collection or retrieval operations;<sup>2</sup>
- stockpile management;
- destruction.

Within each phase there are a number of recommended specific components, which are summarized in the following matrix:

SERIAL	PHASE	COMPONENTS
1.	Information collection and operational planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Team selection and structure</li> <li>■ Eligibility criteria</li> <li>■ Weapons survey</li> <li>■ Risk assessment</li> <li>■ DDR awareness (sensitization)</li> </ul>
2.	Weapons collection or retrieval	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Pick-up points (PUPs)</li> <li>■ Weapons collection points (WCPs)</li> <li>■ Disarmament sites</li> <li>■ Weapons registration and accounting</li> <li>■ Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support</li> </ul>
3.	Stockpile management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Security</li> <li>■ Weapons storage</li> <li>■ Ammunition storage</li> </ul>
4.	Destruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Weapons destruction</li> <li>■ Ammunition destruction</li> </ul>

This module provides the information necessary to plan and implement effective disarmament within a wider DDR programme. The handling of weapons, ammunition and explosives by unqualified or untrained individuals or groups will always result in danger, and therefore the module also examines the management of risks and hazards during disarmament operations.

## 4. Guiding principles

The disarmament component of a DDR programme shall be shaped by four guiding principles:

National governments have the right and responsibility to apply their own national standards to all disarmament operations on their territory, but should act in compliance with international arms control conventions and agreements.

■ *National sovereignty*: National governments have the right and responsibility to apply their own national standards to all disarmament operations on their territory, but should act in compliance with international arms control conventions and agreements. The primary responsibility for disarmament and weapons collection lies with the government of the affected state. The support and specialist knowledge of the United Nations (UN) is

placed at the disposal of a national government or legitimate authority to ensure that disarmament decisions are made in accordance with acceptable regional and international arms control standards (also see IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR);

■ *Armed violence reduction*: The disarmament component of DDR is primarily aimed at reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence. Its longer-term objectives should be to reduce the potential for a wider return to armed violence and conflict, thereby contributing to a secure environment;

■ *Safety*: The protection of people most at risk is a basic objective of disarmament programmes. The humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity shall always apply. A concept of 'balanced disarmament' should be applied at every opportunity (also see section 5.2, below);

The protection of people most at risk is a basic objective of disarmament programmes.

■ *Capacity development*: Building the capacity of state and non-state national bodies is essential to their empowerment and the effective, successful continuation of future disarmament programmes once DDR has come to an end. Emphasis should be placed on building national capacities to develop, maintain and apply appropriate standards for long-term SALW control measures (also see section 7, below, and IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR).

### 4.1. Aim and objectives of disarmament

The overarching aim of disarmament within a DDR process is to reduce or control the number of weapons held by combatants before demobilization in order to build confidence in the peace process, increase security and prevent a return to conflict. Clear operational objectives should also be developed and agreed to. These may include:

- the reduction in the number of weapons possessed by, or available to, armed forces and groups;
- a reduction in actual, or the threat of, armed violence;
- zero, or at the very least minimal, casualties during the disarmament component;
- an improvement in the perception of human security within communities;
- the need to make a public connection between the availability of weapons and armed violence in society;
- the requirement to build community awareness of the problem and hence community solidarity;
- the reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit trade of weapons within the DDR area of operations;
- the reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the community, and addressing the culture of weapons;
- the development of norms against the illegal use of weapons.

## 5. Operational risks and balanced disarmament

### 5.1. Operational risks

The operational risks to the disarmament component of the DDR programme shall be identified during the initial planning phase of the DDR programme. There are likely to be many operational risks, but the following are generally the most common:

- *Threats to the safety and security of DDR programme personnel (both UN and non-UN):* During the disarmament phase of the DDR process, staff are in direct contact with armed individuals, forces and groups.<sup>3</sup> These may not necessarily comply with the Laws of Armed Conflict or Geneva Conventions, may be under the influence of drugs and narcotics, and may respond irrationally;
- *Lack of sustainability of the disarmament process:* The disarmament process shall not start unless the sustainability of funding and resources is guaranteed. Previous attempts to carry out disarmament operations with insufficient assets or funds have resulted in partial disarmament, a return to armed violence and conflict, and the failure of the entire DDR process.

### 5.2. Balanced disarmament

A major operational concept that must be decided on at the planning stage of the disarmament component is the phased sequencing (ordering over time) of arms collection operations. It is vital that the balance in the operational capability of warring factions remains unaffected by the disarmament process. The capability of warring factions will inevitably be reduced during the disarmament component, as that is one aim, but proportionality and the balance of power among these factions must be maintained.

This approach will:

- assist in preventing warring factions from taking advantage of a sudden change in their favour in the balance of military capability;
- ensure that the neutrality of the disarmament organization is not compromised;
- build trust and confidence in the process, as factions can monitor each other's disarmament, which is carried out simultaneously.

A mechanism should be developed to enable former warring factions to monitor or verify the disarmament process and the surrendered weapons of other groups. This will also increase confidence in the disarmament process.

## 6. Technical risks and hazards

In order to deal with potential technical threats during the disarmament component of DDR operations, and then to implement an appropriate response to such threats, it is necessary to understand the difference between risks and hazards. A hazard is defined as “a potential source of physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment”, while a risk can be defined as “the combination of the probability of occurrence of a hazard and the severity of that hazard”.<sup>4</sup> In terms of disarmament operations, many hazards are created by the presence of weapons, ammunition and explosives. While the level of risk is dependent on the knowledge and training of the collection teams, the physical condition of the weapons, ammunition and explosives and the environment in which they have been stored have a major effect on that risk.

A formal risk assessment shall be conducted before the start of the collection phase of the disarmament component in order to ensure the safest possible working environment. This risk assessment should identify the tolerable risk (the risk accepted by society in a given context based on current values), and then identify the necessary protective measures to achieve a residual risk (the risk remaining after protective measures have been taken). In developing this ‘safe’ working environment, it must be acknowledged that there can be no absolute safety, and that many of the activities carried out during weapons collection operations have a high risk associated with them. However, national authorities, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must try to achieve the highest possible levels of safety.

“Safety is achieved by reducing risk to tolerable levels. Tolerable risk is determined by the search for an optimal balance between the ideal of absolute safety and the demands to be met by the product, process or service, and factors such as benefit to the user, suitability for purpose, cost effectiveness, and conventions of the society concerned. It follows that there is a need to review continually the tolerable level, in particular when developments, both in technology and in knowledge, can lead to economically feasible improvements to attain the minimum risk compatible with the use of the product, process or service.”<sup>5</sup>

The factors to be considered in order to achieve tolerable risk include the following:

- the selection of equipment with inherently safe design;
- the development of work practices that contribute to risk reduction;
- risk education as part of a DDR awareness campaign;
- sound and effective training;
- sound management and supervision;
- appropriate personal protective equipment.

Society is increasing the pressure on organizations to reduce the risk of illness, accidents and incidents in the workplace. This includes pressure to ensure equality and uniformity of treatment for employees, regardless of the location of the workplace. The international community should not be exempt from this pressure during the weapons collection or retrieval phase of disarmament operations.

## 6.1. Explosives hazards

There are major explosives safety issues involved in any disarmament operation, ranging from the physical condition of the ammunition that will be surrendered to the degree of knowledge and training of the local population. The major problem areas are discussed in Annex D.

## 6.2. Technical advice

The complexity of the dangers involved in dealing with unstable ammunition and explosives means that the provision of sound advice is a highly technical task. Military forces deployed in support of peace support operations sponsored by the UN or regional organizations do not necessarily have the capability to provide this advice; i.e., their skills are not necessarily adequate to provide complete technical support to disarmament operations. For example, an infantry- or engineer-trained soldier may have solid skills in weapons and explosives use and handling, but will generally have insufficient training in ammunition and explosive safety matters. This module aims to establish the generic training and qualification requirements for the provision of this essential advice. Recommended terms of reference for the disarmament component technical adviser (TA) are given in Annex E.

The complexity of the dangers involved in dealing with unstable ammunition and explosives means that the provision of sound advice is a highly technical task.

# 7. Information collection and operational planning phase

In order to implement effective disarmament programmes, meticulous planning is required. The initial stages of the planning phase will depend heavily on accurate information from all the armed forces and groups to be disarmed, and rely on close liaison with all the stakeholders. The disarmament component is the first stage of the entire DDR process, and operational decisions made at this stage will have an impact on the whole DDR process. Disarmament, therefore, cannot be planned in isolation from the rest of the DDR programme. Decisions made during disarmament planning on, for example, encampment, will influence decisions during demobilization planning, as the camps could possibly have other uses (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures).

Close liaison with the leaders of the warring factions is of particular importance. They will be the UN's link, via the national body responsible for DDR ownership (normally known as the national commission on DDR — NCDDR), to the armed forces and groups themselves. Through these leaders, the sizes and locations of the armed forces and groups, as well as the number and type of weapons held and the nature of any groups associated with these armed forces and groups, may be assessed. It is, however, important not to rely solely on this source of information as military commanders may give false or misleading information about the size of their force in order to achieve political advantage. Military observers (MILOBs) and UN police should cooperate closely in all information-gathering.

It is vital to determine the extent of the capability needed to carry out a disarmament component, and then to compare this with a realistic appraisal of the current capacity available to deliver it. Requests for further assistance shall be made as early as possible in the planning stage (also see IDDRS 4.40 on UN Military Roles and Responsibilities and IDDRS 4.50 on UN Police Roles and Responsibilities).

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The operational planning for the weapons collection phase of the disarmament component should be carried out at the same time as other political and socio-economic activities that may be taking place, including planning for reintegration (e.g., labour market surveys). The practical success of a disarmament component will be increased by the adoption of an integrated approach from the start of the DDR operation.

Generally during the disarmament process, weapons, ammunition and explosives will be collected as ex-combatants arrive at agreed collection points, or report to a mobile collection team. Weapons collection as part of a wider SALW control and reduction initiative, often after the initial DDR programme, is a more complex process, in which a range of incentives and options are necessary to support the collection phase; details of this can be found in IDDRS 4.11 on SALW Control, Security and Development and the South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (SEE RMDS/G) series of regional standards, which are the standard guidelines used in this module.<sup>6</sup>

◀▶ 4.11

### 7.1. Team selection and structure

The detailed structure and make-up of the disarmament team will be heavily influenced by the context, and by the organizational structure and capability of the authority that is responsible for disarmament. Nevertheless, an appropriately qualified TA shall be appointed to the disarmament component planning team during the planning phase (see section 6.2).

Also, detailed terms of reference shall be established for all technical personnel, including locally employed support staff, in order that responsibilities are clearly defined (also see IDDRS 3.42 on Personnel and Staffing).

◀▶ 3.42

The capacity and capability of the local authorities and civilian community shall be determined in order to:

- establish the level of support they are initially capable of providing to the disarmament component;
- establish the amount of training and development necessary to provide the local authority with a sustainable capacity for the future.

The national authority should also be advised on the development of national standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the safe, effective and efficient conduct of the disarmament component of the DDR programme.

### 7.2. Time-lines

The time-lines for the implementation of any disarmament programme should be developed by taking the following factors into account:

- the availability of accurate information about the size of the armed forces and groups that are to be disarmed;
- the location of the armed forces' and groups' units;
- the number, type and location of their weapons;
- the nature, processing capacity and location of WCPs, PUPs and disarmament sites;
- the time it takes for a MILOB to process each ex-combatant (this could be anywhere from 15 to 20 minutes per person). A rehearsal should be carried out before combatants arrive to determine how long individual weapons collection and accounting will take.

Depending on the nature of the conflict and other political and social conditions, a well-planned and well-implemented disarmament component may see large numbers of ex-combatants arriving for disarmament during the early stage of the programme. The numbers of combatants reporting for disarmament may drop in the middle stages of the process, but it is best to expect and plan for a late increase in such numbers. Late arrivals may turn up because of improved confidence in the peace process in the country or because some combatants and weapons have been held back until the very last stages of disarmament as a self-protection measure.

The minimum possible time should be taken to process ex-combatants through the disarmament and demobilization phase and then back into the community. This speed is necessary to prevent DDR participants from becoming comfortable in residential camps and becoming unwilling to leave.

### 7.3. Screening and individual eligibility criteria

#### 7.3.1. General

Establishing rigorous, unambiguous and transparent criteria that allow people to participate in DDR, particularly in contexts dominated by irregular or non-state armed groups, is vital to achieving the objectives of DDR. Selection criteria must be carefully designed and agreed to by all parties, and screening processes must be ready for use in the disarmament and demobilization stages.

Disarmament is usually linked to eligibility to enter the DDR process; however, lessons learned from previous programmes suggest that entry into a DDR programme should not depend on participants actually possessing weapons. Participants may include individuals in support and non-combat roles or those associated with armed forces and groups. Because they are unarmed, these individuals may not be eligible for disarmament, but they will be eligible for demobilization and/or reintegration.

Integrated DDR should be adapted to meet the needs of male and female adult combatants; youth and children associated with armed forces and groups; ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses; those working in non-combat roles; and dependants (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).

DDR programmes are aimed at combatants and people associated with armed forces and groups. These individuals are often quite diverse, having participated in the conflict within rebel armed groups and armed gangs, as mercenaries, as members of organized armed forces, etc. Operational and implementation strategies should be adapted to provide the best assistance to different participant groups (e.g., separate encampment and specialized demobilization and reintegration assistance for children, appropriate medical support for those chronically ill and those with disabilities, etc.) (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR, IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR, IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

The screening process is used to confirm whether or not individuals meet the qualification or 'eligibility' criteria for entering the DDR programme. Screening methods and data storage and interpretation must be standardized and applied equally in all disarmament sites. Close cooperation with the leadership of armed forces and groups, civil society, local police and national DDR-related bodies, and a well-conducted public information and sensitization campaign, are essential tools to ensure that only qualified combatants and those associated with the armed forces and groups participate in a DDR programme (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR).

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Eligibility criteria are usually shaped by particular norms and practical factors. Where they exist, peace agreements determine who is eligible for DDR and define DDR participants in terms of their military affiliation. For individual eligibility, screening is also carried out in order to ensure the inclusion of marginalized or ‘invisible’ groups. When DDR is implemented without a political agreement, there is a heavier emphasis on proof of individual combatant status, rather than affiliation with an armed force or group.

In general, for UN-mandated operations, the screening of combatants at the disarmament phase is carried out by UN military personnel (normally MILOBs). MILOBs should be supported by specialist civilian disarmament staff and military staff who provide both security and specialized technical advice on all aspects of disarmament.

### 7.3.2. Local advisers

Local advisers (social workers, reliable members of the community such as members of women’s peace groups, religious organizations or established NGOs), who know the local languages, customs and history, should also be recruited and trained to assist in the screening process. Specific emphasis should be placed on the importance of confidentiality when dealing with local advisers.

### 7.3.3. Aim and objectives of screening

The fundamental aim of disarmament screening is to ensure that the only recipients of DDR-specific assistance are those groups that meet previously agreed criteria. It is important that non-combatants, petty criminals or civilians in possession of illicit weapons do not enter the programme under false pretences, although mechanisms to deal with these individuals should be developed as part of the wider arms control and reduction measures.

The screening process should also be designed to prevent combatants from ‘double-dipping’.

The screening process should also be designed to prevent combatants from ‘double-dipping’ by registering more than once to

gain more benefits, and should make it difficult for commanders to exploit the process by entering their friends and family. Screening may include biometric registration (e.g., iris scan, finger printing), or additional tests for doubtful cases, such as knowledge of weapons, drill, specific battle events or the command structure of the armed force or group in question (also see IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization).

### 7.3.4. Inclusivity

Non-discrimination, and fair and equitable treatment are core principles in both the design and implementation of integrated DDR. This means that individuals shall not be discriminated against on the basis of sex, age, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, or other personal characteristic or associations. The principle of non-discrimination is particularly important when establishing eligibility criteria for entry into DDR programmes. On the basis of their particular needs, ex-combatants should have access to the same opportunities/benefits regardless of which armed force/group or political faction they fought with.

It is likely that there will be a need to neutralize potential ‘spoilers’, e.g., by negotiating ‘special packages’ for commanders in order to secure their buy-in to the DDR process and to ensure that they allow combatants to join the process. This political compromise should be carefully negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

### 7.3.5. Non-weapons-holders

The surrender of a weapon should not be the single qualifying criterion for an individual to participate in a DDR programme. This practice may require additional rules and safeguards to be established to prevent fraudulent exploitation of the programme. It is important to be cautiously flexible, however, as there is evidence that women associated with armed forces and groups in supporting roles are often left out of DDR processes because they have no weapons to hand in; many accounts from the field have shown that commanders remove weapons from women and give them to male non-combatants for personal financial or political gain.

While eligibility screening is a useful method to protect female combatants and encourage them to enter the process, plans shall be devised to allow access for women associated with armed groups and forces who do not carry weapons, as they are entitled to the benefits of the DDR programme. Children shall under no circumstances be expected to submit a weapon or prove their knowledge of weapons-handling in order to be released from a fighting force (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

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### 7.3.6. Screening methodology

An independent and neutral assessment of the strength, profile, deployment, arms-to-combatant ratio, and number of non-combatants associated with armed forces and groups shall be carried out as part of the DDR planning process (also see IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design and IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration).<sup>7</sup> Provisions for this operational assessment may be included in the political agreement authorizing DDR to take place. If it is not possible to conduct an independent assessment, parties to the conflict should be required, through the peace agreement, to provide DDR planners with verifiable lists of names of combatants and associates in non-combat roles as early as possible.

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Detailed cross-examination of DDR candidates' knowledge of key battles, commanders and armed force/group structure can be used to confirm eligibility. Yet this will only be effective if knowledgeable local staff are available to assist with this task. Female staff should be included to screen female combatants who may otherwise feel too intimidated to come forward.

Other options to assess eligibility may include:

- a language and culture test for foreign combatants;
- for combatants claiming to have taken part in active combat, a weapons procedures test, which will identify their familiarity with, and ability to handle, weapons. Although members of armed groups and militias may not have received formal training to military standards, they should be able to demonstrate an understanding of how to use the weapon. This test should be balanced against others to identify combatant status. (Children and women with weapons should be disarmed, but should not be required to demonstrate their capacity to use a weapon or prove familiarity with weaponry to be admitted to the DDR programme; see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR);
- for local militias (i.e., armed groups that did not travel outside their communities of origin), community verification, which may also be considered as a method to determine combatant status. However, steps should be taken to protect community verifiers in highly politicized and violent environments. Verification should be carried out by both female and male community members to ensure that all women (and girls) in armed groups and forces are accounted for.

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#### 7.4. Weapons survey

An accurate and detailed weapons survey is essential to draw up effective and safe plans for the disarmament component of a DDR programme. Sufficient data on the number and type of weapons, ammunition and explosives that can be expected to be recovered are essential, and data shall be updated and distributed to those involved as operational circumstances change and develop. A weapons survey allows an accurate definition of the extent of the

disarmament task, allowing for planning of the collection or retrieval process, and future storage and destruction requirements.

The more accurate and verifiable the initial data regarding the specifically identified groups participating in the conflict, the better will be the capacity of the UN to make appropriate plans to meet the aims of the disarm-

An accurate and detailed weapons survey is essential to draw up effective and safe plans for the disarmament component of a DDR programme.

ament programme. Sufficient time should be given to information collection and analysis at the planning stage before the finalization of any formal peace agreement. Once sufficient reliable information has been gathered, collaborative plans can be drawn up by the NCDDR and UN DDR unit outlining the intended locations and site requirements for disarmament operations, the logistic and staffing needs required to carry out the disarmament operation, and a timetable for operations.

There is a range of methodologies available for carrying out a weapons survey, from the traditional military J2 intelligence cycle<sup>8</sup> to the social science research-based SALW Survey developed for UNDP by the Small Arms Survey and the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC).<sup>9</sup> If a demining programme is taking place at the same time, then information from the general mine action assessment and land-mine impact survey may also provide valuable information. The basic information requirements for a weapons survey are set out in Annex F.

#### 7.5. Risk assessment

A detailed risk assessment shall be carried out together with a formal threat analysis for the disarmament component. ISO Guide 51 provides useful information on the concept of risk management, and this has been adopted in Annex G to apply to the disarmament component of DDR.

#### 7.6. DDR awareness activities

The early and ongoing sensitization of the armed forces and groups to the planned collection process are essential to the removal of weapons. Indeed, public awareness and sensitization campaigns will have a strong influence on the success of the entire DDR operation.

A professional DDR awareness campaign for the weapons collection component of the disarmament operation shall be conducted (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR and the SALW Awareness Support Pack 2005 [SASP 2]). Well before the collection phase begins, in addition to sensitization, there should be an increase in the levels of contact and coordination between representatives of the armed forces and groups and the disarmament component team. As operational plans for the collection phase are being further defined, additional information should be distributed in the build-up to the launch of the collection phase.

To further consolidate disarmament messages, sensitization should continue throughout the lifetime of the disarmament phase, using all available means to repeat daily the operational details. Furthermore, during ongoing operations, daily feedback on progress towards the aim of the disarmament programme should be disseminated, if at all possible, to help reassure stakeholders that the number of weapons is indeed being reduced, and that the reduction is balanced among former warring factions.

Safety cards shall be prepared, translated, printed and issued to the local community before any collection or amnesty programme (see Appendix 1 to Annex D). These safety cards provide low-level technical advice to the local population that can be followed without any specialist tools and equipment. Distribution may be difficult in some situations, and other ways of distributing this advice should be considered, such as radio, during the awareness-raising process.

## 8. Weapons collection (or retrieval) phase

### 8.1. Static and mobile collection options

Static or site-based disarmament uses specifically designed disarmament sites to carry out the disarmament operation. These require detailed planning and significant organization, and rely on the coordination of a range of implementing partners. The establishment and management of disarmament sites should be specifically included in the peace agreement to ensure that former warring factions agree and are aware that they have a responsibility under the peace agreement to proceed to such sites.

Members of armed forces and groups will usually be met at a PUP before moving to the disarmament sites, and the administrative and safety processes then begin at the PUP. There are similarities between procedures at the PUP and those carried out at a mobile collection point (MCP), but the two activities are different processes and should not be confused. Members of armed forces and groups that report to a PUP will then be moved to a disarmament site, while those who enter through the MCP route will be directed to make their way to the demobilization site.

### 8.2. Encampment

The advantages and disadvantages of encampment during the disarmament and demobilization components of a DDR programme is still an area of major discussion within the DDR community. There have been some examples of disarmament initiatives, usually when combatants had to wait for long periods before being transported to their homes for resettlement, which took place at residential camps. Recently, such cases have been rare, and it is now more usual to reach out to armed forces and groups through DDR information and sensitization campaigns over a considerable period. This happens before groups are assembled by their faction leader and brought to the D1 site for non-residential disarmament, and before an immediate and short residential demobilization period at a demobilization camp begins. For further detailed information on encampment, refer to IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization.

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### 8.3. Buffer zones and separation of forces

The initial operational task of the disarmament phase, if it has not been done as part of the peace negotiation process, should be the establishment of 'buffer zones' as a means of sepa-



Weapons to be incinerated by the head of state in an official disarmament ceremony, Bossangoa, Central African Republic, December 2004. Photo: M. Nzengou, UNDP/Bangui

rating warring factions. This will reduce the risks of contact between such factions during the disarmament process, resulting in:

- a reduction of the risk of a further outbreak of conflict;
- improved safety and security for the DDR team during the DDR process.

The buffer zones shall be patrolled and observed by UN forces during the disarmament phase, and buffer zones shall be clearly identified and agreed to by the warring factions. Consideration should be given to the inclusion of liaison officers from the warring factions with the UN forces patrolling and observing the buffer zones, as this will be an important confidence-building measure.

Secure corridors should be identified, agreed to and then patrolled before the movement of combatants to the PUPs or disarmament sites.

#### 8.4. Pick-up points<sup>10</sup>

A variety of methods may be used to gather combatants together for the purpose of entering a DDR initiative, all of which require significant planning, but the most common is the use of PUPs. These are locations pre-selected and agreed to by armed forces and group leaders and the UN mission military command. They are selected because of their convenience, security and accessibility for all parties. The time, date, place and conditions for entering the disarmament process should be negotiated by commanders, the NCDDR and the DDR unit.

The role of PUPs is to concentrate combatants into a safe location, prior to a controlled and supervised move to the disarmament sites. Combatants often need to be moved from



rural locations, and since many armed forces and groups will not have adequate transport, PUPs should be situated close to their positions. They shall not be located in or near civilian areas such as villages, towns or cities.

All combatants should be informed, through the information and sensitization programme, of:

- the time and date to report;
- the location to report to;
- appropriate weapons safety measures;
- the level of UN or military security to expect on arrival.

A card should be used to inform individual combatants about the reporting process they will be expected to follow. The card shall be translated into the local language(s); an example is given in Annex H.

Once the combatants have arrived at the designated PUP, they will be met by UN military representatives, who shall arrange their transportation to the disarmament site. This first meeting of the combatants with UN staff shall be considered a high-risk situation, and all combatants shall be considered to be potentially dangerous until they are disarmed. A schematic layout of a PUP is provided in Annex I.

#### 8.4.1. Organization of a PUP

The PUP should be secured and staffed by representatives of the main stakeholders. Personnel numbers will be dependent on the expected numbers of participants, but the following will be required:

- MILOBs (male and female);
- a UN military security team (for area protection);
- civilian DDR technical staff;
- local staff from the NCDDR;
- specialist staff (such as child protection officers);
- NGO representatives.

There should be as few personnel at the PUP as possible, given the inherent security and explosive safety risks involved. The officer in charge at each PUP may, in agreement with the senior DDR officer and NCDDR representative, also allow additional NGO staff and independent representatives of the international community access to the sites for the purposes of transparency and verification. This should be at their own risk.

#### 8.4.2. Activities at the PUP

The combatants may be either completely disarmed at the PUP (see section 8.7 for mobile collection procedures), or may keep their weapons during movement to the disarmament site. In such a case, they should be persuaded, if possible, to surrender their ammunition (see section 8.5 for safety measures). The issue of weapons surrender at the PUP will be either a requirement of the peace agreement, or, more usually, a matter of negotiation between the combatants and the PUP commander.

The following activities should occur at the PUP:

- personnel meet combatants outside the PUP at clearly marked waiting area;
- personnel deliver a PUP briefing, explaining what will happen at the site;

- personnel check that weapons are clear of ammunition and made safe, ensuring that magazines are removed;
- MILOBs screen combatants to identify those carrying ammunition and explosives. These individuals should be immediately moved to the ammunition area in the WCP (see section 8.5);
- personnel conduct a clothing and baggage search of all combatants;
- combatants move to the PUP and have their weapons and safe ammunition re-screened by MILOBs;
- combatants with eligible weapons and safe ammunition pass through the MILOB screening area and to the transport area, before moving to the disarmament site;
- combatants move to the disarmament site. The UN shall be responsible for ensuring the protection and physical security of combatants during movement from the PUP.

#### 8.4.3. Non-eligible individuals

Those individuals who do not meet the eligibility criteria for entry into the DDR programme (see section 7.3) should be excluded from the DDR programme, and if possible transported away from the PUP.

It is usual in DDR programmes that individuals with defective weapons have these retained by the MILOBs, but, depending on the eligibility criteria, they may not be allowed to enter the programme. They are given receipt documentation for the weapon in return, which shows full details of the ineligible weapon handed over, which may be used in any appeals process at a later date.

In the past, combatants have been allowed to enter a programme if they can submit the required amount of ammunition. This system is open to abuse, however, as ammunition is easy to hand out to non-combatant supporters, who can then enter a programme for the personal or political gain of the one who gave them the ammunition. The handing over of ammunition, unless it is also a self-contained system (such as mines, grenades, surface-to-air missiles or certain anti-tank rocket launchers), should therefore not be a sufficient criterion for entry. Individuals who only hand over small arms ammunition should have this ammunition retained by the MILOBs, but should not necessarily be allowed to enter the DDR programme. They should be given receipt documentation, which shows full details of the ammunition handed over, but should be subjected to other forms of verification (such as interviews) to qualify to enter the programme, either then or at a later date. The EOD team or TA should advise on whether the ammunition type presents a similar risk to that of a self-contained unit, and should therefore qualify as a weapon (e.g., a high-explosive hand grenade).

#### 8.4.4. Special cases

To attend to the many different needs of those who do not fit a 'classic' combatant profile (i.e., male, adult and able-bodied), the PUP team should be prepared to manage special cases before transporting them to further sites. This is the reason for the multi-skilled organization of the PUP team. The PUP shall therefore be prepared to:

- gather wounded and disabled combatants, women associated with armed forces and groups, children associated with armed forces and groups and dependants outside the PUP;
- all these should be allowed to enter the DDR process and should follow the route described in section 8.4.2, although they should also be screened and then accompanied

by gender and child protection officers, medical staff or NGO representatives, as appropriate, in order to ensure that special needs are taken into account during the process.

These groups will require transportation to interim care centres (children), internment sites (foreigners) or female-only sites (if applicable). Care should be taken to separate women from men at all times to prevent intimidation. Chronically ill and disabled individuals who are eligible to enter a DDR programme may be transported straight to demobilization sites, where sufficient medical care can be given. They may complete their disarmament forms with a MILOB at the medical screening facility at the demobilization site.

### 8.5. Weapons and explosives safety

The organization responsible for the implementation of the disarmament component shall ensure that it fulfils its 'duty of care' in terms of the safety of the local civil population. This 'duty of care' should be fulfilled by:

The organization responsible for the implementation of the disarmament component shall ensure that it fulfils its 'duty of care' in terms of the safety of the local civil population.

- ensuring that the physical layout of WCPs within disarmament sites shall be, as far as possible, in accordance with the plan shown in Annex J;
- developing, printing and issuing safety cards for timely distribution to the local population in the designated area (see section 7.6);
- the deployment of appropriately qualified and experienced staff to each WCP to: (1) advise on explosive safety; (2) certify ammunition and explosives as 'safe to move'; (3) conduct render safe procedures on unsafe ammunition; and (4) advise on 'safety distances' during the collection process. Supporting EOD teams should usually provide these staff (see Annex J).



Disarmament, Liberia, April 2004. Photo: E. Kanalstein, UNMIL



### 8.5.1. Activities at the weapons collection point

The WCP team should perform the following actions at the WCP site before combatants move further through the DDR process:

- a WCP safety briefing is conducted;
- a clothing and baggage search of all combatants is conducted (this may be omitted for those individuals at a PUP);
- combatants enter the screening area where MILOBs identify those combatants with ammunition and explosives. These combatants are directed to the 'ammunition in' point, while those with only weapons move to the 'weapons in' point;
- EOD and ammunition specialists examine the ammunition and explosives. Unsafe ammunition is identified for immediate destruction. Safe ammunition should be moved to the ammunition storage area. The combatant then moves to the 'weapon in' point;
- the combatant surrenders his/her weapon in return for the appropriate documentation;
- ex-combatants are moved to the demobilization site.<sup>11</sup>

The above procedures need to be changed slightly if the WCP is part of a PUP. Then the WCP team shall attempt to take custody of all ammunition and explosives from combatants and provide them with a receipt document that shows full details of the ammunition surrendered. If combatants refuse to surrender their ammunition, then the EOD representative or TA should ensure that it is 'safe to move'. Once the WCP team is satisfied that all ammunition has been surrendered or is 'safe to move', the combatants may then enter the main disarmament process again. Negotiation and diplomatic skills may be necessary to ensure the surrender of 'unsafe' ammunition, but it shall be made clear to the combatant — and armed group commander — that the particular individual will not be allowed to enter the process, purely for safety reasons, and the options should be clearly explained.

If disarmament is completed at the PUP, all weapons collected may be put beyond immediate use (by the separation of components) by military personnel at this point, with weapons' receipts (chits) being issued to each combatant who surrendered arms or ammunition. Similarly, each combatant may also complete a disarmament registration documentation form at this point.

### 8.6. Static disarmament sites

Since members of armed factions might be geographically spread out and difficult to access, the importance of widespread sensitization followed by the controlled arrival of combatants at disarmament sites into the DDR programme, according to specific and controlled timelines, cannot be over-emphasized.

Responsibility for the arrival of combatants at the first entry point of the DDR programme rests firmly with the armed faction leadership, with control passing to the UN peacekeeping mission upon entry to the DDR process. Site-based disarmament relies on the influence of military leaders and chains of command that were established during the conflict, and is therefore considered to be a fairly coercive approach. A schematic layout of a disarmament site is given in Annex L.

A local representative, who has the trust of the community as a whole, shall be present as part of the disarmament collection team at every disarmament site.

Static disarmament generally follows this process:

- widespread sensitization of armed groups and forces;
- agreement of time-lines and the strategy for the controlled arrival of armed groups;
- the arrival of combatants at specifically agreed PUPs or RVs;
- movement of combatants to the designated disarmament site;
- weapons collection at the WCP;
- immediate onward passage of combatants to a residential demobilization camp for the completion of the demobilization components of the DDR programme.

A local representative, who has the trust of the community as a whole, shall be present as part of the disarmament collection team at every disarmament site. The local representative's duties should include liaison, translation, mobilization of local resources and local media operations.

#### 8.6.1. Activities at disarmament sites

Disarmament sites are staffed by a similar team to that needed for PUPs, although on a larger scale. Once members of armed forces and groups arrive, the disarmament team performs the following actions to disarm them:

- combatants that arrive as individuals, groups or from the PUP report to a holding area inside the disarmament site;
- a further clothing and baggage search of all combatants is carried out (for those from this PUP, this may be omitted at the discretion of the disarmament site commander);
- if weapons, ammunition and explosives have not been removed at the PUP, combatants are moved to the WCP;
- the ex-combatants enter the screening area, where MILOBs fill in a disarmament form for combatants with weapons and ammunition documentation;
- ex-combatants then wait for transport (if necessary) to the demobilization camp.

Disarmament documentation, except for weapons and ammunition receipts, should be completed in triplicate, with one copy remaining with the combatant, the second passed to the NCDDR database and the final one held at the UN mission DDR office. The UN copy should be used to collate records on a central DDR electronic database, which will allow for programme analysis, the production of ID cards, and the monitoring and evaluation of the ongoing DDR programme.

#### 8.6.2. Foreign combatants

When foreign combatants are to be repatriated for demobilization at home after disarmament, a temporary holding facility capable of meeting basic humanitarian needs may be set up. The best practice is to locate this within the perimeter of the nearest UN military facility to the border crossing, which minimizes the need for additional support infrastructure or security requirements. Ex-combatants awaiting repatriation should remain in these transit areas until they are formally handed over to the appropriate government official at the national border in the receiving country.

### 8.7. Mobile collection points

In certain circumstances, the establishment of a fixed disarmament site may be inappropriate. In such cases, an option is the use of mobile collection points (MCPs), which usually

consist of a group of modified road vehicles and have the advantage of decreased logistic outlay, flexibility, economy, and rapid deployment and assembly.

MCPs permit a more rapid response than site-based disarmament, and can be used when weapons are concentrated in a specific geographical area or when moving collected arms or assembling scattered combatants would be difficult. They may be the most appropriate method to register and disarm irregular forces that have not been part of, or have yet to enter, a formal DDR programme.

The processes used within a MCP should be adapted to suit local circumstances from those of the PUP and WCP (see sections 8.4 and 8.5, above).

If the local political or security circumstances change dramatically during a mobile disarmament process, all staff as well as the combatants should be moved to a safer location in order to complete the minimum required process. It will then become a command decision whether to continue disarmament operations or to postpone these until more suitable circumstances arise.

### 8.8. Accounting and combatant registration

Data collected from weapons during the disarmament process should provide sufficient recorded information to correctly account for the weapons and ammunition throughout the DDR programme, as well as providing the basis for each individual's demobilization process.

A computerized management information system is essential for:

- the registration of the combatant (i.e., personal, family and educational profile; ID card production; transitional allowance and microcredit control; capacity-building requirement, etc.);
- the stockpile management of the weapons and ammunition, from collection, through storage to destruction and/or redistribution.

UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has developed software to deal with combatant registration and the management of weapons and ammunition within a DDR programme. It is called the *Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and SALW Control MIS* (DREAM) and is available free of charge from UNDP.

### 8.9. EOD support

An immediate EOD response capability shall be established, as described in Annex K. Experience has shown that this capability will be required during the initial collection phase until all disarmament personnel have been trained and have practised the necessary procedures.

## 9. Stockpile management phase

The term 'stockpile management' can be defined as "those procedures and activities regarding weapons, ammunition and explosive safety and security in accounting, storage, transportation and handling".

Yet stockpile management is a term that can have many definitions. Within the IDDRS series, the definition is as above, yet there are further implications for the safe, efficient and effective management of ammunition and explosives than it really covers.<sup>12</sup> In a wider sense, stockpile management can be used to cover the following areas:



- the definition of stockpile types;
- the determination of required stockpile levels;
- the location of stockpiles;
- the financial management of stockpiles;
- accounting for weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- arranging for the safety, storage and transport of weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- the disposal of surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- the destruction of ammunition and explosives (see section 10).

There are well-established principles for the secure and safe storage of weapons, ammunition and explosives, which the TA should advise on. The security of collected weapons is one of the primary concerns in political terms. However, safety must be considered at the same time, for humanitarian and force protection reasons. An accidental explosion in storage leading to civil casualties would have an immediate negative impact on the credibility of the whole process. Post-collection storage shall be planned before the start of the collection phase.

The stockpile management phase shall be as short as possible, for the sooner that the recovered weapons and ammunition are destroyed the better in terms of: (1) security risks; (2) improved confidence and trust; and (3) a lower requirement for personnel and funding.

### 9.1. Stockpile security

The security of the weapons and ammunition that have been collected or surrendered during the collection and retrieval operations is of basic importance to the future of the DDR process.

Confidence needs to be maintained among the UN force, former warring factions and communities by ensuring that the weapons cannot be used and will quickly be destroyed.

Usually the short-term security methodology used is the use of lockable ISO containers, within a secured and guarded compound. Dual key procedures should be considered, as this is a transitional step between final surrender of the weapons and the giving up of all future access to them. Commanders of armed forces and groups, and the UN force should hold the keys to their own locks, which means that the weapons can only be accessed in

the presence of both parties, as both keys are required to open the containers. If an ISO-type container is used, the third key could be in the possession of a community representative as a means of securing the community's buy-in and proof of the improved local security. Alternatively 'once-only-use' seals may be considered.

Confidence needs to be maintained among the UN force, former warring factions and communities by ensuring that the weapons cannot be used and will quickly be destroyed.

## 9.2. Storage of weapons

Detailed SOPs for the storage and security of weapons shall be developed by the DDR team in accordance with the principles and guidelines contained within SEE RMDS/G 05.30: 'Weapons Storage and Security'.

## 9.3. Storage of ammunition and explosives

The reduction of risk and the provision of a safe working environment are basic principles of disarmament operations. In section 6 it is stated that risk reduction involves a combination of safe working practices and operating procedures, effective supervision and control, appropriate education and training, safely designed equipment, and the provision of effective personal protective equipment and clothing.

The provision of a safe working environment within disarmament operations includes the safe storage, transportation and handling of ammunition and explosives recovered during the collection process. This requires appropriate storage facilities, equipment and vehicles to be made available, and for the DDR team to develop and maintain appropriate policy and procedures, or assist the national authority in their development. Where existing national government regulations differ from those contained in IDDRS, the more stringent requirement should be met.

SEE RMDS/G 05.40: 'Ammunition and Explosives Storage and Safety' is designed to provide national authorities and disarmament organizations with guidance on the safe storage, transportation and handling of explosives and explosive materials.<sup>13</sup> Specifications for the storage of explosives and safety distances are those provided by the US Institute of Makers of Explosives,<sup>14</sup> which are consistent with the UN's Draft *Ammunition and Explosives Regulations*. These specifications should not normally be reduced without the advice of a professionally qualified explosives engineer.

Detailed SOPs for the storage and security of weapons shall therefore be developed by the DDR team in accordance with the principles and guidelines contained within SEE RMDS/G 05.40, until the formal acceptance of the draft *UN Ammunition and Explosives Regulations* by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).



## 10. Destruction phase<sup>15</sup>

The physical destruction of weapons must be approached as a separate issue from the destruction of ammunition and explosives. In comparative terms, the physical destruction of the weapons collected is much simpler and safer than the physical destruction of the ammunition.

The destruction of ammunition and explosives is a highly specialist task that can only be safely, efficiently and effectively carried out by appropriately trained and qualified staff. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has developed international mine action standards (IMAS) that cover the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, but these are generic (general) standards and can effectively be applied to cover the stockpile destruction of most types of ammunition. Therefore IMAS 11.10–11.30 are the standard guidelines for this procedure, taking advantage of the work that has already been done by another international organization.

This module will, therefore, concentrate mainly on the physical destruction of weapons.

### 10.1. Destruction of weapons

The introduction of an immediate and systematic process for the destruction of recovered weapons will greatly help prevent the further spread of weapons. The continued presence of such weapons inevitably acts as a destabilizing influence in the area and the potential for illicit trade remains high. If the former warring factions and communities perceive that the weapons that they have handed in are merely being transferred elsewhere, either legally or illegally, then the essential public confidence in the programme could collapse. Again, the principles of transparency, accountability, safety and control must be followed during the disposal process to ensure that the process is legitimized in the eyes of all stakeholders.

Previous DDR programmes have often decided on the final disposal of the recovered weapons on an *ad hoc* basis. The lack of available finance and resources during many programmes has hampered this final process of destruction. For example, in Mozambique, the weapons were placed initially under UN control, but only a limited number of weapons were destroyed and the “mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction and no donor could be found to fund the programme”.<sup>16</sup> This is discouraging, because there was a wide range of available destruction techniques and technologies, and the required human and financial resources were not high as a percentage of the costs of a full UN peace-keeping deployment.

Before the physical disarmament process, there should be an agreement among all concerned parties about what will be done with the collected weapons. Local ownership, transparency and accountability must be a priority throughout the process to achieve credibility with all parties to the conflict and encourage long-term sustainability. Ideally, all collected weapons, ammunition and explosives should be destroyed as quickly as possible to build up confidence in the process through complete transparency. Occasionally, the national government or legitimate authority may prefer not to destroy certain collected weapons so that they can, after proper processing and registration, become part of the national government's stockpile for legitimate use by national armed forces.

There are, therefore, many good reasons why the planning and resources for a final destruction process must be included in any disarmament component. Indeed, it could be argued that donors have a moral responsibility to ensure that such a process is included in the project plan before funding is authorized. Provisions for destruction are as important to the success of a programme as the initial political will and the methodology for weapon recovery.

#### 10.1.1. Weapons destruction techniques and technologies

The destruction technology or technique selected for a particular programme will be dependent on a number of factors:

- the types of weapons;
- the quantity of weapons;
- the available local resources and technology;
- the availability of funds;
- the infrastructure available for moving weapons;
- any security problems;
- SALW awareness needs.

A summary of the currently available destruction techniques and technologies is given in Annex M for reference. The cost and efficiency of these vary widely, but the most important difference is the capacity of each to verify the destruction of the weapons.

Whatever the destruction technique used, a public destruction ceremony with mass media coverage is an important part of the process. Such a ceremony has tremendous symbolic power in helping the public develop confidence in both the DDR programme and in the broader peace-building and recovery process.

Whatever the destruction technique used, a public destruction ceremony with mass media coverage is an important part of the process.

#### 10.1.2. Destruction planning and operations sequence

The following sequence should be followed for the destruction of weapons:

- the establishment of the type and quantity of weapons to be destroyed;
- an examination and selection of the most suitable destruction method (technical advice should be taken at this stage of the planning process);
- the establishment of the financial costs of destruction (technical advice will be necessary here to ensure that a fair price is established if a commercial destruction method is chosen);
- the development of the public information plan;
- informing international organizations, media and NGOs of the date and location of the destruction operation;
- the establishment of a security plan for the movement of weapons and destruction operations;
- the carrying out of any necessary weapons pre-processing operations (removal of components, accounting procedures,<sup>17</sup> deformation, etc.), although these can also be done at the final destruction facility;
- the movement of weapons to the destruction location, ensuring that all appropriate security measures are in place to protect the weapons during transit;
- the establishment of an effective and accurate accounting system at the destruction facility;
- the physical destruction of the weapons;
- the monitoring and verification of the destruction operation, carried out by international observers, media and NGOs; and
- the maintenance of destruction records within the national authority.

## 10.2. Destruction of ammunition and explosives

The safe destruction of recovered or captured ammunition and explosives presents a variety of technical problems. At the lowest level, the demolition of a large number of explosive items that have been collected together, as opposed to the destruction of a single unexploded ordnance (UXO) at the place where it is found, is a complex subject, which requires a significant degree of training in addition to that which is usually provided to a field engineer or EOD technician. Incorrect procedures can lead to further UXO contamination of the local area if the demolition is not prepared correctly and ammunition is then subsequently ‘kicked out’ of the worksite during demolitions. This ‘kicked-out’ ammunition could have been subjected to external forces similar to those found when it is fired from a weapon. These forces (spin, set back, centripetal and set forward) are the forces used by the fuze designer to arm the munition, so that in effect, the ammunition could end up armed, and will therefore be unsafe.

A situation where munitions have been ‘kicked out’ would require a full, planned UXO clearance operation of the entire area around the demolition pits, an operation that is expensive, time-consuming and dangerous. The whole situation can be avoided by proper planning of the demolition at the risk assessment phase of the microdisarmament operation. A proper demolition ground should, wherever possible, be sited near every WCP to enable the immediate destruction of any unsafe or unstable ammunition or explosives that are handed in by the local population.<sup>18</sup> Professional explosive engineering advice must be taken to ensure that the location of these areas does not endanger the civilian population, their property or other fixtures and services.

The industrial-level destruction of ammunition and explosives (demilitarization) combines the skills of production, mechanical, chemical and explosive engineering. Again, it is a highly specialist occupation, and appropriate independent technical advice shall be taken by DDR programme managers during the planning phase if stockpile levels suggest that industrial destruction may be the safest or most cost-effective option.

The following IMAS cover the stockpile destruction of ammunition and explosives and shall therefore provide standard guidelines in this module:

- IMAS 11.10: ‘Stockpile Destruction’;
- IMAS 11.20: ‘Open Burning and Open Detonation (OBOD) Operations’;
- IMAS 11.30: ‘National Planning Guidelines’.

National authorities and destruction organizations shall consult and follow the guidelines contained within the above IMAS when planning and conducting the destruction of ammunition and explosives. The latest IMAS can be found at <http://www.mineactionstandards.org>.

Further advice on the application of IMAS to wider ammunition and explosive stockpile destruction operations can be obtained from UNDP BCPR Small Arms and Demobilization Unit (SADU).

## 11. Sequential operations

Demobilization normally follows directly after disarmament, but if an encampment process has been used for disarmament, then disarmament and demobilization can take place at the same time.

In some cases, it may be better for demobilization to take place at a later date. However, allowing for a gap between disarmament and demobilization may upset those who have disarmed, and may lead to civil unrest (also see IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization).



## Annex A (Normative): Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Ammunition:** See ‘munition’.

**Demilitarization:** The complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose.<sup>19</sup> Demilitarization not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as critical to achieving the final result.

**Demobilization:** “Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

**Destruction:** The process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and explosives into an inert state so that they can no longer function as designed.

**Diurnal cycling:** The exposure of ammunition and explosives to the temperature changes caused by day, night and change of season.

**Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD):** The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include the rendering safe and/or disposal of such explosive ordnance, which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities of those personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposal.<sup>20</sup> The presence of ammunition and explosives during disarmament operations will inevitably require some degree of EOD response. The level of this response will depend on the condition of the ammunition, its level of deterioration and the way that the local community handles it.

**Explosives:** Substances or mixtures of substances that, under external influences, are capable of rapidly releasing energy in the form of gases and heat.

**Harm:** Physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Harmful event:** Occurrence in which a hazardous situation results in harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Hazard:** Potential source of harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Hazardous situation:** Circumstance in which people, property or the environment are exposed to one or more hazards (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**National authority:** The government department(s), organization(s) or institution(s) in a country responsible for the regulation, management and coordination of DDR activities.

**Reintegration:** “Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

**Render safe procedure (RSP):** The application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components to prevent an unacceptable detonation.<sup>21</sup>

**Residual risk:** In the context of disarmament, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove the risks inherent in all collection and destruction activities (adapted from ISO Guide 51:1999).

**Risk:** Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Risk analysis:** Systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the risk (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Risk assessment:** Overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk evaluation (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Risk evaluation:** Process based on risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable risk has been achieved (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Risk reduction:** Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences or both, associated with a particular event or series of events.

**‘Safe to move’:** A technical assessment, by an appropriately qualified technician or technical officer, of the physical condition and stability of ammunition and explosives prior to any proposed move. Should the ammunition and explosives fail a ‘safe to move’ inspection, then they must be destroyed on site (i.e. at the place where they are found), or as close as is practically possible, by a qualified EOD team acting under the advice and control of the qualified technician or technical officer who conducted the initial ‘safe to move’ inspection.

**Safety:** The degree of freedom from unacceptable risk (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

**Small arms and light weapons (SALW):** All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability. Note: There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a ‘correct’ definition has yet to be agreed. On the basis of common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW. For the purposes of the IDDRS series, the above definition will be used.

**Standard:** A documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

**Stockpile:** In the context of DDR, the term refers to a large accumulated stock of weapons and explosive ordnance.

**Stockpile destruction:** The physical activities and destructive procedures towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile.

**Tolerable risk:** Risk that is accepted in a given context on the basis of the current values of society (ISO Guide 51: 1999 [E]).

**Unexploded ordnance (UXO):** Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been dropped, fired, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to be a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material, and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause.<sup>22</sup>

**Weapon:** Anything used, designed or used or intended for use:<sup>23</sup> (1) in causing death or injury to any person; or (2) for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.

**Weapons collection point (WCP):** A temporary, or semi-permanent, location laid out in accordance with the principles of explosive and weapons safety, which is designed to act as a focal point for the surrender of SALW by the civil community.

## Abbreviations

<b>AASTP</b>	Allied Ammunition Storage and Transportation Publications
<b>BCPR</b>	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
<b>D1</b>	disarmament site
<b>D2</b>	demobilization site
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>EOD</b>	explosive ordnance disposal
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/standards.
<b>IMAS</b>	international mine action standard/standards
<b>ISO</b>	International Organization for Standardization
<b>MCP</b>	mobile collection point
<b>MILOB</b>	military observer
<b>NCDDR</b>	national commission on DDR
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>PUP</b>	pick-up point
<b>RV</b>	rendezvous
<b>SADU</b>	Small Arms and Demobilization Unit
<b>SALW</b>	small arms and light weapons
<b>SASP 2</b>	SALW Awareness Support Pack 2005
<b>SEE RMDS/G</b>	South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines
<b>SEESAC</b>	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms
<b>SOP</b>	standard operating procedure
<b>TA</b>	technical adviser
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNMAS</b>	UN Mine Action Service
<b>UXO</b>	unexploded ordnance
<b>WCP</b>	weapons collection point

## Annex B: Normative references

The following normative documents (i.e., documents containing applicable norms, standards and guidelines) contain provisions that make up the norms, standards and guidelines that apply to the processes dealt with in this module. In the case of dated references, later amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on standards laid down in this module are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies. Members of ISO and IEC keep registers of currently valid ISO or EN publications.

International Standards Organization, ISO Guide 51: 'Safety Aspects: Guidelines for Their Inclusion in Standards'.

Small Arms Survey and South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC), SALW Survey Protocols, <http://www.seesac.org/resources/surveyprotocols>.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC), SALW Awareness Support Pack 2005 (SASP 2), <http://www.seesac.org/resources/sasp>.

—, SEE RMDS/G 05.30: 'Weapons Storage and Security', South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) Series, SEESAC, Belgrade, March 2004, [http://www.seesac.org/resources/current\\_eng](http://www.seesac.org/resources/current_eng).

—, SEE RMDS/G 05.40: 'Ammunition and Explosive Storage and Safety', South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) Series, SEESAC, Belgrade, March 2004, [http://www.seesac.org/resources/current\\_eng](http://www.seesac.org/resources/current_eng).

UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, UN Destruction Handbook: 'Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives', July 2001, <http://disarmament.un.org/DDAPublications/desthbk.pdf>.

UN Mine Action Service, IMAS 11.10–11.30: 'Stockpile Destruction', <http://www.mineactionstandards.org/>.

The latest version/edition of these references should be used. UN DPKO holds copies of all references used in this standard. A register of the latest version/edition of the IDDRS and references is maintained by UN DPKO, and can be read on the IDDRS Web site: <http://www.unddr.org>. National authorities, employers and other interested bodies and organizations should obtain copies before starting DDR programmes.

ISO Guide 51 defines the concepts of 'risk' and 'safety' and provides guidance for their use in other ISO documents. The definitions and procedures provided in Guide 51 are used in this standard and others in the IDDRS series of standards and guidelines.

## Annex C: Bibliography

The following informative documents contain useful background information concerning disarmament operations.

Gleichman, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, Swedish National Defence College, Norwegian Defence School, GTZ and the Pearson Peacekeeping Center, 2004, <http://www.unddr.org>.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, OSCE, September 2003, <http://www.osce.org/item/12525.html>.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC), *Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) Series*, SEESAC, Belgrade, March 2004, [http://www.seesac.org/resources/current\\_eng](http://www.seesac.org/resources/current_eng).

## Annex D (Informative): Explosives hazards

### 1. Physical condition of ammunition and explosives

The local population are unlikely to have the technical knowledge necessary to describe the conditions under which the recovered ammunition has been stored when in their possession, or to say whether it has deteriorated or what state the fuzing systems are in. International standards for the safe storage of ammunition and explosives are necessarily strict. They cover areas such as the type and construction of explosives storehouses, surveillance of ammunition in storage, the types of ammunition that can be stored together, fire prevention measures and operational standards to be followed. The local population will inevitably not have access to this information, and will be unaware of the dangers that ammunition and explosives can pose if not properly stored when in their possession. If the ammunition is not stored properly, then it can be affected by conditions such as the presence of moisture and diurnal cycling.<sup>24</sup> This can so badly affect the stability of ammunition and explosives that under some circumstances they become unsafe to handle.

### 2. Movement of ammunition and explosives

Specialized training in the science of explosives, in the design of ammunition and in explosive safety principles is necessary to develop the technical expertise necessary to assess the physical condition, stability, and safety of ammunition and explosives. International explosive safety standards insist that all ammunition and explosives should be certified as being 'safe to move' before any form of transportation is allowed. This caution has often been ignored, and at least one disarmament programme has even suggested that the local population should move ammunition and explosives to a WCP without either such an inspection or risk analysis taking place.

This presents the organization conducting the disarmament programme with a major problem. Ideally the population should have access to a system whereby an ammunition expert can travel to the *ad hoc* storage or collection area to make a safety assessment, but the political situation may mean that this is not possible.<sup>25</sup> The worst-case scenario is that no advice can be given. The majority of programmes will require the production of simple 'safety cards' for distribution during the DDR awareness campaign.

### 3. Response to mine/UXO threats

Past experience has shown that there is always a possibility that civilians will take the risk to move laid mines or UXOs to local authority collection points in order to remove a hazard to their homes or land. Any suggestion that this activity 'rewards' the local community only makes the problem worse, and must not be permitted. Therefore an appropriate EOD response shall be planned in accordance with Annex H.

### 4. Safety guidelines

Guidelines are rarely made available by the national authorities to the civil population for the safe *ad hoc* storage and movement of ammunition and explosives. These shall therefore be provided by the organization responsible for the disarmament operation. One version of recommended 'safety cards' is shown in Appendix 1 to this annex.

It is important that a general safety policy and a quality policy are developed for the weapons collection component of the disarmament programme. A suggested approach can be found in Appendices 2 and 3 to this annex.

## 5. Explosion danger areas

There are international standards that define the explosion danger areas that should be established for all explosive storehouses, and explain the ways of establishing them. While these help to reduce the risk, they are seldom implemented in communities that are storing weapons, ammunition and explosives. The local authority storage locations are often in close proximity to local authority administrative locations or other inhabited areas, and are usually both unlicensed for the storage of ammunition and explosives, and unsecured. The ammunition and explosives in the hands of the local population will generally be hidden on their property, which presents a continual risk to human life.

### **Appendix 1 to Annex D (Informative): Safety cards**

#### **Safety Advice**

Weapons, ammunition and explosives are designed to kill. Therefore they are inherently dangerous to untrained people unless simple safety precautions are followed. This advice card contains simple safety precautions that if followed, will reduce the risk to human life during the Weapons Amnesty and Collection Programme.

#### **Weapons**

Do not ever point a weapon at anyone whether it is loaded or not. You must always assume that it is loaded until proven otherwise.

The Safety Catch or Lever is to be in the SAFE position.

Ensure that magazines are not fitted to weapons when they are handed over for safe storage.

Ensure that the weapons are UNLOADED with no ammunition in the breech of the weapon.

Should ammunition be stuck fast in the weapon the technical staff are to be informed immediately. The weapon is to be clearly marked as containing ammunition.

The weapon is to be shown as empty to the person responsible for accepting the weapon into safe storage.

The storage area is to be locked at all times to protect the stocks. The location of the storage area should not be advertised by signs or any other visible markings.

#### **Temporary Storage of Ammunition in Emergency Situations**

It is important that ammunition collected in emergency situations is handled and stored safely. This advice on the temporary storage of ammunition and explosives is designed to reduce the risk to the implementing organisation and the local community. In emergency situations many different types of ammunition may have to be stored, and a few basic guidelines should be applied to reduce the risk as far as is practically possible.

#### **Storage Buildings/Rooms**

Storage buildings or rooms should be secure, dry, and without any electrical appliances or supply except for that of lighting. Stores should be in an isolated area without trees and overhead power cables.

It is accepted that in certain circumstances all of those listed may not be achievable but the more of these points that can be achieved the better the storage situation. Some form of



firefighting equipment should be close to the store site such as by the doors or the road to the store.

The store should be able to be guarded and have lights around it at night.

If weapons and ammunition are to be stored then they should be stored separately in different buildings or rooms. If this is not possible then they should be separated in different areas of the room preferably by a barrier of some kind such as sand bags or empty wooden boxes filled with dry sand.

## Ammunition

Ammunition should be divided into four categories, which are based on the UN hazard Divisions.

### Category 1 Ammunition

#### High Explosive (HE) Risk

- High Capacity Shells (HE)
- Grenades (HE)
- Demolition Explosives
- Mortar Bombs (HE)
- Rocket Motors with Warhead
- Detonators of all types

### Category 2 Ammunition

#### Burning and Fragmentation Risk

- Semi Armour Piercing Shots
- Cartridge Cases with Propellant
- 20mm – 37mm HE Shell/Rounds

### Category 3 Ammunition

#### Burning Only Risk

- Bagged Propellant Charges
- Loose Propellant
- Rocket Motor without Warhead
- Pyrotechnics

### Category 4 Ammunition

#### Little or no Hazard

#### Small Arms Ammunition (<20mm)

## Appendix 2 to Annex D (Informative): General safety policy

The DDR team shall be committed to achieving the highest performance in occupational health and safety, with the aim of creating and maintaining a safe and healthy working environment throughout its operations, especially during weapons, ammunition and explosives collection; stockpile management; and destruction.

In order to ensure general safety during an SALW collection programme, the general safety principles below should be followed:



- *Decision-making:* Environmental, health and safety concerns are an integral part of the team's decision-making. All strategic and operational decision-making shall take into account environmental, health and safety implications;
- *Compliance:* The team shall comply with all environmental, health and safety regulations that are applicable within the country. Environmental, health and safety programmes shall be established and implemented. Audits shall be carried out to assess compliance with laws and regulations, as well as these principles;
- *Operational practices:* The team shall use internal procedures and adopt practices or other operating guidelines towards the goal of protecting the environment, as well as the health and safety of its employees and the public;
- *Emergency preparedness:* The team shall maintain emergency response procedures to minimize the effect of accidents, as well as to improve, maintain and review procedures to prevent such occurrences;
- *Reduction of pollution:* The team shall develop, maintain and review explosive waste management programmes. These programmes shall deal with the source and nature of wastes generated and, to the extent technically and economically feasible, apply methods to reduce the generation of these wastes or minimize their environmental effects;
- *Conservation of resources:* The team shall improve, maintain and review guidelines for the efficient production and use of energy and natural resources;
- *Legislative/Regulatory development:* The team shall participate, as appropriate, with legislative and regulatory bodies in creating responsible laws, regulations and standards to safeguard the community, workplace and the environment;
- *Research and development:* The team shall guide and support research and development towards the goal of environmental, health and safety improvement and excellence;
- *Communication with employees:* The team shall encourage the development among its employees an individual and collective sense of responsibility for the preservation of the environment and protection of the health and safety of individuals;
- *Communication with the public:* The team shall communicate its environmental, health and safety commitment and achievements to the public and shall recognize and respond to community concerns;
- *Measurement of performance:* The team shall continue to develop and improve methods to measure both current and future environmental, health and safety performance in meeting these principles;
- *Risk management:* The team shall manage risk by implementing management systems to identify, assess, monitor and control hazards and by reviewing performance.

### **Appendix 3 to Annex D (Informative): Quality policy**

In order to ensure control and transparency during DDR programmes, it is essential that the following general quality principles are followed:

- clearly determine the needs and expectations of the local national authorities and civil population;
- ensure the continued development of an enthusiastic commitment to quality within the disarmament programme operations team;
- develop a philosophy within the DDR team that promotes and maximizes the satisfaction of the DDR participants, local national authorities and civil population;

- continually measure the needs of the DDR participants, local national authority and civil population against the performance of the team in order to identify opportunities for continual improvement;
- adopt a team approach to improvement activities to ensure long-term viability, transparency and sustainability through using quality operational practices.

To assist in achieving these objectives, the policy must be to maintain a comprehensive and practical quality management system, based on total local national authority and civil population satisfaction, and continuous assessment and improvement of operational practices.

The primary operational goals shall be realized through personal commitment to the team's quality policy and management system.

## Annex E (Informative): Technical adviser: Terms of reference

### 1. Responsibilities

The technical adviser (TA) to the disarmament programme is responsible to the programme manager for the following:

- the provision of independent technical advice on weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- the assessment of the quality and condition of recovered weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- the establishment of the render safe procedures for unstable ammunition and explosives, where there is an immediate and direct risk to the civil population or the DDR operations team;
- the development of written procedures and advice to ensure that the UN mission, government organizations and the civilian population store any recovered weapons, ammunition and explosives as safely as is technically possible;
- the development of written procedures and advice to ensure that the UN mission, government organizations and the civilian population transport recovered weapons, ammunition and explosives as safely as is technically possible;
- acting as the security liaison officer for the DDR team (if appropriate);
- continuing the development of any supporting computer-based statistical collection, reporting and analysis systems;
- the development of plans that cover the following:
  - team security;
  - the security of recovered weapons, ammunition and explosives;
  - the security of information;
  - the provision of technical intelligence to the disarmament team in order that informed management decisions may be taken.

### 2. TA qualifications and experience

A suitable candidate for the position of TA requires specific experience and qualifications, which are listed below. The appointment would particularly suit ex-military personnel qualified in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), explosive engineering and ammunition technology, although other candidates with the necessary operational experience and qualifications would be considered.

#### 2.1. EOD operational experience

The candidate must have had extensive operational EOD experience in order to have credibility with the local national authority.

#### 2.2. Other requirements

The candidate should have had extensive formal training, and be qualified and experienced in the following:

- ammunition storage (field and depot);
- ammunition inspection and repair;
- ammunition maintenance;
- unit ammunition inspections.

## Annex F: Weapons survey basic information requirements

A weapons survey shall be carried out to support operational planning. It should be carried out as early as possible by independent and impartial staff. It should be carried out through questionnaires and interviews involving all stakeholders, including both public officials and private citizens (male and female). The analysis of all existing reliable data from military sources, as well as consultations with international and regional organizations, relevant focus groups, research organizations and NGOs, should form the basis of the weapons survey.

An information collection plan should be determined, and may be structured in a format similar to the following matrix:

Serial	Critical information requirement	Open sources			Human sources				Liaison sources					Technical sources <sup>26</sup>		
		Media	Internet	UN and IO reports	Civil authorities	Civilian/Household surveys	Journalists	Refugees	Community liaison/focus groups	Embassies and attachés	Deployed military forces	International observers	Warring factions	IMINT <sup>27</sup>	SIGINT <sup>28</sup>	ELINT <sup>29</sup>
Weapons possession and proliferation																
1.	How many weapons are to be collected/surrendered?			X	X					X	X	X		X		
2.	Who is expected to hand in weapons?			X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X		X	
3.	Who else controls weapons outside the warring factions? Do they need to be disarmed?	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	
4.	Are there any pockets of heavily armed resistance?	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	
5.	Do the warring factions have stockpiles, and where are they?	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
6.	Where are the warring factions?	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
7.	What are the SALW supply routes and mechanisms?			X	X			X		X	X	X	X		X	
8.	Is there a previous national inventory or register of SALW?		X		X	X			X	X						
9.	Is there any legal provision for SALW ownership?		X		X	X			X	X						

Serial	Critical information requirement	Open sources			Human sources				Liaison sources					Technical sources <sup>26</sup>		
		Media	Internet	UN and IO reports	Civil authorities	Civilian/Household surveys	Journalists	Refugees	Community liaison/focus groups	Embassies and attachés	Deployed military forces	International observers	Warring factions	IMINT <sup>27</sup>	SIGINT <sup>28</sup>	ELINT <sup>29</sup>
10.	Is there local capacity to produce weapons, ammunition and explosives?	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X			
Weapons impacts																
11.	What is the prevailing cultural attitude towards weapons?	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X				
12.	How does the presence of SALW affect interpersonal relations?	X	X		X	X	X	X	X							
13.	What role do small arms play in the region/culture?	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X				
14.	How does the presence of small arms affect social or interpersonal relations?	X	X			X		X	X			X				
15.	Is there any record of casualties/deaths provoked by small arms (disaggregated by age and sex)?	X	X	X	X				X		X					
16.	Is there any record of criminal activities/ murders involving small arms?	X	X	X	X				X		X					
17.	Is there a 'culture' of weapons?	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X				
18.	What are the local concepts of 'human security'?	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X				

# Annex G (Informative): Guide to risk management during disarmament operations

## 1. Annex scope

This annex provides guidance on risk management and its application to disarmament operations.

## 2. Background

One objective during disarmament operations is the achievement of zero, or at the very least minimal, casualties during the disarmament component (see section 4.1). To achieve this, an ethos of safety must be developed during disarmament operations, according to which the DDR team tries to achieve the objective by developing and applying appropriate management procedures; by establishing and continuously improving the skills of personnel; and by implementing safe, effective and efficient operational procedures.

This module contains a new approach to disarmament operations that takes into account best practice in risk management and quality management. When determining the appropriate resources to be committed to a disarmament operation, appropriate account shall be taken of the risks to all personnel during the process.

## 3. The concept of safety

Safety is achieved by reducing risk to a tolerable level, which is defined in this module as tolerable risk. There can be no absolute safety; some risk will remain and this is the residual risk (ISO Guide 51: 1999[E]).

Therefore, in the context of the disarmament component of a DDR programme, weapons and ammunition collection can never be absolutely safe; it can only be relatively safe (see Annex D for a summary of risks). This is an inevitable fact of life, which does not mean that the requirements of the UN's 'duty of care' to its staff and the armed groups are not to be met. It just means that it cannot be proved, with 100 percent confidence, that they are being achieved. The risk and quality management systems recommended in this module aim to be as close to that 100 per cent ideal confidence level as is realistically possible, while allowing national authorities and DDR programmes to determine what is the tolerable risk that they are prepared to accept in their particular environments.

## 4. Risk management

### 4.1. Determining tolerable risk


Tolerable risk is determined by the search for absolute safety that takes into account factors such as:

- available resources;
- the benefit to the armed forces and groups of entering the peace process through the disarmament component;
- the conventions of society;
- cost effectiveness;
- the technical threat (a combination of hazard and risk).

It follows that there is therefore a need to continually review the tolerable risk that applies to disarmament operations in a particular environment.

## 4.2. Risk assessment and reduction

Tolerable risk is achieved by continually carrying out the process of risk assessment (risk analysis and risk evaluation), and risk reduction:



## 4.3. Achieving tolerable risk

The following procedure should be used, in conjunction with this module, to reduce risks to a tolerable level:

- identify the likely user of, or participant group affected by, the proposed disarmament standing operating procedure;
- identify the intended use and assess the reasonably foreseeable misuse of the procedure;
- identify each hazard (including any hazardous situation and harmful event) arising in all stages of the process;
- estimate and evaluate the risk to each identified user or participant group;
- judge if that risk is tolerable (e.g., by comparing it with other risks to the user or participant group and with what is acceptable to society);
- if the risk is not tolerable, then reduce the risk (by changing the procedure or using relevant equipment if necessary) until it becomes tolerable.

When carrying out the risk-reduction process, the order of priority should be as follows:

- designing inherently safe disarmament procedures;
- using protective equipment and systems;
- supplying information for users and participant groups.

## 5. Conclusion

It must be emphasized that quality is NOT the same thing as safety, and consequently the roles of quality management and risk management should not be confused. The success of a disarmament operation is dependent on the integrated application of both quality management and risk management principles and procedures.


The beneficiaries of the disarmament component of DDR programmes must be confident that the process is safe, and that their personal safety and security needs have been fully taken into account. This requires management systems and disarmament procedures that are appropriate, effective, efficient and safe. Using best practice in risk and quality management will result in significant improvements to disarmament operations.



## Annex H (Informative): Example of a combatant reporting card

1. Group:	Enter name/battalion/unit
2. To arrive at:	Enter pick-up point number
3. PUP location and directions:	Enter location and directions. Example: Grid 023678. Route 34, 3 km south of Greenville, at the abandoned fuel station.
4. Security and weapon safety:	Individuals MUST NOT carry weapons in an aggressive or challenging manner. Weapons should be unloaded and carried or slung from the shoulder. Muzzles should point to the ground. Magazines must be detached.
5. Formation:	The UNIT COMMANDER will lead his or her people in single file.
6. Reporting time:	No later than 12:00 hours (local time) on Tuesday 25 August 2006.


## Annex I (Informative): Schematic layout of a pick-up point



### Notes:

- (1) Combatants arrive at the PUP site with weapons, ammunition and explosives. MILOBs screen them to separate those with ammunition and explosives and send to WCP. Weapons processing location is a tactical decision, either at: (a) PUP clearing area; or (b) WCP.
- (2) Safe ammunition and weapons may be moved from the WCP to a holding area within the PUP if this will assist within security and administration. Again, this must be a tactical decision.

Annex J (Informative): Schematic layout of a weapons collection point



## Annex K (Informative): Explosive ordnance disposal support<sup>30</sup>

### 1. Introduction

Disarmament operations inevitably lead to the return of unstable and inherently dangerous ammunition and explosives together with the return of weapons. Not only does this create a physical threat to human life, but also it can be a threat to the whole DDR process. Any civilian casualties as a result of such programmes can have a negative effect on the credibility of the organization carrying out the operation, leading to a lack of confidence in its abilities by local community members and the subsequent withdrawal of their support for the process. Without appropriate weapon and explosive safety measures, past experience has shown that such casualties are inevitable. Past experience has also shown that these safety measures require support from explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and personnel qualified to dispose of ammunition. Also, EOD and ammunition technical support and advice is necessary for the safe planning and conduct of logistic disposal operations.

Experience has shown that the integration of EOD and ammunition technical support into the wider DDR programme from the beginning can save time, ensure a more efficient use of resources and greatly improve safety. EOD and ammunition technical support was integrated into the Albania disarmament programmes during the period 1999–2002; the result was that there were no civilian or police casualties during the collection and destruction phases of the programme. This has not been the case in other previous DDR programmes, where there was either limited or no integral support.

Therefore this annex illustrates technical areas where EOD and ammunition technical support can have a positive effect on the development and implementation of the disarmament component of DDR programmes.

It is important that DDR programme managers understand the differences between EOD and ammunition technical support. EOD personnel are usually trained and qualified in the disposal of unexploded ordnance (UXO). On the other hand, at the operational level, while ammunition technical specialists, while still trained in UXO disposal, are also qualified to provide additional support for the destruction of ammunition at the logistic level, as well as advise on all aspects of ammunition storage and explosives safety. It is essential that programme managers consult the appropriate level of advice for particular phases of their programme. For example, an EOD technician will be highly unlikely to be able to provide the appropriate level of technical advice on the detailed risks of an undesired explosion in an ammunition storage area.

### 2. Synergy with other international activities

The technical complexity, vulnerability, inherent risks, and the wide distribution and large volume of UXO, ammunition and explosives in the community in post-conflict environments require that they be efficiently and expertly managed and that appropriate risk analysis be carried out. There are often specific concerns regarding the render safe, disposal, safe storage, handling and transport of UXO, ammunition and explosives, and these risks must be minimized, but be in accordance with the operational environment. Sound technical advice and support at all levels are a prerequisite for the future success of peace support operations. The balance and emphasis of this advice will be dependent on the quantity of UXO, ammunition and explosives in the community, the perceived risk in the area and the pace of operations.

The explosives threat to a community in many post-conflict environments covers three main areas: (1) mines and UXO; (2) small arms and light weapons (SALW); and (3) the stockpile safety and destruction of conventional ammunition. There is currently no integrated response to this threat from the international community and areas of responsibility between international and regional organizations are ill-defined. More importantly, no integrated threat analysis has been conducted by an international or regional organization before its intervention in a post-conflict environment. This is usually because such organizations do not utilize the experience and knowledge of EOD organizations during their response planning at the strategic level.

The technical background and training of some of the EOD specialists deployed on mine action programmes can make them ideally suited to provide further technical contributions to operations outside that of mine and UXO clearance operations.<sup>31</sup> Again, recent experience in Albania provides many examples of such support, ranging from stockpile management support to the establishment of technical methodology for the weapons recovery phase of UN disarmament programmes.<sup>32</sup> This recent experience has identified other areas of technical support that are necessary to ensure the safety of both a deployed UN force and the civil population in the area of operations from the threat posed by explosives; these can be considered to be post-conflict activities. The evolution and development of this technical support could be a vital factor in reducing the risk to life on future post-conflict operations.

Therefore programme managers of DDR (disarmament) operations shall investigate the possibility of working together with other programmes involved in the wider area of explosives safety in the community. This will make the best use of scarce technical resources and ensure that there will be no conflict of responsibilities from the start.

### **3. Functional areas of EOD and ammunition technical support**

This part of the module illustrates those areas of technical support that appropriately qualified and trained EOD operators and ammunition specialists should contribute to during a disarmament operation. The degree of technical contribution shall be determined by the training and qualifications of the EOD operator or ammunition specialist.

#### **3.1. Information gathering and survey**

Technical advice and support should be provided to the following areas:

- the development of the collection and collation plan (see Annex F);
- the threat assessment and analysis during programme development;
- the training and technical capabilities of any local EOD or ammunition technical assets.

#### **3.2. Conventional munition disposal**

Technical advice and support should be provided to the following areas:


- the development (and provision if beyond local resources) of an EOD response capability for the render safe of UXO discovered during the collection phase;
- the development of a stockpile destruction system for large quantities of recovered ammunition and explosives;
- the EOD training of local EOD experts.

### 3.3. Explosives safety

Technical advice and support should be provided to the following areas:

- ammunition and explosives accounting;
- the calculation and establishment of danger areas at WCPs;
- 'safe to move' inspections of recovered ammunition and explosives;
- the safe movement and storage of ammunition and explosives;
- ammunition and explosives surveillance and management;
- during negotiations with national authorities for the destruction of SALW;
- the SALW awareness campaign.

## Annex L: Schematic layout of a disarmament site



Note: Combatants will arrive at the disarmament site with weapons or with receipts for weapons and ammunition surrendered at the PUP/WCP.

## Annex M: Weapons destruction techniques and technology

Serial	Technique/ Technology	Explanation	Example country	Advantages	Disadvantages
1.	Smelting and recycling	The use of industrial steel- smelting facilities to melt down complete processed weapons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Costa Rica</li> <li>■ Moldova</li> <li>■ Montenegro</li> <li>■ Peru</li> <li>■ Serbia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Limited training period</li> <li>■ Simple</li> <li>■ Cheap and efficient</li> <li>■ Limited pre-processing</li> <li>■ Minimal labour required</li> <li>■ Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>■ Destruction guaranteed</li> <li>■ Some costs recovered by sale of scrap</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Requires suitable industrial facility</li> <li>■ Limited pre-processing required</li> </ul>
2.	Bandsaw or circular saw	The use of industrial bandsaws to cut SALW into unusable pieces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Albania</li> <li>■ Costa Rica</li> <li>■ Republic of Congo</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Limited training period</li> <li>■ Simple</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Labour-intensive</li> <li>■ Minimum of three cuts per weapon, dependent on type</li> <li>■ Inefficient</li> </ul>
3.	Burning	The destruction of SALW by open burning using kerosene	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cambodia</li> <li>■ Mali</li> <li>■ Nicaragua</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cheap and simple</li> <li>■ Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>■ Limited training requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Labour-intensive</li> <li>■ Environmental pollution</li> <li>■ Not particularly efficient</li> <li>■ Visual inspection essential, but difficult</li> </ul>
4.	Cement	Cast weapons into cement blocks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Kuwait 1991</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cheap and simple</li> <li>■ Limited training period</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Recovery possible, but very labour-intensive to achieve this</li> <li>■ High landfill requirements</li> <li>■ High transport requirements to landfill</li> <li>■ Final accounting difficult</li> </ul>
5.	Crushing by armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs)	The use of AFVs to run over and crush the SALW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Brazil</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cheap and simple</li> <li>■ Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>■ Limited training requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Not particularly efficient</li> <li>■ Visual inspection essential</li> </ul>
6.	Cutting by oxy-acetylene or plasma	The use of high-temperature cutting technology to render the SALW inoperable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Albania</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Established and proven method</li> <li>■ Cheap and simple</li> <li>■ Limited training requirements</li> <li>■ Equipment available worldwide</li> <li>■ Maintenance-free</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Labour-intensive (one operative can process 40 weapons per hour)</li> <li>■ Risk of small functioning components (bolts, etc.) not being destroyed</li> </ul>
7.	Cutting using hydro-abrasive technology	The use of hydro-abrasive cutting technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ UK (trial)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Limited training requirements</li> <li>■ Technology readily available</li> <li>■ High production levels possible using automation</li> <li>■ Environmentally benign</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Medium initial capital costs</li> <li>■ Equipment requires transporting to affected country</li> </ul>



Serial	Technique/ Technology	Explanation	Example country	Advantages	Disadvantages
8.	Cutting by hydraulic shears	The use of hydraulic cutting and crushing systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Afghanistan</li> <li>■ Australia</li> <li>■ Canada</li> <li>■ Kenya</li> <li>■ South Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Limited training requirements</li> <li>■ Technology readily available</li> <li>■ High production levels possible using automation</li> <li>■ Environmentally benign</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Medium initial capital costs</li> <li>■ Equipment requires transporting to affected country</li> </ul>
9.	Deep-sea dumping	The dumping of SALW at sea in deep ocean trenches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Many pre-1992</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Traditional technique</li> <li>■ Efficient</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Constraints of Oslo Convention</li> <li>■ More environmentally benign than many other techniques</li> </ul>
10.	Detonation	The destruction of SALW by detonation using donor high explosives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ NATO SFOR</li> <li>■ NATO KFOR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Highly visible and symbolic</li> <li>■ Destruction guaranteed if sufficient donor explosive used</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Labour-intensive</li> <li>■ Environmental pollution</li> <li>■ Requires highly trained personnel</li> <li>■ Expensive in terms of donor explosive</li> </ul>
11.	Shredding	The use of industrial metal-shredding technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Germany</li> <li>■ South Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Highly efficient</li> <li>■ Limited training requirements</li> <li>■ Technology readily available</li> <li>■ High production levels possible using automation</li> <li>■ Environmentally benign</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ High initial capital costs</li> <li>■ Equipment requires transporting to affected country</li> </ul>
12.	Safe storage	The storage of recovered weapons in secure accommodation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Albania</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cheap and simple</li> <li>■ SALW move under direct control of national government or international organization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Potential for proliferation in the future exists if there is a significant political change of circumstances</li> <li>■ Requirement for adequate and secure infrastructures</li> </ul>

## Endnotes

- 1 This responsibility may be carried out by the UN mission in those areas with non-functioning government until the government is in a position to assume responsibility.
- 2 In this particular module, the term 'weapons' is assumed to include ammunition and explosives unless otherwise stated. It is inevitable that former combatants will surrender ammunition and explosives together with their weapons, and this must be planned for.
- 3 UN and non-UN staff are, of course, also in direct contact with armed individuals, forces and groups throughout the DDR process, as it cannot be assumed that these individuals and groups will all disarm, as requested, at the same time.
- 4 ISO Guide 51.
- 5 ISO Guide 51: 'Safety'.
- 6 Available at <http://www.seesac.org/resources>.
- 7 This is in addition to a weapons survey (section 7.4).
- 8 Collection, collation, analysis and dissemination (distribution).
- 9 <http://www.seesac.org/resources/surveyprotocols>.
- 10 A PUP can also be referred to as a rendezvous (RV).
- 11 It can be argued that at the point of weapons surrender the individual's status changes to that of an ex-combatant.
- 12 More technical detail is contained within SEE RMDS/G 05.50: 'Ammunition Management', <http://www.seesac.org/resources>.
- 13 <http://www.seesac.org/resources>.
- 14 An alternative source of detailed information is the NATO Allied Ammunition Storage and Transportation Publications 1 and 2 (AASTP 1 and 2): 'Safety Principles for the Storage and Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives' (available from the NATO Publications Branch).
- 15 Taken from SEE RMDS/G 05.20: 'SALW Destruction'.
- 16 Herbert Wulf, Bonn International Center for Conversion Workshop on Small Arms, 18–20 February 1999.
- 17 Ideally, each weapon's information (i.e., type, calibre, serial number, country and/or manufacturer monograms/markings) should be registered in a database. This information could be useful in future weapons tracking. See section 8.8 for information on DREAM.
- 18 There will often be a need for informed balance, as this requirement may badly affect the conduct of operations. If the decision is taken not to have an appropriate safe demolition area, then a formal threat assessment shall be carried out to identify the risks.
- 19 IMAS 11.10.
- 20 *UN Guidelines for Stockpile Destruction*, June 2000.
- 21 NATO definition.
- 22 NATO definition.
- 23 Criminal Code of Canada, sec. (S) 2: 'Interpretation', para. 2.
- 24 Diurnal cycling is the exposure of ammunition and explosives to the temperature changes resulting from day, night and change of season. For example, in the eastern European region, ammunition and explosives can be subjected to diurnal cycling from -20°C to +40°C. Under desert conditions, the diurnal cycling upper limit can exceed 60°C.
- 25 *Ad hoc* storage is the location where the civil population have concealed and stored ammunition.
- 26 Dependent on the capability of deployed military or UN force and their willingness to share information.
- 27 Imagery intelligence.
- 28 Signal intelligence.
- 29 Electronic intelligence.
- 30 Derived from SEE RMDS/G 05.60: 'EOD Support'.
- 31 There are wide differences in the training and education, and hence the technical competence, of EOD specialists. Advice should be taken from UNDP BCPR SADU before deciding on the detailed contributions in the areas of EOD or ammunition technical support that an individual can make to a microdisarmament operation.
- 32 NATO, *EODASTT Post Operation Report*, 5 May 1999.

# 4.11 SALW Control, Security and Development

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#### NOTE

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# 4.11 SALW Control, Security and Development

## Summary

Every year, hundreds of thousands of people die and millions more are left injured by small arms and light weapons (SALW). The wide availability of these weapons devastates the lives and livelihoods of people all over the world, whether they are in conflict situations or 'at peace'. In post-conflict situations, where weapons are often widely held by ex-combatants, civilians and criminals, the presence of SALW can severely hamper security, undermining the prospects of longer-term recovery and development. The immediate post-conflict environment therefore represents a vital window of opportunity to control the supply, demand and availability of SALW.

This module provides an overview of the issues that should be considered during the development and implementation of a comprehensive SALW control programme in countries where a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process is under way. It outlines the links and sequencing of DDR, SALW control and wider security sector reform (SSR). It further provides guidance on the principles on which SALW control and reduction are based, and outlines the regional and international SALW agreements that governments around the world have signed up to.

The module provides information on the range on SALW control and reduction measures that have been previously tried and tested in post-conflict environments, providing advice on the most effective approaches for different contexts. The links between the short-term activities performed by peacekeeping operations and the long-term requirements for sustaining security and development in post-conflict situations are emphasized. It further provides guidance on the development of longer-term SALW control programmes that should be planned and initiated *during* the DDR programme, to enable a seamless transfer from a peacekeeping environment to a longer-term development context.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides an overview of the issues that should be considered during the development and implementation of a comprehensive SALW control programme in countries where a DDR operation is being implemented. It provides guidance on the principles, planning and long-term support operations required for integrated SALW control. The links between the short-term activities performed by peacekeeping operations and the long-term requirements for sustaining security and development in post-conflict situations are emphasized. A 'follow-on' SALW control programme should be planned, and perhaps initiated, *during* the DDR programme to enable a seamless transfer from a peacekeeping to a development situation.

This particular module uses many normative references from the South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (SEE RMDS/G). RMDS/G reflect the development of operational procedures, practices and norms that has occurred over the past four years in the area of SALW control. The RMDS/G provide a high proportion

of the technical and operational information necessary to enable a programme manager to plan and implement a safe, effective and efficient SALW control programme. As such, they are complementary to the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS), and their use reduces unnecessary duplication of standards development work.

### 1.1. References

A list of normative references is given in Annex B. Normative references are important documents to which reference is made in this module, and which form part of the provisions of the standards laid down in the module.

A list of informative references, in the form of a bibliography, which provide valuable background information on SALW control operations in support of DDR programmes, is given in Annex C.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms and definitions used in the IDDRS series is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standard laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in International Standardization Organization standards and guidelines.

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications, which are to be adopted in order to satisfy the standard in full.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

## 3. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

During the last decade, the rapid spread and misuse of SALW has resulted in the deaths of millions of people. Increasingly, these weapons are playing a large role in conflict and violence. SALW have a huge impact on society in general. It has been estimated that as much

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as 40 percent of the global arms trade has been diverted to the illicit markets to fuel most of the regional conflicts that have erupted since 1990. Estimates also suggest that in the same period, more than 2 million children have been killed in wars, 6 million seriously injured or permanently disabled, and 20 million have become internally displaced or fled to neighbouring countries. People are terrorized, wounded, maimed or forced from their homes to live as refugees

or internally displaced persons. Private arms brokers have played a particularly negative role in supplying weapons to areas of actual or potential conflict.

The unregulated circulation of SALW to a wide range of unaccountable and untrained actors contributes to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It

also has a profoundly negative impact on development: in some countries, as much as 25 percent of annual gross domestic product is consumed in the treatment of armed violence survivors and increased policing, with firearms being involved in over 80 percent of all violent deaths. The full impact of the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW on nations, communities and individuals is wide ranging and includes:

- undermining the rule of law and the ability to keep the peace;
- fuelling crime and instability;
- increasing tension within communities;
- negating confidence- and security-building measures;
- acting as an obstacle to development;
- encouraging violent rather than peaceful ways of resolving problems;
- contributing to human rights violations;
- discouraging external investment;
- committing resources to security rather than development;
- contributing to a 'gun culture';
- increasing the risk of terrorism;
- undermining the legal arms trade;
- presenting a physical risk to local communities due to the presence of unstable ammunition.

Although DDR and SALW control are separate areas of engagement, technically they work very closely together. DDR rightly focuses on ex-combatants, but during DDR operations, an SALW control component should be established to focus on wider arms control and reduction measures at the national and community levels. This will ensure that weapons and ammunition that are not under the control of armed groups (i.e., civilian and government weapons) are also dealt with during the DDR programme. The mechanisms established during the DDR programme should be designed to be applicable and sustainable in wider SALW control initiatives after the disarmament and demobilization components of DDR have been completed. The scope and scale of the SALW control activities as part of the DDR programme should be based on the threat that civilian and government weapons possession may present to a renewal of violence. It is essential that ALL weapons are considered during a DDR programme, even though the focus may initially be on those weapons in possession of the armed factions or groups entering the DDR process.

The rapid spread of SALW is influenced by a number of factors. Chief among them is the failure of the State to provide security to its citizens. This is one reason why high levels of gun-related violence do not always decrease when conflict ends. If individuals — usually men — arm themselves for 'self-protection', it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure civilian security. Economic factors such as high rates of unemployment and low wages may cause people to use weapons as a means of survival. In certain cultures, the tradition of men carrying weapons, and society's acceptance of violence, may also make the situation worse. The

Although DDR and SALW control are separate areas of engagement, technically they work very closely together.

The mechanisms established during the DDR programme should be designed to be applicable and sustainable in wider SALW control initiatives after the disarmament and demobilization components of DDR have been completed.



proliferation of weapons disproportionately affects the lives of women, who are subjected to more sexual violence both inside and outside the home, and children, who are either direct victims of gun-related violence, or, as recruits into armed or criminal gangs, are encouraged to become involved with criminality and violence.

To effectively deal with these concerns, an integrated and holistic approach is required, one that responds to questions such as how and by whom are these weapons manufactured, marked, transferred,<sup>2</sup> stored and used; how best to deal with the factors that drive the demand for such weapons; and what action should be taken to deal with the humanitarian, health, social, developmental and environmental consequences of the possession and misuse of SALW.

The term ‘SALW control’ means those activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW proliferation and possession. These activities largely consist of, but are not limited to:

- cross-border control measures;
- information management;
- legislative and regulatory measures;
- SALW awareness and communications strategies;
- SALW surveys and assessments;
- SALW collection;<sup>3</sup>
- SALW destruction;
- stockpile management.

However, SALW control and its activities cannot be dealt with in isolation, as there is a great deal of overlap with complementary humanitarian and developmental programmes, and in some cases with peacekeeping and peace support operations. SALW control requires management planning at global, national and local levels, and involves international, regional, national, commercial, NGO and military stakeholders operating under a variety of conditions. Thus it is not possible, nor is it desirable, to establish a unique set of criteria that alone define standards and guidelines. Instead, it is necessary to identify a framework of standards and guidelines that, together, harmonize the way in which activities and tasks are carried out by the different organizations and agencies involved. This module provides this framework of applicable and appropriate international standards and guidelines.

## 4. DDR and SALW control

Sustainable peace requires an SALW control programme that attempts to achieve both short-term stability and long-term peace consolidation. Immediately after a conflict has

ended, the first objective may be achieved through the implementation of a comprehensive DDR programme. As the security situation in the country or region improves, a long-term SALW control strategy should be developed in collaboration with national authorities.

DDR and SALW control both deal with the problems faced by people in an insecure environment of SALW proliferation. They are not so much about the technical response to the presence and spread of weapons and ammu-

Sustainable peace requires an SALW control programme that attempts to achieve both short-term stability and long-term peace consolidation.



dition (survey, collection and destruction), as about individuals and communities, and their ability to lead normal and productive lives, free from the threats created by the uncontrolled presence of SALW. They are about the creation of an environment in which economic, social, political and health development can occur free from the limitations imposed by the spread and use of SALW.

The differences between disarmament within DDR and SALW control can be summarized in the following matrix:

DDR	SALW CONTROL
Usually takes place 'post-conflict'	Can take place at any time
Can include all weapons and ammunition types	Usually restricted to weapons and ammunition of less than 100 mm calibre
Supports some form of peace process and broader recovery	Supports a national SALW control strategy as a part of recovery or development
Undertaken as a specific mandate in support of the 'peace process'	Supports SSR, and social and economic development
'Participants' are normally armed forces, groups or factions and those associated with them. 'Beneficiaries' can be individuals, civilian groups, communities, governments	'Participants' or 'beneficiaries' can be individuals, civilian groups, communities, governments, former warring factions, terrorists or criminals

Despite these differences, there are important similarities at the operational level, and therefore the international and national policy in dealing with both areas should be coordinated.

The security situation on the ground, combined with the impact of civilian possession of weapons, will determine the detailed requirements for an SALW control component of a DDR programme. There are always risks involved in attempting to disarm armed forces, groups and factions as part of a disarmament component, while implementing a simultaneous voluntary surrender programme for the civilian population:

- civilians may attempt to surrender weapons at a pick-up point or weapons collection point (WCP) designed to deal with ex-combatants. This could result in increased tension and local outbreaks of violence;
- the sensitization and key messages of the disarmament and SALW control components will necessarily be very different. The risk of mixed messages should be avoided;
- disputes may arise over who is entitled to 'reintegration' or 'incentives';
- ex-combatants may attempt to 'integrate' with communities too early in the DDR process, with a potential destabilizing effect on those communities.

## 5. International and regional agreements

The international community, recognizing the need to deal with the problem and the grave consequences SALW pose to society, adopted the United Nations *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* (A/Conf.192/15) in 2001 (UN PoA). In this programme, States committed themselves to, among other things, strengthening agreed norms and measures to help prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW, and agreed to mobilize political will and resources in order to prevent the illicit transfer, manufacture, export and import of SALW.

There has also been much activity at the regional level, where agreements, declarations and conventions often go further than the commitments contained within the UN PoA. These regional agreements include;

- *Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium*;<sup>4</sup>
- *European Union (EU) Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*;<sup>5</sup>
- *EU Joint Action on SALW*;<sup>6</sup>
- *EU SALW Strategy*;<sup>7</sup>
- *Nairobi SALW Protocol*;<sup>8</sup>
- *Organization of American States (OAS) Firearms Convention*;<sup>9</sup>
- *OAS SALW resolution AG/RES.1968 (XXXIII-O/03)*;<sup>10</sup>
- *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document on SALW*;<sup>11</sup>
- *OSCE Document on Conventional Ammunition*;<sup>12</sup>
- *OSCE Decision on MANPADS*;<sup>13</sup>
- *Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on SALW*;
- *Stability Pact SALW Regional Implementation Plan*.<sup>14</sup>

## 6. SALW control measures

A range of measures should be introduced to attempt to control the proliferation of SALW. These fall into three main groups:

- reduction measures;
- preventive measures;
- coordination measures.

The activities that combine to form SALW control are:

- cross-border control measures;
- legislative and regulatory measures;
- SALW surveys;
- SALW awareness and communications strategies;
- SALW collection operations;
- SALW destruction operations;
- management of information;
- SALW stockpile management.

A number of other activities are required to support these components of SALW control, including capacity-building, management training, coordination measures, information management and exchange, project support and technical assistance, and resource mobilization. SALW control and its related activities should not be dealt with in isolation, as there is great deal of overlap with complementary humanitarian and developmental programmes, and with peacekeeping and peace support operations.

### 6.1. Aim and operational objectives of SALW control programmes

Confidence and security-building measures are vital to the success of a peace process, and SALW control is one of the most visible of measures. Therefore the overriding aim of any SALW control intervention programme should be to secure a safer environment and control

small arms and light weapons within society in order to promote the conditions that will encourage the continued return of the region to normalisation.

From this aim, operational objectives to reflect the situation within the target community should then be developed as part of the programme planning process. Many of these objectives will be identical, similar or complementary to the operational objectives of the disarmament component of the DDR programme. Such objectives may include:

- a reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals, terrorists, armed forces and armed groups;
- a reduction in the number of weapons and ammunition accidents;
- the need to make a public connection between the availability of weapons and the amount of violence in the society (by both national authorities and the civilian population at large);
- the requirement to build community awareness of the problem and develop community solidarity;
- the reduction and disruption of the transfer and illicit trade of weapons on the black market;
- the control of legal weapons through national legislation and registration;
- the recovery of stolen weapons from the community;
- the reduction of the open visibility of weapons in the community, and getting rid of the culture of weapons;
- the development of norms against the illegal use of weapons;
- the use of SALW control as a launch framework for future capacity-building and sustainable development.

## 7. Guiding principles

The basic principles of SALW control programmes are *safety, control, transparency, sustainability, replicability, impartiality* and *legitimacy*. They are to a certain extent interrelated, and can be adapted to fit any type of SALW control programme. These principles were developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in July 2001:<sup>15</sup>

- *Safety* is arguably the most important principle. The nature of SALW control programmes often requires that the local population or former warring factions surrender their weapons to some form of lawfully appointed national or international body. Inevitably, this also results in the movement of ammunition and explosives. It is necessary to emphasize the threat to human life posed by the movement and handling of potentially unstable or dangerous ammunition and explosives. The international community shall have a 'duty of care' to the local population to ensure that the programme is carried out as safely as possible, and that the risk to human life is reduced to a minimum. Any loss of life as a result of an internationally mandated or supported programme could be argued to be as a direct result of the establishment of that programme. Such a loss of life will inevitably have an impact on the way that the programme is perceived by the local population, without whose support the programme will fail. Should such a programme be carried out in an unsafe way, then it will lose credibility in the eyes of the local community, who may then reduce or withdraw their support. Therefore it is essential that the programme has safety as its highest priority. Any attempt to reduce programme operating costs by failing to employ the appropriate safety measures could prove to be a false economy;

- The second principle of *control* is also directly related to that of safety. The operational aspects of the programme (i.e., SALW collection and destruction) should be carried out in a planned and controlled way. The programme shall be properly managed to ensure a smooth, progressive, safe and secure collection and destruction plan. SALW collection and destruction operations require large logistic resources, and therefore the resources necessary to support them shall be controlled to ensure maximum effectiveness;
- *Transparency* is an important principle in order to gain and keep the support of the local population or former warring factions. They should be allowed complete access to the process of collection and destruction, within the bounds of operational security. They must be confident that the weapons that they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or by the government. To ensure fairness and natural justice, it is important that all parties to the conflict are adequately represented in the decision-making process. Such involvement also helps to ensure that all interests and concerns are adequately dealt with. Transparency is also an important principle in the verification of the final disposal of the recovered weapons and ammunition;
- The *sustainability* of the programme is related to the principle of transparency. For operational reasons, it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process at a specific place in the community and then expand into other areas. Sufficient financial and logistic resources should be made available to sustain the surrender process until the whole community has been covered. No one part of the community will be persuaded to surrender weapons unless it can be convinced that the process will be applied throughout the entire community, or surrender its weapons if rivals in the region will not have to surrender theirs. The argument that it is better to get some weapons out of the community than none does not work, especially if it leaves one part of the community at a tactical disadvantage to another. Unless a secure environment can be created and maintained, the SALW control operation will fail, as individuals will retain weapons for 'self-protection'. In the past, the lack of resources has been identified as a limitation in the weapons surrender process,<sup>16</sup> which has placed programmes at risk. It is therefore important that programmes are ideally not started until all necessary resources have been, and have been seen to be, identified. This statement does not necessarily prevent 'pilot' projects or 'preparatory assistance' from taking place; but no firm commitments to support a national programme should be made until resources have been identified and are available;
- The principle of *replicability* (i.e., the capacity of a programme to be repeated in different contexts) ensures that similar operating methods can be used throughout the programme. This means improved training, better use of resources, safe collection and destruction, complete visibility of weapon and ammunition accounting, and easily understood operating procedures. Because of this, it also helps to ensure the sustainability of the programme;
- The final principle of *legitimacy* is important to the development of a secure environment and the provision of resources to support an SALW control programme. The organization responsible for the programme must be legitimate, and operate according to a national or international mandate given by an appropriate body. This mandate could come from the UN Security Council, a regional organization or the recognized national government of the country. An unmandated programme is very unlikely to succeed, as it will fail to attract the donor resources necessary, or the support of the community it is trying to disarm.

## 8. Types of SALW control programmes

The debate on how to categorize the different types of SALW control programmes is still in progress. Categorization has so far been based on the experience of programmes over the last 10 years, which have indicated that there is no one 'template' (i.e., standard way of carrying out a programme). For the purposes of IDDRS, it is suggested that there are three main types of programme (which can be based on the SALW collection incentive or concept used):<sup>17</sup>

- directed programmes;
- cooperative programmes;
- nationally controlled programmes.

The decision as to which type of programme to adopt will depend less on the political situation within a society than on the strength of the movement towards peace, the DDR operational plan, other peace support operations and the resources available. Whatever the type of SALW control programme developed, it should be designed to:

- *DETER* individuals, groups and organizations from illegally possessing or transferring SALW;
- *DENY* access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users;
- *DISRUPT* criminal operations, and the movement and storage of SALW;
- *DESTROY* surrendered, captured or surplus SALW.

### 8.1. Directed programmes

The concept of a 'directed' SALW control programme allows more options for the way in which such programmes can take place. It covers the use of UN Security Council mandates, military technical agreements and legislation passed by UN transitional authorities or national governments to disarm warring factions, and is usually the concept behind the disarmament component of a DDR programme. It recognizes that the initial aim of an SALW control programme should be to assist in the establishment of a secure and safe environment, rather than political stability, which can only survive in a secure environment. 'Incentives' are not used under this type of programme, as in 'cooperative' programmes, although there are occasions when it may be possible to run a 'directed' programme in parallel with a 'co-operative' programme.

The danger with this approach is that without coordination among the different units carrying out the physical disarmament of the various warring parties there is a risk of creating a weapons imbalance. Should one party surrender a large proportion of their arms without the other doing the same, then it becomes highly vulnerable in the event of a breakdown in the peace process. This is particularly important if there are no external or international guarantors of security, as the role of such guarantors is very important in such situations (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament).

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### 8.2. Co-operative programmes

This concept proposes the use of 'incentives' to disarm, and it can be operated in tandem with a 'directed' programme if the appropriate mandate exists. The concept accepts the complexity of operational environments in which SALW control takes place and therefore the potential future need to rapidly introduce a 'directed' programme if necessary.

A major issue affecting 'cooperative' or voluntary disarmament is the type of incentive to be offered in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons. It is now generally accepted that four criteria are important in this regard:

- the 'target' community (see section 8.4);
- the effectiveness of the incentives in achieving the immediate objective of disarmament or voluntary surrender;
- their contribution to long-term programme objectives;
- the cost and available resources.

Compromise among these four criteria is inevitable, but it is clear that incentives must be attractive to the target community in order to ensure the success of the programme; yet they shall always be less than the market value of the weapons themselves.

There are many examples of incentives used to support the voluntary surrender of SALW in cooperative-type SALW control programmes:<sup>18</sup>

- The 'buy-back' concept, where SALW are returned in exchange for cash, has been used in at least nine previous programmes around the world, with at least two of these operated in tandem with a 'directed' programme. There are significant disadvantages to a 'buy-back' concept. Cash incentives can lead to increases in the numbers of arms, with the cash being used to buy other weapons at better prices elsewhere, encouraging an unwanted illicit trade in small arms. The economic effects of relatively large amounts of cash being injected into a fragile economy must also be considered. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs considers that the disadvantages outweigh the potential benefits, and does *not* therefore recommend 'buy-back' incentives in post-conflict environments. From March 2002, UNDP has decided that it will not support such programmes;
- Other programmes have used the 'guns for food or goods' concept, which is more popular with donors, who may feel that individuals should not be provided with cash 'rewards' for the surrender of weapons. This has a more moral and symbolic value than a pure cash incentive, can assist in ensuring that the community has the food and resources necessary for short-term survival, and can reduce the resources required by other humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Programme. Care must be taken when applying this concept; but, for example, the provision of tools to assist in the redevelopment of agriculture or housing is a very constructive approach. This type of approach is referred to as the '*weapons in exchange for incentives (WEI)*' concept;
- The evolution of the '*weapons in exchange for development*' (WED) concept has resulted in significant success when applied in the correct environment. This concept supports the community *as a whole* with a development project and an improvement in public security in return for the voluntary surrender of weapons by the community. Various models have been applied, and advice on the most appropriate one for a particular situation can be obtained from UNDP;
- A further development of the WED concept is that of '*weapons in competition for development*' (WCD). This is an innovative approach that uses the principle of conditionality, which until recently was not popular within the UN. Yet WCD has been effective in areas where significant development work is already taking place. Communities compete for smaller incentives, which are shared among communities in proportion to the number of weapons they have handed in. These have proved to be attractive to communities;



- A long-term concept has been proposed, but not yet implemented, which is '*weapons linked to development*' (WLD). This involves including SALW control measures in development projects that are already under way. This has the advantage of being cheaper than the other options, but problems such as negotiation with the local community who are already receiving development assistance and cooperation among a wide range of development agencies would have to be resolved before this concept could be effective. It is an area that requires more research, but could be the most promising long-term strategy as donor funding for the other options becomes scarcer.

Whatever approach or concept is used to support the programme, it will only succeed if there is a real desire on the part of the whole community to participate in the process. If the cooperation of the community can be gained and retained, then there is a real chance of success in this type of programme. While the aim should always be to remove or legally register all weapons in society, the reality of a gun culture and the desire for self-protection should always be recognized. In many societies, gun ownership has always been acceptable within the community, therefore perhaps a more realistic aim could be to recover the military-style weapons that create an imbalance with neighbouring communities, or those that could be used for trade. If the community could accept that weapons in open sight should be legally held and recorded, then ownership could be controlled, and criminal investigations into weapon misuse could be simplified.

A factor that must be considered during the planning phase of 'co-operative' SALW control programmes shall be what the affected country wants its national position towards weapons to be at the end of the programme. If there is a national move towards weapon control, e.g., by the framing and adoption of national legislation, this should be developed at the same time as the programme is in operation. The national legislation should ensure that the population fully understands the penalties for the unauthorized keeping of weapons at the conclusion of the SALW control programme.

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#### 8.2.1. Links to reintegration incentives and training

The incentives for voluntary surrender should not only be attractive to the particular individuals or community in order to ensure the success of any voluntary weapons surrender programme, but shall also be coordinated with reintegration incentives. The levels of incentives should be the same in order to ensure that there is not an imbalance between reintegration incentives provided to ex-combatant and incentives provided to civilians and communities for the surrender of their weapons. Any imbalance would be divisive and could compromise both the reintegration and SALW control components of a DDR programme.


### 8.3. National control programmes

‘Directed’ or ‘cooperative’ programmes do not take account of environments where political stability and local security exist, but there is still a large amount of illegally held weapons, or cases where the national government wishes to downsize its security forces. In these cases, the objectives that should be aimed at are either stockpile reduction or the prevention of crime.

National control programmes recognize the need for legislative support for an amnesty programme to include the use of punitive measures (i.e., punishments of some kind) for those failing to comply. In effect, this concept is a combination of the ‘directed’ and ‘cooperative’ concepts, which are more specifically targeted at immediate post-conflict environments.

National control programmes are aimed at criminal elements who try to keep weapons for criminal purposes. The development of legislative measures then allows for the implementation of ‘search-and-seize’ operations against criminal elements, while allowing people who legally hold weapons to keep them. Previous criticisms of voluntary surrender programmes were that they never target criminals; the development of the concept of this type of programme acknowledges this criticism and attempts to develop a framework to deal with the problem. Where strict national legislation is in place, and the local population is in no doubt of the legal consequences of illegal possession and use, the weapons will be either surrendered or less frequently used, and, most importantly, the public perception of safety will be improved.

Figure 1 **Matrix of SALW collection incentive options**



### 8.4. ‘Targets’ for SALW control intervention programmes

It is now accepted that there are five generic (general) ‘targets’ for SALW control interventions:


- individuals;
- governments;



- criminals and organized criminal gangs;
- armed groups
- terrorists.

The type of SALW control intervention, and the incentive or punitive option used to support the collection of SALW, will inevitably be different for each type of target group. The following matrix does not cover all possible aspects of a programme, and specifically does not deal with the treatment of armed forces and groups within the context of a DDR programme, but it does summarize some possible options for targeting SALW control.

Figure 2 Possible incentives for SALW control programmes



## 8.5. National ownership

Success in SALW control initiatives as part of a wider DDR programme, and beyond, requires the full cooperation of ex-combatants, non-combatants, political will and international support to be maintained throughout the process. The encouragement of national ownership of SALW control is one way of achieving this success. The planning of SALW control programmes should deal with both the supply and demand aspects of weapons possession. Care should be taken to include all stakeholders, even those who are not traditionally seen as weapons owners, such as women, children, and the elderly or disabled. Disarming combatants when community-level

Disarming combatants when community-level ownership of weapons is high does not solve the problem. Indeed, failing to provide former combatants with the security they need to return to civilian life might actually create new security concerns.

ownership of weapons is high does not solve the problem. Indeed, failing to provide former combatants with the security they need to return to civilian life might actually create new security concerns.

## 9. The components of an SALW control programme<sup>19</sup>

SALW control is a complex process, in which there are many components, all of which must interact correctly with each other. The components of this process should include:

- the formation of a national SALW commission to develop and implement a national SALW control programme. This should be a component of the national commission on DDR (NCDDR);
- an assessment of the risk of SALW, and their impact on the community. This should form part of the weapons survey (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament);
- the operational planning of a national SALW control programme as a component of the wider DDR programme;
- the development of an SALW awareness campaign (see SASP 2, referred to in Annex B);
- the development of an amnesty plan for those illegally holding SALW;
- the development of national legislation to support the collection and destruction of weapons, and to develop policies for the period following the amnesty programme;
- the development of a collection and destruction plan;
- seeking/securing international funding and technical assistance for the SALW control programme;
- the implementation of the collection phase of the control programme;
- the selection and establishment of the destruction capability, and the implementation of the weapons and ammunition destruction phase;
- the development of a cross-border weapons movement prevention programme;
- carrying out an evaluation to assess the degree of SALW control achieved.

The components above should also include continuous monitoring, to assess the progress being achieved; to inform the government, population and donors to the programme about such progress; and to eliminate as far as possible any difficulties of implementation. A schematic diagram of an SALW intervention process is given in Annex D.

### 9.1. Formation of a national SALW commission

The primary responsibility for SALW control lies with the government of the affected state. This responsibility should normally be vested in a national SALW authority or commission,<sup>20</sup> which should act as a national point of contact for all matters concerning SALW control. It

should plan, regulate, manage and coordinate a national SALW control programme. The national SALW authority is responsible for establishing the national and local conditions that enable the effective management of SALW. It is ultimately responsible for all phases and all facets of an SALW programme within its national boundaries, including the development and implementation of national

This responsibility should normally be vested in a national SALW authority or commission, which should act as a national point of contact for all matters concerning SALW control. It should plan, regulate, manage and coordinate a national SALW control programme.

standard operating procedures and instructions. This body should form part of the national commission on DDR, although the SALW commission should continue to exist long after the DDR commission is disbanded.

In certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and to fulfil some or all the functions, of a national SALW authority. In such cases, reference to a 'national SALW authority' throughout IDDRS shall be understood as applying to the UN or other recognised international body.

In countries with significant SALW control needs, local capacity should be developed from the very start of an SALW programme. Capacity development is the process by which individuals, institutions and societies (individually and collectively) are trained to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives, and increasingly take over these activities.<sup>21</sup> More information on capacity development is available in RMDS/G 01.10.

## 9.2. Acceptability of weapons

In many societies, the ownership of SALW is commonplace, and is accepted by the community, as is the ownership of guns for hunting and sport. The situation changes in conditions following a civil war, regional conflict or proxy war, when large numbers of SALW of many types are introduced into the country. It should also be understood why members of the civilian population feel it necessary to protect themselves, and feel that possession of a weapon is necessary. Law and order may have broken down, leading to a situation that the police or national army cannot control, or where communities do not feel they can trust or rely on the national security infrastructure for protection. The level of crime or internal conflict resulting from large quantities of illegal SALW may become intolerable, and a nation, faced with such a situation, may decide to introduce control of weapons, by a form of voluntary disarmament within the civilian community in parallel to the disarmament component of a DDR programme. This national decision will need to be taken by the NCDDR.

## 9.3. Assessment of the SALW threat

Following the decision to implement an SALW control programme, the first stage shall be to assess the nature and scope of the situation and threats. This should be done by carrying out an SALW survey in order to gain information on the threat to the local community and national authorities. The aim of the survey is to determine the nature and extent of SALW spread and impact within a region, nation or community, in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organization. This may be done as part of the DDR weapons survey (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament), although there are different information requirements.

There are four major components of a comprehensive SALW survey, which are explained further in the *SALW Survey Protocols* developed by the Small Arms Survey and SEESAC:

- *a small arms distribution assessment (SADA)* collects data on the type, quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the country or region, and analyses local resources available to respond to the problem;
- *a small arms impact survey (SAIS)* collects data on the impact of SALW on the community, and social and economic development;
- *a small arms perception survey (SAPS)* collects qualitative information on the attitudes of the local community to SALW ownership and possible interventions;

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- *a small arms capacity survey (SACS)* collects information on the local capacity to conduct an appropriate, safe, efficient and effective SALW intervention.

Each national problem is different, and the methods for carrying out the surveys will have to be adapted accordingly. The data will vary in quantity and quality, but sufficient data must be gained to establish a picture of the threat that will allow a national programme of SALW to be established.

More information on SALW surveys is contained in RMDS/G 05.80, and information can also be found in a study on national assessment or 'mapping' carried out by Saferworld and SaferAfrica.<sup>22</sup>

#### 9.4. Planning a national SALW control programme

The planning of a national programme requires that the national SALW commission (or its equivalent) is in place, and can take the necessary planning action. The national control programme will have to cover all aspects of the programme, many of which are covered below. Four of the main priority topics are the provision of funds, the alerting of the public and government, effective border controls and the creation of a framework of national legislation, which is highly necessary not only during the actual SALW control programme, but after the programme is over, to prevent a rapid return of illegal weapons into the country.

As part of the planning process, the national SALW commission should initiate the political and diplomatic moves to gain consensus and get agreement on the disarmament process, and to establish an independent authority to monitor the fairness of the programme.

Above all, the national SALW commission will have to ensure that all parts of the programme are integrated with each other, and that the whole process can run without interruption. If there is public perception that the programme has stalled, the programme will be hard to restart, political initiative will be lost, and public goodwill and support will be put at risk.

#### 9.5. Planning a national SALW awareness programme

No SALW programme can succeed without the backing of both the people and the government. Where ownership of weapons has been a way of life, and there is a history of

armed factional strife in regions of the country, some communities will need convincing that the removal of weapons will not leave them defenceless against aggressors. The programme should change any perception held by combatants, civilians and communities that only the possession of weapons can guarantee their safety and security. Peace education and disarmament education should be implemented from the very beginning of the DDR process and throughout the post-DDR process to help combatants and communities to learn a culture of peace and non-violence. SALW awareness is therefore

a major part of any SALW programme, and shall be coordinated with the DDR awareness campaign. It will often be difficult to gain the trust of isolated ethnic communities or factions

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who may have no confidence in the military or police, and the organization running this component should have the support of a sufficient number of independent and trusted organizations, such as local and international NGOs or churches, who have many links with the people at local and regional levels. All should understand that the aim is to secure a safer environment and control SALW within society in order to promote the conditions that will encourage the continued return of the region to normalization.

The SALW awareness programme should be put in place early, to build up the support needed to ensure acceptance of the programme. The gathering of such low-level support is relatively inexpensive, and probably within the financial and material resources of the country. It could help to attract external donors to fund the SALW programme.

The SALW awareness programme will also need the full support of government. This might be more difficult to achieve, as political power processes may not always think in humanitarian terms. But without full support from government, the SALW programme is unlikely to succeed.

The more people that are aware of the SALW collection programme, the better. Weapons and ammunition may be held unlawfully, but with no criminal intent. They may in fact be dangerous, especially if they are ammunition items rather than guns. They may also be badly stored and poorly secured. The SALW programme shall be used as the opportunity to educate the local population about the risks of holding such weapons, as well as provide risk reduction advice.

More information on the development and implementation of national DDR and SALW awareness campaigns can be found in IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR, and RMDS/G 06.10 and 06.20.

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## 9.6. Funding of an SALW control programme

SALW control programmes can be expensive, depending on the scale of the weapons problem and the incentives offered to encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons. Many governments believe that most of the funding should come from external donors, but, in reality, the in-country communities that benefit from the programme should also ideally contribute. Local and national government, and businesses should be encouraged to contribute resources to ensure the success of the programme. However, few nations who have recently suffered internal conflict can afford to run an SALW programme without external aid, and the UN, especially UNDP, has been active in a number of SALW intervention programmes.

Funding is always a difficult issue, because estimating the ultimate cost of a programme is highly complex, and not many past successful programmes are available from which to gain experience. The offering of incentives in exchange for weapons can raise the costs a great deal, and the numbers and types of weapons being surrendered may not be known until well into the programme. The main lessons that have so far emerged from past programmes are that sponsors, especially international donors, should be identified before the programme strategy is fully developed so that a programme is sustainable. For operational reasons, it is necessary to start the collection or surrender process at a specific place in the community and then expand into other areas, but sufficient financial and logistic resources should be made available to sustain the surrender process until the whole community has been covered. No one part of the community will be persuaded to surrender weapons unless it can be convinced that the process will be applied throughout the entire community, or surrender its weapons if rivals have not surrendered theirs. The argument that it is better

to get some weapons out of the community than none does not work, especially if it leaves one part of the community at a tactical disadvantage to another. A partial programme based on insufficient funding will therefore probably fail, because it will not be possible to implement it in a way that ensures that equal or proportional numbers of weapons are removed from all factions, or that effective control of the illegal weapons situation can be achieved.

### **9.7. Development of an amnesty plan**

To achieve the surrender of illegal weapons, it will be necessary to declare an amnesty for those who are returning them. In many countries, this will require a change in the law. If the open carrying of weapons is prohibited, the law also may need to be changed or suspended for the amnesty period. It will also be necessary to get the amnesty publicly declared, and information on the terms of the amnesty should be made known to all former warring factions, groups and communities. It shall also be made clear to the security forces, which may have been authorized to detain or shoot anyone openly carrying weapons. The amnesty should have a fixed time limit, to allow the declaration of penalties for owning or carrying illegal weapons after the end of the amnesty period.

Extensive consultation and advice should be taken when determining the period of the amnesty. It will take time to change the attitudes and perceptions of SALW holders, as they need to be convinced that the security situation has improved so much that they will voluntarily surrender their SALW. Previous experience has shown that short amnesties of a month are rarely successful, while longer ones are more effective, resulting in large numbers of weapons being surrendered. The success of the amnesty will be mainly influenced by:

- the active participation and support of the widest range of stakeholders (government, international organisations, NGOs and civil society organizations [CSOs]);
- the effectiveness of the sensitization phase of the SALW awareness component;
- improvements in community perceptions of the security situation;
- well-targeted incentives for voluntary surrender;
- timely delivery of incentives;
- a well-planned and non-confrontational collection operation;
- simultaneous destruction of SALW in support of the SALW awareness component.

### **9.8. Development of national legislation**

Other national legislation may also be required as well as the amnesty. The collection of numbers of weapons in a single collection point may also be illegal, and will require legal authorization. Even the destruction of SALW may have legal implications, and the inspections and monitoring of weapons holdings, including those of national organizations such as the armed forces or police, may itself require an enabling legal framework. This framework should also make clear the areas of responsibility of all the agencies involved. The reimposition of new and possibly harsher penalties for illegal weapons after the amnesty period may also be an important legal step. National legislation may need to be extended to cover the import and export of weapons, to ensure that new weapons cannot lawfully be imported to replace those surrendered during the SALW programme.

More information on arms control legislation can be found in RMDS/G 03.20 and 03.30.



## 9.9. Development of the collection and destruction plan

The most important part of any SALW control programme is the collection and destruction of the SALW, and this shall be carefully planned. The sites for collection shall take into account the fact that many civilians may not wish to visit police posts or military barracks, and some 'neutral ground' may be needed, such as community centres or business premises. The collection plan shall include details of how SALW are going to be accounted for, stored and guarded before being moved to the destruction area. Above all, the programme shall be sufficiently transparent to gain and maintain the support of the local population or factions. They should be allowed controlled access to the process of collection and destruction, within the bounds of operational security. They should be confident that the weapons that they surrender are not going to be used against them by a rival faction or by the government. The methodology developed for weapons collection during the disarmament component of the DDR programme (see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament) may be used as the basis for this phase of SALW control, although it is not recommended that 'joint' weapons collection points (WCPs) are used.

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The planning of the methods for collection and destruction should allow for both collection and destruction to be repeated as often as is necessary. Replicability (i.e., the capacity for a programme to be repeated in different contexts) ensures that the same methods can be used throughout the programme. This means improved training, better use of resources, complete visibility of weapon and ammunition accounting, and easily understood operating procedures. As such, it also helps to ensure the sustainability of the programme.

If some incentive is being provided for weapon surrender such as development aid, food or goods, some method of handling and accounting for the incentives shall also be planned. Depending on the geographical area that the programme will cover, it may well be necessary to plan for a number of SALW collection points. Of particular importance are the personnel managing SALW collection points: the active participation of NGOs and civil society will improve transparency and reduce the 'confrontational' aspects of security force participation.

Information on SALW collection is found in IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and RMDS/G 05.10, and on weapons storage and security in RMDS/G 05.30 and 05.40.

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Plans will also be needed for the destruction of the collected weapons. There are many different methods of destruction, such as crushing, cutting or burning. Different types of weapons may need different forms of destruction,<sup>23</sup> and ammunition will also have to be destroyed. Some forms of destruction are portable, but some are more efficient at fixed locations, which will in turn require planning of the movement of the weapons and ammunition from the collection point to the destruction area. Weapons are probably most vulnerable to theft when being moved, so some form of escorted transport shall be planned. Initial dismantling of the weapon (i.e., removal of the breech blocks) before they are moved may reduce the security risks. There may also be a move by the government to take the higher-quality surrendered weapons and ammunition back into the national police or army, or sell them.<sup>24</sup> UN practitioners should exercise caution when dealing with the issue of weapons retention or redistribution to security forces. Too often, in the absence of sufficient institutional capacity or stockpile control, collected weapons find their way back onto the streets and are used in armed violence and crime. Therefore, weapons collected should be destroyed in the absence of such capacity, particularly if their destruction will contribute to creating trust and confidence in a peace process. However, where the government has demonstrated a commitment to security sector reform, the issue of weapons retention is less of a cause of concern.<sup>25</sup>

## 9.10. Accounting for weapons

The successful management of an SALW programme will require a high standard of accounting, which at the same time should be as transparent as possible. Receipts shall be given for weapons surrendered, and certificates shall be prepared at the moment of destruction. Plans shall be made to publicize the numbers of surrendered weapons, although publicizing detailed locations and community statistics may not be an appropriate measure, and the risks of such a move shall be taken into account. The accountancy process during a pure DDR programme, rather than wider SALW control intervention, shall be transparent enough for all factions to see that equal or proportional numbers of weapons are being surrendered by all parties. It also needs to be accurate enough to ensure that every weapon registered as handed in must also be registered as destroyed. Information on SALW accounting is given in RMDS/G 04.20.

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IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament, section 8.8, provides information on the DREAM management information system, which should be considered for use in a voluntary surrender component of SALW control. This will ensure effective management information throughout the entire DDR process, and will form the basis of any future national weapons accounting or registration system.

## 9.11. Implementation of the collection plan

When the actual collection process starts, the programme managers should ensure that it is witnessed by national and international media, and the results should be publicized, in order to encourage other members of the communities to participate in the voluntary surrender process. This means that collection points shall be correctly staffed and accommodated, with adequate security for recovered weapons and ammunition. There shall also be adequate space for the storage of different kinds of weapons and ammunition. Programmes often receive large amounts of ammunition, grenades and even landmines. Some of these can be actively dangerous if stored incorrectly, and the assistance of EOD-qualified staff will be necessary to advise on correct methods of short-term storage. Collection sites shall have secure storage facilities, possibly in steel shipping containers, which may have to be double locked, with appropriate stakeholders holding the keys to ensure transparency of the process. This will ensure that all stakeholders accept that the weapons are not removed and transferred to armies, police or other factions.

The collection sites should have suitable facilities for the loading of weapons and ammunition into secure transport for movement to the destruction area, or a site near the collection point where mobile weapons destruction equipment can be used.

## 9.12. Implementation of the destruction plan

Where possible, the destruction of the weapons and ammunition should be public and symbolic. Where the weapons are to be destroyed by burning, the actual burning can be observed by independent and local NGOs, politicians and the media. Explosive items such as grenades, ammunition, anti-tank rockets and landmines may also be destroyed in symbolic explosions, in the same way as landmine stockpiles are currently publicly destroyed under the Mine Ban Convention. This shall be done under carefully controlled conditions, which will certainly require specialist EOD advice, and destruction certificates shall be made available to show what weapons have been destroyed.



Following the destruction of the weapons, they shall be inspected to ensure that they cannot be repaired, or that parts of them cannot be rebuilt into complete weapons, or used again as spare parts. This again will initially require specialist expertise. More information on SALW destruction is given in IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament, Annex M, and also in RMDS/G 05.20.

The end result of the destruction process will be large amounts of scrap metal and possibly wood, if burning is not used. Metal scrap can be sold,<sup>26</sup> or recycled into useful tools. This could also have a symbolic effect — in both the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo, steel from destroyed weapons is turned into inspection hatch covers, and this sort of activity can be used to support community awareness programmes.

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### 9.13. Monitoring and verification of the SALW programme

A programme as politically sensitive as SALW control will require active independent monitoring to ensure that the programme is running satisfactorily, and above all is being applied in an even-handed way. For the programme to be successful, there should be continuous feedback to the government, the community, the donors and sponsors stating how many weapons have been collected and destroyed. This assessment should be made by independent verification and monitoring teams. Where possible, these teams need to be able to give some estimates of the proportion of weapons held illegally that have been surrendered. The verifying agencies will need to have the technical expertise to assess the completeness of destruction, not only of weapons, but also of explosive items. More information on the verification and monitoring of SALW programmes can be found in RMDS/G 04.30 and 04.40.

### 9.14. Development of a cross-border SALW movement prevention programme

An SALW intervention programme should not be carried out in isolation, but should be seen as part of a broader disarmament strategy in support of security sector reform — in particular, in the areas of cross-border controls and stockpile destruction. The SALW intervention programme may be needed as part of a peacekeeping or peacemaking strategy, it may assist in creating stability following the restructuring of armed forces, or it may be elevated to become a regional peace initiative. In any of these cases, the good effects of the SALW programme can only be sustained if active measures are taken to prevent weapons coming back into the country to replace those surrendered. Prevention of cross-border weapons movement can only be done by mutual co-operation between the nations on either sides of the border, but it is generally in the interests of both nations

Conflicts can quickly flow across borders unless they are prevented from doing so, and the supply of weapons follows the conflicts. To build a sustainable disarmament programme, groups of nations need to be persuaded to support each other in the establishment of SALW control or other disarmament programmes, and this is one of the keys to success of such programmes.

to work together. Conflicts can quickly flow across borders unless they are prevented from doing so, and the supply of weapons follows the conflicts. To build a sustainable disarmament programme, groups of nations need to be persuaded to support each other in the establishment of SALW control or other disarmament programmes, and this is one of the keys to success of such programmes.

Information on cross-border controls is available in RMDS/G 05.70.

### 9.15. Evaluation of the SALW programme

At the end of the SALW programme, it will be necessary to carry out an evaluation of the results, and the number of weapons handed in compared with the estimated numbers in circulation before the programme started.

An SALW programme is not only a matter of weapons, but the creation of an environment where the government can govern, where the police and armed forces can be trusted, where different communities can live alongside each other and where sustainable development can take place in a secure environment. The socio-economic aspects of an SALW programme are equally as important as the number of weapons recovered.

More importantly, it will be necessary to evaluate as far as possible what effect the reduction of weapons, and the associated SALW awareness programme, has had on the attitudes and way of life of the local people. An SALW programme is not only a matter of weapons, but the creation of an environment where the government can govern, where the police and armed forces can be trusted, where different communities can live alongside each other and where sustainable development can take place in a secure environment. The socio-economic aspects of an SALW programme are equally as important as the number of weapons recovered.

It is also important to evaluate what further steps in disarmament and cross-border co-operation have been taken following the SALW programme. An SALW programme is only one step on the road to disarmament and the creation of national and regional stability.

## 10. SALW control and security sector reform (SSR)<sup>27</sup>

There is much evidence to suggest that a weak security sector creates demand for SALW. Weak security sectors also tend to be highly politicized.<sup>28</sup> This leads to a lack of accountability, increased corruption, lack of coordination, limited professional competence and inter-agency rivalries. This in turn can lead to a security vacuum that may be filled by warring factions or organized criminal groups, resulting in greater insecurity, which leads to an increase in the demand for and use of weapons by the community, as *the demand for weapons is directly related to the perception of threat*. The laws of supply and demand are as equally valid for weapons as anything else, and the lack of a credible security sector makes the supply of weapons to meet this demand relatively easy.

The direct links between SSR and SALW control are an area in which little detailed research has been done so far.

Yet recent operational experience has identified a range of links, and these are identified in this section. SSR covers a wide range of activities, and the need to ensure coordination

and cooperation among many stakeholders is widely acknowledged. Turning this into action at the operational level, however, remains difficult. The spread and unlawful use of weapons is one of the most important security problems in many of the world's poorer countries. Law enforcement agencies in these countries often lack the capacity to investigate and prosecute offenders, or even to collect and secure illegal arms. In some cases, they may even make the problem worse themselves by committing serious abuses against civilians, driving up the demand for illegal weapons.<sup>29</sup>

Links between SSR and SALW at the technical level should be clearly identified and strengthened. The spread of weapons in one country or region improves the capabilities of criminal or warring factions and fuels their activities, which has a possibility of creating instability in neighbouring countries or regions.<sup>30</sup> Therefore the following should be examined during the planning of SALW control interventions in an environment of SSR:

- analysis of SSR within a country should include an SALW control component;
- the functional areas of SALW control should be considered when examining intervention options for SSR;
- SSR interventions should be coordinated with SALW control interventions;
- information on community perceptions of security and the security architecture shall be obtained before resources are committed, to assist in the development of a credible national SSR plan;<sup>31</sup>
- SSR activities should be supported by an SALW awareness campaign to improve community perceptions of improved confidence in the national security architecture.

### 10.1. SALW control and SSR operational relationships

The matrix below identifies those SALW control interventions that are directly related to, or highly complementary to, SSR activities. It is not complete, and further research and operational experience will inevitably result in it being expanded.

SECURITY SECTOR	OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY	SALW CONTROL FUNCTIONAL AREA	REMARKS
Government	Development and implementation of national SSR plan.	Management Information	The National SALW control strategy should be a component of any national SSR plan, with cross links clearly identified.
Armed forces	Armed forces capacity-building and restructuring	SALW destruction SALW stockpile management	The security and destruction of surplus stocks of SALW are fundamental requirements of the logistic component of any armed forces' restructuring.
	Counter-terrorism operations	SALW collection SALW stockpile management	There are links in terms of denying the terrorist access to illegal weapons hides or theft from government facilities.

<b>Police</b>	Police capacity-building and restructuring	SALW destruction	This will occur on a much smaller scale than the military requirements, and should be coordinated as a central destruction programme.
	Offensive search and seizure operations	SALW collection	Links exist in terms of denying criminal access to SALW.
	Defensive search and seizure operations	SALW collection	
	Counter-terrorism operations	SALW collection SALW stockpile management	Links exist in terms of denying the terrorist access to illegal weapons hides or theft from government facilities.
	Community-based policing (CBP)	SALW awareness	An SALW awareness component should be included in any CBP programme.
	Critical incident scene examination (CISE)	Management information	Development should take place of technical methodologies and protocols for dealing with SALW of evidential value.
	Countering organized crime	SALW collection SALW stockpile management	Disruption and denial of criminal access to SALW should be a priority.
<b>Intelligence services</b>	Post-incident analysis	Management information (SALW survey)	See 'Police, CISE'.
	Weapons intelligence	Management information (statistics)	Weapons intelligence agencies must maintain close links with any SALW control operation.
<b>Paramilitaries</b>	See 'Armed forces'.		
<b>Judiciary</b>	Development of legislation	Legislative and regulatory issues	Legislation, guidelines and monitoring of SALW exports, transfers and internal civilian possession and use should be put in place.
		Marking and tracing	
		SALW production restrictions	
<b>Border and customs agencies</b>	Physical export controls	Cross-border controls	
	Anti-trafficking operations		
<b>Private security companies</b>	Commercial operations	Legislative and regulatory issues	Appropriate legislation to control SALW carrying and use of weapons must be developed and implemented.

Also the development of the oversight mechanisms (parliamentarians, journalists, NGOs and CSOs) should include an SALW awareness component to enable them to become actively involved in the SALW control issue, as part of SSR, from a basis of sound knowledge.

## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Arms control:** The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions.

**Arms exports:** The sending of weapons, guns and ammunition from one country to another, often closely monitored and controlled by governments.

**Border controls:** The existence of checks and regulations between countries that control access to and from the country of people, goods and services.

**Broker:**<sup>32</sup> The natural person or legal entity that carries out a brokering activity; anyone who directly performs an activity defined as a brokering activity in the exercise of their own commercial or legal relations. The acts of natural persons, especially employees, are to be ascribed to the legal entity.

**Brokering:**<sup>33</sup> Activities that serve to facilitate the transfer of arms between persons in different third countries, insofar as such transfer is furthered through the assistance of a so-called broker. Core brokering activities include:

- acquisition of SALW located in one third country for the purpose of transfer to another third country;
- mediation between sellers and buyers of SALW to facilitate the transfer of these arms from one third country to another;
- the indication of an opportunity for such a transaction to the seller or buyer (in particular, the introduction of a seller or buyer in return for a fee or other consideration).

**Buy-back:** The direct link between the surrender of weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives in return for cash. Buy-back schemes have been practised in the past, but the concept is often unacceptable to international donors.<sup>34</sup> There is a perception that such schemes reward irresponsible armed personnel who may have already harmed society and the innocent civilian population. They also provide the opportunity for an individual to conduct low-level trading in SALW.

**Capacity:** The strength and ability, which could include knowledge, skill, personnel and resources, to achieve desired objectives.

**Capacity-building:** Used as a noun, refers to processes and programmes that empower and enable the recipients' independent development. Can also be used as an adjective (capacity-building activity).

**Ceasefire agreement:** A binding, non-aggression pact to enable dialogue between conflicting parties.

**Civil society organization (CSO):** Non-state organization composed of voluntary participants.

**Community-based policing (CBP):** CBP involves the police participating in the community and responding to the needs of that community, and the community participating in its own policing and supporting the police. It can further be explained as: the police working in partnership with the community; the community thereby participating in its own policing; and the two working together, mobilizing resources to solve problems affecting public safety over the longer term rather than the police, alone, reacting short term to incidents as they occur.

**Community involvement:** In the context of SALW, the term refers to a process designed to place the needs and priorities of affected communities at the centre of the planning, implementation and monitoring of SALW control and other sectors.

Community involvement is based on an exchange of information and involves communities in the decision-making process in order to establish priorities for SALW control. In this way, SALW control aims to be inclusive, community focused and ensure the maximum involvement of all sections of the community. This involvement includes joint planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects.

Community involvement also works with communities to develop specific interim safety strategies that encourage individual and community behavioural change. This is designed to reduce the impact of SALW on individuals and communities until such time as the threat is removed.

This shall be one of the major strategic principles of SALW control.

**Conflict prevention:** Taking measures to try and prevent violent confrontation.

**Conflict reduction:** Process employed by States with the aim of diffusing tensions and building sustainable peace.

Conflict reduction strategies may include programmes designed to build national and local capacity to settle disputes; encouraging the establishment of coordinated conflict prevention policies among international actors; and assisting countries in reducing the spread of arms.

**Conflict resolution:** Efforts designed to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and strengthen their relationships by building or deepening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact.

Conflict resolution is used to reduce the possibility of violence, or to consolidate the end of a violent conflict in an attempt to prevent its re-escalation.

**Cooperation:** The process of combining separate actors (States/members/armies) to work together as a cohesive unit in attaining pre-defined goals.

**Crisis management:** Actions undertaken by governments and non-governmental agencies in an attempt to respond to security problems, identify their root causes and build international capacity to prevent conflicts from recurring.

**Demilitarization:** The complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose.<sup>35</sup>

Demilitarization not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as essential to achieving the final result.

**Demobilization:** “Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

**Destruction:** The process of final conversion of weapons, ammunition and explosives into an inert state so that they can no longer function as designed.

**Evaluation:** Evaluation is a management tool. It is a time-bound activity that systematically and objectively assesses the relevance, performance and success of ongoing and completed



programmes and projects. Evaluation is carried out selectively, asking and answering specific questions to guide decision makers and/or programme managers. Evaluation determines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme or project.

**Incentives:** Acts or conditions that encourage the achievement of a goal.

**Indicator:** Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a given development or aid factor.

**Intervention:** A process in which an actor enters into the area of another, with or without the consent of the other.

**Monitoring:** Monitoring is a management tool. It is the systematic oversight of the implementation of an activity that establishes whether input deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted outputs have proceeded according to plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct deficiencies. In the context of SALW control, the term refers to the authorized observation by qualified personnel of sites, activities or processes without taking responsibility for what is being observed. This is usually carried out to check conformity with undertakings, procedures or standard practice and often includes recording and reporting.

**National plan:** A comprehensive, short, medium or long-term strategy to bring about the development of a specific issue in a country.

**Operational objective:** Specific target set by an organization to achieve a mission. Operational objectives should be precise, ideally quantifiable, and should be achievable with the resources that are likely to become available.

**Organized crime:** Widespread crime carried out in an organized fashion by criminal organizations, or groups of criminals where the group has a recognizable structure.

**Policy:** A set of statements that define the purpose and goals of an organization and the rules, standards and principles of action that govern the way in which the organization aims to achieve these goals.

Policy evolves in response to strategic direction and field experience. In turn, it influences the way in which plans are developed, and how resources are mobilized and applied. Policy is prescriptive and compliance is assumed, or at least is encouraged.

**Policy development:** The process whereby many academic, international and non-governmental organizations provide assistance to governments in developing their strategies and managerial approaches to particular issues, problems or events.

**Political stability:** A situation where the political system and its actors, rules, cultures and institutions achieve balance and maintain a certain degree of order.

**Post-conflict:** Can describe the time, period or events taking place in a given state or region that had experienced an outbreak of violence or conflict in its recent past.

**Public information:** Information that is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support. The objective of public information within SALW control is to raise general awareness. It is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW problem. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and accurate data, it is the most practical means of communicating safety information. In other situations, public information can support community liaison/involvement.



**Reconstruction:** The process of rebuilding the institutions of state that have failed or are failing due to circumstances of war or to systematic destruction through poor governance.

**Recovery:** A restorative process in relation to the situation prior to the distress. It might entail 'healing', reparation, amelioration and even regeneration.

**Reintegration:** "Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance" (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

**SALW advocacy:** A programme of activities that aim to raise SALW problems and issues with the general public, the authorities, the media, governments and their institutions to achieve changes at both institutional and/or individual levels. These types of activities also include campaigns highlighting the SALW problems and issues with the aim of encouraging people to surrender weapons. This is generally carried out to support weapons collection programmes.

**SALW awareness programme:** A programme of activities carried out with the overall goal of minimizing, and where possible eliminating, the negative consequences of inadequate SALW control by carrying out an appropriate combination of SALW advocacy, SALW risk education and media operations/public information campaigns, which together work to change behaviours and introduce appropriate alternative ways attitudes over the long term. Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national SALW control initiative will dictate the appropriate type of SALW awareness activities. SALW awareness is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW threat. It may take the form of formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and available data, it is the most practical way of communicating safety information. In other situations it can support community liaison.

**SALW control:** Activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW spread and possession. These activities include cross-border control issues, legislative and regulatory measures, SALW awareness and communications strategies, SALW collection and destruction operations, SALW survey and the management of information and SALW stockpile management.

**SALW risk education:** A process that encourages the adoption of safer behaviours by at-risk groups and by SALW holders, and which provides the links among affected communities, other SALW components and other sectors. SALW risk education can be implemented as a stand-alone activity, in contexts where no weapons collection is taking place. If an amnesty is to be set up at a later stage, risk education activities will permit an information campaign to take place efficiently, using the networks, systems and methods in place as part of the risk education programme and adapting the content accordingly.

SALW risk education is an essential component of SALW control. There are two related and mutually reinforcing components: (1) community involvement; and (2) public education.

Generally, SALW risk education programmes can use both approaches, as they reinforce each other. They are not, however, alternatives to each other, nor are they alternatives to eradicating the SALW threat by weapons collection and destruction. The use of those approaches will also depend on whether a weapons collection programme is taking place or not.

**SALW survey:** A systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent of SALW spread and impact within a region, nation or community in order to provide accurate data and information for a safe, effective and efficient intervention by an appropriate organisation. The following terms have been used in the past, though the preferred one is as indicated above: 'national assessment', 'base-line assessment' and 'mapping'.

**Security:** An individual or states feeling of safety or well-being, protected from attack or violent conflict.

OR

The control of threat, integrated with an appropriate response capability.

**Security sector reform (SSR):** A dynamic concept involving the design and implementation of a strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private-military companies (PMCs), correctional services and civil society 'watch-dogs'.

**Small arms and light weapons (SALW):** All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability. There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a 'correct' definition has yet to be agreed. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW. For the purposes of the IDDRS series, the above definition will be used.

**Small arms capacity assessment (SACA):** The component of SALW survey that collects data on the local resources available to respond to the SALW problem.

**Small arms distribution assessment (SADA):** The component of SALW survey that collects data on the type, quantity, ownership, distribution and movement of SALW within the country or region.

**Small arms impact survey (SAIS):** The component of SALW survey that collects data on the impact of SALW on the community and social and economic development.

**Small arms perception survey (SAPS):** The component of SALW survey that collects qualitative and quantitative information, using focus groups, interviews and household surveys, on the attitudes of the local community to SALW and possible interventions.

**Stakeholder:** A broad term used to denote all local, national and international actors who have an interest in the outcome of any particular DDR process. This includes participants and beneficiaries, parties to peace accords/political frameworks, national authorities, all UN and partner implementing agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, and regional actors and international political guarantors of the peace process.

**Standard:** A documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose. IDDRS aim to improve safety and efficiency in DDR operations by encouraging the use of the preferred procedures and practices at both Headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

**Transfer:** The import, export, trans-shipment, re-export, intangible transfer, licensed movement during production, brokering and transport of SALW.

**Transparency:** Free and open access to information that enables civil society to perform its regulatory function. Transparency is sometimes used as a synonym for accountability in governance.

**Verification:** Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled (ISO 9000:2000).

**Violence:** The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or a group or community that either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.

**Voluntary surrender:** The physical return on their own accord by an individual(s) or community of SALW to the legal government or an international organization with no further penalty.

**Weapon:** Anything used, designed or used or intended for use:<sup>36</sup>

- (1) in causing death or injury to any person; or
- (2) for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.

**Weapons in competition for development (WCD):** The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by competing communities in exchange for an agreed proportion of small-scale infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organisation or NGO.

**Weapons in exchange for development (WED; WfD):** The indirect linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in exchange for the provision of sustainable infrastructure development by the legal government, an international organization or NGO.

**Weapons in exchange for incentives (WEI):** The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by individuals in exchange for the provision of appropriate materials by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO.

**Weapons linked to development (WLD):** The direct linkage between the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons by the community as a whole in return for an increase in ongoing development assistance by the legal government, an international organization or an NGO.

## Abbreviations

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/standards
NCDDR	national commission on DDR
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SEE RMDS/G	South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UN PoA	UN <i>Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects</i> , A/Conf.192/15 of 20 July 2001

<b>WCD</b>	weapons in competition for development
<b>WCP</b>	weapons collection point
<b>WED</b>	weapons in exchange for development
<b>WEI</b>	weapons in exchange for incentives
<b>WLD</b>	weapons linked to development

## Annex B: Normative references

The following normative documents (i.e., documents containing applicable norms, standards and guidelines) contain provisions that make up the norms, standards and guidelines that apply to the processes dealt with in this module. In the case of dated references, later amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on standard laid down in this module are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies. Members of ISO keep registers of currently valid ISO publications.

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC), SALW Awareness Support Pack 2005 (SASP 2), <http://www.seesac.org/resources/sasp>.

——, South Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (SEE RMDS/G) Series, SEESAC, Belgrade, March 2004, [http://www.seesac.org/resources/current\\_eng](http://www.seesac.org/resources/current_eng).

Small Arms Survey and SEESAC, *SALW Survey Protocols*, <http://www.seesac.org/resources/surveyprotocols>.

UN DPKO holds copies of all references used in this module. UN DPKO maintains a register of the latest version/edition of the IDDRS, and these can be read on the IDDRS Web site: <http://www.unddr.org>. National authorities, employers and other interested bodies and organizations should obtain copies before starting DDR programmes.

## Annex C: Further reading

The following informative documents contain useful background information concerning SALW control.


Gleichman, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, Swedish National Defence College, Norwegian Defence School, GTZ and the Pearson Peacekeeping Center, 2004, <http://www.unddr.org>.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, September 2003, <http://www.osce.org/item/12525.html>.

UN, *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, A/CONF.192/15 of 20 July 2001.

——, *Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Trans-national Organized Crime*, A/55/255 of 8 June 2001.

## Annex D: SALW intervention process flow



## Endnotes

- 1 Drawn from the Co-ordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) Mechanism Statement, Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects, New York, 9 July 2001.
- 2 The import, export, trans-shipment, re-export, intangible transfer, licensed movement during production, brokering and transport of SALW.
- 3 The functions of SALW collection, SALW destruction and stockpile management are sometimes collectively known in the small arms community as weapons collection, management and disposal (WCMD). The term WCMD is deliberately not used in IDDRS to avoid confusion with the military and official NATO abbreviation for wind corrected munitions dispensers (WCMD).
- 4 ECOWAS, *Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa*, 31 October 1998 and subsequent reaffirmations, <http://www.sec.ecowas.int>.
- 5 EU, *EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*, 5 October 2000, [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/c\\_178/c\\_17820010622eno2730278.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/c_178/c_17820010622eno2730278.pdf).
- 6 Council of the EU, *Joint Action on the European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 2002/589/CFSP, 12 July 2002.
- 7 Council of the EU, *EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and Their Ammunition*, Council of the EU 5319/06 of 13 January 2006, adopted 15–16 December 2005.
- 8 *Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*, 21 April 2004.
- 9 OAS, *Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials*, 14 November 1997, <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html>.
- 10 OAS, *OAS Resolution on Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking in SALW*, 10 June 2003, [http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres\\_1968.htm](http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1968.htm).
- 11 OSCE, *OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 24 November 2000, <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/fsc/2000/decisions/fscew231.htm>.
- 12 OSCE, *OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition*, 19 November 2003, [http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2003/11/1379\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2003/11/1379_en.pdf).
- 13 OSCE, *OSCE Decision on Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)*, [http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2004/05/2965\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2004/05/2965_en.pdf).
- 14 Stability Pact, *Combating the Proliferation of SALW: Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for South Eastern Europe*, 28 November 2001 (revised May 2006), <http://www.stabilitypact.org>.
- 15 Wilkinson, Adrian and John Hughes-Wilson, *Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures*, UNDP, New York, July 2001.
- 16 In Mozambique the disarmament mandate placed all weapons under UN control, but only a limited number of weapons were destroyed, as “the mission could do no more because it had no budget for destruction and no donor could be found to fund the programme” (Herbert Wulf, Bonn International Center for Conversion Workshop on Small Arms, 18–20 February 1999, Geneva).
- 17 It must be recognized that SALW control is about a lot more than SALW collection, but as this is the component of the intervention with the most direct contact with communities, it is the component that generally dictates the progress of the rest of the programme.
- 18 There has been a tendency to label the whole SALW control programme by the type of incentive concept used to support the programme. This should be discouraged, as the success of a programme is not necessarily dependent on the success of the voluntary surrender component. For example, weapons registration may be just as effective as collection and destruction, as at least the weapons are under some form of legislative control.
- 19 Further detailed information can be found in RMDS/G 04.10: ‘Management of SALW Control Programmes’.



- 20 RMDS/G 03.10 provides guidance on the establishment of national SALW commissions, and the distinction between an authority and a commission.
- 21 Taken from the UNDP definition at <http://www.magent.undp.org/cdrb/techpap2.htm>.
- 22 *Resolving Small Arms Proliferation: The Development and Implementation of National Action Plans on Arms Management and Disarmament*, Saferworld and SaferAfrica, 2003.
- 23 See OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, OSCE, 2003, <http://www.osce.org/item/12525.html>.
- 24 UNDP assistance to SALW interventions will normally be conditional on the physical destruction of all weapons destroyed.
- 25 UNDP, *Practice Note on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, November 2005, p. 40.
- 26 See OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practices*, op. cit., chapter VII, 'Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons'.
- 27 Developed from the *Cranfield University Compendium of Good Practices on SSR*, [http://www.gfn-ssr.org/good\\_practice](http://www.gfn-ssr.org/good_practice).
- 28 Donald, D. and F. Olanisakin, *Security Sector Reform and the Demand for SALW*, Project PLOUGHSHARES Briefing 01/7, <http://www.ploughshares.ca>.
- 29 <http://www.nisat.org/security>.
- 30 A classic example of this can be found in the events in Albania during 1997, which led to over half a million weapons being stolen from state armouries. These weapons found their way to criminal groups and warring factions in the region, and have made a significant contribution to both the increase in organized crime violence and the events in Kosovo since 1999 (Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004).
- 31 The *SALW Survey Protocols* cover the methodologies to obtain much of the necessary information.
- 32 OSCE, *Handbook of Best Practices*, op. cit.: 'National Control of Brokering Activities'.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 As of March 2002, UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery will no longer support such schemes.
- 35 IMAS 11.10.
- 36 Criminal Code of Canada, sec. (S) 2: 'Interpretation', para. 2.

# 4.20 Demobilization

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#### NOTE

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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## 4.20 Demobilization

### Summary

Demobilization is both a physical and a mental process.<sup>1</sup> The physical aspect involves the separation of an armed element (i.e., a soldier/combatant) from the systematic command and control structure of an armed force or group, thereby either reducing the number of combatants in an armed force or group, or disbanding it in its entirety. This physical aspect, as an element of security sector reform (SSR), in addition to dealing with the potential threat posed by the continued presence of armed anti-State elements and criminals, can be used to remove from service either military or police forces members who are considered to be surplus, thus contributing to the downsizing of the armed forces, if this is considered appropriate for the needs of the State. This has economic and security implications in that it allows a State, in a period of transition from conflict to peace, to reduce the size of its security forces while keeping those personnel most appropriate to its present requirements and simultaneously finding alternate livelihoods for the remainder.

The mental aspect of the demobilization process involves preparing the disarmed individual to find his/her place in civil society without the camaraderie and support systems of the structured armed force or group. This is a longer-term objective, and can be regarded as a by-product of successful reinsertion.

The phase of physical demobilization should be jointly planned and developed by an inter-agency team. The military have an important role to play in both disarmament and demobilization, particularly with regard to security and links to SSR. However, whereas disarmament is primarily the responsibility of the military, supported by civilian staff, demobilization is primarily the responsibility of the civilian component of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, with military support. Civil-military cooperation is the key to efficiency in this part of DDR operations.

The mental process is supported by civilian specialist agencies offering readjustment counselling, personal profiling in identifying appropriate reinsertion options, domestic support, and a certain amount of monitoring and general support during the reinsertion process.

Demobilization is an integral part of DDR. Whether at the political/institutional level or at the individual or group level, it is voluntary. Demobilization normally follows individual disarmament, and must in turn be followed by a long-term reintegration programme. After a conflict, in particular one that has been civil or ethnicity based, reintegration requires both social and psychological rehabilitation, whether combatants are later recruited into new, more formalized and disciplined groupings, i.e., the national military or police services, or reinserted into the civilian community. In preparation for this phase, the demobilization process should include guidance and education to equip participants to more easily make the transition from combatant status to either new roles in national service, or a return to civil society.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

The aim of this module is to equip the reader with practical tools and suggestions on the design and management of demobilization activities. Various methods for demobilization are examined, from which the DDR practitioner may select those that best meet the specific needs of each situation.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

### DEMOBILIZATION

"Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may comprise the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion."

Note by the Secretary-General on administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peace-keeping operations, A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005

## 3. Introduction

Demobilization, as a component of the DDR process, officially certifies an individual's change of status from military to civilian. Demobilization is generally a lengthier process than disarmament, and involves the psychological transformation from military to civilian. As such, it lays the groundwork that is essential for the reintegration of the individual into civilian life. Individual demobilization mirrors the wider demobilization of a society emerging from conflict, and is an important symbolic phase in the consolidation of peace.

## 4. Guiding principles

Demobilization must be planned according to the following guidelines:

- *Respect for engagements and commitments:* Promises about post-demobilization packages must be honoured;

- *Unity of effort*: The physical phase of demobilization involves civil–military cooperation; United Nations (UN)–non-governmental organization (NGO) collaboration; and collaboration among DDR participants, communities, the government and the UN;
- *Non-discrimination, and fair and equal treatment*: Appropriate attention should be given to the needs of women, youth and children so that (1) they are not excluded; and (2) their security is assured throughout the demobilization process;
- *Human and community security*: Demobilization is the phase where reintegration needs are identified. It is important that between the demobilization and reintegration phases, links be developed with national authorities, communities and other stakeholders, to ensure a smooth transition between the two phases.

## 5. Planning factors

### 5.1. Security

Ensuring the security of participants is essential to the DDR process. In the unpredictable and volatile context in which DDR takes place, the risk of spontaneous violence within and between disarmed groups cannot be overruled. Such occurrences can place the whole peace process at risk. In any event, DDR participants who have disarmed may have concerns regarding their own security. Personal security shall be assured, from disarmament right into the reintegration phase. This usually requires awareness and attention from the UN military and UN Police (UNPOL) elements supporting the process.

Ensuring the security of participants is essential to the DDR process. In the unpredictable and volatile context in which DDR takes place, the risk of spontaneous violence within and between disarmed groups cannot be overruled.

### 5.2. Location

Where security permits, demobilization should be done in the community of settlement. Residential options should be avoided where possible. If the DDR process is included in a peace agreement, the location of demobilization sites should be defined in that agreement and be agreed to by all parties to it. Demobilization sites should be easily accessible to each faction, be located in the area under their control, and be secured by neutral forces. Demobilization sites or internment camps for guerrilla forces operating from neighbouring countries can be set up in those countries, and disarmament can take place there as well, if relevant political agreements exist (also see IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

If the DDR process is included in a peace agreement, the location of demobilization sites should be defined in that agreement and be agreed to by all parties to it.

Responsibility for the establishment, security and supply of demobilization sites is generally assumed by UN peacekeeping troops, UNPOL and/or various UN agencies. Availability of water, accessibility by road and air, and the condition of the terrain are some important determining factors for their location.

5.40 ◀▶

### 5.3. Size and capacity

The size and capacity of demobilization camps are determined by the number of combatants to be discharged and the time required for processing them.

It is recommended that, where possible, camps for smaller numbers of ex-combatants should be considered, as they are easier to administer, control and secure. However, having many small camps at once can also lead to widely dispersed resources and difficult logistic and other support issues. Modular camps designed to accommodate up to 600 persons are recommended, but when time constraints mean that larger numbers have to be dealt with in a short period of time, two modular camps may be constructed simultaneously and managed by the same team (see Annex B for an example of a typical modular camp). In order to maximize the use of the camps and avoid bottlenecks or other problems in the demobilization stage, the operational plan should carefully provide methods for controlling the number and flow of people to be demobilized in each group dealt with at any particular time.

Carrying out demobilization in phases is one option to increase efficiency. This process may include a pilot test phase, which makes it possible to learn from mistakes in the early phases and adapt the process so as to improve performance in later phases. As with disarmament, clear and replicable procedures (i.e., procedures that can be repeated in different contexts) allow a reduction in personnel training costs, more efficient use of resources, and better prospects for a sustainable programme. Successful demobilization requires a commitment from all the parties involved and strict adherence to the timetable. Where these are not in place, mobile DDR operations become more uncertain, and may depend on the willingness of groups to enter the programme, the specific geographical area where the mobile camps are situated, and their proximity to a safe border.

### 5.4. Information management: Databases

A secure database of all the participants in the DDR process, containing the details collected during the screening process, needs to be established as early as possible. This database is essential to track the reintegration of DDR participants and follow up on protection and human rights issues. It should be mobile, suitable for use in the field, cross-referenced and be able to provide DDR teams with a clear overall view of where participants have reintegrated and what their cumulative profiles are.

The establishment of an effective and reliable means of registration and recording is essential to the demobilization process. A good-quality information management system should be installed, tested and secured before operations start. While the Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) is responsible for providing equipment, and the camp manager for maintenance, it is the DDR unit information systems officer who should ensure the suitability of the equipment (hardware and software) for the intended purpose. He/She may occasionally require the assistance of information technology (IT) technical staff.

### 5.5. Inter-agency coordination

Demobilization sites should be properly planned, prepared and managed. This could involve the establishment of an inter-agency co-ordination group, which may also include donor representatives.

The most important body that staff implementing DDR should liaise with is the national commission on DDR (NCDDR), which is the body responsible for the overall carrying out and supervision of the process. At both the regional level and at the disarmament and



demobilization sites, the camp manager and military commander form the core of the DDR implementing group, which should also include the operational implementation partners responsible for each site. DDR managers at the regional and subregional levels should adequately liaise with local leaders and security implementers to ensure that nearby communities are not badly affected by the demobilization camp or process.

## 5.6. Links with reintegration

Integrated DDR design is based on an understanding that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are fundamentally indivisible and interlinked at both the strategic and the operational levels. Maintaining this indivisibility requires a seamless transition from one phase of the process to another. Experience from several peacekeeping missions, including Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, has highlighted the risks of disjointed DDR operations in which the three elements are not properly integrated. They can become disjointed for a combination of reasons: insufficient or inflexible funding mechanisms from widely different donors; the uncertainty of voluntary contributions; and unrealistic time-lines or far too many beneficiaries resulting from inappropriate entry criteria, all of which rapidly use up limited resources during the disarmament/demobilization phase. This can cause frustration and possibly civil unrest, which, in extreme circumstances, could cause the collapse of peace-building efforts and bring about a return to violence. Therefore, it is vital that reintegration programmes be prepared to receive demobilized personnel immediately after they have been demobilized. It is the responsibility of the various actors in the planning cycle, i.e., UN Headquarters, mission headquarters, UN agencies, donors and the DDR team, to ensure that sufficient funds, resources and capacity exist in order to carry out simultaneous planning and preparation for DDR. The availability of assessed contributions for a peacekeeping mission to fund reinsertion projects can lessen the pressure to develop an instantly available reintegration programme (also see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR).

A focus on community-based reintegration is at the core of DDR. Demobilization should therefore be linked to projects that benefit both the community and ex-combatants. Labour-intensive projects are of particular value, as they can keep often-restless ex-combatants busy in the short term.

## 5.7. Striking a balance between assistance and rewards

Cash assistance is often viewed by former combatants and their commanders as 'cash for weapons'. Recent field reports indicate that 'buy-back' schemes rarely have the desired effect; instead, old and unserviceable weapons are often submitted to allow combatants to enter the demobilization phase while commanders hold on to serviceable weapons as protection in case of the failure of the peace process. Furthermore, 'buy-back' schemes can increase arms flows into a country and actually encourage cross-border arms trading by creating a new 'market' for weapons. Surveys of the quality of the weapons handed in and the price of arms

'Buy-back' schemes rarely have the desired effect; instead, old and unserviceable weapons are often submitted to allow combatants to enter the demobilization phase while commanders hold on to serviceable weapons as protection in case of the failure of the peace process.

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on the black market should be used to monitor the process and avoid such situations (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament).

The civilian population often go through far worse experiences than combatants during armed conflict, and are likely to become resentful if ex-combatants receive relatively

During the strategic planning phase, as well as in the development of the operational plan, every effort should be made to avoid making disparities in wealth worse between DDR participants and the general population.

large benefits before they are reintegrated into war-torn and poor communities. Such post-conflict inequity (unfairness) may undermine conciliatory efforts, making it difficult to carry out meaningful social reintegration programmes. During the strategic planning phase, as well as in the development of the operational plan, every effort should be made to avoid making disparities in wealth worse between DDR participants and the general population.

### 5.8. Links with security sector reform

DDR is just one component of the peace-building strategy of a country. After a conflict, the security apparatus of the state (including the judiciary and correctional systems, as well as law-enforcement agencies) in post-conflict countries may undergo major reforms. They may have been at the source of, or one of the contributing factors to, the conflict. Links should be developed between parallel reform initiatives in the security sector. For example, the police, gendarmerie and restructured army may be potential sources of employment for demobilized combatants. The restructuring process may also create large numbers of combatants to be demobilized. Discharged combatants wanting to join the security forces must go through an appropriate selection procedure, including vetting (also see IDDRS 4.50 on UN Police Roles and Responsibilities). Those meeting predetermined criteria can be identified as potential candidates for the new armed forces during the demobilization operation.

### 5.9. Public information and awareness-raising

A strong public information campaign should be run to provide accurate and detailed information on the DDR process, including the demobilization activities. This can help to provide former combatants with realistic expectations and to deal with rumours and other types of misinformation that may create negative attitudes to DDR (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR).

## 6. Profile of demobilization participants

DDR candidates include combatants and dependants (see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners). The definition of a combatant should include individuals who were part of the armed force or group in a support capacity, as well as those involved in active combat. This means that cooks, porters, messengers, administrators, 'war wives' and sex slaves also qualify for combatant status. There are also civilian dependants, who may not have played a role in the armed force or group, but may have relied upon a combatant member of his/her family for support. Each category of people associated with armed forces

and groups has its own needs and concerns, and should be catered for accordingly at the demobilization site. Most importantly, information on each DDR participant needs to be collected in order to define his/her reintegration needs and to provide information for the design of reinsertion and reintegration programmes (also see IDDRS 5.10–5.70).

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## 6.1. Children

Girls and boys associated with an armed group or force in any role shall be identified as early on as possible in the process, handled in accordance with the *Cape Town Principles*, and taken to an interim care centre (ICC) for further attention. The ICC shall be separate from the demobilization site, and should be run by an organization specializing in the care of children associated with armed groups and forces. Child mothers and young mothers, whatever role they played in the armed group or force, will also require special assistance in caring for young children (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

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Family tracing to help reunite children with their families may also take place at the demobilization site. Possible partners for such operations include the United Nations Children's Fund and its working partners, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It is advisable that a memorandum of understanding (MoU), clearly defining the responsibilities of each implementing partner in this regard, be drawn up.

Children, especially, should be processed in the community, and should not be put in institutions. In addition to family tracing, reinsertion packages for children should focus on their education.

## 7. Demobilization methods

Although encampment is no longer considered standard practice, DDR planners may or may not choose to carry out disarmament and demobilization through encampment, depending on the context. The decision to establish demobilization sites, and whether to carry out disarmament as well as demobilization at the same place, shall be carefully considered by the DDR planning team. Answers to the following questions can help shape decisions:

- How much time has passed since fighting ended?
- Are the combatants already in the communities where they will reintegrate?
- Does the security context indicate that encampment is necessary?
- Will encampment play an important confidence-building role in the peace process?
- What is the size of the armed forces and groups participating in the process?
- Will there be enough resources for encampment, i.e., to build semi-permanent demobilization sites?
- What are the potential risks of encamping any one of the groups? (See IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR.)
- Does the context allow the use of other alternatives to encampment?

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### 7.1. Semi-permanent demobilization sites

DDR planners should carefully consider both the advantages and disadvantages of establishing any form of encampment (disarmament and) demobilization, depending on the country context. The following issues can assist in deciding on the best approach:

SEMI-PERMANENT DEMOBILIZATION (ENCAMPMENT)	
ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Provides security, as long as control of the group is ensured and sufficient and capable peacekeeping forces are deployed</li> <li>■ Easier to carry out procedures (counting, identification, registration, supervision)</li> <li>■ Administrative and logistic needs can be pre-planned; material can be stockpiled</li> <li>■ Can be an important symbol that the war is over and help build confidence in the peace process</li> <li>■ Easier to provide services like accommodation, food, medical care, re-orientation and counselling, and 'citizenship' training</li> <li>■ Can help mark the transition from military to civilian life, and can help combatants adjust mentally to their change in status</li> <li>■ Can benefit the community if old barracks, missions, schools and hospitals are refurbished for the temporary purpose of DDR and long-term service of the community</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Costly to construct and maintain</li> <li>■ If entry is not phased and adequately organized, can lead to security incidents in volatile situations (made worse by lack of force protection)</li> <li>■ Can create a negative mindset and discontent among combatants; can be seen as a loss of freedom</li> <li>■ Potentially dangerous for female combatants and associates, who may require separate cantonment areas</li> <li>■ Becomes a known, fixed concentration of potential or previous adversaries</li> <li>■ Disarmament sites become known as places for weapons storage before destruction</li> <li>■ Presents a target for political discontent or social/ethnic retribution (revenge)</li> <li>■ May encourage people to present themselves as combatants, even if they have never been associated with armed forces or groups</li> <li>■ May attract local people scavenging for supplies and food</li> <li>■ May become 'permanent' if demobilization and/or reintegration are delayed</li> </ul>

Where encampment is judged to be necessary, DDR planners should take all possible steps to minimize the disadvantages that are normally associated with encampment. Encampment should be kept as short as possible (one week to a month). It should not start before demobilization and reintegration are ready to be put into operation.

## 7.2. Mobile demobilization sites

Mobile demobilization may be the best alternative to constructing semi-permanent demobilization sites. Mobile demobilization may be used particularly if the target group is small and already cantoned in one location (e.g., barracks). This allows demobilization teams to carry out their activities in these locations without the need to build permanent structures. It is a system that works best with disciplined, recognizable units that are willing to demobilize. It may also be the best approach to take if the target group is already based in the community where its members will reintegrate, as it reduces the logistic requirements for transporting combatants from their community to a demobilization centre and back again.

Furthermore, mobile demobilization centres are also useful in situations where the target group is scattered and not all its members are willing to demobilize. Establishing mobile demobilization centres near these groups can make it easier for those willing to demobilize to take part in the process. Such a programme does, however, require the collaboration of local authorities, and must be combined with a public information campaign to inform the groups about the nature of the DDR programme, the location of the camp and the dates at which it will be operational so that they know what is on offer and how to join the DDR programme.

Mobile demobilization site may not offer that full range of services that semi-permanent sites do. If regional reintegration centres are established, DDR participants may be referred to them once back in their communities, rather than receiving induction and reintegration orientation in the demobilization phase.

Below are the advantages and disadvantages of this method of demobilization:

MOBILE DEMOBILIZATION (WITHOUT ENCAMPMENT)	
ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Is cheaper, more expedient and more flexible than encampment</li> <li>■ Does not reproduce power structures found in military life</li> <li>■ May be less of a security risk than encampment</li> <li>■ Is less coercive</li> <li>■ Can focus more on individual combatants and small groups, including special groups</li> <li>■ May allow greater community involvement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The full range of services to participants may not be on offer</li> <li>■ The psychological effects of demobilization are less clearly felt</li> <li>■ Is more dependent on the willingness of ex-combatants to participate in the DDR process</li> </ul>

Where mobile demobilization sites are used, DDR planners shall also take all possible measures to minimize the disadvantages of this approach. Mobile demobilization sites shall not become operational before reintegration assistance becomes available.

## 8. Activities during demobilization

### 8.1. Reception

Combatants can enter the demobilization site in two ways. Either they assemble at predetermined pick-up points or assembly areas, from which they are transported to the demobilization site (this may require UN forces to secure transport routes between the assembly areas and the demobilization site), or they may be directed on foot from a disarmament site to the demobilization site, if the two are separate. All routes to the demobilization centre must be thoroughly monitored and guarded by UN military forces to provide security or to prevent entry of additional people, with or without weapons.

In each case, a list should be kept of the people who are being sent from one site to another. This allows better control of the flow of people from one site to another. On arrival, individuals should be checked against the list and searched again for concealed weapons or munitions.

### 8.2. Screening and registration

Screening and registration of DDR candidates is the single most important activity at the demobilization stage of the DDR process. The aim of this activity is to:

- establish the eligibility of the DDR candidate to enter the process, and to register those who meet the criteria;
- gather background information on the candidate, in order to design reintegration to suit his/her needs;

- weed out those trying to cheat the system by passing through demobilization twice in the hope of receiving more benefits, and other cheaters;
- identify DDR candidates with special needs;
- gather military information on the armed group/force.

General information on the background of the DDR participants is needed in order to match the individual with their reintegration needs. The following list provides an idea of some of the information which may be required:

- nationality;
- education level;
- literacy;
- name, number, sex and age of family members and dependants;
- community of origin;
- place of reintegration;
- marital status;
- former occupation;
- role in armed force/group;
- family members already present in reintegration location;
- special needs (disabilities, etc.).

An example of a screening form is given in Annex F.

In order to provide DDR planners with a realistic view of the remaining caseload, a separate screening to gather information on military activities could also take place. This screening should be carried out with the strictest discretion, and should be done by specialists in each area. Examples of the type of information that may be requested are included below.

#### **CHECKLIST OF MILITARY INFORMATION ON THE ARMED FORCE/GROUP**

1. Name or identification of group
2. Origins and (political/military) orientation and/or obligations
3. Names and ranks of leadership (request permission to obtain digital photos)
4. Details of groupings and organization (including ethnic, religious and cultural details)
5. Additional component forces (associated 'other groups')
6. Degree and extent of command and control by leaders
7. Communications capacity
8. Locations and likely movements
9. Intentions, aspirations and expectations (including perception of peace process)
10. Level of knowledge of and attitudes relating to DDR (leaders and ranks may differ)
11. Means of self-sustenance and general health of group
12. Numbers and task groupings of group:
  - Combatants
    - i. Male
    - ii. Female
    - iii. Under 18
    - iv. Under 14
  - Non-combat support (i–iv) (logistics, medical, cooks, etc.)
  - Non-combatants/families (i–iv) (include details of infants and infirm or injured)

13. Numbers and type of small arms and light weapons
  14. Details of ammunition and explosive stocks (or best estimate)
  15. Numbers and type of vehicles and mounted weapons
  16. Number and type of medium and heavy weapons
  17. Estimate movement timings to nearest known or estimated assembly area or pick-up point.  
Note obvious or declared routes
- N.B. Developed contact with group may reveal the veracity of the leadership

### 8.3. Registration and documentation

Once combatants have been screened and found to be eligible for participation in the DDR programme, they should be registered and issued with identity documents. When mobile DDR is carried out, copies of the registration and personal documentation should be stored in a secure location and be included in the DDR database as soon as possible.

### 8.4. Introduction and briefing

It is important to provide the ex-combatants and associated persons with clear and simple guidance when they arrive at the demobilization site, so as to ensure that they are informed about the process, that they understand the rules and regulations they are expected to observe, and to respond to any concerns — whether justified or unjustified — they may have about the process. This can also help to prevent unrest and stress within the group.

Introductory briefings should cover, among other things, the following:

- orientation on accommodation, cooking, eating, washing and ablution facilities;
- outline of activities and processes;
- camp routines and time schedules;
- camp rules and discipline, including off-limits areas and penalties;
- policies on gender-based violence and penalties for infringement;
- camp security;
- details of family routines;
- fire precautions and physical safety.

### 8.5. Counselling and referral

Counselling involves identifying specific needs, providing psychosocial assistance and supporting voluntary testing for HIV / AIDS. It can take place at the demobilization site or may be postponed to the reintegration phase (also see IDDRS 5.60 on HIV / AIDS and DDR and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

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#### DRUGS AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE

Recent experience in West and Central Africa reveals high levels of drug abuse among former fighters (adult and children). In addition to social, psychological and health complications, drug-addicted individuals may potentially upset the dynamics of their community and, before reintegration, may cause problems at the demobilization site (also see IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

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## 8.6. Health screening

After being accepted as a DDR participant, the individual should be directed to the medical screening team. At this point, general and specific health needs are assessed. Those who require immediate medical attention of a kind that is not available in the camp should be taken to a hospital (by the suitable partner agency). Others should be treated within the camp facilities.

Basic specialized attention in the areas of reproductive health and sexually transmitted infections, including voluntary testing and counselling for HIV/AIDS, should be provided. The senior medical staff member should be responsible for the supervision of the medical support services (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

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## 8.7. Pre-discharge awareness-raising/sensitization

Before being discharged, former combatants should be given advice on the challenges of the transition from military to civilian life. The pre-discharge phase provides an opportunity to offer individuals information to prepare them for civilian life, and aims to reduce the likelihood of remobilization. It allows them to deal with some of their concerns about returning to civilian life, and to gain further information on the steps that they will be taking once they are demobilized.

Suggested topics of information include: human rights; citizenship; child rights; gender issues; the ongoing peace process; reconciliation; provisions for justice; and HIV/AIDS. A practical orientation course should also be established so as to deal with some of the more immediate concerns of the combatants, e.g., finding accommodation, accessing services and DDR benefits, logistics for returning to their homes, etc.



Female combatant receiving her demobilization kit in Sibut, Central African Republic, July 2005. Photo: A. Barry, UNDP, Central African Republic

It is vital that the pre-discharge orientation be closely coordinated with provisions for reinsertion and reintegration. Misinformation and the creation of false expectations can undermine the reinsertion and reintegration efforts of DDR; to prevent this, accurate information should be provided by the DDR team and partners (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR).

## 8.8. Discharge

A discharge document — such as a demobilization declaration — has important symbolic value for ex-combatants, and should be given to them upon completion of the demobilization process. Demobilization declarations provide recognition of a person's military activities. However, no reference should be made on discharge papers to any particular groups or roles, as this may have negative effects during the reintegration phase. This document should also serve as the former combatant's proof of demobilization and of eligibility for access to DDR services and programmes.

## 8.9. Reinsertion: Provision of transitional assistance

Reinsertion is the final step of demobilization and aims to help provide the combatant with support until they are able to enter a formal reintegration programme.

### REINSERTION

"Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year."

Note by the Secretary-General on administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the UN peacekeeping operations, A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005

Reinsertion assistance often takes the form of what is known as a transitional assistance package, which may be financial (a 'transitional safety allowance' or TSA), food and non-food items or, as is most often the case, a mixture of both. These packages should enable ex-combatants to cater for their immediate needs and those of their dependants. As much as possible, the value of reinsertion packages should be similar to the standard of living of the rest of the population and in line with assistance being provided to other war-affected populations such as refugees or internally displaced persons, so as to avoid the perception that former combatants are receiving special treatment.

The provision of reinsertion benefits, or transitional assistance, should in no way affect the DDR participants' access to long-term reintegration assistance. Reinsertion, which may be funded by the peacekeeping operation's assessed budget, may cover the important first few months following discharge, during which it is likely that reintegration projects will not yet be in place.

Given that reinsertion is funded by the assessed budget, it needs to be accounted for in the mission's budget cycle, which usually begins in June/July. For start-ups, reinsertion should be included in the first submission of the mission's budget.



Reinsertion benefits should be distributed by one of the implementing partners; however, it is the responsibility of the camp manager to ensure the fair distribution of such items to avoid confrontation.

#### 8.9.1. Cash or no cash?

There has been much debate over the pros and cons of cash hand-outs to ex-combatants and dependants upon completion of the demobilization phase of DDR. On the one hand, some argue that this is the same as a weapons buy-back scheme, and may have the counter-productive effect of encouraging weapons recyclers and/or fuelling the arms market. Past experience has documented misuse of cash hand-outs, which is spent on alcohol or weapons rather than essential items. On the other hand, some believe that a cash hand-out is necessary for the ex-combatant to pay for initial expenses and to provide them with a sense of dignity. There is no strict rule on this; DDR planners are recommended to evaluate the local context and choose a course of action that best suits it (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

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### 8.10. Transport

Depending on the context, DDR planners may wish to provide transport to the DDR participants to assist them to return to their communities. Alternatively, as part of the TSA, cash for transport may be given. The logistic implications of providing transport must be taken into account and it will not be possible for all combatants to be transported to their final destination. A mixture of transport to certain appropriate key locations and funding for transport from there on may therefore be required. If transport is provided on UN vehicles, authorizations (from UN administration) and waivers (for passengers) need to be signed. The DDR team should arrange pre-signed authorizations and waivers in order to avoid last-minute blockages and delays. Alternatively, private companies may be subcontracted to provide transport.

## 9. Constructing a demobilization site

Ideally, the location and accessibility of disarmament and/or demobilization sites should be included in the peace agreement between the former factions. Where this is not done, it is important that the parties to the conflict should be involved in selecting locations and informed about the disarmament and demobilization timetable so as to avoid any misunderstandings that may arise from the movement and regrouping of combatants for disarmament and demobilization.

If security and logistic requirements allow, the disarmament and demobilization process should take place at the same site, which should have a weapons collection point and a demobilization area. The site should consist of separate areas for disposal of weapons, and for the civilian programmes and humanitarian assistance.

Sufficient data on the number of combatants and dependants (e.g., accompanying family members), and on the number of weapons (by means of a weapons survey), should be collected well in advance in order to plan for the number and size of disarmament sites and for proper logistic/technical planning (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament).

The provision of equipment and logistic support should be coordinated by the DDR logistics officer. The JLOC should liaise closely with the military force to confirm what re-

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sources will be provided by them and what will be required from UN stocks and acquisitions. It is essential that the JLOC is kept informed of any issues that will slow the construction and completion of demobilization sites or badly affect the management or maintenance of the site.

### 9.1. Factors in site selection

The correct selection of disarmament/demobilization sites is extremely important. The following factors must be considered:

- *Accessibility:* The site should be easily accessible. Distance to roads, airfields, rivers and railways should be considered. Accessibility for the protection force to secure the site and for logistic and supply lines is extremely important. The effects of weather changes (e.g., the start of the rainy season) should be considered when assessing accessibility;
- *Security:* Ex-combatants should feel safe in the selected location. Site security should be provided by UN forces. When establishing sites, it is important to consider the general political and military environment, as well as how close they are to potential threats, including international borders. The security of nearby communities should also be taken into account;
- *General amenities:* Disarmament/demobilization sites should be chosen with the following needs taken into account: (potable) water supply; easy set-up of washing and toilet facilities; drainage for rain and waste; natural water course and flooding potential; local power and food supply; environmental hazards, pollution, infestation and dangerous habitats; cooking and eating facilities; lighting, both for security and functionality; and space for recreation facilities, including sports. Special arrangements/contingency plans should be made for children, disabled people, pregnant or lactating women, AIDS sufferers and so on (also see IDDRS 5.10–5.70);
- *Storage facilities/Armoury:* Secure and guarded facilities/armouries for temporary storage of collected weapons should be set up. Transportation should be organized as soon as possible for surrendered weapons and ammunition that are to be moved to permanent storage or destruction sites (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament);
- *Communications infrastructure:* The site should be located in an area suitable for radio and/or telecommunications infrastructure.

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#### 9.1.1. Site alternatives

Using pre-existing camps, and the comprehensive and disciplined demobilization of combatants may allow for greater resources to be directed towards combatants with specific needs and community reintegration programmes, including job creation for the demobilized combatants. Where relevant, the following should be considered:

- *Refurbishment and temporary use of community property:* If available in the area where the demobilization site is to be set up, the use of existing hard-walled property should be considered. The decision should be made by weighing the medium- and long-term benefits to the community of repairing local facilities against the overall security and financial implications. These installations may not need rebuilding, and may be made usable by adding plastic sheeting, concertina wire, etc. Possible sites include disused factories, warehouses, hospitals, schools, colleges, farms, etc. Efforts should be made to verify ownership and avoid legal complications;



- *Refurbishment and temporary use of state/military property:* Where regular armed forces or well-organized /disciplined armed groups are to be demobilized, the use of existing military barracks, with the agreement of national authorities, should be considered. These generally should offer a degree of security and may have the required infrastructure already in place. The same security and administration arrangements should apply to these sites as to others.

## 9.2. Construction: Contracted or military?

When a decision is made to refurbish or rebuild local hard-walled facilities, it may be preferable to contract the work to an NGO or other agency. This involves several potential risks, which must be considered:

- the lengthy process of UN tendering, contract issue and payment may make the programme run over the time and budget allowed for it, with serious security consequences;
- the potential for remaining armed groups to attack, threaten or extort 'protection' fees from the contractor;
- lack of knowledge about the contractor's reliability;

- the possibility that the local community may complain of lack of employment opportunities;
- the employment of ex- (or soon to be demobilized) combatants is particularly dangerous, if not physically, then in terms of control of the workforce. This should be avoided.

The quickest and surest method of construction is to use the skills of the military force.

### 9.3. Mobile demobilization sites

Mobile DDR requires few facilities, since the period during which they will be used is comparatively short. Finding a location that offers protection is necessary, along with the provision of armoured military security forces. Here again the internal perimeter of an old mission or school, or, where the local population supports the DDR process, a football field, may be all that is required.

Ideally, fresh potable water and electricity should be available; otherwise, a water purification system or water supplies and a generator should be brought in. Sanitary facilities must be supplied. Lighting should be installed to ensure security around the perimeter of the camp.

All data collected in mobile facilities should be transferred to the central recording system as soon as possible to ensure its protection.

If circumstances change dramatically during the mobile demobilization process, the staff and ex-combatants should move, under secure escort, to the temporary transit facility in order to complete the minimum required process.

Annex D contains a checklist of items needed for mobile demobilization sites.

## 10. Managing a demobilization site

### 10.1. Coordination of services, supplies and assistance

Although DDR is primarily the responsibility of the national government or legitimate authority, these organizations often lack capacity, and it is likely that the task of planning and coordinating services and supplies for demobilization will instead fall to the peace-keeping mission. Working with national bodies and local agencies, as well as international partners, the mission should provide both capacity-building for national bodies, and management and services for the demobilization process.

Acting on the instructions provided by the DDR implementation plan, issued by the DDR unit at mission headquarters, the team leader of the regional DDR field office is responsible for the supervision of DDR operations within his/her designated area. He/She should consult with all relevant agencies about the administration, management and operational support of the demobilization operation. This regional coordination group should include the senior member of the national representative of the NCDDR or designated body. In addition there should be representatives from the implementing partners for camp management, medical support, JLOC, and the military force and military observers. This team should review the plan in light of any new local conditions and/or recommend changes before it is implemented.

The camp manager is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the demobilization site. The entire management and support team should be established well before operations start. Full rehearsals should take place, using members of staff and military — this is a valuable training technique, as well as a way of checking procedures. Using the phased DDR model provides a final training opportunity. In this case, the first planned intake of



DDR participants should be relatively small to allow staff to learn lessons and adjust procedures accordingly.

### **10.2. Camp management contracts**

Tenders for management services to the demobilization sites should be invited as early as possible in the preparation stages of demobilization. The agency that is chosen may be an international NGO or a national body, if it has the required capacity.

The advantage of outsourcing management of the camp is that there is no need to get involved in logistic and supply issues. Furthermore, not all parts of the UN system have the capacity or expertise for direct camp management. The disadvantage of outsourcing is its high cost, especially in the case of international NGOs. An alternative would be a local NGO, or even local individuals with the relevant experience, supervised by a UN camp manager.

### **10.3. Management of disputes within the demobilization site**

Establishing group leaders, including women, who will be responsible for reporting any misbehaviour is a good way of involving the DDR participants in the management of the camp, and opens up clear lines of communication for passing on information. Penalties for misbehaviour should have an impact on the group as a whole, in order to develop a sense of collective responsibility. Note that the time spent at the demobilization site should be as short as possible. DDR participants should be kept as busy as possible, and should be responsible for their own cooking, cleaning and washing.

### **10.4. Civil–military cooperation**

While disarmament and demobilization are planned by the DDR unit, including its own military component, efficient coordination of either of these sites can only be achieved through significant levels of civil–military cooperation. The military will play a large part in the selection, construction and security of the sites, as well as being responsible for administrative tasks where military observers will assist the DDR process. The camp manager may or may not be military, but the administrator will almost certainly be civilian. Internal security of the camps should be provided by unarmed or lightly armed civilian/police security staff, and military activity within the camp should be limited to an absolute minimum.

Civilian staff of the implementing partner that is involved will generally administer the day-to-day running of the camp. Working routines, responsibilities and guidelines should be developed jointly between the senior military and civilian managers of the camp.

### **10.5. Equipment and logistics**

Logistical aspects and camp management are essential for timely and effective demobilization. Demobilization sites can be excellent confidence-building measures in the early stages of the broader peace process. If DDR participants are well treated by demobilization camp staff, attitudes towards the process will be positive. However, the camps should not provide such a high standard of living that combatants are reluctant to leave after discharge.

Compatible communications between military and civilians by HF radio should be ensured, since contingent soldiers usually possess their own communications, which are separate from that of UN civilian staff. Compatible communications systems are essential, and failing to organize this will have serious security implications for the camp and its staff,

clients and equipment. Adequate communications systems should be a priority for DDR operations detached from main UN locations. A supply chain must be developed in order to ensure the availability of fuel (for generators and vehicles), water and other support material. All staff members should be supplied with personal weapons for self-protection, where this is appropriate.

Stores and equipment tables for a generic (typical or standard) disarmament site are listed in Annex C. The logistics officer should list extra quantities of any stores that are constantly in short supply in the camp in his/her weekly and post-operational reports, in order that the equipment list may be revised.

## 10.6. Staff security, emergency and evacuation planning

The senior military commander and camp manager are responsible for the development and distribution of the emergency and evacuation contingency plan for their site. Guidelines will be provided by the regional security officer, who is responsible for authorizing the plan. All should liaise closely and, if circumstances permit (without causing local concern), the evacuation plan should be rehearsed.

In most circumstances, the evacuation of staff and equipment from a site will include considerable and close military protection. The commanding officer should ensure that adequate resources remain available at all times, at levels appropriate to the assessed security risk.

## 10.7. Provision of basic needs (food, water and medical treatment)

Demobilization sites must be supplied with sufficient food and drinking water. A lack of supplies endangers the discipline of the ex-combatants. It is equally important that there are sufficient basic health care and sanitary facilities in the camps, specific to the needs of men, women, children and infants, to ensure that sick ex-combatants are looked after and to prevent epidemics. The camps should provide sufficient shelter and housing for the ex-combatants and the camp staff (also see IDDRS 5.50 on Food Aid Programmes in DDR).

The camp manager is responsible for the coordination of adequate provision of food/water and medical support to the demobilization site and its clients. He/She should liaise closely with the JLOC and military commanders to ensure the safe passage and constant resupply of stocks (also see IDDRS 5.60 on HIV / AIDS and DDR and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

In some cases, the provision and management of food and/or medical support may be provided by an implementing partner, NGO or government agency. In such cases, the camp manager should monitor and report on the effectiveness of the arrangements, and assist where possible (also see IDDRS 5.50 on Food Aid Programmes in DDR and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

# 11. Managing a mobile demobilization site

There is no substitute for security in the DDR process. Many circumstances may change in the political or governmental arena, or in the military, that result in rapid changes in the security environment on the ground or at particular locations. Good relations with the local community and respectful interaction with the commanders of the demobilizing groups may provide early warning of possible risks.

In general, the international military force should provide external, area and proximity security to any DDR facility. The force should be well trained, armed and equipped. Operating within the parameters of the agreed mandate, rules of engagement and bilateral agreements (MoUs), the force should be prepared to protect UN staff and equipment and the lives of those within the site.

Security within demobilization sites should be assured by lightly equipped local security services or police. These should be well trained and operate within the guidelines provided for the safe conduct of their duties and the protection of the DDR participant group.

Experience suggests that a mechanism should exist between group leaders and staff that will enable arbitration to take place in cases of complaints and discontent, before such matters get out of control. Early discussion of any problem will usually deal with fears, concerns and anxieties. These are normally the result of a lack of communication or of miscommunication, so it is better to ensure that communications are clear before matters become violent. This preparation reduces the risk to internal camp security. The camp manager is responsible for ensuring that a discussion forum is established at the earliest opportunity, and should use it regularly to ensure that information is provided to those who need it and to deal with problems or issues raised.

Security for mobile operations is entirely the responsibility of the military commander. Provided the security environment is stable enough, and terrain permitting, one or two armoured personnel vehicles, standard service trucks and two four-wheel drive vehicles are necessary to support the operation. Each operation requires approximately one platoon (25–45 people), with some technical support, if necessary.

### **11.1. Disarmament and weapons storage**

Weapons security is also the responsibility of the military. Weapons shall be made safe and registered, and firing mechanisms removed and stored separately. Weapons remain in the custody of the military and are jointly accounted for with DDR staff, to ensure transparency and safe destruction of all weapons. If an objective of the DDR programme is the destruction of all weapons collected, all firearms should be immediately placed beyond local repair, by damaging them sufficiently to make them unusable. In all cases, weapons must be securely stored and taken out of the site within the shortest time possible (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and IDDRS 4.11 on SALW Control, Security and Development).

◀ ▶ 4.10


◀ ▶ 4.11

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>CTO</b>	centre for transit and orientation
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>IMTF</b>	International Monitoring Task Force
<b>JLOC</b>	Joint Logistics Operation Centre
<b>MoU</b>	memorandum of understanding
<b>NCDDR</b>	national commission on DDR
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>SSR</b>	security sector reform
<b>TSA</b>	transitional safety allowance
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commission for Refugees
<b>UNPOL</b>	UN Police



## Annex B: Generic modular demobilization site (D2) plan



## Annex C: Semi-permanent demobilization site stores and equipment table

	MISSION:		REGION:		LOCATION:	LAT.	LONG.
	Camp design		Log. base			Grid ref.	
Serial	Equipment	Description	Units req.	Metres req.			

### DEFENCE STORES

21001	Barbed wire	Single strand		3,500			
21002	Barbed wire	Concertina coiled wire		8,900			
21003	Pickets	Metal right angle 2 m height	3,500				
21004	Pickets	Metal right angle 1 m height	2,100				
21005	Sandbags	Hessian/fibre/polyfibre	3,200				
21006	Soil container	Metal cage form 1 m cube	200				
21007	Metal sheeting	Corrugated metal 1 m x 3 m	300				
21008	Tools	Shovel	20				
21009	Tools	Pickaxe	20				
21010	Screens	Hessian/polyfibre 1.5 m x 100 m	20				
21011							
21012							
21013							
21014							

### ACCOMMODATION STORES

22001	Tent 5 m x 8 m	Alum. frame 20 pax accom. tent	36				
22002	Tent 5 m x 8 m	Alum. frame utility tent	8				
22003	Tent 5 m x 8 m	Frame eating cover	8				
22004	Tent 5 m x 8 m	Frame cooking cover	5				

### ELECTRICAL STORES

23001		Generator large	1				
23002		Generator medium (towable)	2				
23003		Generator light (portable)	4				
23004		Genset + cables 25 m	12				
23005		Genset + cables 15 m	12				
23006		Perimeter security lights	12				
23007		Camp working lamps	24				
23008		Office working lamps	24				
23009		Office desk lamps	12				
23010							

#### INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STORES

24001	IT hardware	Computer server	1				
24002	IT hardware	Computer desktop	1				
24003	IT hardware	Computer notebook/laptop	12				
24004	IT hardware	ID card production equipment	2				
24005	IT hardware	Digital camera	9				
24006	IT hardware	Colour printer	2				
24007	Ancillaries	Surge protector	4				
24008	Ancillaries	Hardware covers/containers	14				
24009	Ancillaries	Battery recharger	4				
24010	Consumables	Printer consumables	24				

#### COMMUNICATIONS STORES

25001		SatCom dish	1				
25002		VHF base radio station	2				
25003		VHF portable radio	27				
25004		HF base radio station	1				
25005		HF vehicle unit	2				
25006		HF manpack unit	1				
25007							
25008							
25009							
25010							

#### FURNITURE STORES

26001		Tables folding 1 m x 2.5 m approx.	50				
26002		Tables folding 1 m x 1.5 m approx.	10				
26003		Desks 1 m x 2 m approx.	8				
26004		Desks miscellaneous	4				
26005		Chairs office	12				
26006		Chairs utility/folding	400				
26007		Beds lightweight/portable	20				
26008		Beds midweight/portable	20				
26009							
26010							

#### STATIONERY STORES

27001		DDR form DELTA	5,000				
27002		DDR form ECHO	5,000				
27003		DDR form FOXTROT	5,000				
27004		Paper printer A4 rms	200				
27005		Pens ballpoint utility	200				
27006		Pencils HB	500				
27007		Erasers	30				
27008		Stapler heavy duty	8				
27009		Punch heavy duty	8				
27010		Binders ring clip	36				

#### WATER AND SANITATION EQUIPMENT

28001		Toilet units	7				
28002		Shower/Wash unit	7				
28003		Water tanks					
28004		Water purification equipment					
28005		Water pumps					
28006		Water hoses					
28007		Water-pipe, etc.					
28008		Refrigerators & water cooling systems					
28009		Water heating systems					
28010							

#### MISCELLANEOUS STORES AND EQUIPMENT

29001	Containers	Metal sea/road freight	> 3				
29002							
29003							
29004							

## Annex D: Checklist of items needed for a mobile demobilization site

### GENERAL

✓ Generator (if no electricity)	✓ Kitchen utensils
✓ Electric cable	✓ Coal stoves
✓ Sockets	✓ Water filter
✓ Light bulbs	✓ Extra spare tyres
✓ Fuel	✓ Camping beds for DDRR staff
✓ Jerrycans for water	✓ Sleeping bags for DDRR staff
✓ Basins for water	✓ Barbed wire
✓ Disinfectant	✓ UN flags
✓ Candles	
✓ Matches	
✓ Kitchen pots	

### DDR PROCESS

✓ Plastic sheeting	✓ Demob. declaration forms
✓ Mats for bedding	✓ 'Liste nominative' forms
✓ Blankets	✓ Weapons registration forms
✓ Coal stoves	✓ 'Fiche individuelle' form
✓ Cooking utensils	✓ Pencils
✓ Number tags	✓ Pens
✓ Jerrycans for water	✓ Staplers
✓ Basins for water	✓ Extra staples
✓ Baby food	✓ Paper clips
✓ Adult food (see IDDRS 5.50 on Food Aid Programmes in DDR)	✓ Basic medicines (see IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR)
✓ Screening sheets for ID forms	✓ Polaroid camera and film
✓ Antiseptic soap for DDRR participants	✓ Satphone


### MILITARY

✓ Rations	✓ Fuel
✓ Drinking water	✓ Tents
✓ Torches	✓ Axes
✓ Communications – radios compatible with civilian radios	✓ Nails
✓ Candles	✓ Sleeping bags
✓ Shovels	✓ Camp beds

◀ ▶ 5.50 ■ ▶ 5.60

◀ ▶ 5.70

## Annex E: Example of an individual's demobilization process



## Annex F: Example of a screening form

DDR IDENTIFICATION FORM STRICTLY FOR MISSION PERSONNEL ONLY			
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION:		DELAYED/NO REPATRIATION:	
Mission to repatriate		a) Refer to UNHCR/ICRC/NGO	
Refer to UNHCR/ICRC or other		b) Transfer to CTO (minors)	
		c) Other:	

PHOTO

REGISTRATION SITE INFORMATION:		SERIAL NO.: ____--____--____--
Date: (DD-MM-YY)	Location:	Name of interviewer:

STATUS OF CANDIDATE (PLEASE CIRCLE):			
Ex-combatant (armed)	Non-combatant (not dependant, e.g., community member)	Child associated with armed forces	Unaccompanied minor
Ex-combatant supporter	Dependant with combatant	Dependant without combatant	
Has dependants elsewhere in the country	Foreign	Other	
If yes, where?			
How many			

PERSONAL INFORMATION:			
First name:	Last/Family name:	Date of birth:	Place of birth:
Age:	Sex:	Nationality:	Challenged: Physically ____ Mentally ____
Religion/Association	Language: Mother tongue: Second language:		
Contact address:		City/Village:	Province/State:
Residential address:		City/Village:	Province/State:

**HEALTH:**

Is he/she ill or injured upon demobilization? If yes, describe diagnosis

Yes \_\_\_

No \_\_\_

Does he/she require psychosocial services?

Yes \_\_\_

No \_\_\_

Does he/she want to be physically separated from particular person(s) in the camp? If yes, who?

Does he/she want to live in the same camp with particular person(s)? If yes, who?

**FAMILY/COMMUNITY INFORMATION:****Spouse/partner information:**

Marital status: Married ___ Single ___ Widow(er) ___ Other ___	Number of spouse(s) or partners:	Living with spouse?	
Registered spouse/Partner:	Date of birth:	Relationship:	
Name of spouse or partner:	Age:	Legal (L) or Customary (C) marriage? L ___ C ___	Married how long?
Contact address:		City/Village:	Province/State
Residential address:		City/Village:	Province/State

**Child/Dependant information:**

Number of children:	Living with how many children?	Living with how many dependants?		
<b>Information on children (c), dependant (D):</b>				
Name: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.	Sex:	Age:	Name of father:	Name of mother
Residence of father: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	Residence of mother:			
City/Village:	Province/State:			



<b>Community of reintegration information:</b>			
Name of community:	Type of community:	Reintegration committee?	
Address:		City/Village:	Province/State:

<b>FURTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION:</b>			
<b>Academic and professional curriculum:</b>			
School/Training level:			
Reading and writing level:	Formal educational level:	Vocational specialization:	
Work experience (from most recent to least recent occupation):			
From:	To:	Place:	Description of work:
What does he/she want to do after demobilization?			
What type of job does he/she want to get?			
1st choice:			
2nd choice:			
Does he/she want to receive vocational training? If yes, what type?			
<b>Military curriculum:</b>			
Force ID number:			
Rank:	Unit:	Faction:	Last duty station:
Year of service:	Monthly military income:	Recruitment type: Voluntary ___ Forced ___ Other:	
Description of military occupation/activities:			
Dates and places of engagement:			
From (MM-YY): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	To (MM-YY):	Commander's name:	Place:

<b>ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS:</b>		
Does he/she know other combatants/supporters/dependants who have not come to the programme? If yes,		
Why:	Where:	How many:

How did he/she hear about this programme (check all that apply)?

Radio ☐

Newspaper ☐

Public advertisement ☐

TV ☐

UN employee ☐

Fellow ex-combatant/supporter ☐

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

What was his/her incentive to come to this programme (tick all that apply)?

Economic ☐

Peer pressure ☐

Family ☐

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

#### SUPPORTER ONLY:

Function:	Tick if applicable:	How long?	Comments
1. Administrator			
2. Camp leader/Coordinator			
3. Cook			
4. Health care provider/ Nurse			
5. Informant			
6. Messenger			
7. Mine worker			
8. Mobilizer of public support			
9. Porter			
10. Radio operator			
11. Sex worker			
12. Translator/ Interpreter			
13. Other (                    )			
14. Other (                    )			

**Additional observations and comments:**

Signature of interviewer: .....

Signature or thumbprint of interviewee: .....

## Annex G: Example of a DDR participant terms and conditions form

As a participant in the [mission name] disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, the terms of your benefits are conditional on the following:

1. Your surrender of all weapons and ammunition;
2. Your full cooperation with [mission name] efforts to recover weapons;
3. Your agreement to renounce military status;
4. Your acceptance of and conformity with all rules and regulations as stated by [mission name] during the full period of your stay in [mission name] disarmament and demobilization camps;
5. Your refraining from all criminal activity and contributing to your nation's development;
6. Your agreement to return to your country of origin;
7. Your cooperation with and participation in programmes designed to facilitate your return to civilian life.

I hereby accept and will adhere to the above terms and conditions and request to be considered a beneficiary of the [mission name] disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as explained to me by representatives of [mission name].

Signature: .....

Location: .....

Date: .....

Temporary DDR ID number: .....

Verified and endorsed by:

## Endnotes

- 1 This module draws significantly from Colin Gleichmann, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, a joint publication by the Swedish National Defence College, Norwegian Defence School, GTZ and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2004.

# 4.30 Social and Economic Reintegration

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#### NOTE

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 4.30 Social and Economic Reintegration

## Summary

The sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants should be the ultimate objective of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). If reintegration fails, the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase are undermined, instability increases, and sustainable reconstruction and development are put at risk.

Successful reintegration is a particularly complex part of DDR. Ex-combatants and those previously associated with armed groups and forces are finally cut loose from structures and processes that are familiar to them, re-entering societies that are equally unfamiliar and that have often been significantly transformed by conflict. In some post-conflict countries, former combatants will have no experience, or memory, of pre-war peaceful patterns of life.

A key challenge that faces former combatants is that it may be impossible for them to reintegrate in their area of origin. Their limited skills may have more relevance and marketable value in urban settings, which are also likely to be unable to absorb them. In the worst cases, villages from which ex-combatants came may no longer exist after a war, or ex-combatants may be associated with groups that have committed atrocities in or near their own communities and may not be able to return home.

Community support is essential for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants, but their presence may make worse the real or perceived vulnerability of local populations, which have neither the capacity nor the desire to assist a 'lost generation' of ex-fighters with little education, employment or training; war trauma; and a highly militarized view of the world. Unsupported former combatants can be a major threat to a community's capacity to recover because of their lack of skills or assets, their tendency to rely on violence to get what they want, and their ignorance of or disrespect for local cultures, leaders and social habits.

To reduce their capacity for destabilization, ex-combatants will usually need specifically designed, sustainable support to help them with their transition from military to civilian life. Yet the United Nations (UN) must also ensure that such support does not mean that other war-affected groups are treated unfairly or resentment is caused within the wider community. The reintegration and reconciliation of ex-combatants must therefore be part of wider recovery strategies for all war-affected populations. Reintegration programmes should also aim to build local and national capacities to manage the process in the long term, as reintegration increasingly turns into reconstruction and development.

This module recognizes that reintegration challenges are multidimensional, ranging from creating microenterprises and providing education and training, through to preparing receiving communities for the return of ex-combatants, dealing with the psychosocial effects of war, and meeting the specific needs of different groups. It argues that ongoing inter-agency liaison is the best way for the UN to balance the specifically designed support offered to ex-combatants, which aims to increase security, with the wider support given to communities, which aims to bring about reconciliation and create the conditions for recovery.

This module outlines the basic principles that should guide UN reintegration programmes. It discusses the various pre-programme assessments that can be carried out in order to provide the information on which the reintegration strategy and programme will be based. It highlights the key elements of programme design that are necessary to keep the programme focused on its objectives and offers guidance for programme managers who have to make difficult decisions about directing support towards individuals or communities. Finally, the module outlines in detail the various components of reintegration assistance, from the moment of demobilization through to wider reconciliation and recovery programming.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module offers practical guidance on how planners might successfully deal with the challenges of reintegration within the context of a DDR programme. It highlights the key guiding principles that relate to reintegration, explains the pre-programme assessments that need to be carried out, and describes the main aspects of programme design and planning. Three context-specific approaches to ex-combatant reintegration are then presented, their selection being guided by the consultation and assessment processes that should take place before reintegration begins. The specific components of reintegration programming are then outlined. Given the complexity of reintegration, and the need to adapt it to a particular context, the guidance offered here is less prescriptive than in some other modules of the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS).

The objective of this module is to provide DDR practitioners with an overview of the issues that need to be taken into account when designing a reintegration programme, and to offer guidance on implementing such a programme.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the IDDRS series is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).



### 3. Introduction

Sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants is the ultimate objective of DDR. Failure to reintegrate ex-combatants will undermine the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase, placing the DDR programme at risk and causing increasing instability. However, reintegration is a particularly complex challenge. Ex-combatants and their societies have often been significantly transformed by wars, especially when conflict has lasted a long time. In some post-conflict countries, ex-combatants will have no experience, or memory, of pre-war peaceful patterns of life. Reintegration is in some cases, therefore, the wrong word to use to describe what is happening.

Not all ex-combatants can or will reintegrate in their area of origin. Their limited skills may have more relevance and marketable value in urban areas (i.e., towns or cities). It is in such settings that male former combatants, at least, are more likely to use the skills they learned in war-time as security guards, mechanics, drivers or similar positions. Women are likely to have few marketable skills, especially in those places where the knowledge they acquired as combatants or while associated with armed forces and groups is considered inappropriate for women in civilian life. Combatants who have been with an armed force or group since childhood may have no memory of the place of that they came from. Villages from which ex-combatants came may no longer exist after a war, or ex-combatants may be associated with groups or forces that have committed atrocities in or near their own communities and may not be able to return home. Many former combatants, women in particular, may find it difficult to return because they fear being stigmatized for belonging to an armed force or group.

The return of ex-combatants can also worsen the real or perceived vulnerability of local populations. Ex-combatants may be seen as a 'lost generation', having been deprived of education, employment and training during the conflict period. Often they are left traumatized by war and can only understand the world from a military perspective. Their lack of civilian skills or assets, combined with their habit of relying on violence to get what they want, may result in their becoming involved in predatory behaviour against communities, such as banditry and theft; or they may turn once more to organized armed violence in a group.

Returning ex-combatants are potential 'spoilers' of peace. This is why, while other war-affected groups such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) may far outnumber them, ex-combatants will usually need focused, sustainable support if they are to succeed in making the transition from military to civilian life. However, when designing and implementing DDR programmes, a key challenge is to fulfil the specific and essential needs of ex-combatants without turning them into a privileged group within the community. The reintegration support for ex-combatants should therefore be planned to avoid creating resentment and bitterness within the wider community or putting a strain on a community's limited resources. The reintegration and reconciliation of ex-combatants needs to be part of wider recovery strategies for all war-affected populations.

Many different activities combine to make up the process of reintegration, ranging from creating microenterprises, and providing education and training, through to preparing receiving communities for the return of ex-combatants, dealing with the psychosocial effects of war, and meeting the specific needs of different groups — men, women, girls and boys, persons with disability, and so on. UN DDR programme managers will need to carefully liaise with other agencies to balance the targeted support offered to ex-combatants, which aims to increase security, with the wider support given to communities, which aims to bring about reconciliation and create the conditions for recovery.

## 4. Guiding principles

IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR sets out the main principles that shall guide all aspects of DDR planning and implementation. They shall all be taken into consideration when designing reintegration programmes. Outlined below are key principles that are particularly important for ex-combatants' reintegration.

### 4.1. Clarify objectives and expected results with all parties

The objectives and expected results of the reintegration programme shall be clearly defined from the start, particularly with regard to the number of beneficiaries, their composition (e.g., men, women, youth, etc.), and the criteria for their selection. All parties to the conflict shall commit themselves to accepting an agreed framework, together with a timetable for carrying out activities.

### 4.2. Start planning for reintegration as soon as possible

Frequently, disarmament and demobilization are carried out very effectively, but then reintegration fails, jeopardizing the DDR programme and the wider security situation. A variety of factors can contribute to this failure, including:

- lack of recognition by key stakeholders of the importance of reintegration;
- lack of resources; lack of community involvement; or
- loss of confidence in the reintegration process by demobilized ex-combatants after long delays in implementation.

These failures often point to a lack of adequate and timely planning and budgeting. UN practitioners shall therefore begin preparing for reintegration at the very start of any future DDR intervention.

### 4.3. Ensure national ownership

National ownership is essential to the success and sustainability of DDR programmes. The primary responsibility for the outcome of DDR programmes rests with the national and local actors who are ultimately responsible for the peace, security and development of their own communities and nation. National ownership includes much more than just central government leadership: it requires the active participation of a range of state and non-state actors at national, provincial and local levels. It is important to ensure the participation of groups traditionally marginalized in DDR and post-conflict reconstruction processes, in particular representatives of women's groups, youth representatives, children's advocates, people living with disability and chronic illness, and minorities.

### 4.4. Ensure community participation

The success of reintegration programmes depends on the combined efforts of individuals, families and communities. Reintegration programmes shall be designed through a participatory process that involves ex-combatants and communities, local and national authorities, and other non-government actors in planning and decision-making from the earliest stages.

The success of reintegration programmes depends on the combined efforts of individuals, families and communities.

#### 4.5. Develop national capacity

Reintegration programmes shall try to develop the capacities of receiving communities, as well as local and national authorities. In contexts where national capacity to implement DDR is weak, it is important to ensure that the UN does not act as a substitute for national authorities in the management and implementation of DDR, but instead temporarily fills the capacity gap, under strong national policy oversight, while also working to improve and strengthen national capacities.

#### 4.6. Consider regional implications

Successful national capacity-building for the reintegration of local combatants may become more complex when the conflict has affected more than one country in a region. Careful assessments in the planning stages shall be carried out to determine whether foreign combatants and/or mercenaries will have to be repatriated to their country of origin, and to develop ways of doing this if these are not specified in the peace accord. Inter-agency co-operation is essential in cases of cross-border repatriation. Particular care shall be exercised when repatriating foreign combatants and/or mercenaries with families so that accompanying wives, husbands and children are registered and given official forms of identification that will protect and assist them in the country to which they relocate. Women in marriages recognized by customary or national law who wish to remain with their husbands will need particular assistance to integrate into their new country (also see Annex B, as well as IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

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#### 4.7. Engage donors

As outlined in section 4.2, the lack of timely and adequate resources has in the past hampered the ability of the UN to implement sustainable reintegration programmes. DDR programme managers shall therefore engage donors in discussions on the scope and focus of the reintegration programme as early as possible.

#### 4.8. Engage potential ‘spoilers’

Management of the interests and expectations of key warlords and military leaders is often essential for the establishment of sustainable peace processes and agreements. However, a certain number of military leaders/warlords, especially mid-level commanders, may end up being left out of the incentive structure agreed to in the peace agreement. Buy-in to the process by these key participants shall therefore be one of the first priorities of DDR planning and programme design.

Either the national government, supported by the national commission on DDR, should deal with their concerns directly, which is by far the preferable option, or the DDR programme should include a two-tier system of reintegration support, one for these commanders, whose expectations are usually quite high, and another for the rest of the combatants.<sup>1</sup> Failure to deal with this issue may lead to these key stakeholders acting as ‘spoilers’, which could jeopardize the entire DDR programme and undermine wider peace and security. Attention must also be paid to foreign combatants and mercenaries (also see Annex B and IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

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#### 4.9. Make reintegration part of a wider recovery strategy

DDR is carried out primarily to improve security, in order to allow for post-conflict recovery and development to take root. DDR alone, however, cannot be expected to prevent further conflict and restore stability. DDR is a precondition, and not a substitute, for recovery interventions aimed specifically at vulnerable groups like IDPs, returnees and other victims of the conflict. It should be accompanied by other economic, political and social reforms, as well as wider development and recovery initiatives. Reintegration programming shall therefore be conceptualized, designed, planned and implemented as part of, or at least in very close cooperation with, the wider recovery strategy, which often includes post-conflict rehabilitation, resettlement of displaced populations, reconciliation efforts, respect for human rights, rule of law, and improved governance (also see IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building & Recovery Frameworks).

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#### 4.10. Balance equity with security

Non-discrimination and equitable (fair) treatment are core principles in the design of UN-supported DDR programmes. The principle of equity shall be applied when establishing eligibility criteria for entry into DDR programmes (see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament). However, this principle should also be applied to all war-affected populations. In most conflicts, IDPs and refugees far outnumber ex-combatants. All three groups face similar reintegration problems and, in principle, they should be given equal access to reintegration opportunities. Offering special treatment to ex-combatants may cause resentment among other groups who may view special or unique benefits to ex-combatants as an unjustified reward to the perpetrators of conflict.

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However, although applying the principle of equity will increase the chances of reconciliation and sustainable reintegration, the security situation often demands that, in the short term at least, a specific focus on ex-combatants is required to increase security. The important thing is to ensure that the receiving communities are adequately consulted, and that they understand and accept that specifically designed support given to ex-combatants will increase their own security. In this sense, reintegration support for ex-combatants is not to be regarded as special treatment for ex-combatants, but rather as an investment in security for the population as a whole.

#### 4.11. Ensure a timely transition from supporting individuals to supporting communities

Despite concerns that ex-combatants receive disproportionate benefits during post-conflict reconstruction, there is a growing consensus that a focus on former combatants within DDR programmes is necessary and justified in order to build confidence and security in war-torn societies. To achieve the security objectives of a DDR programme, support should be given for the full initial reintegration of ex-combatants. However, in the context of longer-term reintegration, a balance must be struck between supporting ex-combatants' specific needs and the needs of the wider community in order to prevent resentment and a continued sense of difference between civilians and former military. Any focus on the longer-term reintegration of ex-combatants must be accompanied by interventions that focus on both the families of ex-combatants and their respective communities, without whom sustainable reintegration cannot succeed. Emphasis shall therefore be placed on moving quickly from programmes specifically designed for ex-combatants to community-based and national development programmes. Failure to do so will result in ex-combatants continuing to identify themselves

as belonging to a special group outside society, which slows down their reintegration into local communities and undermines reconciliation and restitution processes.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4.12. Be 'people-centred'

The primary focus of any UN-supported DDR strategy shall be on people and communities. A 'people-centred' approach recognizes that there will be differences in the support required by both sexes and those of differing ages and physical ability. Designing culturally relevant and appropriate reintegration activities for each group, and offering specifically designed health and psychosocial services, as well as training and support for microenterprises, will break down violent structures that exclude certain social groups and ensure the sustainability of the reintegration programme.

## 5. Pre-programme assessment

Decisions on the scope and focus of reintegration assistance shall be based on a thorough analysis of the beneficiary groups and the context into which they are (re)integrating. Local actors with strong knowledge of the political, economic and social contexts should be involved in this assessment process and DDR programme planners should draw on the knowledge of the UN country team. In some circumstances, the security situation may limit the range and scope of assessments. Political factors may also limit the time available. UN DDR programme managers should carry out assessments and analysis in the areas outlined in this section as early as possible in order to improve programme design.<sup>3</sup>

### 5.1. Conflict and security analysis

The nature of the conflict will determine the nature of the peace process, which in turn will influence the objectives and expected results of DDR and the type of reintegration approach required. An initial conflict and security analysis should be carried out in order to clarify the nature of the conflict and how it was resolved, and to identify the challenges facing a DDR programme. A holistic analysis (i.e., looking at the situation as a whole) of conflict and security dynamics should inform the development of the objectives and strategies of the DDR programme. There are certain conflict analysis tools that can assist the UN and its local counterparts (i.e. local government departments, agencies, NGOs, etc.) in understanding conflict causes and dynamics, and the impact of current policies and programmes, in order to design conflict-sensitive interventions (see Annex C). The following table suggests questions for this analysis and assessment.

CONFLICT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS: QUESTIONS	
Root causes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What are the root causes of conflict?</li> <li>■ Have they been resolved or do they still exist?</li> <li>■ Was it an informal conflict of shifting alliances among many groups, or an organized conflict among clearly defined warring parties?</li> </ul>
Nature of war and peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What is the nature of the peace agreement?</li> <li>■ Are all parties to the conflict included?</li> <li>■ Has one of the parties won the fighting?</li> <li>■ Was it a war of liberation?</li> <li>■ Will it require cross-border and multi-country DDR operations?</li> </ul>

Combatant profile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Were combatants mainly civilians or military personnel?</li> <li>■ Were combatants part-time or full-time fighters?</li> <li>■ Are there any foreign combatants or mercenaries in the armed forces and groups involved?</li> <li>■ Are there people working with armed forces or groups in non-combat roles?</li> <li>■ Are there any children (people under 18) with the armed forces or groups?</li> <li>■ Were combatants forced into fighting through abduction or violent coercion?</li> <li>■ Did their involvement last long?</li> <li>■ Has conflict become a way of life for the combatants?</li> <li>■ Have combatants been involved in the conflict for years, or just a few months?</li> <li>■ Have combatants and associates been living outside of their communities during the conflict?</li> <li>■ Have they lost social capital during the conflict?</li> <li>■ Have they lost access to means of production because of conflict?</li> <li>■ Have they been alienated from their traditional support network during the conflict?</li> </ul>
Security situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What is the capacity of state security forces to enforce security during the peace consolidation phase?</li> <li>■ What is the capacity of the peacekeepers to do so?</li> <li>■ How long is this phase expected to last?</li> </ul>
Role of government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Does the government have political legitimacy?</li> <li>■ Will legitimacy be sought or reaffirmed through elections?</li> <li>■ When will these realistically take place?</li> </ul>
Role of DDR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What is the intended role of the DDR intervention?</li> <li>■ Is it intended to stabilize a situation before an election?</li> <li>■ Is its role to support the return of freedom fighters after a war of liberation or defence?</li> <li>■ Is the process linked to a downsizing of armed security forces?</li> <li>■ Is it linked to security sector reform (SSR)?</li> <li>■ Is this a formal process (e.g., peacekeeping operations, encampment, formal demobilization with disarmament, and structured reintegration procedures)?</li> <li>■ Is it more informal (decentralized DDR interventions, voluntary turn-in of weapons, self-demobilization and decentralized reintegration support mechanisms)?</li> <li>■ Will the DDR programme be part of wider recovery programmes? If yes, is DDR designed to fit in with and complement these programmes?</li> </ul>
Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What institutional actors in the country are able to carry out DDR-related activities (public and private institutions, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and international NGOs [INGOs], donors and other civil society actors)?</li> <li>■ What community-based organizations/traditional associations can play a role in helping to bring about peace or reconciliation?</li> </ul>
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What internal and external resources are available to assist with DDR and with wider reconstruction and recovery?</li> <li>■ When will these resources be made available?</li> </ul>

## 5.2. Pre-registration survey of beneficiaries

The registration of ex-combatants during the demobilization phase will give a picture of their social and economic expectations, as well as their capacities and resources. However, by the time this registration takes place, usually during demobilization, it is already too late to begin planning the reintegration process. A profile of potential beneficiaries of the DDR programme should therefore be developed before disarmament and demobilization begins.<sup>4</sup> Early information should be gathered about the issues listed in the following table:



## PRE-REGISTRATION SURVEY OF BENEFICIARIES: QUESTIONS

Demographic composition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the age, sex, ethnicity of the group(s) to be reintegrated?</li> <li>What is their general state of health (including disability profiling and voluntary HIV/AIDS testing and counselling)? (See IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR.)</li> <li>What language(s) do they speak?</li> </ul>
Background	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is their marital status?</li> <li>How many dependants do they have?</li> <li>Do they plan to be reunited with their family/social group in their selected destination of return?</li> </ul>
Education and qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is their level of education?</li> <li>What skills and work experience do they have?</li> <li>What is their standard of living?</li> <li>What was their rank/grade in the armed forces or groups?</li> </ul>
Special needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has an analysis been carried out of special needs among ex-combatants and associated groups?</li> <li>If not, how, when and by whom can it be done most effectively?</li> <li>Do other programmes/services provide targeted assistance that ex-combatants, their dependants and associated groups can access?</li> <li>How will special needs be dealt with within the reintegration programme?</li> </ul>
Areas of return	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are their communities of origin?</li> <li>Where do they plan to (re)integrate?</li> </ul>
Expectations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are their expectations or concerns about the reintegration programme and their return to civilian life?</li> <li>What are the expectations of the community about returning combatants?</li> </ul>
Security risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Are ex-combatants a long-term security threat? How and to whom?</li> <li>How is this risk assessed?</li> <li>What effect will this have on the sustainability of the reintegration strategy and the focus of its support?</li> </ul>

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### 5.3. Identification and assessment of areas of return or resettlement

Based on the information gathered from the initial pre-registration survey of beneficiaries, an assessment should be made of the economic and social potential of the areas that ex-combatants are expected to return to or resettle in. This assessment should take into account the availability of natural resources, the economic infrastructure (such as access to markets, and the availability of communications and services), and the security situation in the area. It should also map (i.e., list and survey to gain an overall impression of) local social services and institutions.<sup>5</sup> Key issues for this analysis and mapping exercise are as follows:

## AREAS OF RETURN: QUESTIONS

Demand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the local demand for goods and services?</li> <li>What is the demand for labour (skilled, unskilled)?</li> <li>What are potential areas for new market growth and economic reintegration opportunities?</li> <li>Are there cultural or social labour norms relating to sex divisions or sex-specific restrictions in the labour market? (See IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR.)</li> <li>Can youth and older children enter the labour market safely, and is legislation in place to protect children from exposure to the worst forms of child labour? (See IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR.)</li> <li>Have labour norms changed during the conflict?</li> </ul>
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Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Which services (social- and business-related; public and private) are available? Can services be made available easily?</li> <li>■ Who supplies services, or can supply them?</li> <li>■ What support is required to upgrade services that are essential for reintegration?</li> </ul>
Other target groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What other war-affected groups are present in the area (or will return), and what type of assistance will they receive?</li> <li>■ What are their needs?</li> <li>■ Can the reintegration programme indirectly supply their needs?</li> </ul>

#### 5.4. Reintegration opportunities and services mapping

The post-conflict economic environment can be extremely problematic. Armed conflicts invariably damage or destroy productive assets and weaken the labour market. Conflict can also cause considerable damage to physical, social and economic infrastructure, which may further reduce productive employment and income-generating activities. Trading networks are disrupted and public and private sector investment declines. Working conditions tend to deteriorate, while violations of workers' rights, especially those of women and youth, and the potential for inequitable employment practices increases.

In this degraded environment, it is essential that UN DDR programmes avoid creating unrealistic expectations among beneficiaries. Expectations can best be managed if programme managers have a clear understanding of the actual economic opportunities available to those being reintegrated. DDR programme planners should prioritize the development of a countrywide systematic mapping to identify existing and potential employment opportunities, whether in existing business enterprises, in self-employment and/or through creating microenterprises. Attention shall be paid to different groups so that the employment, education and training needs and opportunities of women and men, youth and children are understood (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR). This analysis will define the nature of the situation that reintegration will have to take place in and be at the core of the reintegration strategy.

Relevant education and training, microcredit services, and other employment and business development services (i.e., technical advisory, information and counselling services) should also be mapped. The survey should include other development programmes (both existing and planned) within the national recovery effort, as well as those of international and national development organizations. Other social support services, such as support for people living with AIDS; trauma and drug abuse counselling; and/or disability rehabilitation services should also be identified. This mapping should take place as early as possible to ensure that training programmes are ready when ex-combatants need them, and should reflect an understanding of local norms and standards about sex- and age-appropriate labour, as well as changes in gender roles that may have occurred during conflict.

In most post-conflict countries, little labour market information is available, and both collection and analysis are difficult tasks. Preliminary labour market surveys should be conducted to make data and analysis available quickly. The adaptation and use of existing questionnaires developed in other post-conflict contexts can speed up this research.<sup>6</sup> Rapid assessments can be carried out by the public employment service or by using key informants at the community level. Data on both labour supply and demand should be built into the overall management information system (MIS) (see section 6.8). The reintegration opportunities mapping exercise should attempt to answer the following questions:

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REINTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES AND SERVICES MAPPING: QUESTIONS	
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What is the overall economic situation of the country?</li> <li>■ Which are the most dynamic, or potentially dynamic, economic sectors?</li> <li>■ Do these sectors present reintegration opportunities for both male and female ex-combatants and for adults, youth and older children?</li> <li>■ What other opportunities are, or can be, available to former combatants, given their existing skill sets?</li> <li>■ How can their skills be improved in a way that increases their employability?</li> <li>■ Have opportunities for public–private partnerships been explored?</li> </ul>
Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What infrastructure exists to allow economic activity to take place (e.g., roads, communications, electricity supplies, etc.)?</li> <li>■ Where are the worst bottlenecks?</li> </ul>
Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What business development services are available, and where?</li> <li>■ What services could be developed with minimal support?</li> </ul>
Training providers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What education and training providers and institutions exist?</li> <li>■ What subjects/skills and age groups do they specialize in?</li> <li>■ What capacity do they have to support the DDR programme?</li> </ul>
Development programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ What other recovery and development initiatives are being planned or implemented?</li> </ul>

An early survey of existing education and training providers and their training courses should also be carried out. This survey should include information on which sectors they cover; which age groups they can teach or train; their capacity, equipment, teacher and trainer resources; and what they need to be able to provide training. On the basis of this assessment, the DDR programme can: select training providers; develop programmes designed to meet the needs of disabled, young, male and female ex-combatants; assess costs; and provide support to trainers.

Opportunities for apprenticeships and on-the-job training should also be identified. All labour-related assessments should take place as early as possible, as it takes a long time to upgrade training infrastructure and services, and these usually make up the first component of economic reintegration. However, as will be stressed in section 9.2, training should be seen only as a tool for reintegration, not as reintegration itself. DDR programme managers should avoid training ex-combatants in skills or economic fields that the ex-combatants might identify as their preference, but that are not needed in the labour market. The feeling of frustration and helplessness that caused people to take up arms in the first place only increases when they cannot find a job after their training, making them more open to re-recruitment.

## 6. Programme design and planning

Once the pre-programme assessments have been carried out, planning for reintegration can begin. As outlined in section 4.2, this should take place together with planning for disarmament and demobilization, as part of an integrated DDR programme. This section outlines key issues to consider when planning for reintegration.

### 6.1. Ensuring that planning is participatory

One of the reasons why DDR operations have failed in the past is a lack of local ownership, resulting in the perception that DDR is imposed from outside. The participation of a broad

range of stakeholders in the development of a DDR strategy is essential to its success, as it provides a basis for effective dialogue among national and local authorities, community leaders, and former combatants, and helps define a role for all parties in the decision-making process. These actors should be fully involved in planning and decision-making from the earliest stages. A participatory approach will significantly improve the DDR programme by:

- providing a forum for testing ideas that could improve programme design;
- enabling the development of strategies that respond to local realities and needs;
- ensuring local ownership;
- encouraging DDR and other local processes such as peace-building or recovery to work together and support each other;
- encouraging communication and negotiation among the main actors to reduce levels of tension and fear and to improve human security;
- recognizing and supporting the capacity of women, especially in security-related matters (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR);
- building respect for women's and children's rights (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR);
- involving youth in decision-making processes (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR);
- helping to ensure the sustainability of reintegration by developing community capacity to provide services and establishing community monitoring, management and oversight structures and systems.

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## 6.2. Engaging ex-combatants in reintegration planning

DDR programme planners should ensure that participatory planning includes representation of ex-combatants, especially mid-level commanders (see section 4.8). This will help to ensure that their expectations are, where possible, met in the programme design or at least managed from an early stage. The creation of veterans' associations is often encouraged as a way of ensuring adequate representation of ex-combatants in a DDR process. These associations are also considered to be an early warning and response system for identifying dissatisfaction among ex-combatants, and for confidence-building between discontented groups and the rest of the community.

However, experience shows that such associations will usually be respected by communities members if they emerge naturally and spontaneously from other reintegration activities, but are not set up as national or hierarchical organizations, since formal veterans' associations can delay or prevent the effective reintegration of ex-combatants by helping them keep their identity as soldiers and their involvement in the command structures that they were familiar with when they were combatants. DDR programme planners may respond supportively to the creation of associations of ex-combatants where these emerge because former combatants organize themselves within the context of the broader community. Where national top-down associations have already been formed as a result of political processes, DDR programme planners may assist such associations to take part positively in reintegration activities.

## 6.3. Involving communities in reintegration planning

Communities play a central role in the reintegration of ex-combatants. Ultimately it is communities who will, or will not, reintegrate ex-combatants and it is communities who

will, or will not, benefit from a successful DDR programme. It is important therefore to ensure that communities are at the centre of reintegration planning when it comes to identifying opportunities for individuals, potential stress points and priorities for community development projects. International support should strengthen the capacities of local and provincial actors and service providers to play a central role in the reintegration process.

Communities play a central role in the reintegration of ex-combatants.

It is good practice to involve families, traditional and religious leaders, women's and youth groups, and other local associations in planning the return of ex-combatants. These groups should receive support and training to assist the process. Women, in particular, often bear the burden of reintegration of ex-combatants in families and communities, and will require assistance to deal with the reintegration of sick, traumatized, violent ex-combatants, and of children. Community women's groups should also be sensitized to support and protect women and girls returning from armed groups and forces, who may struggle to reintegrate.

Reintegration programmes should be designed to support receiving communities to the fullest extent possible. All DDR interventions have components that potentially help other target groups in some way. For instance, setting up training or health centres for ex-combatant services usually requires an upgrading of basic health-related infrastructure (clinics, hospitals, etc.), which, if well planned through consultation with communities and in coordination with authorities, can directly benefit other community members. The sustainability of ex-combatant reintegration is directly linked to wider issues such as public security, communications and social services. Within the funding constraints of the DDR programme, and if care is taken to avoid underinvesting in the central objective — ex-combatant reintegration — these issues can, and should, be dealt with through participatory planning processes.

#### 6.4. Developing national and local capacities

A primary role of international assistance is to support the development of national and local capacities to implement DDR. This capacity will encourage ownership, commitment and the successful delivery of services, as well as the long-term sustainability of the DDR process. The reintegration component of DDR should be focused on developing the capacity of national and local training institutions and service providers through education and training, and technical and material assistance. Support should also be given to communities to set up local forums and consultative committees.

#### 6.5. Ensuring coordination and partnership

As emphasized in all IDDRS modules, effective coordination assures the success of DDR programmes. It should be the guiding principle from the earliest pre-mission assessment phase and continue throughout all stages of strategy development, programme planning and implementation. DDR programme managers will need to ensure close coordination:

- in the field, where coordination mechanisms within the UN system, with national counterparts, with implementing partners, with receiving communities and with donors should be established at the earliest stages of mission planning;

- in Headquarters, through integrated mission planning structures and processes (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures) to ensure that coordinated, coherent and consistent direction and support is provided to field operators;
- between the field and Headquarters to ensure that lessons learned and policy development on DDR are built into field-level programming, particularly at the start of missions and DDR processes, as well as to ensure the participation of key stakeholders at the international level.

In order to ensure the sustainability of reintegration, DDR programme manager should also focus on building strong local, national and international partnerships from the start. Partnerships are essential, both in direct, short-term programme implementation and in forming links to longer-term recovery, peace-building and governance programmes.

## 6.6. Public information and awareness-raising strategies

The return of ex-combatants to communities can create real or perceived security problems. The DDR programme should therefore include a strong, long-term, public information campaign to keep communities informed of the reintegration strategy, timetable and resources available. Focus-group interviews with a wide range of people in sample communities should

The return of ex-combatants to communities can create real or perceived security problems.

provide DDR programme managers with a sense of the difficulties and issues that should be dealt with before the return of the ex-combatants. Mapping 'areas at risk' can also help managers and practitioners identify priority areas in which support will need to be offered to communities. Lessons learned

from previous DDR programmes suggest that radio programmes in which ex-combatants have spoken about their experiences are a powerful reconciliation tool (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR).

## 6.7. Developing a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system

One of the weaknesses of DDR programmes in the past has been the lack of clearly defined objectives and indicators of the effect the programme is having, which are needed for monitoring and evaluation (M&E). As a result, it has been difficult to assess the actual overall impact and success of DDR interventions and the relative merits of specific approaches. Once the decision to implement a DDR programme has been taken, the NDDRC and/or national and local stakeholders, together with UN agencies and partners, shall develop a framework for results-based M&E.

The starting point for effective, results-based M&E is for all the concerned parties to arrive at a clear and unambiguous agreement about the objectives and expected results of the DDR programme. Different contexts will require different DDR approaches, with different objectives and expected results, so these must be clarified from the start rather than assuming that DDR always produces certain standard outcomes. Once expected results are clearly defined, key indicators for monitoring and measuring programme impact must be agreed by all stakeholders. Individuals or organizations responsible for monitoring should also be identified, as well as how often monitoring reports will be drawn up.

Conventional assessment of DDR programmes has tended to focus on short-term quantitative outputs such as the number of weapons collected and the number of ex-combatants

demobilized or trained. DDR planners should also focus on qualitative impacts such as changes in ex-combatant behaviour, successful interactions with other social groups, and improvement in security both at national and local levels. The early development of a rigorous M&E mechanism will allow for 'lessons learned' to be identified, communicated and shared.

The M&E framework becomes the tool by which stakeholders together measure progress and identify bottlenecks. Through a process of defining the M&E framework, stakeholders develop a shared understanding of the objectives of the DDR programme, which in turn leads to greater ownership (also see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes).

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MONITORING AND EVALUATION: A CHECKLIST	
Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Have all concerned parties negotiated and agreed on the objectives and expected results?</li> </ul>
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Have these objectives and results been specifically designed to fit the country context?</li> </ul>
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Have all stakeholders agreed on indicators for monitoring and measuring the programme's impact?</li> <li>■ Are these indicators qualitative as well as quantitative?</li> <li>■ Are these indicators disaggregated by sex, age, region, faction, etc?</li> <li>■ Are the indicators objective? Do all stakeholders share an understanding of what each indicator is measuring?</li> <li>■ Are they both short- and long-term indicators?</li> <li>■ Can the data for the indicators be obtained in a timely way and at a reasonable cost?</li> <li>■ Are the data used to develop the indicators of sufficient reliability and quality for confident decision-making?</li> </ul>
Roles and responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Who is responsible for monitoring? Is M&amp;E part of their terms of reference?</li> <li>■ How often will monitoring reports be submitted to stakeholders?</li> </ul>

## 6.8. Establishing a management information system (MIS)

The collection of sex- and age-disaggregated personal and socio-economic data (including information on special needs) provides information on which to base the planning and implementation of disarmament and demobilization programmes, as well as the later M&E of ex-combatants as they reintegrate into civilian life. The volume of data needed to track ex-combatants, and to design and monitor reintegration programmes, requires a comprehensive MIS. The software used during the registration of ex-combatants in the disarmament and demobilization process will greatly assist in gathering data and in management, planning, monitoring and evaluation. Specially designed software is essential to avoid double counting, to track ex-combatants, and to manage programme monitoring, evaluation and reporting. These information systems must include data not only on thousands of individuals, but also on the opportunities available for their reintegration and the status of individual and collective reintegration projects.

The lack of readily available commercial or institutional software packages for this purpose has meant that every DDR programme has had to build its own database and MIS, placing a heavy burden on their financial and human resources during the critical start-up period. The need to design this software every time a DDR programme is initiated

has often delayed the beginning of project activities in situations where security-related issues do not permit delays. Furthermore, creating a new system for each programme failed to ensure that experiences gained from previous programmes were effectively integrated into new MIS systems. To solve these problems, UNDP has developed a generic MIS that can be adapted to the needs of each UN integrated DDR programme to minimize implementation delays and provide savings for future DDR projects.<sup>7</sup>

## 6.9. Resource mobilization

Many people and large amounts of funds are required at the start of a DDR programme. Given the need for early planning and implementation of key reintegration activities, such as pre-registration surveys and the development of the capacity of service providers, adequate funds need to be available at the start in order to prevent delays that could undermine programme credibility. Previous UN programmes have faced serious funding problems, as outlined below:

THREE KEY FUNDING PROBLEMS	
The funding gap	Most DDR programmes experience a funding gap, usually of eight to twelve months, from the time voluntary contributions are pledged to the time they are received, which can cause serious difficulties for the reintegration programme.
Use of the peacekeeping budget	Lack of clarity about the budgetary process and Member States' reluctance to fund reintegration programmes from the peacekeeping assessed budget have limited contributions from the regular budget to DDR.
UN fragmentation	The UN system's previously fragmented approach to DDR programming has resulted in poorly planned and synchronized resource mobilization activities and duplication of effort. This has reduced donors' confidence and their willingness to contribute the required funds.

The move towards integration across the UN will help to solve some of these problems. In addition, a recent decision in the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly clarified the use of the regular budget for DDR during peacekeeping operations.<sup>8</sup> Resolution A/C.5/59/L.53 formally endorsed the financing of staffing and operational costs for disarmament and demobilization (including reinsertion activities) pending a final policy decision at its sixtieth session. The resolution agreed that the demobilization process must provide “transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year”. This decision should greatly assist DDR programme managers in planning their reintegration programmes.

Flexible funding arrangements are essential to deal with the complex nature of DDR, and to enable UN agencies to adopt an integrated approach to programming. Both the types of funding mechanisms, such as trust funds and pooled funding, and the criteria established for the use of funds must be flexible. As past experience has showed, strict allocating of funds for specific DDR components (e.g., reintegration only) or expenditures (e.g.,



logistics and equipment) reinforces an artificial distinction between different parts of DDR. This is particularly the case with phased funding or funding from assessed contributions, whose inherent limitations have in the past seriously undermined the capacity and performance of DDR operations (also see IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting).

## 6.10. Exit strategy

The time-frame of DDR is limited, covering the conflict, transition and early recovery periods, and therefore close attention should be paid, from the start, to ending programmes and their transition into longer-term development and peace-building processes managed by national counterparts and in-country UN agencies. Many aspects and outcomes of the reintegration programme therefore need to be sustained beyond the lifespan of a DDR operation. Therefore, DDR programme managers shall clearly define the exit strategy during the planning stage, focusing in particular on the transition between reintegration and broader and/or longer-term SSR, violence prevention, recovery and peace-building processes.

A capacity-development component should be included in the programme design, to assure a smooth programme transition and a gradual transfer of responsibility to national institutions and government. This capacity development should focus on activities that are relevant to other aspects of socio-economic recovery and development and not only to specific DDR activities. Ideally, DDR should be a one-time intervention, done correctly the first time, and never to be repeated again. Otherwise, no matter what safeguards are put in place, the rewards people think they receive from taking part in DDR can become an incentive for them to participate in future conflicts.

## 7. Context-specific approaches to reintegration<sup>9</sup>

While the above principles, assessments, and design and planning issues should be taken into account in all reintegration programmes, the process of adapting the DDR programme to the political, socio-economic and security context of each DDR intervention will require different approaches each time. Depending on the nature and type of conflict, the way in which it has been ended and the post-conflict security and development priorities, it is possible to identify three broad approaches to reintegration.

APPROACH	PURPOSE	OBJECTIVE	CHARACTERISTICS	ACTIVITIES
Short-term stabilization (reinsertion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To draw ex-combatants away from fighting or criminality until a peace mission is deployed, or security sector or political reform is completed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To provide rapid transitional support for resettlement and short-term income-generation opportunities to all potentially disruptive ex-combatants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Low cost per ex-combatant</li> <li>■ Short-term measure</li> <li>■ Only works when ex-combatants are not a long-term security threat</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Information, counselling and referral services</li> <li>■ Transitional support schemes (food, clothing, transportation, other)</li> <li>■ Short-term labour-intensive projects</li> </ul>

Reintegration focused on ex-combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To provide ex-combatants with specifically designed, individually focused sustainable programmes for long-term reintegration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To involve ex-combatants in sustainable micro-projects to reduce the long-term security risks they present</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Higher cost per ex-combatant</li> <li>■ Can create feelings of unfairness within the community</li> <li>■ To be used when ex-combatants represent a long-term threat to security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Information, counselling and referral services</li> <li>■ Microproject development through grants</li> <li>■ Training, technical advisory and related support services</li> </ul>
Community-based reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To provide communities with tools and capacities to support reintegration of ex-combatants, together with IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To support ex-combatant reintegration as a component of wider, community-focused reconciliation and recovery programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Highest cost per ex-combatant</li> <li>■ May not deal with ex-combatants' concerns directly</li> <li>■ Deals with the needs of the community as a whole</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Community projects with greater inclusion of all social actors</li> <li>■ Peace-building and reconciliation activities</li> <li>■ Local activities to improve security</li> </ul>

The specific context of a DDR intervention in any country may require a mix of the above reintegration strategies, combining an individually focused reintegration strategy for ex-combatants with an approach that deals with the main priorities of the receiving communities, in terms of both improving their capacity to absorb ex-combatants and dealing with their most urgent security concerns — other than the presence of ex-combatants themselves. The various approaches are discussed below. They are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined at various times in the DDR process to increase responsiveness and flexibility.

### 7.1. Short-term stabilization

In this strategy, stopgap (temporary) projects combined with an extended transitional subsistence allowance to cover the resettlement period are usually seen as a sufficient response. The short-term stabilization approach is used in situations where it can reasonably be assumed that ex-combatants will reintegrate through their own networks, that they already possess the means for their reintegration (social capital, access to land) and/or that they are not a threat to peace. This approach is very useful in the short term, when longer-term reintegration is planned but not available immediately after demobilization is complete. It can increase the flexibility and responsiveness of DDR by ensuring that former fighters are kept busy and can sustain themselves until longer-term reintegration programmes start.

### 7.2. Reintegration focused on ex-combatants

The second type of reintegration strategy, which focuses specifically on the needs of ex-combatants, is characterized by the need to develop an individual long-term reintegration strategy for each ex-combatant. This approach is mostly used when ex-combatants are seen




as a threat to long-term security and development or in contexts where normal life has continued for others in post-conflict communities. In these circumstances, the reintegration programme should assist individual ex-combatants by providing relevant training, identifying employment opportunities in existing businesses and by creating microenterprises. The DDR programme should also provide ongoing technical advice, as well as monitoring and supervisory services to each microproject. Advice, monitoring and supervision will help to keep ex-combatants focused on their plans and help them to adapt their original plans if the circumstances of their microenterprises change in some way.

### 7.3. Community-based reintegration

The third approach to reintegration links the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants directly into a wider strategy for the recovery of a community, where there is not a specific focus on ex-combatants for livelihood support, except by providing key services such as mental and physical health care. This approach ensures that ex-combatants' reintegration programmes form a part of the wider goal of community recovery and development. It also helps avoid the potential problem of community members feeling excluded from specially designed reintegration programmes that are solely for ex-combatants, and it deals with the problems that arise when stabilization strategies focus on short-term security issues.

### 7.4. Linking reintegration to wider recovery programming

Whichever of the above approaches (or combination of approaches) is adopted, DDR managers should ensure that the reintegration programme is closely linked to wider reintegration programmes, which are designed to meet the needs of IDPs, refugees and other war-affected populations. It should also link to wider peace-building activities, including the promotion



IOM supporting demobilization in Guatemala.  
Photo: P. Cote/UNDP

of human rights, justice and SSR and recovery. Reintegration activities should deal with not only vital security and political issues, but also the social context in which processes of reconciliation, changing social relations, and strengthening the rule of law are taking place. Therefore, when designing reintegration programmes, UN practitioners should coordinate and, where possible, jointly plan programmes with actors working on the reintegration of other war-affected groups, reconciliation, justice, governance, political reform, human rights, gender equality, poverty reduction and development.<sup>10</sup>

DDR managers should also ensure that their programmes are integrated into other relevant frameworks, such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)<sup>11</sup> and the development of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). This is vital to ensure that DDR programming is linked to peace-building, transition, recovery and reconstruction strategies and that it will facilitate the involvement of the various UN and other international agencies, as well as resource mobilization. However, while all efforts should be made to coordinate closely with other actors implementing related programmes, UN DDR programme managers should clearly identify those objectives that the reintegration programme can deal with directly, and those to which it can only contribute (see Annex C and IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery).

◀▶ 2.20

## 8. The transition from demobilization to reintegration

DDR is not linear or sequential, but dynamic and integrated: reintegration actually starts during the demobilization process. Since the phases of DDR do not occur one after the other, but simultaneously, UN staff responsible for reintegration, as well as national counterparts and other implementing partners, should be involved in the planning and implementa-

tion of relevant aspects of the demobilization process. It should be noted that many of the activities described below, such as counselling and referral, will start during demobilization, but will continue during the reintegration period.

DDR is not linear or sequential, but dynamic and integrated: reintegration actually starts during the demobilization process.

### 8.1. Registration and profiling

Registration and profiling, which usually occurs during the demobilization process, will establish the nature and size of the group for which a DDR programme is to be designed. The collection of personal and socio-economic data provides baseline information needed for the planning, implementation and later monitoring and evaluation of the process of ex-combatants' reintegration. As stated above, the volume of data needed to track ex-combatants, and design and monitor reintegration programmes requires a good MIS.

Programme managers should ensure that the registration process is designed to support reintegration, and that information gathered through profiling is included in future programme design. Previous DDR programmes have often experienced a delay between registration and the delivery of assistance, which can lead to frustration among ex-combatants. To deal with this problem, UN DDR programmes should provide ex-combatants with a clear and realistic timetable, at the time that they first register for DDR, of when they will receive assistance.

## 8.2. Information, counselling and referral

A key feature of any ex-combatant reintegration programme should be the information, counselling and referral system, which provides vital briefing and orientation for ex-combatants, preparing them for a return to civilian life. It is essential to start this process during demobilization; however, services should be provided throughout the lifespan of the reintegration programme.

During demobilization, pre-discharge orientation should include information on opportunities available through the reintegration programme, and referral support to help ex-combatants take advantage of these opportunities. Ex-combatants should also be provided with counselling on their expected change in role and status in society, as well as advice on political and legal issues, accommodation support services, their civic and community responsibilities, and reconciliation programmes.

Often ex-combatants do not know how to carry out simple activities that are easily understood by their peers, and do not have the confidence to either ask for assistance or find out for themselves. Making choices is often a new experience for ex-combatants, and even for their dependants, as they are used to command structures and collective lifestyles where they are told what to do by others, rather than personal decision-making. Appropriate counselling and peer support can play an important part in providing ex-combatants with the confidence, 'life skills' and aptitude required to face everyday problems, challenges and opportunities without resorting to violence. Where possible, specialized, confidential, gender- and age-appropriate counselling should be offered, to avoid peer pressure and encourage the independence of each ex-combatant. These services are an important way of supporting ex-combatants during the difficult transition from demobilization to reintegration. All counsellors should be trained to handle violent reactions from ex-combatants.

A key challenge for counsellors is to strike the right balance between the hopes and ambitions of ex-combatants and what is available in the labour market. Frustration and hopelessness, which are often at the root of the decision to join an armed force or group in the first place, can reappear when ex-combatants do not find a job after having been involved in ineffective training and employment. Counsellors should therefore match the skills and hopes of ex-combatants with employment or education and training opportunities. This is essential in managing the transition to civilian life and the world of work. If offered during demobilization, guidance and counselling can play a key role in identifying and specifically designing employment programmes and education and training opportunities, as well as helping ex-combatants make realistic career choices.

Once ex-combatants are settled in the receiving communities, information, counselling and referral services should continue to be provided, through as wide a network of offices as possible. These services can help ex-combatants and others associated with armed groups and forces to sort out any uncertainties about the reintegration process and help them to make informed decisions about the most appropriate route to reintegration, taking account of their personal circumstances, the potential reintegration opportunities and the various support services available to them.

Information, counselling and referral services should build on existing national or local employment services, which are normally the responsibility of the ministry of employment. In countries where such services are weak or non-existent, the reintegration programme should either start, re-launch or strengthen national and local services, as appropriate.<sup>12</sup> Temporary structures doing the same things should be avoided whenever possible, as using national structures will ensure the sustainability of an essential structure that countries emerging from armed conflict will need in the future for the whole of the civilian population.

## INFORMATION, COUNSELLING AND REFERRAL: RATIONALE AND SERVICES

	Purpose	Services
Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To ensure that individual ex-combatants understand the reintegration process and the opportunities available to them</li> <li>■ Information will also help to manage ex-combatants' expectations</li> </ul>	<p>Information collected during the pre-registration survey and registration process on each ex-combatant and their associates and dependants is cross-referenced with reintegration opportunities and support services mapping. This should provide the reintegration programme with information on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ education and training opportunities and services, and potential obstacles to getting access to these;</li> <li>■ job opportunities and referral to prospective employers;</li> <li>■ other economic reintegration opportunities, such as self-employment or microenterprise creation;</li> <li>■ business support services and their providers.</li> </ul> <p>This information, which serves as the basis for future counselling and referral, needs to be kept continuously updated to ensure its usefulness, and must be easily available to the counsellors so that they can use it to help individual ex-combatants.</p>
Counselling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To help individual ex-combatants identify and extend the range of opportunities available to them, in order to assist in a smooth transition from military to civilian life</li> </ul>	<p>Counselling services during demobilization should offer specialized counselling on reintegration options for each ex-combatant or associate based on his/her age, sex, physical ability, skills, experience and expectations and the identified reintegration opportunities in the proposed community of return.</p> <p>In the selected resettlement community, the following should be available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ provision of transitional support services;</li> <li>■ access to essential social services, particularly health and education;</li> <li>■ problem-solving assistance;</li> <li>■ support to ex-combatants to develop their individual reintegration strategies/business plans;</li> <li>■ ongoing counselling link between the ex-combatant and the supervisory and monitoring services of the reintegration programme.</li> </ul>
Referral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To refer ex-combatants to support services, either within the reintegration programme or externally</li> </ul>	<p>Referral within the DDR programme to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ health screening and support services;</li> <li>■ reintegration assistance grant-approval mechanisms;</li> <li>■ advisory and monitoring services.</li> </ul> <p>External referral to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ social services: health, education, pensions;</li> <li>■ job opportunities;</li> <li>■ community support structures;</li> <li>■ business development services;</li> <li>■ education, training and technical advisory services.</li> </ul>

### 8.3. Health services

The demobilization process provides a first opportunity to brief ex-combatants on key health issues. Former combatants are likely to suffer a range of both short- and long-term health problems that not only affect their own reintegration prospects, but also pose potential threats to the communities to which they will return. In addition to basic medical screening and treatment for wounds and diseases, particular attention should be directed towards the needs of those with disabilities, those infected with HIV/AIDS, and those experiencing psychosocial trauma and related illness. Support should also be given to their main care-givers in the community to which they return. As in the case of information, counselling and referral, the services described below may start during the demobilization process, but continue into and, in some cases, beyond the reintegration process (also see IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

5.70 ◀▶

#### 8.3.1. HIV/AIDS

A very direct and demonstrable connection exists between the spread of HIV/AIDS and conflict. Conflict greatly increases the spread of HIV/AIDS for various reasons. These can include: the lack of a safe blood supply; the shortage of clean equipment for injecting drug users; an insufficient supply of condoms and health care; and the widespread use of sexual and gender-based violence, both as a weapon of war and as a means to discipline and control people, especially women and girls, but also including boys, within armed groups and forces.<sup>13</sup> The overall post-conflict recovery strategy should urgently focus on the threat and impact of HIV/AIDS, and the DDR programme is an obvious place in which to plan interventions. Military personnel and armed groups and forces are known high-risk groups for the transmission of HIV/AIDS, as well as other diseases that spread among those living in close quarters or difficult conditions. The demobilization and reintegration process can therefore contribute to the spread of disease. However, it also provides an excellent opportunity to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS among this key target group and offer voluntary counselling and testing services. In many cases, counselling on substance abuse, especially those practices that contribute to the transmission of HIV/AIDS, should also be supplied at this stage (also see IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR).

5.60 ◀▶

#### 8.3.2. Psychosocial and mental health care

The widespread presence of psychosocial problems among combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups has only recently begun to emerge as a major issue affecting DDR programmes.<sup>14</sup> Many of them have been victims or perpetrators of horrendous violence, which may have left deep emotional and psychological scars resulting in depression, apathy or rage. Post-war trauma, especially in combination with substance abuse, is likely to affect reintegration processes, overstraining the capacity of the receiving community; limiting the development of human-rights-based social practices, especially gender equality; and undermining possibilities for the non-violent resolution of conflict.

Psychosocial support and counselling to deal with these effects is an essential, but often overlooked, component of DDR. Particular attention should be paid to post-war trauma and mental illness, which, especially in combination with alcohol or drug abuse, is likely to affect both reintegration processes and the capacity for using non-violent methods to resolve conflict, particularly within the family.<sup>15</sup> As long as ex-combatants remain traumatized, their productivity and self-esteem, and their commitment to self-help and recovery remain extremely limited and they continue to threaten peace, stability and recovery.<sup>16</sup> The



dramatic increase in domestic violence recorded in post-conflict countries highlights the need to raise awareness and provide education on women's human rights and non-violent ways of resolving interpersonal conflict within reintegration programmes.

### 8.3.3. Disabilities

War leaves behind large numbers of injured people, both civilians and fighters. Ex-combatants with disabilities should be treated as victims of armed conflict; they have special needs and require special care. This group should be included in general reintegration programmes, not excluded from them, i.e., many ex-combatants with disabilities can and should benefit from the same programmes and services made available to non-disabled ex-combatants. DDR programme managers should ensure that the following guidelines are taken into account when dealing with disabilities in reintegration programmes:

DEALING WITH DISABILITIES: BASIC GUIDELINES	
Access	Ex-combatants with disabilities should have access to vocational training centres and other skills acquisition programmes.
Inclusion	Ex-combatants with disabilities should be included in micro- and small business development opportunities and resources.
Equity	Ex-combatants with disabilities should have access to a fair share of formal job opportunities.
Caregiver support	Their caregivers should have access to support.
Workplace adaptation	Reintegration programmes should offer potential employers assistance in adapting workplaces to allow them to employ workers with disabilities. Often only minor adaptations are required. These adaptations can help ensure that limited space in special rehabilitation centres can be given to persons too severely disabled to join mainstream programmes.

Some ex-combatants with disabilities will require long-term medical care and family support. They sometimes receive some form of pension and medical assistance, especially if they were part of a government force. However, it is very rare to find long-term assistance for disabled ex-combatants who were part of a rebel movement or other kinds of informal army, with the exception of direct medical assistance such as artificial limbs. In places where the health infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, attention must be paid to informal care providers — often women and girls — who care for disabled combatants, and support structures must be put in place to lessen the largely unpaid burden of care that they carry.

### 8.3.4. Reproductive health services

The provision of reproductive health services, which should start as soon as the demobilization registration and screening process has identified specific needs, should be continued, as appropriate, during reintegration. Efforts should be made to direct those requiring further support and health services to public or private national and/or community health facilities. Preferential or subsidized access may still be required, particularly in those cases where the lack of continued treatment can in itself create a renewed public threat, such as HIV/AIDS, drug abuse and psychological illness.



#### 8.4. Transitional subsistence support (TSS)

Ex-combatants are usually provided with benefits as a part of demobilization. Normally, some sort of transitional subsistence support (TSS) is provided for the immediate and basic needs of the combatant and his/her dependants. However, because the material benefits of DDR have often been overemphasized, DDR has been regarded as a commodity, and considered to be an entitlement, rather than a process. Cash-based TSS packages have contributed to this misconception.

When designing UN integrated DDR programmes, special attention should be paid to refocusing and repackaging benefits, especially those given in the transitional phase. The tendency has been to provide money as TSS. Although intended to provide ex-combatants and their dependants with a way of supporting themselves while waiting for reintegration assistance, cash payments have many drawbacks, especially if provided in large instalments. Small payments over a longer period are a more effective way of ensuring a peaceful resettlement process. Experience has shown that a family member or partner of the beneficiary should also be informed of the payment and its purpose, to improve the chances that money will be spent wisely. Packages should be linked to work or services performed by the ex-combatant, for their benefit and that of the community. Stopgap or quick-impact projects have an important role to play, as is discussed in section 8.5, below.

DDR programme managers should consider TSS, which provides ex-combatants, those previously associated with armed forces and groups, and their dependants with food, civilian clothing and personal items, household goods, building materials, work tools, agricultural inputs, and some basic services such as medical assistance. In addition to the TSS, and in order to deal with the possible resistance of communities to receiving returning ex-combatants and prevent accusations that ex-combatants are receiving more and better benefits, it may be useful to issue a 'reintegration voucher' to ex-combatants. Ex-combatants can give this to their community of return, for use in local activities aimed at increasing the communities'

capacity to receive ex-combatants and to improve local security conditions. Another option is to issue an 'employment voucher', giving ex-combatants access to employment programmes.

As with much of reintegration programming, the TSS should be adapted to a specific context. However, the following issues should be taken into consideration:

DESIGNING TRANSITIONAL SUBSISTENCE SUPPORT: BASIC GUIDELINES	
It is emergency support.	The TSS is primarily an emergency support measure and not a payment for participating in the conflict.
It should not be linked to the handover of weapons.	The TSS should not be directly linked to the turning in of weapons, so that the monetization of weapons can be avoided.
Equity with other war-affected groups should be assured.	The nature and size of any benefits paid should be equitable with benefits given to other groups, such as IDPs, returnees and affected communities, and should be based on local economic conditions (e.g., civil service salaries).
Support should be based on a sound assessment of needs and resources.	The TSS should be appropriate to the socio-economic context, and should be based on the assessed needs of ex-combatants, associates and their dependants during the transitional phase. It should also be affordable for the DDR programme. The more money spent on TSS, the less money can be invested in reintegration support.
Cash payments should be minimized.	Direct cash payments should be proportionately the smallest part of any benefit package. Food and other goods and services (tools, seeds, counselling, etc.) are generally a better option.
The TSS should be linked to participation in stopgap projects.	Participation in community-based stopgap projects for short-term livelihood support should be linked to the receipt of the transitional support package, particularly any money received.

## 8.5. Stopgap projects and temporary employment creation

The transition from military to civilian life can be a difficult time for ex-combatants struggling to come to terms with their new identity and role in society. 'Stopgap' projects are short-term interventions that help to provide a smoother transition from demobilization to reintegration. Stopgap projects implemented through community-based activities in sensitive and strategic areas may help reintegrate ex-combatants into the community by creating short-term jobs while they wait to enter longer-term reintegration programmes. The use of these projects is only a temporary fix rather than a well-thought-out, sustainable solution to the problem.

Ex-combatants may be involved in public infrastructure works, such as reconstruction of schools, water systems, hospitals, roads, demining, garbage collection, etc. Stopgap projects should only help with the community's immediate needs. Since they are highly visible, they contribute to improving the public perception of ex-combatants and may serve as a first, crucial step towards the latter's reintegration, especially if other members of the community are included in the workforce. This approach is particularly recommended for the urgent repair of damaged infrastructure, because during post-conflict reconstruction it is best to rely on what is immediately available at low cost, i.e., local light equipment and labour. Heavy equipment is generally not available, or else out of order or lacking spare parts, fuel or skilled machine operators.<sup>17</sup>

DDR programme managers should avoid falling into the trap of using stopgap projects so often, and for so long, that they finally become the main reintegration mechanism.



This can be avoided by reducing the time between demobilization and reintegration support. This can best be done by starting the profiling of ex-combatants as soon as possible through the pre-registration survey (see section 5.2), and through reintegration opportunities mapping (see section 5.4). This will allow for the early establishment of information, counselling and referral services, and will reduce the transitional period to a minimum.

## 9. Economic reintegration

Large-scale armed conflicts usually have a devastating effect on economies, productive capacities and livelihoods, leading to the impoverishment of much of the population. The end of hostilities does not automatically result in an improvement of economic conditions. At the end of a conflict there is often an abrupt release into the labour market of thousands of ex-combatants who compete with ordinary civilians for extremely scarce jobs and livelihood opportunities. In such circumstances, ex-combatants might attempt to use violence to make a living, becoming involved in banditry, theft and other forms of illegal and harmful activity. Providing support for the reintegration of ex-combatants is therefore vital to help develop alternatives to violence-based livelihoods. This support can have an immediate positive effect on security and contribute to the improvement of overall economic conditions. Economic reintegration will be successful only if the reintegration support provides or encourages viable forms of economic activity and is socially productive. All interventions must be sustainable to ensure that ex-combatants do not turn to violence to earn a living.

### 9.1. Ongoing labour market analyses

As outlined in section 5.4, early assessment of the opportunities and services open to ex-combatants is vital in the design and planning of a reintegration programme. However, this analysis of the labour market needs to be regularly updated during the implementation of the reintegration programme, and should include analysis of culturally appropriate professions for men and women of varying age groups, recognizing how conflict may have changed cultural norms about gender-appropriate work. The capacity of the ministry of employment or labour should be strengthened to perform this task at the national and provincial level, while providers of vocational training and employment services should be equipped to carry out assessments regularly at the local level. This labour market analysis should be shared with national authorities, UN agencies, and local and international non-governmental organizations involved in supporting reintegration, and should serve as the basis for training activities.

### 9.2. Education, training and skills development

Many ex-combatants have missed opportunities for basic and further education, and as a result are disadvantaged in the competition for jobs and opportunities. Provision of adult literacy classes, adult education, and technical and vocational training is important both to improve the skill sets of adult and young ex-combatants and provide opportunities for reorientation and demilitarization. Training and education offered to children should be specialized for their needs (see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR). As far as possible, education and training for ex-combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups should be supplied as part of the wider provision of educational services to the general

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population, and not in schools or colleges exclusively for them, even when ex-combatants have preferential access (e.g., by not having to pay fees).

In the past, DDR programmes often sent ex-combatants on training courses and assumed that they would be reintegrated when the course was over. In the majority of cases, this does not happen, and the resulting frustration can lead to increased security risks, which undermines the objective of the DDR programme. Another problem has been that ex-combatants have been provided with a range of training courses and asked to make their choices with limited advice and no opportunity to consult their families or peers, or to understand their options as part of the broader reintegration process. These choices may have no relation to the state of the economy or an individual's capacity to benefit from the training provided.

Training should generally be regarded as a tool for reintegration and not as reintegration itself. It should be practical, and should be designed mainly to respond to the requirements of the informal sector, which is where most microenterprises will start up. As outlined in section 5.4, socio-economic profiling of ex-combatants should be directly linked to reintegration opportunities and services mapping. With this in mind, DDR programme managers should provide the following services, if they are appropriate (which will depend on the specific context of each DDR intervention).

#### 9.2.1. Education and scholarships

Young ex-combatants, especially those aged under 15, should be reintegrated into formal education, which may mean extra support for teachers and trainers to manage the special needs of such learners. Some ex-combatants can be offered scholarships to finish their studies. Youth should have priority in these cases, and particular attention must be paid to assisting girls to return to school — which may mean making available nursery facilities for children in their care. In some countries where the conflict has lasted a long time and combatants have received little or no schooling, emphasis should be placed on 'catch-up' education to ensure that this group does not stay trapped in life-long poverty. If allowances or school fees are to be funded by the reintegration programme, DDR programme managers should ensure that resources are available for the full duration of ex-combatants' education, which could be longer than the reintegration programme. If resources are not available, there should be a clearly communicated plan for phasing out support.

#### 9.2.2. Vocational training

Ex-combatants often need to learn new skills in order to make a living in the civilian economy. Vocational education plays a vital role in successful reintegration, by increasing ex-combatants' chances to effectively join the labour market. Training can also help break down military attitudes and behaviour, and develop values and norms based on peace and democracy. Vocational training activities need to be linked with studies of the local labour market and identification of the economic potential of an area and its business opportunities. Attention should be paid to existing economic cultures, including whether women and men will have equal access to all types of work and how this can be addressed. Training should also be regularly adapted to the changing demands of the labour market. Certification of training has proved important in ensuring that the quality of training given by the

different providers is similar, to increase the confidence of ex-combatants when applying for work, and to gain recognition by employers.<sup>18</sup>

Ex-combatants often need to learn new skills in order to make a living in the civilian economy.

### 9.2.3. Apprenticeships and on-the-job training

After completing a vocational training course, the trainee can use his/her newly acquired skills through apprenticeships or on-the-job training in existing workshops or businesses. Alternatively, apprenticeships and on-the-job training can themselves be a particularly effective form of training, since they might result in more sustainable employment. A reintegration programme can subsidize these learning and training opportunities by paying the trainee an allowance. Apprenticeship and on-the-job training should be carried out according to the local tradition of apprenticeships, in order to ensure sustainability. An apprenticeship can also be an excellent means of social reintegration and reconciliation, as it also offers insertion, through an association with a mentor/trainer, into an already existing socio-economic network consisting of groups and communities of people who are not ex-combatants.

### 9.2.4. Life skills

DDR programme managers should regard the provision of life skills as a necessity, not a luxury, in reintegration programmes. Life skills include non-violent ways of resolving conflict, civilian social behaviour, and career planning, but also understanding what kinds of behaviour, etc., employers expect. This type of training should complement the various other forms of educational and/or training services provided. Education on political rights and responsibilities, especially in countries undergoing major governance reform, is essential to encourage the participation of ex-combatants in democratic structures.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING: BASIC GUIDELINES	
Inclusiveness	Education should be supplied as part of the wider provision of education to the general population, not in colleges exclusively for ex-combatants.
Focus on youth	Young ex-combatants, especially those under 15, should be reintegrated into formal education. Emphasis should be placed on 'catch-up' education to ensure that ex-combatants do not become trapped in lifelong poverty.
Focus on girls and women	Particular attention should be paid to assisting girls to return to school and to providing educational and training opportunities to women.
Limitations of training	Training is only one tool for reintegration.
Practical application	Training should teach practical skills and be responsive to the demands of the labour market.
Cultural considerations	Attention should be paid to existing economic cultures, including whether women and men will have equal access to all types of work.
Life skills	In the context of DDR, the teaching of life skills is a necessity, not a luxury.

## 9.3. Employment creation

Labour-based public works programmes and public sector job creation are often important features of reintegration programmes. It is essential that the inclusion of these activities in reintegration programmes is based on a clear understanding that they are a temporary measure only. Public sector job creation is often a political expedient forced on governments when reintegration programmes fail to provide sustainable job opportunities for ex-combatants. While taking ex-combatants into public service may be an important part of overall reconciliation and political integration strategies, especially as part of SSR, it can be sustain-

able only when economic circumstances allow for the expansion of public services, and therefore should be managed as a part of overall economic development strategies.

## **9.4. Livelihood and income generation**

### **9.4.1. Developing the private sector and business development services**

Policies and programmes that support the creation and expansion of businesses can help create employment in a post-conflict environment. Providing business development services (BDS) can help overcome the difficulties faced by ex-combatants, such as lack of education, inadequate technical skills, poor access to markets, lack of information and unreliable infrastructure. Government agencies should be encouraged to develop the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks to encourage private sector growth and to play a role in monitoring and coordinating this growth. However, in many post-conflict societies, government agencies lack the capacity to support and deliver services to micro- and small enterprises. Various actors, including businesses, local NGOs with experience in economic projects, para-governmental institutions and community groups can be encouraged to provide BDS (see Annex D).<sup>19</sup>

### **9.4.2. Employment in existing businesses**

Reintegration programmes ideally should try to place qualified ex-combatants in existing jobs, as the risk of failure is lower than if they try to start a new microenterprise themselves. In reality, there are very few employment opportunities in post-conflict environments, and, where these opportunities do exist, business owners are often not willing to employ ex-combatants. Reintegration programmes should therefore help to increase the opportunities available to ex-combatants by offering wage, training and equipment subsidies. These subsidies, however, should have the following conditions:

- wage subsidies should be partial and last for a fixed period of time;
- newly hired ex-combatants should not take the jobs of workers who are already employed;
- employers should use the subsidies to expand their businesses, which means that the ex-combatant's job will be permanent.

Governments should be also supported in the creation of a legal framework to ensure that labour rights are respected and that demobilized or other vulnerable groups do not become 'slaves' of the private sector.

### **9.4.3. Microenterprise and small business start-ups**

In most post-conflict societies there are few businesses that can rapidly expand their workforce. Therefore, while the recovery and expansion of the private sector should be encouraged, it is often necessary to focus on creating new microenterprises for most ex-combatants. Once opportunities for employment in existing businesses have been exhausted, the DDR programme should therefore help ex-combatants to develop their own microenterprise start-up business plans.

DDR programme managers should provide support that is specifically designed to meet the needs of each individual ex-combatant, wherever possible, to prevent commanders from extorting part of their reintegration assistance from previous group members. Although it

is more expensive and more time-consuming, this kind of support also equips ex-combatants to decide for themselves what they will do, and to act alone, which helps to break their dependence on the group structure. Specifically designed support does not mean that reintegration projects cannot involve more than one ex-combatant, but rather that each individual should make the decision to start a microenterprise without too much outside pressure. Recent evaluations have shown that the bigger the group, the less likely it is that an income-generating project will last very long; this is because of the increased difficulties in managing a multi-member project. Reintegration programmes should also ensure that many different kinds of small businesses are started, to avoid distorting the balance of supply and demand in local markets. Too many of the same type of business means that many are bound to fail.

#### 9.4.4. The provision of microgrants

The main way of funding the creation of microenterprises should be microgrants, which, as recent experience shows, should be provided to the ex-combatants only after they have drawn up a clear start-up business plan, and should be paid in instalments.<sup>20</sup> The instalments should, as far as possible, be given in kind (equipment, supplies, training, etc.), avoiding large cash payments, which are difficult to monitor effectively and can be misused. Training and technical assistance services are essential to the success of start-ups, together with direct, on-the-ground supervision and monitoring by the DDR programme.

Credit, rather than grant schemes, has regularly been used in reintegration programmes. However, credit has rarely been successful, mainly because ex-combatants are one of the groups of society least able to take on the obligations of credit schemes, especially in the early phases of their reintegration. Grants are therefore a more appropriate way of providing start-up resources. Because of their poor track record, microfinance programmes that are designed for ex-combatants should not be encouraged. Offering 'credit' to individuals who cannot repay, or to institutions that do not have the capacity to ensure repayment, can undermine the local credit culture and hence the sustainability of other financial institutions, if the population comes to see credit as something that does not have to be repaid.

LIVELIHOOD AND INCOME GENERATION: BASIC GUIDELINES	
Government role	Governments should encourage and support private sector growth.
Use existing employment opportunities	Reintegration programmes should use existing employment opportunities wherever possible, as the risk of failure is lower than if ex-combatants try to start new microenterprises.
Offer employment incentives	Reintegration programmes can help to expand the opportunities available to ex-combatants by offering wage, training and equipment subsidies.
Respect labour rights	Labour rights should be respected. No ex-combatant should become a 'slave' of the private sector.
Specifically designed support	When developing microenterprises, reintegration programmes should offer ex-combatants support that is specifically designed to meet their needs.
Diversify	Many different types of small businesses should be established, to avoid putting pressure on local markets.
Offer grants	Grants, rather than credit, should be offered to ex-combatants.





Agricultural kits ready to be distributed in the Central African Republic. Photo: L. Yeke Yekes, UNDP Bangui

## 10. Social reintegration

### 10.1. Land distribution, property rights and resettlement

Disputes over land and access to water or mineral resources are the root causes of many conflicts. UN DDR programme planners must take these underlying conflicts into account when planning the return, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants, as they are often competing with other returnees for access to land. Conducting an early conflict analysis will assist programme managers in designing conflict-sensitive programmes. However, it cannot be the task of the reintegration programme to advance reforms of land access or mineral rights, for example. These are national policy issues. DDR programmers must be aware of and responsive to these issues, and should not make things worse through their interventions.

Most ex-combatants, like refugees and IDPs, wish to return to the places they have left or were forced to flee. Returning home, where this is possible for individuals, is often a key step in reintegration programmes. However, they may find their land occupied by others, either spontaneously or as part of a planned strategy. As many intended beneficiaries of reintegration processes will return to rural areas and to mainly pastoral or agricultural economies, access to land is an extremely important issue for them.<sup>21</sup> For women, in particular, land inheritance traditions may exclude them from owning land. While it is beyond the scope of the DDR programme to reform constitutional and statutory laws, it should support efforts to make changes to legislation so that women can own property. Where necessary, the reintegration programme should support female ex-combatants and other women previously associated with armed groups and forces in their efforts to receive legal assistance to protect their property rights (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

The lack of available land for resettlement has been a major obstacle to successful reintegration in several countries. Failing to deal with issues of equity and land redistribution within the broader recovery framework can mean that when ex-combatants try to return to land they previously owned, they become a source of conflict. Programme planners and national and local authorities need to focus carefully on issues of land resettlement as part of post-conflict recovery and reintegration strategies in rural areas. Specifically designed land resettlement and agricultural extension services and support may be appropriate during the resettlement of war-displaced groups by including ex-combatants who may have lost access to land as a result of the war. However, the resettlement of former combatants within communities is always likely to be a sensitive matter, and a great deal of consultation and reassurance are essential.

Preferential access to housing is another way in which ex-combatants may receive specifically designed assistance to enable them to re-enter civilian life. Such support is based on the assumption that combatants have not had the same opportunities as their civilian peers and so deserve to receive such support. However, former combatants are usually not the only sector of society that has to reintegrate, and refugees and IDPs may also require similar support to get access to land and property they previously owned. Community consultation and arbitration are essential to resolve these matters fairly and peaceably.

Reintegration programmes for ex-combatants should work together with other reintegration programmes to support the establishment of local conflict-resolution mechanisms that can work towards finding equitable and sustainable solutions to potential conflict about access to land and other resources. Such mechanisms can transform potential conflict into reconciliation opportunities, e.g., through involving both ex-combatants and non ex-combatants in stopgap projects that use land for the benefit of entire communities.

## **10.2. Urban reintegration<sup>22</sup>**

Because of a number of factors, such as changing expectations and difficulties in reintegrating into village life, ex-combatants are increasingly reintegrating into urban settings. For ex-combatants reintegrating into cities and towns, where they cannot depend as much on family or other support networks, transitional assistance and reintegration programmes are essential to prevent them from returning to violence and insecurity. Ex-combatants' preference for reintegration in an urban setting can also be a sign of marginalization, possibly indicating that families and communities of origin are unwilling to accept them.

When accommodation is limited and services are run down, urban reintegration presents both a challenge and an opportunity: combatants should be discouraged from entering urban slums, whose degraded conditions will not offer them many opportunities for reintegration. Instead, former combatants could be usefully employed in repairing houses or building new ones, both for themselves and to contribute to urban renewal projects in the reconstruction phase. The preparation of such projects is complex and requires early and integrated planning.

## **10.3. Restoring social cohesion**

The success of any DDR programme and the effective reintegration of former combatants depend on the extent to which they become positive agents for change in their societies. The creation of social cohesion between ex-combatants and other community members is essential, but relations between ex-combatants and other community members are usually



anything but ‘normal’ at the end of a conflict. Ex-combatants often return to extremely difficult social environments, where they might be seen as additional burdens to the community, rather than assets. UN DDR programme planners should carry out sensitization campaigns to ensure a broad understanding among stakeholders that DDR is not about rewarding ex-combatants, but rather about turning them into valuable assets to rebuild their communities and ensure that security and peace prevail (also see IDDRS 4.60 on Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR). Ex-combatants should also be actively involved in activities designed to both stabilize their own socio-economic situations and benefit the community as a whole. This approach should consolidate peace and contribute to security, with minimum involvement from external actors, while enabling government counterparts, local authorities, traditional authorities and the demobilized ex-combatants themselves to take ownership of the process.

#### **10.4. Reconciliation and peace-building**

A key component of the reintegration of ex-combatants, people previously associated with armed forces and groups, and their dependants is the process of reconciliation, which should take place within war-affected communities if long-term security is to be firmly established. Ex-combatants, people previously associated with armed groups and forces, and their dependants are one of several groups who are returning and reintegrating into the community. These groups, and the community itself, have each had different experiences of conflict and may require different strategies and assistance to rebuild their lives and social networks. Reconciliation among all groups is perhaps the most fragile and significant process within a national peace-building strategy. DDR reintegration programmes should focus on supporting reconciliation among different groups, not only through focused ‘reconciliation activities’, but also by introducing activities that encourage reconciliation into all components of reintegration programmes. To achieve this, the DDR programme should benefit the community as a whole, ex-combatants need to work with other groups, and specifically designed assistance should also be available to other war-affected people. DDR programmes should also identify, together with other reintegration and recovery programmes, ways of supporting reconciliation initiatives and mechanisms.

#### **10.5. Human rights**

Armed conflict generally results in gross human rights violations. Confidence in the justice system and citizens’ (including ex-combatants’) perceptions of their own security are affected by how past and ongoing human rights violations are handled.<sup>23</sup> It is often felt that ex-combatants who violated human rights should be appropriately punished. However, harsh punishments might not only increase tensions, e.g., between ex-combatants and the rest of society, but prevent them from presenting themselves for DDR in the first place. The problem of people not being punished for war crimes should be tackled and the DDR programme should be supported by efforts to strengthen and reform both the justice and the security sector. However, an emphasis on protection, human rights and reconciliation should also be at the heart of reintegration programming, which should ‘re-educate’ combatants into civilian life, prepare communities for the return of ex-combatants and help both groups anticipate some of the difficulties they may encounter, which in itself makes such problems less difficult to deal with.

## 10.6. Reducing armed violence

A key characteristic of many post-conflict societies is the breakdown of the traditional state monopoly on the use of violence, because a wide variety of individuals possess and use weapons. Despite a formal end to hostilities, high levels of armed violence can continue, undermining the ability of the state to restore or maintain law and order, and threatening peace, security and development.

Warring factions and violent youth gangs exploit the feelings of alienation and marginalization of jobless, frustrated young men in many poor countries. Because of their specific needs and ambitions, young men, and increasingly, young women, form a distinct group among ex-combatants, requiring specific interventions to help them adjust peacefully to civilian life. In addition, there may be numerous 'pre-combatants': groups of violence-prone, at-risk youths, who have not (as yet) participated in formal conflict, but can easily fall prey to the next round of instability because of their alienation from mainstream society. To avoid this situation, young men and women should be involved in all decision-making processes in reintegration programmes to ensure that their specific concerns are dealt with.

Youth organizations can help the reintegration of young ex-combatants and 'pre-combatants' into society by allowing them to meet with other people of their age in a non-military environment. In addition to their social benefits, youth centres and clubs can be focal points for training and employment activities by offering computer or language classes, organizing job information fairs, and designing and implementing youth projects. Also, theatre, music, arts and sports activities have excellent social benefits, can provide employment, and can help young people learn life skills that prepare them to be better partners, parents and citizens. Given the vulnerability of youth to recruitment into armed violence, DDR reintegration programmes should consider how to support youth organizations to give them a safe space where they can meet off the street and enjoy non-violent excitement in a secure and controlled environment (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

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## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Business development services (BDS):** A set of ‘business services’ that include any services that improve the performance of a business and its access to and ability to compete in markets.

**Internally displaced persons (IDPs):** Persons who have been obliged to flee from their homes “in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (*UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, [1998]).

**Poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs):** PRSPs are prepared by governments in low-income countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. A PRSP describes the macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes that a country will follow over several years to bring about broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and the associated sources of financing (IMF, *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: A Fact Sheet*, September 2005, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm>).

**Quick-impact projects (QIPs):** Small, rapidly implemented projects intended to:

- help create conditions for durable solutions for refugees and returnees through rapid interventions;
- through community participation, provide for small-scale initial rehabilitation and enable communities to take advantage of development opportunities;
- help strengthen the absorptive capacity of target areas, while meeting urgent community needs (UNHCR, *Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): A Provisional Guide*, Geneva, May 2004).

### Abbreviations

ABD	area-based development
BDS	business development services
CDA	conflict-related development analysis
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
IDP	internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	international non-governmental organization
LED	local economic development
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MIS	management information system
NGO	non-governmental organization
SSR	security sector reform
TSS	transitional subsistence support
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme

## Annex B: Foreign combatants and mercenaries

Foreign combatants and mercenaries are potential spoilers of both the peace process and DDR, and must be planned for as follows:

- Are they included in the peace accord? If not, DDR planners may wish to advocate for their inclusion. If there is resistance to account for them in the peace negotiations, what are the underlying political reasons and how can the situation be resolved?
- How do the foreign combatants and/or mercenaries fit into the conflict? Are they a root cause of the conflict, or opportunists who arrived after it started?
- Do they have a coherent chain of command? If so, is their leadership seen as a legitimate participant in the peace process by the other parties to it and the UN? Can they be approached for discussions on DDR?
- Are measures for the repatriation and reintegration of foreign combatants in place in their country of origin? If not, DDR planners should consider contacting the authorities of their home country to establish a mechanism for their return and reintegration.
- Who is employing and commanding mercenaries?
- Do individuals have the capacity to act unilaterally?
- What threat, if any, do they pose to the peace process?
- Do they have an interest in DDR?
- If not, what measures can be put in place to neutralize them, and by whom — their employers and/or the national authorities and/or the UN?

## Annex C: Conflict analysis and DDR priorities

The UN Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance Working Group on Transitions has developed a 'framework for conflict analysis' for the UN system and its partners that can easily be adapted for DDR strategic and programme planning. Three steps are given, as follows:

- Step 1: Conflict analysis;
- Step 2: Mapping ongoing responses and actor roles and capacities;
- Step 3: Strategic and programmatic priorities in DDR.

In each step, there is a disaggregation of information at every sector and level, as in the following table:

	SECURITY	POLITICAL/ GOVERNANCE	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL
International				
Regional				
National				
Sub-national				
Local				

Before DDR is implemented, the contextual analysis and conflict assessment attempt to answer the following questions:

- What are the root causes of conflict? Have they been resolved? What, if any, are the ideologies behind the war and are they still relevant?
- What circumstances led to the negotiation and signing of the peace agreement? Are all parties to the conflict included? Has one of the parties 'won' the fighting? Is DDR called for in the peace agreement?
- What is the current level of security in the country? What is the capacity of state security forces to enforce security during the peace consolidation phase? How long is this phase expected to last?
- Does the current government have political legitimacy? Will there be elections? When? How does DDR fit into the goal of political reform?
- Is DDR an appropriate peace-building strategy? What kind of armed forces will undergo DDR? Is downsizing a goal? Should there be a formal DDR within a peacekeeping operation, requiring encampment, formal demobilization with disarmament, and structured reintegration procedures? Should there be informal processes such as decentralized DDR interventions, voluntary turn-in of weapons, self-demobilization and decentralized reintegration support mechanisms?
- What are the short- and long-term goals, e.g., comprehensive disarmament or the long-term reintegration of violence-prone groups?
- What institutional actors in the country are able to carry out DDR activities (e.g., public and private institutions, UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs, donors and other civil society actors)? What support do they need? What institutions need to be created?
- What internal and external resources are available to fund DDR and wider reconstruction and recovery activities?

## Annex D: Tools for reintegration planning and programming

Outlined below are key tools that can assist UN DDR programme managers in implementing reintegration programmes. More information on these tools can be found at <http://www.unddr.org>.

### 1. Area-based development

Developed by UNDP, 'area-based development' (ABD) deals with overall social and economic recovery while also assisting with reintegration. The usual features of all ABD programmes are as follows:

- they are based on well-defined geographical areas and are responsive to the needs of the overall population;
- they are genuinely participatory and are driven by beneficiaries' needs and demands;
- they are largely managed by local institutions and organizations using systems that are decentralized, but still accountable;
- they require high levels of inter-agency cooperation to assure coordinated delivery of results within the integrated area-based planning process.

### 2. Business development services (BDS)

Within the framework of strengthening local capacities for providing support to self-employment and the promotion of micro- and small and medium-sized enterprises, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has developed various ways of improving BDS. These services try to overcome the non-financial problems and limitations encountered by entrepreneurs, such as lack of education, inadequate technical skills, poor access to markets, lack of information and unreliable infrastructure.

Methodologies include:

- *Start and improve your business (SIYB)*: This process supplies trainers who can train ex-combatants to start and run their own businesses;
- *Business training*: Most ex-combatants starting a business need specific training, while somebody who already has some experience in running a business may need to improve his/her business skills.

### 3. Conflict-related development analysis

As part of UNDP's efforts to make conflict prevention a key part of development, an approach to conflict assessment has been developed that seeks to 'operationalize' conflict prevention and peace-building into strategy development and programming. The 'conflict-related development analysis' (CDA) builds on the pilot conflict assessments that have been carried during the period 2001–2002 in several countries, including Guatemala, Nepal, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau and Tajikistan. CDA has been developed as an analytical aid for country offices to use for both strategic analysis and programme design/review in conflict-prone and -affected countries, and one that will guide UNDP, other UN agencies, and local counterparts to understand conflict causes and dynamics, and the impact of current policies and activities (particularly development) in order to design conflict-sensitive interventions at the macro- and microlevels.

#### **4. Guidelines on employment-intensive reconstruction works in countries emerging from armed conflicts**

The ILO published these guidelines in 2000. They provide checklists and recommendations on how to plan for reintegration and rehabilitation. For more information see *Guidelines on Employment-intensive Reconstruction Works in Countries Emerging from Armed Conflicts* – ILO, Geneva, 2000

#### **5. Key informants approach/survey**

Developed by ILO, the ‘key informants approach/survey’ is a method of rapid appraisal of a regional labour market, its main trends and its possibilities for the future development of local markets. The information gathered from these surveys can provide appropriate information to encourage entrepreneurship and local initiatives, particularly for all qualified former combatants who want to establish their own (formal or informal) businesses.

#### **6. Local economic development (LED)**

Experiences in war-affected countries have demonstrated that dialogue involving a wide range of local actors on economic development priorities contributes to the consolidation of peace. The purpose of these consultations is to come to a common and shared vision on the economic development of the territory. The tool LED has been developed by ILO. Key parts of the LED process are:

- *Territorial diagnosis*: Rapid assessment of urgent problems and measures to tackle them, collection and analysis of socio-economic information, and institutional mapping;
- *Sensitizing*: Broad awareness-raising of the issues that affect the socio-economic development of the territory, and creating a feeling of ownership in the LED process among those involved;
- *Creating a forum*: Developing a gathering of all public and private stakeholders as a forum in which to share their views on LED priorities;
- *Designing a LED strategy*: Preparation of a central reference document on which interventions are based and against which progress is measured;
- *Establishing coordination/implementation structures*: Setting up institutional mechanisms to coordinate and maintain the momentum of recovery efforts;
- *Actions*: Translating LED strategy priorities into actions in core areas such as business services, including (micro)finance, training, planning, special groups, environmental awareness and attracting investment.



## Annex E: Planning tool: Agency capacity matrix

[INSERT AGENCY NAME]	DISARMAMENT	DEMOBILIZATION	REINTEGRATION
Existing resources/expertise			
Obtainable resources/expertise			
Time-frame to obtain additional resources/expertise			

## Endnotes

- 1 Because the expectations of these commanders are much higher than those of the rest of the fighters, benefits need to be specifically designed for them, which is not only time-consuming, but also a very difficult balancing act that can easily backfire by creating jealousies among individuals or groups.
- 2 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Report on the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique (1992–1996)* recommends that “within three years of demobilization, the demobilized soldiers should no longer be a specially targeted group, but should be included as an important group in sector or community-based development programmes” (p. 28).
- 3 Surveys can be specifically designed to gather specific information on specific groups such as children, youth and adult women. These issues are explored more thoroughly in IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR.
- 4 Specific tools for beneficiary survey profiling are as follows: ‘Ex-combatant needs assessment documents: Survey of ex-combatants’ (International Labour Organization [ILO]), ‘Sample registration forms’ (International Organization for Migration, and UNHCR *Registration Handbook* (UNHCR).
- 5 The process of gathering this information is known as ‘territorial diagnosis and institutional mapping’.
- 6 See ILO, *Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-combatants*, ILO, Geneva, 1997, Annex 2 (c): ‘Labour market analysis support document’; and ILO, *Guidelines for Establishing Emergency Public Employment Services*, ILO, Geneva, 2003. The school-to-work-transition survey is a generic statistical tool that could also be adapted to an analysis of the youth labour market in a post-conflict situation. For more information on this tool, see <http://www.ilo.org/youth>.
- 7 This generic software is available from the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, to all DDR programmes upon request.
- 8 See resolution A/C.5/59/L.53 for more information.
- 9 This section draws from the UNDP *Practice Note on DDR*, 2005.
- 10 UN DDR programme managers need to ensure also that their reintegration programmes take account of the ‘4Rs framework’, which was developed jointly by humanitarian and development actors in an effort to assure an integrated approach to refugee repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction. While ex-combatants and their dependants enter the reintegration process from a different starting point than refugees, IDPs and other war-affected populations, they should as far as possible be integrated into larger reintegration frameworks such as 4Rs.
- 11 UNDAF is the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the UN system at the country level. It provides a collective, coherent and integrated UN system response to national priorities and needs, including PRSPs and equivalent national strategies, within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals and the commitments, goals and targets of the Millennium Declaration and international conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments of the UN system (UN, *Common Country Assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework: Guidelines for UN Country Teams*, 2004).
- 12 ILO, *Guidelines for Establishing Emergency Public Employment Services*, ILO, Geneva, 2003.
- 13 Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), *HIV/AIDS and Security*, <http://www.unaids.org/security/Issues/conflict.html>.
- 14 A UNDP conference on ‘Lessons Learned in DDR Programmes in Africa’ reviewed presentations from eight African countries, all of which stressed the need to incorporate psychosocial support for demobilized combatants; see UNDP, ‘Presentation to Psychosocial Support Project Workshop’, UNDP, Nairobi, 2002, p. 1.
- 15 Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), *Improving External Support to Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life*, BICC, Berlin, 2002, p. 7.
- 16 Drawn from UNDP, ‘Presentation to the Psychosocial Support Project Workshop’, op. cit., p. 1.

- 17 For more information see ILO, *Good Labour Policies and Practices in Employment-intensive Programmes*, ILO, Geneva, undated.
- 18 For more information, see ILO, *Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-combatants*, ILO, Geneva, 1997; and ILO, *Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries*, ILO, Geneva, 1998.
- 19 For more information, see Miehlabradt, Alexandra O. and Mary McVay, *Seminar Reader, Developing Commercial Markets for Business Development Services*, prepared for the Small Enterprise Development Programme of the International Labour Office, ILO, Turin, 2004; and Finnegan, Gerry, *Are W.E. Being Served? The Work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Promoting More and Better BDS for Women Entrepreneurs*, prepared for the ILO InFocus Programme on Boosting Employment through Small Enterprise Development – Women’s Entrepreneurship Development, ILO, Geneva, 2003.
- 20 For guidance on when to use grants versus loans/credit, see, for example, ‘Recapitalising Liberia: Principles for Providing Grants and Loans for Microenterprise Development’, in Tucker, John, Tim Nourse, Rob Gailey, Dave Park and Stephan Bauman *Forced Migration*, May 2004, <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR20/FMR2006.pdf>.
- 21 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*, OECD/DAC, Paris, 1998.
- 22 While urban reintegration is a growing phenomenon, more needs to be done to develop guidance and standards to address it. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR will address this issue before the second edition of the IDDRS.
- 23 International Peace Academy Workshop, paper on ‘Improving External Support to the Reintegration of ex-combatants into Civilian Life’, 12–13 December 2002.

# 4.40 UN Military Roles and Responsibilities

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# 4.40 UN Military Roles and Responsibilities

## Summary

In the typical operational environment in which United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions take place, the primary contribution made by the military component of a mission to a the peacekeeping operation's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, if it has been mandated to do so, is to provide security. The military component could also contribute through the gathering and distribution of information specifically related to a DDR programme, as well as monitoring and reporting on security issues. Specialist military ammunition and weapon expertise could contribute to the technical aspects of disarmament (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilization).

4.20 ◀▶ ■ 4.10 ◀▶

In addition, military capabilities could be used to provide various aspects of logistic support, including camp construction, communications, transport and health, if spare capacity is available. It must be noted that unless specific planning for military DDR tasks has taken place, and forces generated accordingly, then military logistic capacity cannot be guaranteed.

It is essential to the successful employment of any military capability in a DDR programme that it must be included in planning, be part of the endorsed mission operational requirement, be specifically mandated and be properly resourced. If this is not the case, the wider security-related function of the military component will be badly affected.

Involvement in a DDR programme does not take the place of the normal military component command and control chains.

A fundamental assumption in any military involvement in operational aspects of UN DDR programmes is that it is pointless to attempt disarmament or demobilization if it is not clear that reintegration is properly planned and resourced. Put another way, the combatants must see a future if they are to be expected to enter a DDR programme. If this is not clear, such programmes are likely to fail, and elements of the military component (and others) can be exposed to unacceptable risks.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module covers the use of the capabilities under the control of the military component to support a DDR programme carried out by a UN peacekeeping mission. Issues and planning considerations raised here may also be useful in other situations, e.g., to militaries involved in DDR programmes conducted outside of UN peacekeeping missions. The module is aimed at two audiences. Its first aim is to provide guidance to a mainly military audience, at Headquarters, in the field and in Member States, as to what the military component may be expected to provide in support of a DDR programme. In addition, it provides very basic information to a non-military audience on the military component of a peacekeeping operation.

The module does not cover detailed tactics, techniques and procedures, particularly those related to creating and maintaining a secure environment, since these are normal military tasks and are carried out according to national policies.

The objectives of this module are to outline the possible contribution by the military component of a UN peacekeeping mission to the mission's DDR programme, and to discuss various factors that should be considered when employing military capacity.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

## 3. Introduction

The military component of a peacekeeping mission often possesses a wide range of skills and capabilities that could be vital to a DDR programme. As military resources and assets for peacekeeping are limited and are often provided for multiple purposes, it is important to identify DDR tasks that are to be carried out by a military component of a peacekeeping mission at an early stage in the mission planning process.

## 4. The military component

### 4.1. General

Although some small military observer missions continue, most UN peacekeeping missions, particularly those with a mandate that includes DDR, rely on a mix of unarmed military observers and numbers of armed troops that are collectively referred to as the peacekeeping force. The primary function of the military component is to observe and report on security-related issues and provide security. Military contingents vary in capability; policies; procedures; and understanding of peacekeeping, humanitarian and development issues from country to country. Each peacekeeping mission has a military component specifically designed to fulfil the mandate and operational requirement of that mission. Early and comprehensive DDR planning will ensure that appropriately trained and equipped units are available to support DDR.

### 4.2. Composition

The military component can be made up of three groups:

- *Formed units or contingents:* These can include armour, infantry, aviation, engineers and various support units, some of which can provide logistic support, including specialists



in explosives and weapons destruction. Normally the support element of the force is designed primarily for the needs of the military component. The tasking of the logistic support, aviation and engineering units is actually controlled by the mission's chief of integrated support services (i.e., a civilian who is not part of the military component);

- *Military observers (MILOBs)*: MILOBs are unarmed officers normally provided by Member States for 12 months and operating in small teams of between two and six. Where possible, MILOBs are incorporated into the force command structure;
- *Staff officers*: Although technically part of contingents, individual military officers serve in staff posts, both within the force headquarters and in various specialized positions where they are integrated with civilian staff, e.g. in sections such as Integrated Support Services (also see IDDRS 3.42 on Personnel and Staffing) and DDR.

3.42 ◀▶

Annex B provides a table showing various structures and ranks within a military component. It should be taken as a broad guide only, as each contingent will be different in some way.

### 4.3. Command and control

A peacekeeping force is commanded by a force commander, who, although an active duty member of his/her parent armed forces, is a salaried UN staff member. All Member States retain national command over their own troops and most take a very keen interest in ensuring that their troops are employed as agreed in negotiations that take place (in UN Headquarters) before they deploy. A particular concern will be safety and security. Clearly, the security of unarmed MILOBs will be of special interest; in some situations they are at greater risk than unarmed UN civilians.

## 5. Military component contribution

Military capability, particularly in specialized capacities such as communications, aviation, engineering, and medical and logistic support, is often difficult for the UN to obtain, and may be used only where it is uniquely able to fulfil the task at hand. Where civilian sources can meet an approved operational requirement and the military component of a mission is fully employed, civilian resources should be used. If mandated, and therefore resourced and equipped appropriately, the military should be able to contribute to a DDR programme in the ways described below in sections 5.1–5.6.

### 5.1. Security

Security is essential both to ensure former combatants' confidence in a DDR programme, and to ensure the security of other elements of a mission and the civilian population. A military component is often tasked with providing a secure environment so that a UN mission can meet its overall objectives. If tasked and resourced, military capability can be used to provide security that is specifically related to a DDR programme. This can include camp/cantonment security, including security of weapons and ammunition that have been handed in or stored as part of a DDR programme, and security of disarmament and/or demobilization sites. The military component can also be tasked with providing security to routes that former combatants will use to enter the programme, and provide escorts to movement of those participating in the programme. Security is provided by armed UN troops.

If the mandate and the concept of operations specify that military support to DDR should carry out specific tasks, then the need for this has to be factored into the force structure when the concept is drawn up.

The security task can be carried out in such a way that there is a disincentive for former combatants to remain outside a programme. This approach can be linked to wider incentives offered in the reintegration programmes of DDR. This type of coercion should be accompanied by a focused public information/sensitization campaign. Expe-

rience has shown that unarmed MILOBs do not provide security, although in some situations they can assist by contributing to early warning, wider information-gathering and information distribution.

The use of MILOBs in remote situations must be carefully balanced with their security requirements. Unfortunately, the UN flag is not a guarantee of security in many of the situations facing UN peacekeeping forces.

To assess the security tasks that will be expected of military units when planning any Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) mission, the planner needs to have a good understanding of the number of combatants expected to join the programme, as well as of the location of proposed DDR sites, in order to draw up of the concept of operations. This pre-planning will serve as a good indication of whether the units have the capacity to carry out their role. Planners are encouraged to plan for area security within the current mandated tasks, rather than deploying specific units for short-term tasks. The use of mobile demobilization camps, where the demobilization process moves from location to location so that other military security tasks are not interfered with should also be considered.

If the mandate and the concept of operations specify that military support to DDR should carry out specific tasks, then the need for this has to be factored into the force structure when the concept is drawn up. It is preferable to provide a single recommendation for the force requirement rather than going back to the UN Security Council for additional forces once a mission has started.

## 5.2. Information-gathering and reporting

The military component can contribute to DDR operations by seeking information on the locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants who may or will become part of a DDR programme. Parties to the conflict are often reluctant to fully disclose troop strengths and locations, and it would also be naïve to assume that all combatants fully accept or trust a peace process. As a result, accurate figures on weapons and ammunition expected to be collected during the programme may never be available, so the technical part of the programme must include some flexibility.

The information-gathering process can be a specific task of the military component, but it can also be a by-product of its normal operations, e.g., information gathered by patrols and the activities of MILOBs. A characteristic of many DDR programmes, particularly those involving less-structured warring factions, is a tendency of leaders to withhold information about the programme from their rank and file. The military component can be used to detect whether this is happening and can assist in dealing with this as part of the public information and sensitization campaign associated with DDR. A mission's joint operations centre (JOC) and joint mission analysis centre should coordinate the information-gathering and reporting activities.

### 5.3. Information dissemination and sensitization

The military component normally is widely spread across the post-conflict country/region, and can therefore assist by distributing information on a DDR programme to potential participants and the local population. This is particularly useful when command chains and communications in armed factions are poor. Any information campaign should be planned and monitored by the DDR and wider mission public information staff. Depending on the security situation, MILOBs may be particularly useful in fulfilling this function.

The military component normally is widely spread across the post-conflict country/region, and can therefore assist by distributing information on a DDR programme to potential participants and the local population.


### 5.4. Programme monitoring and reporting

If involved in a programme to provide security, the military component can assist dedicated mission DDR staff by monitoring and reporting on aspects of programme progress. This work must be managed by the DDR staff in conjunction with the JOC.

### 5.5. Specialized weapon and ammunition expertise

The military possesses specialized ammunition and weapon expertise that will be useful as part of disarmament aspects of a DDR programme. Depending on the methods agreed on in peace agreements and plans for future national security forces, weapons and ammunition will either be destroyed or safely and securely stored. However, not all military units possess

Weapons being burned during the official launch of the DDR programme in Burundi, December 2004. UN Photo: M. Perret





The military possesses specialized ammunition and weapon expertise that will be useful as part of disarmament aspects of a DDR programme.

◀▷ 4.10

capabilities of a level that could be used to support the disarmament component of DDR. Early and comprehensive planning should identify whether this is a requirement, and units/capabilities should be generated accordingly (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament).

### 5.6. Logistic support

As mentioned above, military logistic capabilities can be useful in a DDR programme. Their support must be coordinated with units that provide integrated services support to a mission.

Where the military is specifically tasked with providing certain kinds of support to a DDR programme, additional military capability may be required by the military component for the duration of the task. A less ideal solution would be to reprioritize or reschedule the activities of military elements carrying out other mandated tasks. This approach can clearly have the disadvantage of degrading wider efforts to provide a secure environment, perhaps even at the expense of the security of the population at large.



UN peacekeepers transporting combatants to disarmament site in Liberia, April 2004. Photo: E. Kanalstein, UNMIL

## 6. Pre-deployment planning

For the military component, DDR planning is not very different from planning related to other military tasks in UN peacekeeping. As in other military planning, clear guidance is necessary on the scope of the military's involvement.

### 6.1. Contingency planning

As the UN does not normally possess military staff specifically dedicated to DDR planning, contingency planning for the military contribution of a possible DDR programme will normally be carried out by staff with a broader planning task within the military component of DPKO, specifically the Military Planning Service of Military Division. These officers respond to directions from DPKO's military adviser. Ideally, once it appears likely that a mission will be established, individuals will be identified in Member States to fill specialist DDR military staff officer posts in an integrated DDR unit in a mission headquarters. These specialists could be called upon to assist at UN Headquarters if required, ahead of the main deployment.

### 6.2. Joint assessment mission

Military staff officers, either from the Military Division or, ideally, individuals specifically allocated as DDR staff for the peacekeeping operation, will participate, when required and available, in joint assessment missions to assist in determining the military operational requirement specifically needed to support a DDR programme. These officers can advise on technical issues that will be relevant to the DDR elements of a peace agreement.

### 6.3. Mission concept of operations

Once sufficient information is available, a mission concept of operations is drawn up as part of an integrated activity at UN Headquarters, normally led by DPKO. As part of this process, a detailed operational requirement will be developed for military capability to meet the proposed tasks in the concept; this will include military capability to support a UN DDR programme. The overall military requirement is the responsibility of the military adviser; however, the Military Division is not responsible for the overall DDR plan. Similarly with other issues in UN missions that involve more than one component of the mission, there must be close consultation among all components involved in the DDR process throughout the planning process. The concept of operations forms the basis for the report of the Secretary-General that will be presented to the Security Council when a new mission is proposed.

### 6.4. Mission plan

Ideally, detailed mission plans will be drawn up by individuals who will fill planning and management positions in a proposed new mission. If this is not possible, initial plans will be drawn up by UN Headquarters staff, then reviewed and adjusted by mission staff

As most DDR programmes are owned by governments or transitional governments, mission plans should be flexible and allow for adjustments as the DDR programme is progressing.

once they are assigned to the mission. Mission plans and concepts of operations will also need to be reviewed, should the Security Council not approve all identified and proposed operational requirements. In addition, as most DDR programmes are owned by governments or transitional governments, mission plans should be flexible and allow for adjustments as the DDR programme is progressing.

### **6.5. Force generation**

The Force Generation Service of the Military Division is responsible for interaction with Member States to acquire the military capabilities identified in the operational requirement. Contributions are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. While much informal interaction can take place before a mandate is given, Member States will not start formal negotiations until the Security Council has mandated a mission. This can delay deployment. For complex missions, i.e., most missions involving DDR, the UN has a target of having troops completely deployed within 90 days. This goal is rarely achieved, owing to the pace of the political decision-making process in many Member States. In addition, once the contribution of troops is approved, there are often delays in obtaining information from a Member State as to what type of troop support has to be moved and from where.

Given that the military operational requirement specifically identified to support DDR programmes is likely to be concentrated on support to disarmament and demobilization, it may be possible to reduce the size of the force after these aspects of the programme are completed. In other words, it may be possible to design a force structure that has an element that will be required only for the disarmament and demobilization phases. However, by their very nature, DDR operations are likely to demand that any force will be dispersed (perhaps in platoon- or company-sized groups) and be working in operational areas where other units have their own tasks and report through a separate chain of command. Also, introducing new forces into a mission means that it is unlikely that they will possess the same knowledge of the situation on the ground as a unit that is already in location and familiar with the environment and personalities. Despite the fact that different types of units perform different tasks in a given operational area, all efforts and activities in that area must be well coordinated.

### **6.6. Standby capacity**

The UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), managed by the Military Division, provides the ability for Member States, or groups of Member States, to place specific units of their forces, called force packages, on standby for specific activities, including DDR. A DDR package could consist of planning officers, public information officers, MILOBs, units designed to provide security specific to DDR sites, construction engineers, demining units, camp management personnel, explosive disposal and weapon destruction units, and language assistants. All components of the package could be specifically trained in DDR; however, some of the disciplines identified — e.g., planning, public information, MILOBs, construction engineers, deminers, explosive ordinance device (EOD) experts — should have the core competencies necessary to adapt to supporting DDR operations. The Military Division usually includes an EOD capability within each battalion deployed. This capability, considered a force multiplier, may also be useful for the destruction of weapons and ammunition in a DDR programme.

No specific DDR unit currently exists in UNSAS, and, arguably, none exists in any other military forces.

## 7. Integrated DDR unit staffing

Military capacity used in a DDR programme will be planned in detail and carried out by the military component of the mission. Military staff officers could fill posts in a DDR unit as follows. The posts will be designed to meet the specific mission requirements:

- Mil SO1 DDR – military liaison (lieutenant-colonel);
- Mil SO2 DDR – military liaison (major);
- Mil SO2 DDR – disarmament and weapons control (major);
- Mil SO2 DDR – gender and child soldier issues (major).

## 8. DDR links to security sector reform

DDR is closely linked to security sector reform (SSR), because often, reconstructed or entirely new armed forces will be one result of a DDR programme. For this reason, DDR planning and management should be closely linked to SSR planning and management structures. International support to SSR is normally a bilateral issue between the Member State carrying out SSR and those Member States providing support. At present, the UN does not possess an SSR planning or integration capacity. For this reason, the military staff officers carrying out DDR tasks can become involved with external actors in integrating DDR activities with SSR activities carried out by others.

## 9. DDR training requirements for military personnel

DDR activities are included in Levels 1 and 2 of the DPKO Standardized Training Module programme. These are available from DPKO's Training and Evaluation Service and from the DPKO Web site, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training>.



## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>EOD</b>	explosive ordinance device
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>JOC</b>	joint operations centre
<b>MILOB</b>	military observer
<b>SSR</b>	security sector reform
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNSAS</b>	United Nations Standby Arrangement System

## Annex B: Military organizations and ranks

ORGANIZATION	COMMANDER	COMMANDER'S EXPERIENCE (YEARS)	EQUIVALENT UN GRADE	PERSONNEL
UN force	Major-general/ Lieutenant-general	30–40	D2–ASG	Varies
Division	Major-general	30–35	D2	15,000+
Brigade	Brigadier or colonel	25–30	D1–P5	1,500–4,000
Battalion or regiment	Lieutenant-colonel	20–25	P4	600–1,000
Company or squadron (3–4 per battalion)	Major or captain	7–15	P3	80–120
Platoon or troop (3–4 per company)	Lieutenant	1–4	P2	25–35
Section or Squad (3–4 per platoon)	Corporal or sergeant	3–5	P1–G7	8–12

# 4.50 UN Police Roles and Responsibilities

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# 4.50 UN Police Roles and Responsibilities

## Summary

This module outlines the proposed involvement of the United Nations Police (UNPOL) in an integrated approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The relevance of policing to DDR is two-pronged and focuses on: (1) crime control, law and order, and security; and (2) police reform/restructuring and development in the post-conflict period.

As the peace process moves forward, a large number of activities start taking place in the social, economic and political arenas of the country emerging from war. These activities often present many challenges, which, if not properly dealt with, could seriously undermine the entire process of peace-building. The police services need to be aware of possible challenges and prepare appropriate plans of action to deal with them.

Previous DDR programmes have frequently experienced difficulties because they have failed to connect sufficiently with the police and other components of the criminal justice system in order to deal with the problem of increasing crime levels in the post-war period. The ineffective and often incomplete transition of combatants to civilian life can cause serious law and order problems. If reintegration activities do not succeed, there is the risk that increased criminal activity will develop among demobilized ex-combatants. When small arms continue to be easily available, some ex-combatants continue to misuse them in order to retain power and authority and to make a living. It will require both an attractive package of incentives and effective, collaborative programmes for them to give up their weapons and accept new state authority.

DDR is conducted in a dynamic and volatile environment and, as a result, excellent liaison and coordination across all security sectors are essential to the success of the entire process. This module discusses the likely involvement of the police services at various stages of DDR, from conceptual planning through to the practical implementation of community-based reintegration and long-term peace-building processes.

DDR is conducted in a dynamic and volatile environment and, as a result, excellent liaison and coordination across all security sectors are essential to the success of the entire process.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module looks at the various levels and areas of police involvement in the DDR process, from the pre-mission planning stage to actual and effective liaison to promote and improve the links between planning and its practical application in the field. The module provides a working example of how to 'operationalize' the concept of integrated planning and to follow it through to effective practical action.

Despite successes in many missions, the role that UNPOL can actually play in relation to DDR is often undervalued. This module provides guidance on improving the involve-

ment of UNPOL in UN peacekeeping missions, highlighting its specific roles and responsibilities within the DDR process. The module also includes advice on:

- pre-mission assessments;
- pre-mission planning;
- deployment and induction training of UNPOL personnel;
- practical operations of the UNPOL component within the mission.

It should be noted that the extent of the involvement of the UNPOL component will vary considerably according to the nature and extent of the mandate granted under Security Council resolutions. However, the involvement of UNPOL can be said to cover the following basic areas within the mission's DDR activities:

- coordination;
- advice;
- monitoring;
- improving and encouraging public confidence;
- reforming and restructuring the national police service.

DDR is a collective responsibility of all those involved in the process, and each component of the security sector should contribute to the success of the entire process to prevent the resumption of conflict. The overall objective of police involvement in the DDR process is to assist in the disarmament and demobilization of combatants and to establish an environment that allows the successful reintegration of former fighters, so that sustainable peace and stability can be established.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

## 3. Introduction

DDR is a multidimensional process that should be based on: an in-depth understanding of the sociocultural history and long-standing problems of the country under reconstruction; an understanding of the causes and nature of the conflict; the resolve of the post-conflict government to abide by the terms of the comprehensive peace agreement; and adequately funded and efficiently mobilized resources.

Because of the multiple problems and challenges in the post-conflict period, successful DDR needs comprehensive strategies to plan the contributions that all in-country partners can make to the process. UNPOL should play an active and fully integrated role in the entire DDR process, since it works at the community level, where reconciliation and the reintegration of combatants to become productive members of society will be the most important factor both in short-term conflict resolution and in the long-term sustainability of peace and stability. Simply put, a well-managed DDR process can make the job of policing local communities simpler, whereas lack of coordination can cause problems requiring solutions that are costly in terms of both human and financial resources.

At present, the issue of policing is only raised in discussions of DDR when considering the possibility of reintegrating combatants into the police service. However, ex-combatants should be recruited to become members of the police service only through a proper process of vetting and selection. There should be no promises that simply being a former combatant will grant free passage to become a police officer as a part of the reintegration initiatives. The issue of setting up the criteria for recruitment should be fully covered in plans for wider police reform and restructuring, including such aspects as ensuring gender balance and ethnic diversity. Such reform and restructuring should proceed together with other criminal justice reform initiatives and be part of the overall security sector reform (SSR) process. Ultimately, SSR initiatives require political will and a level of commitment that can only come from a comprehensively detailed provision within the framework of the peace agreement.

SSR initiatives require political will and a level of commitment that can only come from a comprehensively detailed provision within the framework of the peace agreement.

The mission mandate given to the UNPOL component may dictate the level and extent of its involvement in the DDR process as a whole. Depending on the situation on the ground, the Security Council could grant mandates that might vary from the 'light footprint' activities of monitoring and advisory functions to full policing responsibilities. There is no one-size-fits-all policing policy and, as a result, there can be no standardized approach to determining police support to the DDR process.

## 4. Military and police roles

To assess and fully analyse the future of DDR, it is important to understand the dynamics of the transition from military to police security during the post-conflict period. This transition has important implications, not only for the DDR exit strategy, but also because the establishment of an effective and professional police service is essential for the transformation from a militarized society to a civilian one. Often, the police service that existed previously will have been reduced in both its size and powers during the time of the conflict and many of its functions taken over by a military with far greater resources. Such a practice militarizes the police. As the State increasingly uses military in police functions, the distinction between maintaining internal order and external security becomes unclear.

As peace returns, the police service should be restructured and its role as the most important security service for maintaining internal order re-established. In order to establish



security institutions with proper civilian control and oversight, the transitional phase should be short, under political control and operationally assisted by international peacekeeping forces. The transition to police assuming overall responsibility for internal security can be challenging, however: there may be overlap of tasks, lack of accountability for acts committed in the conflict period and, moreover, rivalry between the various institutions involved. While a short transition period increases the chances of successfully establishing proper, publicly accountable institutions to strengthen the democratic process, the withdrawal of international peacekeeping forces should be a carefully planned exercise and its speed should be based on the capability of the local security services to take over the maintenance of security and public order.

## 5. The pre-mission assessment

As soon as the possibility of UN involvement in peacekeeping activities becomes evident, a multi-agency technical team visits the area to draw up an operational strategy. The level of engagement of UNPOL should be decided according to the existing structures and capability of the national police service. Pre-mission assessment is the responsibility of the Strategic Policy and Development Section within the Police Division (PD), which examines the entire structure of the police service, including its legal basis; human resources; and technical, management and operational capabilities. The police assessment takes into account the overall local police capabilities to deal with the immediate problems of the post-conflict environment and estimates the overall requirements to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the local police service as it is redeveloped into a professional police force. Of critical importance during the assessment is the identification of the various security agencies that are actually performing law enforcement tasks: military intelligence units in particular are extremely powerful and perform all types of law enforcement functions, while other paramilitary forces and irregular forces also carry out these functions during conflict periods.

During the assessment phase, it should be decided whether police institutions themselves are to be included as part of the DDR process. Police may have been directly involved in the conflict as fighters or as supporters of the main fighting forces. If this has been the case, keeping the same police in service could be harmful to the peace and stability of the nation, and the police as an institution will have to be disarmed, demobilized, and re-recruited and trained to perform proper policing functions.<sup>1</sup>

Also during the assessment phase, the extent of disarmament challenges should be identified. UNPOL should play a central role in identifying the number and type of small arms in the possession of civilians, and assessing the capability of local police to protect civilians and the prospective number of former combatants and their dependants who will return to the community. It is also important to assess the possibility of rapid rearmament as the result of arms coming across badly protected borders and the unregulated availability of arms in neighbouring States. Legal statutes to regulate the possession of arms by individuals for self-protection should be carefully assessed, and recommendations shall be made on any revisions required to meet the objective of proper weapons control.

## 6. Pre-deployment planning

Before the mandate and establishment of any UN mission, the PD is fully involved in the integrated mission planning process. The planning officer should take into account the

broad aims of the integrated mission and, after consultations and interactions with others involved, outline in practical terms the necessary course of action for police in relation to the DDR operation. Such a course of action will depend on the overall mandate based on the realities on the ground and the expectations of the parties concerned. The size and the composition of the police mission will depend on the mandate from the Security Council. Once these matters have been decided, a deployment plan is drawn up. Usually the deployment will be in phases, responding to the immediate priorities in the country where the mission will be deployed. The planning officer within the PD should take responsibility for DDR liaison and planning.

## 7. UNPOL's involvement in DDR

A Security Council resolution provides the legal basis for the establishment of a mission. The specific tasks of the related components of such a mission are often well defined and form the basis for the concept of operations. With the deployment of UNPOL to the mission area, the UNPOL Commissioner will (depending on the size of the UNPOL component and its mandate) establish a dedicated DDR coordinating unit with a liaison officer who will work very closely with the mission's DDR command structures in order to coordinate activity with military, national police services, the UN Development Programme and other relevant agencies involved in DDR programmes.



Haitian National Police (PNH) spokeswoman and UNPOL spokesman during press conference at PNH station in Delmas 33 in Port-au-Prince with weapons, ammunition and uniforms (both ex-FADH and PNH) that were seized over the weekend in two joint UNPOL–PNH operations. Photo: S. Paris, MINUSTAH

As a general principle, UNPOL tasks in relation to DDR will fall into the following areas:

- advice;
- coordination;
- monitoring;
- building and encouraging public confidence;
- police reform and restructuring.

Upon deployment to a mission area, all UN police officers receive induction training, which outlines their role in the DDR process. It is essential that all police officers in the mission fully understand the aims and scope of DDR programmes and are aware of the responsibilities of the UNPOL component in relation to the DDR process.

## 8. Advice

International police are increasingly engaged in advising the local police and policy makers in post-conflict countries. UNPOL carries out advisory functions in missions that are specifically mandated with advisory and assistance tasks. Advisory functions are carried out at three levels:

- *Strategic level:* This is where specific policy issues are conceptualized and formulated, usually with the ministry for the interior, police executive boards and senior police leadership;
- *Operational or middle-management levels:* At this level, international police officers work with operational commanders and mid-level managers, advising them on how to implement concepts and policies on the ground;
- *Service delivery level:* At this level, international police officers advise police officers working on the ground to ensure that their service delivery is appropriate and complies with the professional standards of policing.

UNPOL, with its unique positions at various levels, can positively influence the way the local police service performs its tasks. Advice and capacity-building can range from establishing policy frameworks on disarmaments to drawing up future regulations on arms possession, and can include reforming the national police service in its entirety. At the operational level, the UNPOL component can assist local operational commanders in identifying the problems of crime and lawlessness, and suggest the best ways to deal with them. This function becomes increasingly important as displaced persons and refugees start to return to their homes at the prospect of post-war peace. As they do, economic, political and social activities start to resume and social tensions are likely soon to appear. Such problems, if not tackled straight away, could lead to more complicated problems requiring a major diversion of efforts, resources and time to return the situation to normal. There are also clear links between UNPOL and intelligence gathering in support of military planning to maintain and improve the security of the area in which the UN mission as a whole operates. Police are best positioned to collect information that can help the military component in such security operations.

Advice is often required to assist the local police in dealing with the issues of law and order within and around the vicinity of the disarmament and demobilization camps. Local police shall proactively engage in dealing with criminal activities at these sites and promptly react to any indications that serious crimes could be committed.

The UNPOL component can provide advice and training to local officers to ensure that they develop procedures and processes not only to deal with the shorter-term aspects of disarmament and demobilization, but also to determine longer-term laws and procedures to manage the legitimate possession of firearms and decide the correct follow-up actions for the social reintegration of former combatants into society.

## 9. Coordination

DDR is a complex process requiring full coordination among all stakeholders, actors and participants. Success depends on the full support of the community. The UNPOL component is usually in a unique position, being welcomed and accepted because of its neutral and non-partisan nature. It can therefore build a working relationship with the community to help create an environment that allows DDR to take place. It can assist with such matters as selecting the sites for the demobilization camps, broker agreements with communities and help assure their safety for practical purposes such as getting to their farms, bringing in the harvest, etc. In the past, ignoring these concerns has caused delays and a loss of opportunities to push forward DDR efforts. The UNPOL component, in cooperation with the local police, is often in the best position to identify local concerns and coordinate with the parties involved to quickly resolve any problems that may arise.

Another important aspect of coordination is ensuring the safety and security of demobilization camps and other sites where the gathering of large numbers of former combatants might cause potential security risks. UNPOL can effectively coordinate security arrangements that reassure ex-combatants trying to return to normal civilian life. Demobilization camp security, on the other hand, shall be the responsibility of the military component of the mission.



Members of UNPOL and Formed Police Unit from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) at weapons collection site. Photo: UNMIK



In practice, all matters related to law and order should be undertaken by the UNPOL component. In a UN-led transitional mission with full executive authority, UNPOL shall ensure both law and order and criminal justice provisions. In cases where the UNPOL component is mandated to support law and order, it shall work in close coordination with the local police in ensuring the effective maintenance of law and order. Another important area of coordination will be with international and regional police agencies for information sharing and operational planning with regard to dealing with arms trafficking, terrorism and other trans-border crimes.

The presence of a dedicated UNPOL liaison officer within a DDR unit helps in gathering and processing intelligence on ex-combatants, their current situation and possible future activities/location. Such a liaison officer provides a valuable link to the operations of the UNPOL component and the local police, since ex-combatants can potentially cause law and order problems if they are not properly reintegrated into society. It is important for local police to participate in the process of keeping track of ex-combatants who are reintegrating into society. With a proper involvement in the DDR process, the UNPOL component is well placed to receive 'community intelligence' through active engagement with the local civil society.

Similarly, the liaison officer can fully explain the role of UNPOL in advising and training the national police service to ensure that it has effective training and procedures to contribute to the success of the DDR process.

A final area of coordination will be the operational engagement of formed police units (FPUs) in crowd control and public order problems in the DDR camps or their vicinity. If such incidents arise, immediate employment of an FPU can contain such situations with minimum use of force. Military engagement in these situations might lead to greater numbers of casualties and wider damage.

## 10. Monitoring

One of the core tasks of the UNPOL component is to monitor whether local law enforcement officers comply with professional standards of policing. This monitoring process is also linked to those of mentoring and capacity-building to ensure that local police are given new skills and an understanding of how to perform their tasks in accordance with the expectations of both local people and the international community. UNPOL should help to ensure that the demobilization and demilitarization process does not merely focus on technicalities and individuals, but firmly establishes the principles and practices of DDR in both the institutions and culture of the country. UNPOL is in a good position to observe and monitor any return to military-style activities; can assist in getting rid of checkpoints, illegal collection points and hold-ups; and can help former combatants give up the idea that they are still part of a fighting force. UNPOL can also monitor the activities of local militia commanders and make them fully responsible for complying with the peace agreement. Above all, it shall focus on the activities of the local police and monitor their compliance with the agreed principles of service delivery. Monitoring involves not only watching the activities, but also being part of the correction measures if there are problems, so that the local police learn the proper way of carrying out their tasks.

Monitoring the trends of crime and criminality and other social problems will be very important, to limit and control any activities that could hinder progress towards stability. Demobilized combatants and regular soldiers are often involved in human trafficking, the

sex trade, racketeering, smuggling and other organized criminal activities in the post-conflict environment. UNPOL, depending on the mandate, will have to ensure that these activities are controlled effectively right from the start to avoid the transitional authority being undermined and the entire peace process being derailed.

Another aspect of monitoring should be that of establishing mechanisms to gather intelligence and monitor any increase in the possession of arms by the civilian population. Rules and regulations on the possession of arms for self-protection shall be well defined and implemented strictly by the local police. Monitoring the efforts of the national authorities in controlling the movement of arms across the borders will be crucial, to identify possible rearmament trends. The disarmament process will not succeed if the flow of weapons is not fully controlled.

Monitoring is a tool for observing the actions of the local police, so that objective recommendations on appropriate corrective measures can be made to the host government. Non-compliance reporting is one of the best tools available to monitors for ensuring that host authorities fulfil their obligations, and it should be used to apply pressure if officers and the authorities fail to deal with incidents of non-compliance, or routinely violate the principles of an agreement. Non-compliance reporting usually focuses on two themes: the standards of professional service delivery (client-focused); and the agreed principles of access and transparency with regard to commitments (bilateral agreements, access to records, detention centres, etc.).

## 11. Building up public confidence

The division between police and community that emerged during the conflict should be bridged with mutual understanding and acceptance; the prospects for long-term peace depend on how fast this can be achieved. The process of reconciliation requires willingness to compromise and true commitment to maintaining peace, but no progress can be made unless public confidence in the police has been established. Community policing initiatives have proved to be a very effective means of establishing and sustaining long-term community reconciliation processes. They involve changing police methods and practice so that the police and community work together to solve the problems of crime, disorder and insecurity, and in this way a relationship between the police and the public is established.

The philosophy of community policing encourages the development of new ways of dealing with community security concerns, particularly to ensure that the different needs of social actors — women, men, old and young, minorities, disabled people and other vulnerable groups — are systematically dealt with. Community policing forums are the best means to create favourable environments so that ex-combatants and formerly discredited local police are accepted back into the community. UNPOL, in most of its present operations, acts as a bridge to build up confidence and mutual trust so that the community will accept the ex-combatants. It acts to ensure that all stakeholders are made fully aware that compromises will be essential for the peaceful reintegration of ex-combatants into the community. UNPOL can develop local forums and sensitize all parties to the need for caring for each other, reconciliation and trust. Such initiatives offer the opportunity to regularly share matters of concern to all stakeholders, thus encouraging broader understanding and harmony.<sup>2</sup>

#### BASIC PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY POLICING

- Policing is carried out by consent, not coercion (force).
- The police are part of the community, not apart from it.
- The police and community work together to find out what communities' needs are.
- The police, public and other agencies work together in partnership.
- The business of policing is specifically designed to meet community needs.
- The community is empowered to root out the causes of its social and security problems.
- Diversity in the police force reflects diversity in the community and meets the needs of different social actors.

In a normal society, controlling the availability and circulation of small arms and light weapons is vital for community safety. Citizens will only hand over their firearms if they can see a visible improvement in public safety and security and if they have a certain degree of trust in the police and the security agencies. Community-based policing can play an important role in strengthening weapons control initiatives. Similarly, if there is a good working relationship between the police and the community, it will be easier for the police to obtain information about arms caches and help the military conduct successful operations in ridding the community of arms.

Similarly, police can offer practical advice on security and provide visible reassurance to vulnerable communities such as refugees and returnees during the DDR process. The mere presence of UNPOL often contributes to the safety, security and confidence of the local population. Regular FPU patrols in DDR cantonment sites are a strong confidence-building initiative, providing not only a highly visible and reassuring presence to deter crime and criminal activities, but also relief to the military component of the mission, which can then concentrate on more serious threats to security and wider humanitarian support. However, FPU engagement shall always be limited to the regular maintenance of law and order and not be involved in high-risk camp and weapons security matters.

As mentioned earlier, demobilized combatants from both armed forces and groups are very likely to be involved in the growing problems of domestic violence, sexual abuse and other anti-social behaviour that often characterize a post-conflict community. To deal with such problems, communities shall be encouraged to work collaboratively with the police, and police shall undergo special training on gender-based violence towards women and children, as well as other hidden social problems such as abuse of the elderly.

The sensitization of communities on how to take preventive action to avoid growing interpersonal violence increases confidence and enables police to more effectively deal with the needs of the most vulnerable. The following steps can be taken to strengthen public confidence in the police:

- open access to all police services;
- the availability of police services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
- a highly visible police presence;
- aggressive public information campaigns;
- the creation of public forums and civil society engagements so that police actions are monitored and evaluated regularly;
- the representation of minority groups and balanced ethnic composition in the police service;
- the promotion of gender balance in the police force and gender mainstreaming in all police work.



In fulfilling an executive mandate, UNPOL shall develop and carry out all confidence-building measures. To fulfil a non-executive mandate, UNPOL shall assist and advise local police in their confidence-building initiatives.

## 12. Police reform and restructuring

One of the key tasks that UNPOL is regularly engaged in is the reform, restructuring, re-building and capacity development of national and local police. Failure to ensure accountable and transparent police services is an important reason for the breakdown of the rule of law. In conflict-ridden societies, police institutions are mostly neglected, underfunded, politicized and exploited as tools for repression and gross human rights violations. Given that police are the most visible arm of the State, and are entrusted with responsibility for preserving order and maintaining the law, the way in which they carry out their duty is an important indicator of the stability of peace. Police reform is therefore one of the most vital areas of focus for the re-establishment of peace and stability in a post-conflict State. Without properly constituted and trustworthy police, the transition from conflict to peace will be much more difficult. However, police reform cannot take place in isolation and shall be part of a holistic (all-embracing) process of SSR, including simultaneous reform initiatives in the judiciary and prison service. Police reform is usually based on the principles of democratic policing, which in turn are based on the principles of representation, responsiveness and accountability. Police reform is a long process and requires sustained support from the international community.

The process of reforming and restructuring the police has several close links with all three aspects of the broader DDR process. Removing high-calibre, military-style arms from the police should take priority, although care should be taken not to leave police without adequate arms to deal with criminal violence, which can increase during the transition phase. Disarmament of the police should take place within the wider processes of arms control and police reform, so that police can fulfil their mandate to protect the lives and property of citizens. The replacement of military-style weapons with light individual weapons will help pave the way for service-oriented police; however, this requires careful and intensive education and training, supported by new policy and legal frameworks.

Ensuring balanced ethnic diversity and gender representation in the police is vital to the success of reform initiatives. This is why it is essential to avoid any political compromise that allows the inclusion of ex-combatants at the cost of achieving and maintaining high standards of policing. The international police can play a vital role in insulating local police from such political interference.


The demobilization of police personnel within the reform framework shall be carefully managed and controlled. Extreme care shall be taken to ensure that the demobilization of large numbers of police does not result in a lack of trained personnel during the transition period. Reduction of the numbers of police shall be carried out in line with local needs and shall proceed in phases, so that there is no gap in the police presence and also to allow the police to prepare for the transition that is about to take place.

As with the reintegration of former combatants, police reintegration shall be a carefully planned activity. Great care is needed to ensure that anyone with a criminal background (including human rights violators) is not re-enlisted into the reformed police service. If any ex-combatants are to be reintegrated into the police, their recruitment shall follow the standard procedures, which will ensure that only those who meet the required standards will be enlisted.<sup>3</sup>

Lessons learned from earlier missions have shown that existing police personnel should go through a proper vetting process before they are formally certified as police officers. Vetting involves an assessment of existing police officers to make sure that they are suitable for continued employment in the reformed police organization. Depending on the current situation in the country and the UN's mandate, provisions should be made to maintain an interim police force/service composed entirely of the existing police personnel in the country, or the UNPOL component, which will have legal executive authority until the national police service is re-established.

In this case, the interim police shall remain in existence until the new framework, including organizational structures, legal provisions and all the necessary management and administrative procedures, is in place. The aim of creating an interim police service is to ensure that all those with criminal backgrounds, or officers without the proper personal and professional qualifications to conduct themselves correctly as police, are prevented from joining the new reformed police service.

The following diagram shows the process of establishing a new police service:



## 12.1. The vetting process

This takes place in three phases:

### 12.1.1. Registration

Registration is the most important process for obtaining information on the enlistment of all persons who carry out policing functions. Reliable information on the status of individual police officers is often limited, and it may be difficult to validate the different versions or claims individuals may make regarding their status. Similarly, it will be difficult to find out the personal histories of ex-combatants who apply to be inducted into the police. The registration process should clarify matters by:

- providing an accurate number of active police personnel;
- identifying 'ghost' police officers whose salaries are paid, but who do not exist in reality, thus allowing the government to reduce expenditure;

- allowing the authorities to establish an accurate register of the details of prospective police officers;
- allowing police training institutions to design and develop sound training programmes.

The registration programme shall be well planned so that no stakeholders are left out. The registration forms should include a photograph and all personal details. All the registration details shall be included in the central database for future reference, and shall be kept confidential.

#### 12.1.2. Screening

Once the number and type of personnel to be included within the reformed institution have been decided, the selection process is started. Individual screening will determine how well people fit the set of criteria for recruitment to the police service. Criteria shall be established that take into account the circumstances of the conflict and the restrictions this might have imposed, for example, on an individual's education, which, in a long-lasting conflict, probably will have been interrupted. The screening process shall also be designed to reveal any involvement in human rights abuses and war crimes. Other areas of importance will be evidence of corruption and unethical conduct, including sexual exploitation, domestic violence and other crimes committed while serving under the previous authority. The screening should take the form of a formal test so that the candidates' standards of literacy can be determined, and include medical tests to assess their physical and mental condition. An interview should be conducted to identify any other relevant competencies that they possess. There should also be background and character checks to verify the suitability of each individual, authentication of any documents, an assessment of general reputation and character, and other measures to determine the strengths and weaknesses of each applicant.

#### 12.1.3. Certification

Provisional officers will be certified as members of the reformed police service after they have been through the entire process of vetting. Certification will be strictly based on the individual having met the recruitment criteria. Once the individuals are certified, they are issued with service identity cards.

### 12.2. Training

Individuals who meet the basic eligibility criteria shall undergo compulsory training based on their level of experience and education. The standard of training programmes is often determined by the human resources available to train the police service, so a particular effort shall be made to recruit good trainers. Training programmes shall cover all aspects of police work, and shall be properly developed to suit the needs of the country. Imported training programmes that are not adapted to the local environment and realities and the sociocultural background are often a waste of time and resources. Training programmes in the post-conflict environment shall focus specifically on human rights, community policing principles and human security. All training should be reinforced by a full mentoring service to ensure that the theoretical knowledge gained during the training programme is reinforced in practice, through close supervision and guidance. The establishment of a properly trained and capable police organization often allows the withdrawal of the UN mission from a post-conflict society.

Training programmes for police in transition usually focus on the following aspects:

- *Standard harmonization training:* War often interrupts regular training programmes, and the police lose their capacity to properly carry out their tasks. Moreover, many police officers who were recruited during the war have never undergone the proper training to raise their understanding of policing work to an acceptable standard. Harmonization training is often short but intensive, and is designed to train the workforce so that everyone achieves the basic minimum requirements of skills and knowledge on professional policing practices;
- *Supervisory and middle-management training:* This training is often focused on the development of supervisory and managerial skills, and can help prepare leaders for the new police structure;
- *Special skills training:* Depending on the immediate needs of the local police, special skills training is usually carried out to prepare specialised members of the police, such as investigators, traffic officers, security officers, trainers, drivers, mechanics, etc., to resume their responsibilities.

## 13. Issues of concern

Police reform is a long-term undertaking, which must be methodical and properly planned. The following factors are essential for the establishment of a professional police service.

### 13.1. Political will

Police reform and restructuring require a strong national political will for change. This is demonstrated when proper measures are taken to ensure the promulgation and amendment of police regulations and police statutes. Furthermore, national political will is shown by protecting police reform plans and processes from any political interference and influences. The police force needs to be a totally non-partisan institution that represents all the groups in the nation, and police officers shall be responsible to the public through obeying and being loyal to a duly elected government. Making resources available for paying regular salaries and providing basic requirements such as uniforms are other ways of displaying political will and commitment. Ultimately, the police reform process should be a national effort and not something imposed on a country from outside. The sustainability of the reform process depends on the level of national ownership of the entire process and the ability of the government to support it in the long run.

### 13.2. Sustained and coordinated international support

Any war-torn country will have a huge number of priorities, but the damaged economy can deal with these in only a very limited way. Police reform and capacity-building is a long-term requirement, and international support should sustain these initiatives. Piecemeal police reform without such sustained support often brings no long-term benefits. However, contributing to the police reform process can be a politically sensitive issue, and many donor countries are not willing to support this particular activity. It is therefore very important to make the best use of available resources by coordinating and integrating international support so that, through the united effort of all concerned, the best possible end result can be achieved.

### 13.3. Comprehensive initiatives

Police reform cannot be an isolated activity. Many examples from earlier missions have indicated that police reforms should take place at the same time as the reform and development of the judiciary and prison systems, in a holistic (all-embracing) process of SSR. All three components of the criminal justice system work together and support each other, so their redevelopment should move forward in the same way. Police reform shall therefore also be a part of the overall SSR plan that will include the reform of all security agencies.

## 14. Conclusion

The importance of DDR for sustainable peace and security in the post-conflict environment is now a generally accepted reality. Strategic plans backed up by political frameworks are vital to the success of such processes. Each step has its own challenges and difficulties, which need to be assessed and dealt with in a coherent manner. There are many areas of UNPOL work that directly affect the DDR process, and the DDR process also directly affects the work of the UNPOL component. This interdependency requires a structured and integrated approach towards planning and operational activities. In short, the following tasks will be the key responsibilities of the UNPOL component within the DDR process:

- to assist and advise the local law enforcement authority in the maintenance of law and order and criminal investigations within demobilization and cantonment centres;
- to improve, through the local police, provisions for the security of demobilized combatants while they are being reintegrated into civil society;
- to proactively carry out confidence-building initiatives through advocacy and education on all aspects of the social reintegration of ex-combatants into the community;
- to assist the national police service in its reform process through the vetting of its existing members and the selection of new ones, including former combatants who wish to join the national police service;
- to assist the military component of the mission in clearing weapons from civilian areas through sharing of information, controlling movements of the civilian populations, etc.;
- to assist the local law enforcement authority in developing the policies and capacities it needs in order to be closely involved in the national DDR process.

## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Formed police unit (FPU):** A self-contained police unit of 125 officers capable of providing a range of tactical options, including an effective public order function.

**Police statute:** A law, decree or edict enacted by the relevant authority governing the establishment, functions and organization of a law enforcement agency.

**Weapons control:** Regulation of the possession and use of firearms and other lethal weapons by citizens through legal issuances (e.g., laws, regulations, decrees, etc.).

### Abbreviations

<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>FPU</b>	formed police unit
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>PD</b>	Police Division
<b>SSR</b>	security sector reform
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNPOL</b>	UN Police

## Endnotes

- 1 Haiti is an example of a country where existing police will have to give up their military hardware and individuals will be properly vetted before rejoining the reformed police force/service.
- 2 For example, such forums were established and facilitated by the civilian police in each community in Sierra Leone. Paramount chiefs were regularly called in to hold such meetings and support trust-building activities for all concerned.
- 3 In Sierra Leone, for example, the police services were extremely rigorous in their recruitment of new members. The standards they adopted prevented the enrolment of ex-combatants.



# 4.60 Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR

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**NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 4.60 Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of DDR

## Summary

Public information (PI) plays a crucial support function in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. Once the political framework for DDR is in place after parties agree to demobilize and have signed a ceasefire and a peace accord, planning for DDR operations begins. The conceptualization and preparations for the DDR PI campaign should start at the same time as the planning for the DDR programme.

PI is important because it both ensures that DDR beneficiaries are made fully aware of what the DDR process involves and encourages individuals to participate in the programme. It also serves the vital purpose of making the communities, to which DDR beneficiaries are to return, understand how the DDR programme will involve them in the reintegration of ex-combatants. The basic rule for an effective PI strategy is to have clear overall objectives based on a careful assessment of the situation in which DDR is to take place. It is the responsibility of DDR planners to define these objectives in good time, in consultation with their local PI counterparts, so that the machinery of PI can be established at the same time as other DDR planning.

PI should link to all the other DDR components as part of a multisectoral strategy for peace-building. It will make an important contribution towards creating a climate of peace and security, provided that the process of identifying the many different groups at which it is directed, the best local methods of communication and other necessary elements for the successful roll-out of a PI campaign are correctly put in place. It is essential that PI materials are pre-tested on a local audience and that the PI campaign is then closely monitored and evaluated.

It is important to note, however, that PI activities are just one component of the overall process and cannot compensate for a faulty DDR framework or on its own convince people that it is safe to enter the programme. If combatants are not willing to disarm, for whatever reason, PI alone will not persuade them to do so.

## 1. Modules scope and objectives

The objective of this module is to present the range of target groups, materials and means of communication that DDR planners must choose from to formulate a specifically designed PI strategy in support of DDR, and includes pointers for planning, designing, implementing and monitoring such a strategy.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

1.20 ◀▶

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

### 3. Introduction

DDR is an activity that requires the mobilization of multiple actors, from the government or legitimate authority and other signatories to the peace agreement, to ex-combatants and others associated with armed forces and groups, their dependants and receiving communities. Attitudes towards DDR may vary among groups: potential spoilers, such as those left out of the peace agreement or former commanders, may wish to sabotage DDR, while others, such as the internally displaced, will want it to take place urgently. These differing attitudes will at least partly be determined by individual levels of knowledge of the peace process, as well as people’s personal expectations. In order to bring the many different stakeholders in a post-conflict country (and region) together in support of the DDR process, it is essential to ensure both that they are aware of how DDR is meant to take place, and that they do not have false expectations about what it can do for them. Changing and managing attitudes and behaviour through information distribution and strategic communication are therefore essential parts of implementing DDR.

PI carries out a vital support function in the DDR process. Once the political framework for DDR is in place — i.e., once the parties agree to demobilize and have signed a ceasefire and a peace accord — planning for DDR operations begins. The conceptualization and preparations for the DDR PI campaign should start at the same time as planning for the DDR programme. The basic rule for an effective PI strategy is to have clear overall objectives. It is the responsibility of DDR planners to define what these are for their PI counterparts on the ground, who can be drawn from civil society organizations with existing experience in community sensitization. PI, as a component in a multisectoral strategy for peace-building, will contribute towards creating a climate of peace and security. It is important to note, however, that PI activities cannot compensate for a faulty DDR framework, or on their own convince people that it is safe to enter the programme. If combatants are not willing to disarm, for whatever reason, PI alone will not persuade them to do so.

DDR in post-conflict contexts is usually one component of a wider programme of activities in support of peace, which may also include justice and reconciliation, and the reintegration of internally displaced persons and returnees. PI can play an important role in bringing these different processes together, by encouraging a holistic (i.e., all-embracing) view of the challenges of rebuilding a nation. It is also a major tool in advocacy for best practices in HIV/AIDS prevention and gender awareness, both of which form part of DDR (also see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR, IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR).

While PI officers have overall responsibility for designing and implementing a PI campaign in support of DDR, it is essential that other key actors in the DDR process play active roles. The leadership of the peacekeeping mission (the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General [SRSG], Deputy SRSG and force commander), as well as DDR experts from the various United Nations (UN) agencies, must be available to participate in PI activities such as press conferences and interviews with UN, local and international media. Other components of the mission, the military in particular, can play a vital role in ensuring the widest possible distribution of printed PI materials. It is also important to involve influential local actors in PI activities, in order to encourage people to support the DDR programme.

It must always be kept in mind that PI and strategic communications are aimed at a much wider audience than those people who are directly involved in or affected by the DDR process within a particular country. Together, these strategies can play an essential role in building regional and international political support for the UN's DDR efforts and can help mobilize funding that is crucial for the success of reintegration programmes. PI staff in both the peacekeeping mission and UN agencies should therefore be actively involved in preparations for any pledging conferences (also see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR, IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners and IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

2.10 ◀▶  
5.40 ◀▶ ■ 2.30 ◀▶

## 4. Objectives of PI in support of DDR

PI is a key support tool for DDR processes, and is used both to inform DDR beneficiaries and receiving communities of the process, and to influence attitudes towards it. If successful, PI strategies will secure buy-in to the DDR process by outlining what the programme consists of as well as contributing to changing attitudes and behaviour.

On the assumption that the government or the legitimate authority is supportive and cooperative, specific objectives may include the following:

If successful, PI strategies will secure buy-in to the DDR process by outlining what the programme consists of as well as contributing to changing attitudes and behaviour.

*Pre-DDR:*

- former factions, including commanders, endorse the DDR process;
- the civilian population, particularly those in the receiving communities, and including civil society representatives and local government institutions, are aware of and endorse the process;
- local and international donors are informed about how to contribute to the DDR programme.

*During disarmament and demobilization:*

- DDR participants have realistic expectations and know what is expected of them;
- women ex-combatants and other women associated with armed groups and forces in non-combat roles are correctly informed about DDR and any special programmes for them;
- child-friendly information is provided for children associated with armed groups and forces and their caregivers;
- foreign fighters and cross-border communities are correctly informed about any repatriation activities associated with DDR;
- communities in areas surrounding disarmament and demobilization (DD) locations are aware of the purpose and activities in the process and have realistic expectations;
- the right attitudes are developed for community disarmament and longer-term arms management to take place.

*During reintegration:*

- communities accept the DDR participants and have reasonable expectations of what reintegration will bring;
- victims of sexual violence and/or HIV/AIDS are not stigmatized;
- connections are made with ongoing security sector reform, including arms control and police and judicial reform.

(Also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and IDDRS 5.10–5.70, all of which contain detailed information about PI.)

## 5. Guiding principles

The following list offers the guiding principles for a public information strategy:

- *Flexibility:* PI strategies must be responsive to new political and/or social developments;
- *Integrity:* The key to managing expectations is being clear, realistic, honest and consistent about what DDR can and cannot deliver;
- *Cultural sensitivity/appropriateness:* Cultural factors must be considered when drawing up a PI strategy in order to increase its effectiveness, including levels of trust in different types of media;
- *Participatory:* The focus of PI should be on the national participants in the DDR process, i.e., ex-combatants and dependants, receiving communities, parties to the peace agreement, civil society, local and national authorities, and the media;
- *Gender equality and women's participation:* PI messages should take into consideration the needs and interests of women and girls, who play a central role in peace-building at the community level. In resource-poor areas where female literacy levels are low and women's access to radios may be limited because of poverty, specific attention should be paid to developing female-friendly information strategies;
- *National ownership:* PI messages, materials and means of communication that attempt to influence attitudes towards DDR should be drawn up by the people who know the target audience the best, i.e., the locals themselves;
- *Capacity-building:* Reliable, honest PI is essential to long-term peace-building, and efforts should be made to leave behind a legacy of good practice once the DDR-specific PI campaign is over, by working with civil society actors to draw up and implement the PI campaign.

## 6. Primary audiences

These are the main stakeholders in the DDR process:

- *The political leadership,* which usually includes the signatories of ceasefires and peace accords. They may or may not represent the military branches of their organizations;
- *The military leadership of armed groups or the government army:* In many countries, it is the armed branch of a movement that takes precedence over the civilian, political branch (they can also be considered a secondary target group, as they could motivate their subordinates to participate in the DDR process);

- *Rank-and-file of armed groups/forces:* Although these, too, belong to the (former) warring factions, it is important to make the distinction between leadership and rank-and-file, because their motivations and interests may differ;
- *Women associated with armed groups and forces in non-combat roles,* for whose information needs it is particularly important to cater, especially those who have been abducted. Communities, especially women's groups, should also be informed about how to further assist women who manage to leave an armed force or group of their own accord;
- *Children associated with armed groups and forces* need child-friendly information to help reassure and remove any of them who are illegally held by an armed group or force. Communities should also be informed on how to assist children who manage to escape;
- *Receiving communities:* Enabling the smooth reintegration of DDR participants into their communities is vital to the success of DDR.

## 7. Secondary audiences

These groups influence the post-conflict environment, and DDR in particular:

- *Civil society* comprises women's groups, local associations, religious organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and business groups, and is a primary partner in the DDR process. It can help encourage buy-in, assist women and children associated with armed groups and forces who may not know how to take part in the DDR process, and identify and support reintegration opportunities;
- *International and local media* are the main sources of information on progress in the peace process. Keeping the media supplied with accurate and up-to-date information on the implementation of DDR is important in order to increase support for the process and avoid bad press. The media are also key whistleblowers who can identify, expose and denounce potential spoilers of the peace process;
- *Regional stakeholders:* These include governments, regional organizations, military and political parties of neighbouring countries, civil society in neighbouring States, businesses and potential spoilers;
- *The international community:* This includes donors, their constituencies (including diasporas who can influence the direction of DDR), troop-contributing countries, the UN system, international financial institutions, NGOs, think-tanks, etc.

The intended audiences will vary according to the phase in the process and, crucially, the changes in people's attitudes that DDR planners want to bring about. For example, following the signature of a peace agreement, an important objective will be to remove or prevent mistrust and achieve buy-in to the process. The key actors in ensuring that the peace agreement stays on course are the former belligerents. A tactic to gain their buy-in could be to hold interviews with the signatories on local and international radio stations and in newspapers, during which they publicly support and endorse the agreement. This will help to create a climate of confidence among the signatories.

## 8. PI tools

This section outlines the various media that can be used in PI strategies, and illustrates the advantages and disadvantages associated with each.



The PI office of most large-scale UN peacekeeping operations usually includes the following components: a spokesperson's office, a radio unit, a TV unit, a print and publications unit, and community outreach officers.

The spokesperson's office, working closely with local advisers, the peacekeeping mission's leadership and DDR experts, including those from partnership agencies, designs and creates messages about the DDR process. These messages are not only aimed at distributing information to DDR participants and the general population, but are also intended to apply pressure on potential spoilers and to gain the support of both the international and the local donor communities. They can be delivered in press conferences (including background briefings), through media interviews or in press releases and further distributed using the tools described below.

## **8.1. Radio**

When compared with other media, the advantage of radio is that it often reaches the largest number of people, particularly in developing countries, because it is less dependent on infrastructural development or the technological sophistication and wealth of the listener, and reaches illiterate people. It should not be assumed, however, that women (and children) have the same access to radio as men, especially in rural areas, since they may not have enough resources to buy either the radio or batteries. It is vital to schedule radio broadcasts at the most appropriate time of day for listeners and to get broadcasts out as frequently as possible.

Radio can be broadcast on either FM or short-wave frequencies. While FM radio is usually available in a limited radius around urban areas, short-wave radio can be picked up anywhere. However, short-wave transmitters are expensive, bulky and need a specialized technician for maintenance. When choosing whether to use short wave, its comparative advantages/disadvantages need to be weighed against those of other tools.

To ensure access to radio broadcasts, especially among the most marginalized members of society, portable wind-up short-wave/FM radios may be distributed to increase the effectiveness of radio programmes about DDR. A choice can be made between wind-up radios that can receive many stations and those that are pre-set to a particular frequency. The pre-set type can be chosen if DDR programmes are broadcast on only one radio station. Wind-up radios are available in 'child-friendly' models suitable for child-headed households, and their distribution is also a good way to ensure women's access to broadcasts.<sup>1</sup>

### **8.1.1. UN radio stations**

Many peacekeeping missions establish their own 'UN Radio' stations with broadcast capabilities and their own frequencies. These stations are managed by UN international professionals and staffed mostly by local journalists recruited to work for the UN. Through UN radios, the UN system has a way of transmitting messages and stimulating national debate on key transition-related issues. The advantage of such stations is that they provide a peacekeeping mission with the ability to put out its message 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The challenge is to build up an audience where none previously existed.

### **8.1.2. Partnership stations run by a UN peacekeeping mission and an NGO**

Radio Okapi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a noteworthy example of such a collaboratively developed station. Radio Okapi was established by the UN Mission

in DRC, MONUC, and the Fondation Hirondelle. While Radio Okapi cooperates closely with MONUC, it retains full control over its editorial policy. This has enabled the station to gain the confidence of the Congolese population and is an excellent example of local capacity-building.

### 8.1.3. Non-UN local and international radio stations

Specific programming on DDR can be designed and broadcast, both on UN radio stations and on non-UN public and private radio stations. To set up broadcasting on non-UN stations, memoranda of understanding need to be signed between the peacekeeping operation or the national commission on DDR (NCDDR) and the radio stations. The advantage of this approach is that DDR programmes will reach more people, because these stations already have an established audience. Note that care must be taken in selecting the radio station; in some cases, it may have positions or views that are not in keeping with UN principles and objectives.

### 8.1.4. Mobile radio stations

DDR messages directed at specific geographical areas for a limited period of time can be broadcast using mobile FM radio stations. This may be useful, for example, in the run-up to and during the operations of a demobilization site. Such radios can both prepare communities and inform and sensitize the beneficiaries of the DDR process.

### 8.1.5. Basic components of a DDR radio programme

A DDR radio programme should include the following components:

- basic information on the procedure for DDR, especially eligibility, entitlements, dates and locations for assembly;
- updates on the DDR process, e.g., the opening of demobilization sites and inauguration of reintegration projects;
- debates on issues such as reconciliation, justice and developments in the peace process, possibly including interviews;
- information on the rule of law and judicial process that DDR participants will be subject to;
- messages targeting women and girls to encourage their participation in the process;
- messages on the rights of children associated with armed groups and forces and consequences for enlisting or holding them;
- messages to and from separated family members.

RADIO: TARGET AUDIENCES	
UN radio stations	DDR participants and beneficiaries; former belligerents; national institutions; locally based donors; local civil society; the UN system; international and local NGOs. On short wave, can reach diaspora; rural communities in-country; international community
Local radio stations	DDR participants and beneficiaries; former belligerents; national institutions; locally based donors; local civil society; international and local NGOs. On short wave, can reach the diaspora and rural communities in-country
International radio stations	All of the above, as well as regional stakeholders; constituencies of donor countries

## 8.2. Print media: Leaflets, pamphlets, posters/cartoons, newsletters and magazines

Although the effectiveness of these media will be limited by the literacy of the intended audience, their main advantages are their durability and the level of detail that printed information can contain. Written PI products can be passed on from person to person, and should, if clearly written, allow the reader to understand the contents easily. Graphic material such as cartoons or posters will have a wider impact by covering audiences of varying levels of literacy and age, although the scope of messages passed on may be more limited. The impact of print media will be limited to the particular geographical area where they are distributed.

Articles may be written and published in the local newspapers, as well as the international press. While locally published articles will be read by local stakeholders, articles in the international press may be read by other key actors in the peace process, such as donors, influential Security Council members and regional actors.

### PRINT MEDIA: TARGET AUDIENCES

Pamphlets/leaflets	Literate members of local civil society; locally based donors
Cartoons	Literate and illiterate members of civil society; especially good for children
Posters	All local actors

## 8.3. Visual media: TV and video

Because TV can reach illiterate audiences and is more dynamic as a medium than radio, this form of medium is the most effective. In countries where TV is the most popular way of distributing information, it is essential that the mission makes use of TV, even in a limited way. Some peacekeeping missions have established their own UN TV stations with their own broadcasting frequency, while others have made arrangements to broadcast their programmes on existing public or private stations. Again, scheduling and frequency of broadcasts must be carefully planned to respond to the needs of the widest possible audience.

In countries where TV is inaccessible to the majority of the population, including ex-combatants and people living in rural receiving communities, video products, in the form of video-cassettes, films or DVDs, can play an important role in getting out DDR messages. It is important to remember that showing films and documentaries needs basic technical requirements, i.e., electricity, a projector and sound system. Video-cassettes and DVDs also need specialized equipment and a power source. In most developing countries, electricity is a scarce commodity, making it necessary for generators to be procured. This is a costly and cumbersome undertaking, especially if sensitization is to take place in remote areas. Nonetheless, mobile cinema units (MCUs) have been in use in development projects for a number of years, and can be used in DDR education.<sup>2</sup> It is important to remember, however, that in some contexts, potential viewers may be banned or prevented from watching films and videos; cultural restrictions may mean that women, in particular, cannot watch films in public. In such cases, it may be possible to negotiate a women-only screening.

### VISUAL MEDIA: TARGET AUDIENCES

Films, documentaries, stories	Local civil society; children, youth and adults, although not necessarily in mixed-age and mixed-sex groups
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Singer performs during DDR sensitization in Kakata, Liberia, March 2004. Photo: M. Novicki, UNMIL

#### 8.4. Interactive mechanisms: Theatre, seminars, debates

Although their main impact may be only on their direct audience, oral forms of communication have the advantage of involving the audience much more because they are more interactive. Presenting ideas and concepts figuratively, especially if based on local folklore, culture and humour, involves the audience far more than using other, more remote forms of media, especially in communities with a strong oral culture.

##### SPOKEN WORD: TARGET AUDIENCES

Theatre/role-playing/community art workshops/exhibitions	Children, youth and adults, both literate and illiterate
Seminars	Educated opinion leaders
Debates	Children, youth and adults, both literate and illiterate

#### 8.5. The Internet

In most countries where the UN has a mandate to carry out DDR, it is unlikely that many of its citizens, especially ex-combatants and rural villagers, have Internet access. However, the Internet is a very good way to project your messages to the wider international audience, particularly the donor community, troop-contributing countries and international media. All PI products can be posted on the Web, including print materials, digital video clips, and live or recorded radio programming.

## 9. PI strategies and approaches: Planning

When designing a PI strategy, planners will have to take six key factors into account:

- What stage is the DDR process at?
- Who are the primary and intermediary target audiences?
- What behavioural/attitude change is the programme trying to bring about?
- What are the tools best suited to achieve this change (taking into account literacy rates, the presence of different media, etc.)?
- What other organizations are involved, and what are their PI strategies?
- How can the PI strategy be monitored?

An example of a planning tool based on the above can be found in Annex B of this module.

In order to design the DDR PI effort to fit local needs, it is important to understand the social, political and cultural context and to identify factors that shape attitudes.

### 9.1. Understanding the local context

In order to design the DDR PI effort to fit local needs, it is important to understand the social, political and cultural context and to identify factors that shape attitudes. It will then be possible to define behavioural objectives and design messages to bring about the

social change that is required. Information-gathering during the planning stage should aim to collect the following information (the list is not complete) to aid planners in determining the local context:

- the role of women, men and children in society;
- media mapping, including geographic reach, political slant and the cost of different media;
- the key communicators in the society (academics and intelligentsia, politicians, religious leaders, commanders, etc.);
- traditional methods of communication;
- cultural perceptions of the disabled, rape survivors, extra-marital childbirth, etc.;
- literacy rates;
- the attitudes of community members towards ex-combatants.

Partners in the process also need to be identified. Particular emphasis, especially in the case of information directed at the receiving communities and DDR participants, should be placed on selecting local theatre troops and animators who can explain concepts such as DDR, reconciliation and acceptance using figurative language. Others, such as traditional village leaders, who usually command the respect of communities, must also be brought into PI efforts, and may be used to distribute DDR messages. Planners should ensure that partners are able and willing to speak to all DDR beneficiaries, and also to community members, including women, children, disabled people and those living with HIV/AIDS.

### 9.2. Coordination mechanisms

The PI strategy should be created through a collaborative effort between the DDR and PI components of the mission, with the participation of national counterparts (e.g., the NCDDR).



Usually, DDR and PI sections are separate entities in peacekeeping missions. However, because the PI requirements for DDR are extensive and specific, it is useful to second PI officer(s) to DDR sections, in order to ensure close and consistent coordination between PI sections and the DDR managers (both UN and national). This will ensure that PI activities support and assist with other DDR activities.

Where integration between the two mission components is not possible, it is important to establish working coordination mechanisms, such as weekly meetings or email groups. Note that the work of PI officers goes beyond DDR to cover the PI needs of the peacekeeping mission as a whole; as a result, they may not have sufficient time to meet all DDR needs. In order to help PI officers organize their work, DDR planners must be clear from the start of their requirements and schedule of activities.

The PI strategy should be created through a collaborative effort between the DDR and PI components of the mission, with the participation of national counterparts

### 9.3. Scheduling PI material

At the same time as a PI strategy is being prepared, other PI resources can be activated. Ready-made PI material on peacekeeping and the UN's role, prepared by the Department of Public Information, can be distributed. Note that most DDR-specific material will be created for the particular country where the DDR operation will take place. Production of PI material is a lengthy process. The time needed to design and produce printed sensitization tools, and to set up radios, should be taken into account when planning the schedule for PI activities. Certain PI tools may take less time to produce, such as: basic pamphlets; DDR radio programmes for broadcasting on non-UN radios; interviews on local and international media; and debates, seminars and public theatre. As detailed below, pre-testing of PI materials must also be included in operational schedules.

In addition to the considerations above, the strategy should have a coherent schedule, bearing in mind that while some PI activities will continue throughout the DDR process, others will take place at specific times, or during specific phases of the DDR process.

### 9.4. Monitoring and evaluation

From the start, it is important to identify measurable indicators (the pieces of information that will show whether objectives are being met) as well as how this information will be gathered (sources and techniques) in order to monitor and evaluate the impact of the PI strategy. Any aspects of the PI campaign that do not have the effect they are designed to achieve will have to be adapted.

Indicators may include:

- the levels of violence in receiving communities;
- the number, sex, age and location (i.e., rural or urban) of people listening to DDR radio programmes;
- the number of DDR beneficiaries participating in the programme;
- a reduction in the number of incidents at DD cantonment sites where beneficiaries previously misunderstood eligibility criteria and entitlement packages;
- the extent of the involvement of the local civilian population in reintegration programmes.

This information can be gathered through surveys and interviews carried out throughout the implementation of the DDR programme, and also from the activity reports of other organizations, media reports, staff at the DD cantonments, local civil society actors in the communities, etc. Findings should be used to guide and shape ongoing activities.

### 9.5. Dealing with ‘hate media’

In the volatile post-conflict context, those who profited from war, or those who consider that their political objectives have not been met, may not wish to see the peace process succeed. They may have access to radios or distribute pamphlets and tracts spreading ‘hate’ messages undermining the UN or some of the former warring factions.

Several approaches can be taken to counteract ‘hate media’. The legal framework in the country regulating the media can be reviewed, and laws put in place to prevent the distribution of messages inciting hate. If this approach is used, care must be taken to ensure that civil and political rights are not affected. An alternative would be to denounce the hate messages through other media. Those distributing the hate messages, depending on their background, may be legitimately involved in the peace process. If this is the case, they may be approached and perhaps it will be possible to negotiate an end to their spoiling action.



Clown performs during DDR sensitization in Ganta, Liberia, February, 2004. Photo: M. Novicki, UNMIL



## 10. PI strategies and approaches: Implementation

### 10.1. Pre-testing materials

To ensure the appropriateness of messages, materials and media to the local context, it is essential that materials are pre-tested on a local audience so that they can be modified where necessary before they are implemented. Methods of pre-testing may be through questionnaires, seminars with target groups, round tables or group discussions.

Points to consider are as follows:

- Are the images, illustrations, messages and/or footage clearly and correctly understood?
- Do the people on which the material was pre-tested have any suggestions for changes?
- How do these people relate to the messages and materials?
- Are the messages convincing?
- Will the messages and materials reach all the different target groups?

### 10.2. Changing circumstances

DDR takes place in a fluid environment. Progress may be undermined by new developments; setbacks and pauses in the process may occur. PI will be required to adapt its strategy accordingly.

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Media monitoring is a fundamental way of keeping track of the way in which the DDR process is developing. The local and international media may purposefully or unintentionally misinform listeners or readers about progress or setbacks in the peace process. Counteracting this as soon as possible is essential to prevent further damage and put matters to right.

### 10.3. Resource requirements

If possible, budgetary requirements should be defined in advance of the DDR PI strategy. Getting PI activities up and running is a costly and lengthy process, involving procurement and/or production of PI material. The proposed budget must make provisions for unexpected expenses, as these occur frequently in volatile post-conflict situations.

### 10.4. Personnel requirements

Ideally, PI staff will be attached to the DDR coordinating body, either within the UN or within an NCDDR. Radio producers and staff familiar with public relations and handling the media are vital to the success of any programme (also see IDDRS 3.42 on Personnel and Staffing).

3.42 ◀▶

## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>DD</b>	disarmament and demobilization
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>MCU</b>	mobile cinema unit
<b>MONUC</b>	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
<b>NCDDR</b>	national commission on DDR
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>PI</b>	public information
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>UN</b>	United Nations

## Annex B: Public information strategy planning tool

AUDIENCE	BEHAVIOURAL OBJECTIVES	TACTICS AND TOOLS	MESSAGES	MONITORING RESULTS
E.g.: ■ Combatant leadership	E.g.: ■ Commit to the process ■ Participate fully in DDR ■ Motivate subordinates to participate in DDR	E.g.: ■ Publicize decisions/statements/ceremonies marking the leadership's commitment to DDR ■ Give them or help them to get access to the media ■ Organize seminars and debates	E.g.: ■ Explain the DDR process, especially the benefits ■ Explain the rights and responsibilities of DDR beneficiaries	E.g. ■ Increase/decrease in disagreement/dissent within the armed group ■ Find out whether orders have been passed on

## Endnotes

- 1 For more information, see <http://www.freeplayfoundation.org/>.
- 2 An MCU consists of a video projector, a screen, a clear sound system and a generator. The system is designed to pack easily into a pick-up truck and to travel in dusty conditions. Two technicians are usually required to set up and show the film, and they usually lead discussions afterwards. In some countries emerging from conflict, e.g., Sierra Leone, former combatants have set up MCU microprojects in the reintegration period.

# 5.10 Women, Gender and DDR

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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## 5.10 Women, Gender and DDR

### Summary

Women are increasingly involved in combat or are associated with armed groups and forces in other roles, work as community peace-builders, and play essential roles in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. Yet they are almost never included in the planning or implementation of DDR. Since 2000, the United Nations (UN) and all other agencies involved in DDR and other post-conflict reconstruction activities have been in a better position to change this state of affairs by using Security Council resolution 1325, which sets out a clear and practical agenda for measuring the advancement of women in all aspects of peace-building. The resolution begins with the recognition that women's visibility, both in national and regional instruments and in bi- and multilateral organizations, is vital. It goes on to call for gender awareness in all aspects of peacekeeping initiatives, especially demobilization and reintegration, urges women's informed and active participation in disarmament exercises, and insists on the right of women to carry out their post-conflict reconstruction activities in an environment free from threat, especially of sexualized violence.

Even when they are not involved with armed forces and groups themselves, women are strongly affected by decisions made during the demobilization of men. Furthermore, it is impossible to tackle the problems of women's political, social and economic marginalization or the high levels of violence against women in conflict and post-conflict zones without paying attention to how men's experiences and expectations also shape gender relations. This module therefore includes some ideas about how to design DDR processes for men in such a way that they will learn to resolve interpersonal conflicts without using violence to do so, which will increase the security of their families and broader communities.

Special note is also made of girl soldiers in this module, because in some parts of the world, a girl who bears a child, no matter how young she is, immediately gains the status of a woman. Care should therefore be taken to understand local interpretations of who is seen as a girl and who a woman soldier.

Peace-building, especially in the form of practical disarmament, needs to continue for a long time after formal demobilization and reintegration processes come to an end. This module is therefore intended to assist planners in designing and implementing gender-sensitive short-term goals, and to help in the planning of future-oriented long-term peace support measures. It focuses on practical ways in which both women and girls, and men and boys can be included in the processes of disarmament and demobilization, and be recognized and supported in the roles they play in reintegration.

The processes of DDR take place in such a wide variety of conditions that it would be impossible to discuss each of the circumstance-specific challenges that might arise. This module raises issues that frequently disappear in the planning stages of DDR, and aims to provoke further thinking and debate on the best ways to deal with the varied needs of people — male and female, old and young, healthy and unwell — in armed groups and forces, and those of the communities to which they return after war.



## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides policy guidance on the gender aspects of the various stages in a DDR process, and outlines gender-aware interventions and female-specific actions that should be carried out in order to make sure that DDR programmes are sustainable and equitable. The module is also designed to give guidance on mainstreaming gender into all DDR policies and programmes to create gender-responsive DDR programmes. As gender roles and relations are by definition constructed in a specific cultural, geographic and communal context, the guidance offered is intended to be applied with sensitivity to and understanding of the context in which a DDR process is taking place. However, all UN and bilateral policies and programmes should comply with internationally agreed norms and standards, such as Security Council resolution 1325, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Beijing Platform for Action.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

## 3. Introduction

Generally, it is assumed that armed men are the primary threat to post-conflict security and that they should therefore be the main focus of DDR. The picture is usually more complex than this: although males (adults, youth and boys) may more obviously take part in the conflict and make up the largest number of combatants, females (adults, youth and girls) are also likely to have been involved in violence, and may have participated in every aspect of the conflict. Despite stereotypical beliefs, women and girls are not peacemakers only, but can also contribute to ongoing insecurity and violence during wartime and when wars come to an end.

The work carried out by women and girl combatants and other women and girls associated with armed forces and groups in non-fighting roles may be difficult to measure, but efforts should be made to assess their contribution as accurately as possible when a DDR programme is designed. The involvement of women in the security sector reform (SSR) processes that accompany and follow DDR should also be deliberately planned from the start.

Women take on a variety of roles during wartime. For example, many may fight for brief periods and then return to their communities to carry out other forms of work that contribute to the war. These women will have reintegrated and are unlikely to present themselves for DDR. Nor should they be encouraged to do so, since the resources allocated for DDR

are limited and intended to create a foundation of stability on which longer-term peace and SSR can be built. It is therefore appropriate, in the reconstruction period, to focus resources on women and men who are still active fighters and potential spoilers. Women who have already rejoined their communities can, however, be an important asset in the reintegration period, including through playing expanded roles in the security sector, and efforts should be made to include their views when designing reintegration processes. Their experiences may significantly help communities with the work of reintegrating former fighters, especially when they are able to help bring about reconciliation and assist in making communities safer.

It is important to remember that women are present in every part of a society touched by DDR — from armed groups and forces to receiving communities. Exclusionary power structures, including a backlash against women entering into political, economic and security structures in a post-conflict period, may make their contributions difficult to assess. It is therefore the responsibility of all DDR planners to work with female representatives and women's groups, and to make it difficult for male leaders to exclude women from the formulation and implementation of DDR processes. Planners of SSR should also pay attention to women as a resource base for improving all aspects of human security in the post-conflict period. It is especially important not to lose the experiences and public standing acquired by those women who played peace-building roles in the conflict period, or who served in an armed group or force, learning skills that can usefully be turned to community service in the reconstruction period.


Ultimately, DDR should lead to a sustainable transition from military to civilian rule, and therefore from militarized to civilian structures in the society more broadly. Since women make up at least half the adult population, and in post-conflict situations may head up to 75 percent of all households, the involvement of women in DDR and SSR is the most important factor in achieving effective and sustainable security. Furthermore, as the main caregivers in most cultures, women and girls shoulder more than their fair share of the burden for the social reintegration of male and female ex-combatants, especially the sick, traumatized, injured, HIV-positive and under-aged.

Dealing with the needs and harnessing the different capacities and potential of men, women, boy and girl former fighters; their supporters; and their dependants will improve the success of the challenging and long-term transformation process that is DDR, as well as providing a firm foundation for the reconstruction of the security sector to meet peacetime needs. However, even five years since the passing of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on *Women and Peace and Security*, gender is still not fully taken into account in DDR planning and delivery. This module shows policy makers and practitioners how to replace this with a routine consideration of the different needs and capacities of the women and men involved in DDR processes.

It is the responsibility of all DDR planners to work with female representatives and women's groups, and to make it difficult for male leaders to exclude women from the formulation and implementation of DDR processes.

## 4. Guiding principles

Up till now, DDR efforts have concerned themselves mainly with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of male combatants. This approach fails to deal with the fact that women can also be armed combatants, and that they may have different needs from



Demobilization site in Liberia, 2004. Photo: UNFPA Humanitarian Response Unit

their male counterparts. Nor does it deal with the fact that women play essential roles in maintaining and enabling armed forces and groups, in both forced and voluntary capacities. A narrow definition of who qualifies as a ‘combatant’ came about because DDR focuses on neutralizing the most potentially dangerous members of a society (and because of limits imposed by the size of the DDR budget); but leaving women out of the process underestimates the extent to which sustainable peace-building and security require them to participate equally in social transformation.

In UN-supported DDR, the following principles of gender equality are applied:

- *Non-discrimination, and fair and equitable treatment:* In practice, this means that no group is to be given special status or treatment within a DDR programme, and that individuals should not be discriminated against on the basis of gender, age, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, or other personal characteristics or associations. This is particularly important when establishing eligibility criteria for entry into DDR programmes (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament);
- *Gender equality and women’s participation:* Encouraging gender equality as a core principle of UN-supported DDR programmes means recognizing and supporting the equal rights of women and men, and girls and boys in the DDR process. The different experiences, roles and responsibilities of each of them during and after conflict should be recognized and reflected in the design and implementation of DDR programmes;
- *Respect for human rights:* DDR programmes should support ways of preventing reprisal or discrimination against, or stigmatization of those who participate. The rights of the community should also be protected and upheld.

◀ ▶ 4.10

## 5. International mandates

### 5.1. Security Council resolution 1325

Security Council resolution 1325 marks an important step towards the recognition of women’s contributions to peace and reconstruction, and draws attention to the particular impact of conflict on women and girls. On DDR, it specifically “encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different

needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants". Since it was passed, the Council has recalled the principles laid down in resolution 1325 when establishing the DDR-related mandates of several peacekeeping missions, such as the UN Missions in Liberia and Sudan and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

## 5.2. The Beijing Platform for Action

At the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, 189 Member States committed themselves to a range of strategic objectives and actions aimed at achieving gender equality. The Member States repeated their commitment to ensuring that women make up 30 percent of all decision-making bodies and further committed themselves, among other things, to:

- increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels, and protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation (E.1);
- reduce excessive military expenditures and control the availability of armaments (E.2);
- encourage and support women's contribution to fostering a culture of peace (E.4).

## 5.3. The Secretary-General's Study on *Women, Peace and Security*

In his 2002 *Study on Women, Peace and Security*, the Secretary-General recommended the following actions on DDR:

- *Action 1:* Incorporate the needs and priorities of women and girls as ex-combatants, 'camp-followers' and families of ex-combatants in the design and implementation of DDR programmes, including the design of camps; the distribution of benefits; and access to basic resources and services, including food, water, health care and counselling, in order to ensure the success of such programmes, women and girls' full participation, and their access to benefits;
- *Action 2:* Increase the number of programmes for child soldiers, fully include attention to the specific situation and needs of girl soldiers, and identify means to support child soldiers, including girls, who do not enter DDR programmes;
- *Action 3:* Recognize the impact of armed conflict and displacement on family relations, and develop awareness of the risk of increased domestic violence, especially in the families of ex-combatants; and develop programmes on the prevention of domestic violence that are designed for families and communities, and especially male ex-combatants;


### Box 1 Why support women and girls in DDR?



- *Action 4:* Recognize and use the contributions of women and girls in encouraging ex-combatants to lay down arms and participate in weapons-collection programmes, and ensure that they benefit from any incentives provided for such activities;
- *Action 5:* Ensure full access of women and girls to all resources and benefits provided in reintegration programmes, including skills development programmes.

## 6. Gender-responsive DDR

Figure 1 **Gender-responsive DDR**



### 6.1. Negotiating DDR: Ensuring women's political participation

A gender-responsive approach to DDR should be built into every stage of DDR. This begins with discussions during the peace negotiations on the methods that will be used to carry out DDR. DDR advisers participating in such negotiations should ensure that women's interests and needs are adequately included. This can be done by insisting on the participation of female representatives at the negotiations, ensuring they understand DDR-related clauses and insisting on their active involvement in the DDR planning phase. Trained female leaders will contribute towards ensuring that women and girls involved in DDR (women and girls who are ex-combatants, women and girls working in support functions for armed groups and forces, wives and dependants of male ex-combatants, and members of the receiving community) understand, support and strengthen the DDR process.

#### 6.1.1. Negotiating DDR: Gender-aware interventions

Negotiation, mediation and facilitation teams should get expert advice on current gender dynamics, gender relations in and around armed groups and forces, and the impact the peace agreement will have on the status quo. All the participants at the negotiation table should have a good understanding of gender issues in the country and be willing to include ideas from female representatives. To ensure this, facilitators of meetings and gender advisers



should organize gender workshops for women participants before the start of the formal negotiation. The UN should develop a group of deployment-ready experts in gender and DDR by using a combined strategy of recruitment and training, and insist on their full participation in the DDR process through affirmative action.

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#### 6.1.2. Negotiating DDR: Female-specific interventions

Facilitators, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) and senior UN personnel supporting the peace process should receive an explicit mandate to cater for the needs and interests of women and girls, whether combatants, supporters or dependants. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms should be set in place to assess the effectiveness of their interventions. (See Annex D for a gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation framework.)

Peace process facilitators, SRSGs and envoys should be made aware of the internationally agreed minimum standard of 30 percent female participation in any democratic decision-making forum. Women who are familiar with the needs of female fighters, veterans and other community-based women peace-builders should attend and be allowed to raise concerns in the negotiation process. In circumstances where the participation of women is not possible, DDR planners should hold consultations with women's groups during the planning and pre-deployment phase and ensure that the latter's views are represented at negotiation forums.

Women in leadership positions at national and local levels, including female local councillors, representatives of women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and female community leaders, all of whom will assist the return of male and female ex-combatants, supporters and dependants to civilian life, are stakeholders in the peace process, and should be enlisted as partners in the DDR process. Furthermore, governmental ministries or departments with gender-related mandates should be included in negotiations and decision-making whenever possible.

To facilitate women's participation, the UN advance team or country team should carry out a risk assessment to evaluate the threat posed to women who take up a public role in the peace process. Adequate protection should be provided by governmental bodies or the UN itself if these women's security is at risk. Facilitators and other participants in the peace process should attempt to create an inclusive environment so that female representatives feel comfortable to raise their concerns and needs.

The release of abducted women and girls from within the ranks of an armed force or group should be made a condition of the peace agreement.

The requirement for the representation of women in structures established to manage DDR processes, such as a national DDR commission, should be included in the peace accord. Information about the DDR programme and process should be made available to any subsidiary bodies or sub-committees established to facilitate the participation of civil society in the peace process.

### 6.2. Assessment phase


Planners should develop a good understanding of the legal, political, economic, social and security context of the DDR programme and how it affects women, men, girls and boys



Wife of ex-combatant, Sierra Leone, January 2002  
Photo: P. Marwah, UNFPA Humanitarian Response Unit

differently, both in the armed forces and groups and in the receiving communities. In addition, planners should understand the different needs of women, men, girls and boys who participate in DDR processes according to their different roles during the conflict (i.e., armed ex-combatants, supporters, or/and dependants). The following should be considered.

- *Different choices:* There may be a difference in the life choices made by women and girls, as opposed to men and boys. This is because women, men, girls and boys have different roles before, during and after conflicts, and they face different problems and expectations from society and their family. They may, as a result, have different preferences for reintegration training and support. Some women and girls may wish to return to their original homes, while others may choose to follow male partners to a new location, including across international boundaries;



- *Different functions:* Many women and girls participate in armed conflict in roles other than as armed combatants. These individuals, who may have participated as cooks, messengers, informal health care providers, porters, sex slaves, etc., are often overlooked in the DDR process. Women and girls carry out these roles both through choice and, in the case of abductees and slaves, because they are forced to do so.

Within receiving communities, in which women already have heavy responsibilities for caregiving, reintegration may place further burdens of work and care on them that will undermine sustainable reintegration if they are not adequately supported.

## Box 2 Definition of female beneficiaries

### 1. Female combatants

Women and girls who participated in armed conflicts as active combatants using arms.

### 2. Female supporters/Females associated with armed forces and groups (FAAFGs)

Women and girls who participated in armed conflicts in supportive roles, whether by force or voluntarily. Rather than being members of a civilian community, they are economically and socially dependent on the armed force or group for their income and social support (examples: porter, cook, nurse, spy, administrator, translator, radio operator, medical assistant, public information officer, camp leader, sex worker/slave).



### 3. Female dependants

Women and girls who are a part of ex-combatants' households. They are mainly socially and financially dependent on ex-combatants, although they may also have kept other community ties (examples: wives/war wives, children, mothers/parents, female siblings and female members of the extended family).

(See Annex B for an integrated assessment checklist on gender and DDR.)

#### 6.2.1. Assessment phase: Gender-aware interventions

Gender expertise should be considered an essential element of any assessment mission carried out by the UN, specifically those teams with DDR-related mandates, and gender analysis and information should be adequately reflected in reporting to the Security Council and the UN Development Group that coordinates joint assessment missions before the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.

The assessment team should identify community responses to giving female ex-combatants the option of joining reconstructed peacetime armies and other security institutions such as intelligence services, border police, customs, immigration services and other law-enforcement services. To boost the number of female peacekeepers, women's eligibility for peacekeeping roles in other conflict zones should also be determined.

In order to plan how to deal with obstacles to reintegration and better prepare the community and returnees to play supportive roles, an ongoing assessment should be conducted of community attitudes towards returning female combatants, supporters and dependants. Baseline data and analysis should be gathered and then reassessed at various stages of the process. Analysis should focus closely on potential causes of insecurity for returning women and on the extent of gender-based insecurity (e.g., gender-based violence) in communities more generally.

If the assessment team has the task of identifying sites for cantonment, such sites should be able to provide separate facilities for women and men, and girls and boys, as required. Sanitary facilities should be designed in a way that allows for privacy, in accordance with culturally accepted norms, and water and sanitation should be available to meet women's and girls' hygiene needs.

#### 6.2.2. Assessment phase: Female-specific interventions

The number and percentage of women and girls in armed groups and forces, and their rank and category, should be ascertained as far as possible before planning begins. Necessary measures should be put in place — in cooperation with existing military structures, where possible — to deal with commanders who refuse to disclose the number of female combatants or associates in the armed forces or groups that they command. It is the human right of all women and girls who have been abducted to receive assistance to safely leave an armed force or group.

Baseline information on patterns of weapons possession and ownership among women and girls should be collected — if possible, before demobilization — to gain an accurate picture of what should be expected during disarmament, and to guard against exploitation of women and girls by military personnel, in attempts either to cache weapons or control access to DDR.

The assessment team should identify local capacities of women's organizations already working on security-related issues and work with them to learn about the presence of

women and girls in armed groups and forces. All interventions should be designed to support and strengthen existing capacity. (See Annex D for gender-responsive needs assessment and the capacities and vulnerabilities analysis matrix of women's organizations.)

Along with community peace-building forums, women's organizations should routinely be consulted during assessment missions, as they are often a valuable source of information for planners and public information specialists about, for instance, the community's perceptions of the dangers posed by illicit weapons, attitudes towards various types of weapons, the location of weapons caches and other issues such as trans-border weapons trade. Women's organizations can also provide information about local perceptions of returning female ex-combatants, and of women and girls associated with armed groups and forces.

Working closely with senior commanders within armed forces and groups before demobilization to begin raising awareness about women's inclusion and involvement in DDR will have a positive impact and can help improve the cooperation of mid-level commanders where a functioning chain of command is in place.

Female interpreters familiar with relevant terminology and concepts should be hired and trained by assessment teams to help with interviewing women and girls involved in or associated with armed groups or forces.

Women's specific health needs, including gynaecological care, should be planned for. Reproductive health services (including items such as reusable sanitary napkins) and prophylactics against sexually transmitted infection (both male and female condoms) should be included as essential items in any health care packages.

When planning the transportation of people associated with armed groups and forces to cantonment sites or to their communities, sufficient resources should be budgeted for to offer women and girls the option of being transported separately from men and boys, if their personal safety is a concern.


The assessment team report and recommendations for personnel and budgetary requirements for the DDR process should include provision for female DDR experts, female translators and female field staff for reception centres and cantonment sites to which women combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups can safely report.

### **6.3. Demobilization**

A strict 'one man, one gun' eligibility requirement for DDR, or an eligibility test based on proficiency in handling weapons, may exclude many women and girls from entry into DDR programmes. The narrow definition of who qualifies as a 'combatant' has been motivated to a certain extent by budgetary considerations, and this has meant that DDR planners have often overlooked or inadequately attended to the needs of a large group of people participating in and associated with armed groups and forces. However, these same people also present potential security concerns that might complicate DDR.

If those who do not fit the category of a 'male, able-bodied combatant' are overlooked, DDR activities are not only less efficient, but run the risk of reinforcing existing gender inequalities in local communities and making economic hardship worse for women and girls in armed groups and forces, some of whom may have unresolved trauma and reduced physical capacity as a result of violence experienced during the conflict. Marginalized women with experience of combat are at risk for re-recruitment into armed groups and forces and may ultimately undermine the peace-building potential of DDR processes. The involvement of women is the best way of ensuring their longer-term participation in security sector reform and in the uniformed services more generally, which again will improve long-term security.

Figure 2 Female eligibility criteria



### Box 3 Why are female supporters/FAAFGs eligible for demobilization?

Female supporters and females associated with armed forces and groups shall enter DDR at the demobilization stage because, even if they are not as much of a security risk as combatants, the DDR process, by definition, will break down their social support systems through the demobilization of those on whom they have relied to make a living. If the aim of DDR is to provide broad-based community security, it cannot create insecurity for this group of women by ignoring their special needs. Even if the argument is made that women associated with armed forces and groups should be included in more broadly coordinated reintegration and recovery frameworks, it is important to remember that they will then miss out on specifically designed support to help them make the transition from a military to a civilian lifestyle. In addition, many of the programmes aimed at enabling communities to reinforce reintegration will not be in place early enough to deal with the immediate needs of this group of women.

#### 6.3.1. Demobilization mandates, scope, institutional arrangements: Gender-aware interventions

In drafting a peace mission's plan of operations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) shall reflect the recommendations of the assessment team and produce language that defines a mandate for a gender-sensitive DDR process in compliance with Security Council resolution 1325. Specifically, DDR programme participants shall include those who play support functions essential for the maintenance and cohesion of armed groups and forces, and reflect consideration of the needs of individuals dependent on combatants.

When the Security Council establishes a peacekeeping operation with mandated DDR functions, components that will ensure gender equity should be adequately financed through the assessed budget of UN peacekeeping operations and not voluntary contributions alone. From the start, funds should be allocated for gender experts and expertise to help with the planning and implementation of dedicated programmes serving the needs of female ex-combatants, supporters and dependants. Gender advisers and expertise should be considered essential in the staffing structure of DDR units.

The UN should facilitate financial support of the gender components of DDR processes. DDR programme budgets should be made gender-responsive by allocating sufficient amounts of resources to all gender-related activities and female-specific interventions.

When collaborating with regional, bilateral and multilateral organizations, DDR practitioners should encourage gender mainstreaming and compliance with Security Council resolution 1325 throughout all DDR efforts that they lead or support, encouraging all partners, such as client countries, donors and other stakeholders, to dedicate human and economic resources towards gender mainstreaming throughout all phases of DDR.

DDR practitioners should ensure that the various personnel of the peacekeeping mission, from the SRSG to the troops on the ground, are aware of the importance of gender considerations in DDR activities. Several strategies can be used: (1) ensuring that DDR training programmes that are routinely provided for military and civilian staff reflect gender-related aspects; (2) developing accountability mechanisms to ensure that all staff are committed to gender equity; and (3) integrating gender training into the training programme for the troops involved.

#### Box 4 Gender training in DDR

##### Main topics of training

- Gender mainstreaming and human rights
- Sexual and gender-based violence
- Gender roles and relations (before, during and after the conflict)
- Gender identities
- Gender issues in HIV/AIDS and human trafficking

##### Main participants

- Ex-combatants, supporters, dependants (both male and female)
- DDR programme staffs
- Representatives of government
- Women's groups and NGOs
- Community leaders and traditional authorities

#### 6.3.2. Demobilization mandates, scope, institutional arrangements: Female-specific interventions

Definitions of who is a dependant should reflect the varied nature and complexity of the conflict situation, where dependent women and girls may not be legal wives of ex-combatants. Where a male ex-combatant and a woman or girl live as man and wife according to local perceptions and practices, this will guarantee the eligibility of the woman or girl for inclusion in the DDR programme. Eligibility criteria should be determined so that they include — where relevant — multiple wives (both formal and informal) of a male ex-combatant. The dependants of an ex-combatant should include any person living as part of the ex-combatant's household under their care.

In situations where governments are responsible for all or part of the DDR process, UN representatives should encourage national DDR commissions to work closely with government ministries in charge of women's affairs, as well as women's peace-building networks. National DDR commissions should be encouraged to employ women in leadership positions and assign gender focal points within the commission.

Troop-contributing countries should be encouraged by DPKO to make it an urgent priority to deploy women in peacekeeping operations. Female military personnel with gender training should be used as much as possible during the DDR process, in particular during the initial stages of screening and identification. Female military personnel should also play an important role in receiving and transmitting information on gender-based violence and/or sexual exploitation and abuse occurring in DDR sites.

#### 6.4. Transitional support

Transitional support can include one or more of the following: financial resources; material resources; and basic training. The overall aim should be to ensure that the distribution of benefits enables women and girls to have the same economic choices as men and boys, regardless of the roles they performed during the war, and that women and men, and girls and boys are able to engage constructively in reintegration activities that contribute to overall security in their communities.

A good understanding of women's rights and social attitudes relating to women's access to economic resources is needed when designing the benefits package. This will assist planners in designing the package in a way that will allow women to keep control over benefits, especially financial reinsertion packages, after leaving the cantonment site. For example, providing land as part of the benefits package may not be appropriate in a country where women cannot legally own land.

Although DDR planners have assumed that financial packages given to male ex-combatants will be used for the benefit of family members, anecdotal evidence from the field suggests that demobilized men use their start-up cash irresponsibly, rather than to the benefit of family and community. This compromises the success of DDR programmes and undermines security and community recovery. On the other hand, much empirical evidence from the field indicates that women use the resources they are given for family sustenance and community development.<sup>1</sup>

For reintegration to be sustainable, gendered strategies must be developed that will equally benefit women and men, and ensure the equitable distribution of aid and resources within the family unit.

For reintegration to be sustainable, gendered strategies must be developed that will equally benefit women and men, and ensure the equitable distribution of aid and resources within the family unit.

##### 6.4.1. Transitional support: Gender-aware interventions

When planning the demobilization package, women/girls and men/boys who were armed ex-combatants and supporters should receive equitable and appropriate basic demobilization benefits packages, including access to land, tools, credit and training.

Planning should include a labour market assessment that provides details of the various job options and market opportunities that will be available to men and women after they



leave demobilization sites. This assessment should take place as early as possible so that training programmes are ready when ex-combatants and supporters need them.

Opportunities for women's economic independence should be considered and potential problems faced by women entering previously 'male' workplaces and professions should be dealt with as far as possible. Offering demobilized women credit and capital should be viewed as a positive investment in reconstruction, since women have an established record of high rates of return and reinvestment.

Demobilization packages for men and boys should be also sensitive to their different gender roles and identities. Demobilization packages might be prepared under the assumption that men are the 'breadwinner' in a household, which might pressurize men to be more aggressively hierarchical in their behaviour at home. Men can also feel emasculated when women appear more successful than them, and may express their frustration in increased violence. More careful preparation is needed so that transitional support packages will not reinforce negative gender stereotypes.

#### 6.4.2. Transitional support: Female-specific interventions

If cash hand-outs are given to DDR participants as part of their transitional support, the needs and spending patterns of women should be taken into account, and accommodated as much as possible (e.g., do women prefer large payments of cash or monthly payments? Does either form of payment subject women and girls to additional security risks?).

Women's traditional forms of money management should be recognized and supported (e.g., through rotational loan and credit schemes or other innovative forms of microcredit), and, where available, women should be given access to banks and encouraged to open private bank accounts to safeguard their money.

Education and training efforts should deal with the needs and desires of the women and girls and start as soon as possible during the demobilization phase. Experience has shown that women and girls tend to be overwhelmed by household responsibilities and may be unable to move around freely once they return home, and are therefore less likely to be able to attend training programmes. Women's access will be greatly improved if efforts are made to provide child-care and other services.

In many countries, women and girls have lower educational levels and are skilled in jobs that earn less money than their male peers. This should be taken into account in training programmes through providing additional resources for literacy and training in high-earning skills for women and girls. Skills should be culturally appropriate as far as possible, although efforts should be made not to restrict women to low-paid 'traditional' female work, since

the post-conflict period offers the possibility of social transformation, including making use of skills acquired by women in wartime.

Educational opportunities should be equally available to female and male children of ex-combatants and widows.

The spouse or other female family members of a male ex-combatant should be brought in to witness the signing of an agreement on



Female Officer, Democratic Republic of Congo  
Photo: P. Delargy, UNFPA Humanitarian Response Unit

how his money will get paid. In this way, the resources may actually get passed on to the family, and from there move into the broader community.

Receiving communities and women community leaders should be informed about the intention and use of reintegration packages and their potential impact. It cannot be assumed that the benefits of DDR will automatically enrich the community that they enter; they may in fact cause resentment and violence. Efforts should be made to include communities when deciding how development packages will be provided so that ex-combatants' access to these resources can be influenced and monitored by the community to which they return.

## 6.5. Assembly

Female ex-combatants are less likely to ask to participate in DDR than their male peers, for a variety of reasons:

- a failure to adequately assess the number of women and girl combatants, supporters and dependants in the assessment phase, so that women and girls are neither expected nor catered for;
- women and girls in many post-war contexts having poorer access to news sources such as radios and being less likely to be able to read than men;
- the stigma during peacetime of being associated with an armed force or group;
- the perception or fact that a weapon is required for participation in a DDR programme;
- security concerns or a fear of exposure or re-exposure to sexual and gender-based violence;
- in some cases, commanders deliberately holding girls back because they are considered essential workers and the most desirable sexual partners within the group.<sup>2</sup> They may also hide women and girls who have been abducted, for fear of legal and social consequences. Measures should be put in place to ensure women know they have the right to leave, and the capacity to do so in safety.

### 6.5.1. Assembly: Gender-aware interventions

Male and female ex-combatants should be equally able to get access to clear information on their eligibility for participation in DDR programmes, as well as the benefits available to them and how to obtain them. At the same time, information and awareness-raising sessions should be offered to the communities that will receive ex-combatants, especially to women's groups, to help them understand what DDR is, and what they can and cannot expect to gain from it.

Information campaigns through the media (e.g., radio and newspapers) should provide information that encourages ex-combatants, supporters and dependants to join programmes. However, it is important to bear in mind that women do not always have access to these technologies, and word of mouth may be the best way of spreading information aimed at them.

Eligibility criteria for the three groups of participants should be clearly provided through the information campaign. This includes informing male ex-combatants that women and girls are participants in DDR and that they (i.e., the men) face punishment if they do not release sex slaves. Women and girls should be informed that separate accommodation facilities and services (including registration) will be provided for them. Female staff should be present at all assembly areas to process women who report for DDR.

Gender balance shall be a priority among staff in the assembly and cantonment sites. It is especially important that men see women in positions of authority in DDR processes.



If there are no female leaders (including field officers), men are unlikely to take seriously education efforts aimed at changing their attitudes and ideas about militarized, masculine power. Therefore, information campaigns should emphasize the importance of female leadership and of coordination between local women's NGOs and other civil society groups.

Registration forms and questionnaires should be designed to supply sex-disaggregated data on groups to be demobilized.

#### 6.5.2. Assembly: Female-specific interventions

It is imperative that information on the DDR process, including eligibility and benefits, reach women and girls associated with armed groups or forces, as commanders may try to exclude them. In the past, commanders have been known to remove weapons from the possession of girls and women combatants when DDR begins. Public information and advocacy campaigners should ensure that information on women-specific assistance, as well as on women's rights, is transmitted through various media.

Many female combatants, supporters, females associated with armed groups and forces, and female dependants were sexually abused during the war. Links should be developed between the DDR programme and the justice system — and with a truth and reconciliation commission, if it exists — to ensure that criminals are prosecuted. Women and girls participating in the DDR process should be made aware of their rights at the cantonment and demobilization stages. DDR practitioners may consider taking steps to gather information on human rights abuses against women during both stages, including setting up a separate and discreet reporting office specifically for this purpose, because the process of assembling testimonies once the DDR participants return to their communities is complicated.

Female personnel, including translators, military staff, social workers and gender experts, should be available to deal with the needs and concerns of those assembling, who are often experiencing high levels of anxiety and facing particular problems such as separation from family members, loss of property, lack of identity documents, etc.

In order for women and girl fighters to feel safe and welcomed in a DDR process, and to avoid their self-demobilization, female workers at the assembly point are essential. Training should be put in place for female field workers whose role will be to interview female combatants and other participants in order to identify who should be included in DDR processes, and to support those who are eligible. (See Annex C for gender-sensitive interview questions.)

#### Box 5 Gender-sensitive measures for interviews

- Men and women should be interviewed separately.
- They should be assured that all conversations are confidential.
- Both sexes should be interviewed.
- Female ex-combatants and supporters must be interviewed by female staff and female interpreters with gender training, if possible.
- Questions must assess women's and men's different experiences, gender roles, relations and identities.
- Victims of gender-based violence must be interviewed in a very sensitive way, and the interviewer should inform them of protection measures and the availability of counselling. If violence is disclosed, there must be some capacity for follow-up to protect the victim. If no such assistance is available, other methods should be developed to deal with gender-based violence.

## 6.6. Cantonment

### 6.6.1. Cantonment: Gender-aware interventions

The physical layout of the reception centre should be structured so that women and girls may register separately from their male partner, and receive separate identity cards. This will help ensure the safety and autonomy of women and girls who are sex slaves or forced 'wives', for whom the assembly point may offer a rare opportunity for escape from their captors.

Separate facilities will be made available to male and female DDR participants at the cantonment site. However, it is also important to make space available for families that do not wish to be separated. Men, women, boys and girls will initially be escorted to separate facilities, but reassured and shown that there will be frequent opportunities offered for contact in the early stages of the demobilization processes, as families may have joint decisions to make about their futures. However, women and girls should be given the option of being out of contact with their male counterparts, if they choose to be.

Men, women, boys and girls should be offered equal (but, if necessary, separate) access to education about HIV/AIDS, including voluntary testing, and other health services and supplies (also see IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR).

Efforts should be made to balance domestic duties between men and women so that rather than collecting fuel or water, women and girls can take equal advantage of briefings, retrainings and other facilities at the site. An unequal division of domestic duties can also make women and girls more likely to suffer gender-based violence as they leave the site to fetch water, food or fuel.

### 6.6.2. Cantonment: Female-specific interventions

If women and girls are to take advantage of training and education opportunities offered in the cantonment phase, child-care provisions cannot be optional or considered as non-essential.

In order to safeguard against sexual violence, latrines, ablution areas, and washing and kitchen facilities should be placed in open areas and should be well lit at night. Cooking facilities, fuel and water should be provided so that women and girls do not need to leave the cantonment area.

Health care services, which include reproductive and psychosocial health services, are essential. Women and girls may have specific health and psychosocial needs, e.g., relating to maternity or gender-based violence. Cantonment sites should provide birthing kits, sufficient clean water, supplemental feeding and medical facilities. Women and girls who have been abducted and/or suffered sexual assault during and after the conflict should be assisted by women who are trained in trauma management and offered counselling services, provided that these are culturally acceptable and appropriate. Such assistance is essential to allow female ex-combatants in particular to participate in training and receive any health care or counselling services required.

Opportunities should be provided during cantonment to educate women and girls about their rights, e.g., the right to own land or the right to take legal action against those who have committed crimes against them.

In some countries, demobilized soldiers are offered opportunities to be employed in new security structures. Female ex-combatants should be provided with the same opportunities as their male counterparts to join the restructured police and security forces.

## 6.7. Disarmament

Weapons possession has traditionally been a criterion for eligibility in DDR programmes. Because women and girls are often less likely to possess weapons even when they are actively

engaged in armed forces and groups, and because commanders have been known to remove weapons from the possession of women and girls before assembly, this criterion often leads to the exclusion of women and girls from DDR processes (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament).

#### 6.7.1. Disarmament: Gender-aware interventions

Women's equal access to secure disarmament sites is important to ensure that gendered stereotypes of male and female weapons ownership are not reinforced.

Ongoing programmes to disarm, through weapons collections, weapons amnesties, the creation of new gun control laws that assist in the registration of legally owned weapons, programmes of action such as weapons in exchange for development (WED; also referred to as WfD), and other initiatives, should be put in place to support reintegration and development processes. Such initiatives should be carried out with a full understanding of the gender dynamics in the society and of how gun ownership is gendered in a given context. Media images that encourage or support violent masculinity should be discouraged.

Other incentives can be given that replace the prestige and power of owning a weapon, and social pressure can be applied when communities have a sense of involvement in weapons-collection processes. Men are traditionally associated with the use, ownership and promotion of small arms, and are injured and killed by guns in far larger numbers than are women. However, the difference between female and male gun ownership does not mean that women have no guns. They may pose threats to security and are not only nurturers, innocents and victims in situations of armed conflict.

#### 6.7.2. Disarmament: Female-specific interventions

At the weapons-collection sites, identification of female ex-combatants who return their weapons and female community members who hand in weapons on behalf of ex-combatants is vital in order to collect and distribute different types of information. Female ex-combatants can be a source of information about the number, location and situation of hidden weapons, and can be asked about these, provided there are adequate security measures to protect the identity of the informant. Programme staff should also ask female community members if they know any female ex-combatant, supporter or dependant who has 'self-reintegrated' and ask them to participate in any WED programmes and other disarmament processes.

#### 6.7.3. Arms reduction and control: Female-specific interventions

WED projects are ideal opportunities for delivering specific training for women and girls, as such projects are often tied to the provision of services or goods that can reduce the burden of care disproportionately placed on women and girls in many parts of the world, such as water and fuel collection.

Existing efforts of women's NGOs and female community leaders to raise awareness of weapons spread and misuse should be identified and recognized when planning long-term disarmament processes.

Women's knowledge of trading routes, weapons caches, and other sources of hidden small arms and light weapons should be accessed, where this can be done safely, during the field assessment phase, and this information should be used in disarmament planning. Those conducting interviews will need to establish a close relationship with interviewees; and there is a moral responsibility on the part of such interviewers to protect their sources.

When surveys are being carried out to determine attitudes to small arms and light weapons, women and girls (both those who participated in conflicts and community members) should be interviewed at the same time as, but separately from, men.

Educating and including women prominently in disarmament activities can strengthen women's profile and leadership roles in the public sphere, and should be encouraged. Opportunities should be taken to link women's knowledge and awareness of disarmament to the promotion of their broader political participation and involvement in community development.

Collected weapons should be properly guarded and, ideally, destroyed. The involvement of women's groups in monitoring weapons collection and destruction, and as participants in destruction ceremonies, can be a powerful way of solidifying community support for and investment in the peace process.

## **6.8. Resettlement**

### **6.8.1. Resettlement: Female-specific interventions**

After demobilization, mechanisms should be put in place to allow female ex-combatants and supporters to return to their destination of choice using a safe means of transport that minimizes exposure to gender-based violence, re-recruitment and abduction or human trafficking.

Female ex-combatants and supporters should be properly catered for and included in any travel assistance that is offered after encampment. If a journey will take several days, the needs of women and girls and their children should be catered for, with separate vehicles made available if required.

Female ex-combatants and supporters should be free to choose where they will live, and can decide to return to a rural area from which they or their partner came, or to move to a semi-urban or urban area where they may have more freedom from traditional gender roles. Those who have been attached to an armed force or group for a long period of time might not know where they want to go, and therefore need more time and special support to help them decide.

A transitional safety net should be put in place to help resettled female ex-combatants and supporters with housing, health care and counselling, and offer educational support to get their children (especially girls) into school.

Female ex-combatants and supporters should be fully informed about, and able to access, any reintegration support services, e.g., a local demobilization support office, if one is established.

Measures should be put in place to help reunify mothers and children.

## **6.9. Social reintegration**

### **6.9.1. Social reintegration: Gender-aware interventions**

Ex-combatants who have been wounded or disabled in action, or have become chronically ill owing to exposure to combat, should be provided with medical care, counselling, rehabilitation facilities and relevant vocational training. Counselling should also deal with problems such as drugs, alcohol and gender-based violence. These measures will reduce the burden of care that is carried by women and girls, usually unpaid, and can lead to negative coping mechanisms, such as the withdrawal of girls from school to care for disabled relatives.

Ex-combatants, their partners and dependants, and receiving families and communities need to be sensitized to the difficulties of readjustment to civilian life of persons participating in or associated with armed groups and forces. Messages of reconciliation should also deal with the problems and specific needs of women and girls who may have suffered abuse in armed groups or forces.

Leadership training for community leaders, including church leaders, traditional authorities and women's NGOs, should be carried out before community sensitization projects begin, in order to inform them about community development projects associated with reintegration programmes and to strengthen their leadership skills. Training for community members should also include gender training.

The media and arts should be used to exchange ideas and experiences and encourage a culture of peace, and respect for human rights and women's rights

#### 6.9.2. Social reintegration: Female-specific interventions

As part of the broad consultation carried out with a wide variety of social actors, community awareness-raising meetings should be held to prepare the community to receive ex-combatants. Inclusion of women and women's organizations in these processes shall be essential, as women often play a central role in post-conflict reconstruction and the provision of care.

Receiving communities should be informed about the intention and use of reintegration programmes and their potential impact on community development and sustainable peace-building. WED projects should recognize the important role of women in development activities, and should organize information campaigns specifically for female community members.

Resources should be allocated to train female community members, ex-combatants and supporters to understand and cope with traumatized children, including how to help abducted girls gain demobilization and reintegration support. It is unfair to burden women with the challenges of reintegrating and rehabilitating child soldiers simply because they are usually the primary caregivers of children.

Women's organizations should be supported; and should be trained to participate in healing and reconciliation work in general, and, in particular, to assist in the reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants from different factions. Have women in the post-conflict zone already begun the process of reconstruction after war? Is this work recognized and supported?

The expertise of female ex-combatants and supporters — which may be non-traditional expertise — should be recognized, respected and utilized by other women. Female ex-combatants' reintegration should be connected to broader strategies aimed at women's post-conflict development in order to prevent resentment against fighters as a 'privileged' group.

Radio networks should include women's voices and experiences when educating local people about those who are being reintegrated, to prevent potential tensions from developing.

Community mental health practices (such as cleansing ceremonies) should be encouraged to contribute to the long-term psychological rehabilitation of ex-combatants and to address women's and girls' specific suffering or trauma (often a result of sexualized violence), as long as they encourage and support rather than undermine women's and girls' human rights and well-being.

Female ex-combatants should have equal access to legal aid or support to assist them in combating discrimination (in both the private and public spheres).

The establishment of formal/informal network groups among female ex-combatants and supporters should be encouraged, with support from women's NGOs. This will give them an opportunity to support each other and foster leadership. Particularly for those who decide to go to a new place rather than home, such support will be essential.

## Box 6 Example of factors that may contribute to women's social reintegration

- The level of women's participation in decision-making:
  - in the household
  - at the community level
  - at the national and government levels
- The public image and self-image of women and men
- The public and private/domestic roles of women and men\*
  - the level of diversity and flexibility in these gender roles
  - inflexible gender roles
- The public perception of gender-based violence, including rape
- Organizational and other capacity of women's NGOs and women's ministries
- Social networks of local women's groups, female community leaders and church leaders
- Media coverage of women and gender issues

\* Note: An assessment of gender roles could help women and men to think about:

- what women and men can and cannot do in their society
- what kinds of expectations the community has of women and men
- what barriers women and men face if they want to perform non-traditional roles
- in what area(s) women and men could transform their gender roles
- how women's and men's roles have changed during conflict

### 6.10. Economic reintegration

Women and girls may have acquired skills during the conflict that do not fit in with traditional ideas of appropriate work for women and girls, so female ex-combatants often find it more difficult than male ex-combatants to achieve economic success in the reintegration period, especially if they have not received their full entitlements under the DDR programme.

Women often find it more difficult to get access to credit, especially the bigger amounts needed in order to enter the formal sectors of the economy. With few job opportunities, particularly within the formal sector, women and girls have limited options for economic success, which has serious implications if they are the main providers for their dependants. The burden of care that many women and girls shoulder means they are less able to take advantage of training and capacity-building opportunities that could offer them better opportunities for economic self-sufficiency.

#### 6.10.1. Economic reintegration: Gender-aware interventions

Measures should be put in place to prevent women ex-combatants, supporters, dependants and war widows from being forced to live on the fringes of the economy. Even excessive reliance on women's unpaid or low-paid NGO activity might become a substitute for their meaningful participation in the labour market.

One of the greatest needs of ex-combatants and their families is access to land and housing. In securing these, specific gender dynamics should be taken into account, particularly when traditional practices do not allow female-headed households or women's land ownership. Legal reform should aim to get rid of this exclusion.

In many societies, the production of crops and animal husbandry is divided among household members according to gender and age. This division of labour should be assessed



and should be taken into account when providing reintegration assistance that is aimed at reviving the agricultural sector, improving food security and securing livelihoods for ex-combatants.

#### 6.10.2. Economic reintegration: Female-specific interventions

Special measures have to be put in place to ensure that female participants have equal training and employment opportunities after leaving the cantonment site. Funding should be allocated for childcare to be provided, and for training to be conducted as close as possible to where the women and girls live. This will also reduce the chances of irregular attendance as a result of problems with transport (e.g., infrequent buses) or mobility (e.g., cultural restrictions on women's travel). Barriers such as employers refusing to hire women ex-combatants or narrow expectations of the work women are permitted to do should be taken into account before retraining is offered. Potential employees should be identified for sensitization training to encourage them to employ female ex-combatants.

Women and girls should be given a say in determining the types of skills they learn. They should be provided with options that will allow them to build on useful skills acquired during their time with armed groups and forces, including skills that may not usually be considered 'women's work', such as driving or construction jobs. They should be taught vocational skills in fields for which there is likely to be a long-term demand. Those successfully completing vocational training should be issued with certificates confirming this.

Widows, widowers and dependants of ex-combatants killed in action may need financial and material assistance. They should be assisted in setting up income-generating initiatives. Widows and widowers should be made active participants in reintegration training programmes and should also be able to benefit from credit schemes.

Because women's homes are often the main geographical base for their work, technical and labour support systems should be in place to assist demobilized women in building a house and to support self-employment opportunities.

Single or widowed women ex-combatants should be recognized as heads of household and permitted to own and rent existing housing and land.

Measures should be taken to protect women ex-combatants or war widows from being forced into casual labour on land that is not their own.

Where needed, particularly in rural areas, women should be provided with training in agricultural methods and they should have the right to farm cash crops and own and use livestock, as opposed to engaging in subsistence agriculture.

Security should be provided for women on their way to work, or to the marketplace, particularly to protect them from banditry, especially in places with large numbers of small arms.

Women should have equal access to communally owned farming tools and water-pumping equipment, and have the right to own such equipment.

Greater coordination with development agencies and women's NGOs that carry out projects to assist women, such as adult literacy courses, microcredit facilities and family planning advice, is essential to make this reintegration programme sustainable and to reach all beneficiaries.



## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Empowerment:** Refers to women and men taking control over their lives: setting their own agendas, gaining skills, building self-confidence, solving problems and developing self-reliance. No one can empower another; only the individual can empower herself or himself to make choices or to speak out. However, institutions, including international cooperation agencies, can support processes that can nurture self-empowerment of individuals or groups.<sup>3</sup> Empowerment of participants, regardless of their gender, should be a central goal of any DDR interventions, and measures should be taken to ensure that no particular group is disempowered or excluded through the DDR process.

**Gender:** The social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women, men, girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender is part of the broader sociocultural context. Other important criteria for sociocultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age.<sup>4</sup> The concept of gender also includes the expectations held about the characteristics, aptitudes and likely behaviours of both women and men (femininity and masculinity). The concept of gender is vital, because, when it is applied to social analysis, it reveals how women's subordination (or men's domination) is socially constructed. As such, the subordination can be changed or ended. It is not biologically predetermined, nor is it fixed forever.<sup>5</sup> As with any group, interactions among armed forces and groups, members' roles and responsibilities within the group, and interactions between members of armed forces/groups and policy and decision makers are all heavily influenced by prevailing gender roles and gender relations in society. In fact, gender roles significantly affect the behaviour of individuals even when they are in a sex-segregated environment, such as an all-male cadre.

**Gender analysis:** The collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated information. Men and women perform different roles in societies and in armed groups and forces. This leads to women and men having different experience, knowledge, talents and needs. Gender analysis explores these differences so that policies, programmes and projects can identify and meet the different needs of men and women. Gender analysis also facilitates the strategic use of distinct knowledge and skills possessed by women and men, which can greatly improve the long-term sustainability of interventions.<sup>6</sup> In the context of DDR, gender analysis should be used to design policies and interventions that will reflect the different roles, capacity and needs of women, men, girls and boys.

**Gender balance:** The objective of achieving representational numbers of women and men among staff. The shortage of women in leadership roles, as well as extremely low numbers of women peacekeepers and civilian personnel, has contributed to the invisibility of the needs and capacities of women and girls in the DDR process. Achieving gender balance, or at least improving the representation of women in peace operations, has been defined as a strategy for increasing operational capacity on issues related to women, girls, gender equality and mainstreaming.<sup>7</sup>

**Gender equality:** The equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that women's and men's rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and

priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, while recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a women's issue, but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centred development.<sup>8</sup>

**Gender equity:** The process of being fair to men and women. To ensure fairness, measures must often be put in place to compensate for the historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field. Equity is a means; equality is the result.<sup>9</sup>

**Gender mainstreaming:** Defined by the 52<sup>nd</sup> session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1997 as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal of this strategy is to achieve gender equality.”<sup>10</sup> Gender mainstreaming emerged as a major strategy for achieving gender equality following the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. In the context of DDR, gender mainstreaming is necessary in order to ensure that women and girls receive equitable access to assistance programmes and packages, and it should, therefore, be an essential component of all DDR-related interventions. In order to maximize the impact of gender mainstreaming efforts, these should be complemented with activities that are directly tailored for marginalized segments of the intended beneficiary group.

**Gender relations:** The social relationship between men, women, girls and boys. Gender relations shape how power is distributed among women, men, girls and boys and how that power is translated into different positions in society. Gender relations are generally fluid and vary depending on other social relations, such as class, race, ethnicity, etc.

**Gender-aware policies:** Policies that utilize gender analysis in their formulation and design, and recognize gender differences in terms of needs, interests, priorities, power and roles. They recognize further that both men and women are active development actors for their community. Gender-aware policies can be further divided into the following three policies:

- *Gender-neutral policies* use the knowledge of gender differences in a society to reduce biases in development work in order to enable both women and men to meet their practical gender needs.
- *Gender-specific policies* are based on an understanding of the existing gendered division of resources and responsibilities and gender power relations. These policies use knowledge of gender difference to respond to the practical gender needs of women or men.
- *Gender-transformative policies* consist of interventions that attempt to transform existing distributions of power and resources to create a more balanced relationship among women, men, girls and boys by responding to their strategic gender needs. These policies can target both sexes together, or separately. Interventions may focus on women's and/or men's practical gender needs, but with the objective of creating a conducive environment in which women or men can empower themselves.<sup>11</sup>

**Gendered division of labour** is the result of how each society divides work between men and women according to what is considered suitable or appropriate to each gender.<sup>12</sup> Atten-

tion to the gendered division of labour is essential when determining reintegration opportunities for both male and female ex-combatants, including women and girls associated with armed forces and groups in non-combat roles and dependants.

**Gender-responsive DDR programmes:** Programmes that are planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated in a gender-responsive manner to meet the different needs of female and male ex-combatants, supporters and dependants.

**Gender-responsive objectives:** Programme and project objectives that are non-discriminatory, equally benefit women and men and aim at correcting gender imbalances.<sup>13</sup>

**Practical gender needs:** What women (or men) perceive as immediate necessities, such as water, shelter, food and security.<sup>14</sup> Practical needs vary according to gendered differences in the division of agricultural labour, reproductive work, etc., in any social context.

**Sex:** The biological differences between men and women, which are universal and determined at birth.<sup>15</sup>

**Sex-disaggregated data:** Data that are collected and presented separately on men and women.<sup>16</sup> The availability of sex-disaggregated data, which would describe the proportion of women, men, girls and boys associated with armed forces and groups, is an essential precondition for building gender-responsive policies and interventions.

**Strategic gender needs:** Long-term needs, usually not material, and often related to structural changes in society regarding women's status and equity. They include legislation for equal rights, reproductive choice and increased participation in decision-making. The notion of 'strategic gender needs', first coined in 1985 by Maxine Molyneux, helped develop gender planning and policy development tools, such as the Moser Framework, which are currently being used by development institutions around the world. Interventions dealing with strategic gender interests focus on fundamental issues related to women's (or, less often, men's) subordination and gender inequities.<sup>17</sup>

**Violence against women:** Defined by the UN General Assembly in the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private. Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

- (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;
- (b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;
- (c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs."<sup>18</sup>

## Abbreviations

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FAAFG	female associated with armed forces and groups

<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>M&amp;E</b>	monitoring and evaluation
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>SSR</b>	security sector reform
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNIFEM</b>	UN Development Fund for Women
<b>WED</b>	weapons in exchange for development

## Annex B: DDR gender checklist for peace operations assessment missions<sup>19</sup>

- How many women and girls are in and associated with the armed forces and groups? What roles have they played?
- Are there facilities for treatment, counselling and protection to prevent sexualized violence against women combatants, both during the conflict and after it?
- Who is demobilized and who is retained as part of the restructured force? Do women and men have the same right to choose to be demobilized or retained?
- Is there sustainable funding to ensure the long-term success of the DDR process? Are special funds allocated to women, and if not, what measures are in place to ensure that their needs will receive proper attention?
- Has the support of local, regional and national women's organizations been enlisted to aid reintegration? Has the collaboration of women leaders in assisting ex-combatants and widows returning to civilian life been enlisted? Are existing women's organizations being trained to understand the needs and experiences of ex-combatants?
- If cantonment is being planned, will there be separate and secure facilities for women? Will fuel, food and water be provided so women do not have to leave the security of the site?
- If a social security system exists, can women ex-combatants easily access it? Is it specifically designed to meet their needs and to improve their skills?
- Can the economy support the kind of training women might ask for during the demobilization period? Have obstacles, such as narrow expectations of women's work, been taken into account? Will childcare be provided to ensure that women have equitable access to training opportunities?
- Do training packages offered to women reflect local gender norms and standards about gender-appropriate behaviour or does training attempt to change these norms? Does this benefit or hinder women's economic independence?
- Are single or widowed female ex-combatants recognized as heads of households and permitted access to housing and land? Are legal measures in place to protect their access to land and water?

## Annex C: Gender-sensitive interview questions<sup>20</sup>

### 1. ROLES AND EXPERIENCES DURING CONFLICTS

- What was your main job(s) in the armed force/group (e.g., combatant, health care provider/nurse, cook, porter, spy, messenger, translator/interpreter, administrator, radio operator, mine worker, public information, camp leader, sex worker)?
- What was your rank in the armed force/group?
- What training (if any) did you receive?
- How long did you spend in the armed force/group?
- How did you join? Was it voluntary or by force?
- Why did you decide to leave the armed force/group and come to this programme?
- How did you hear about this programme (e.g., radio)?
- Have you been in touch with your family or been in your area of origin during the conflict?

### 2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

- What kind of occupation did you have before joining the armed force/group? How long did you do that work?
- How much did you earn from the previous job?
- Have you received formal education? Up to what level?
- What languages do you speak?
- Do you know how to read and write? In how many languages?
- Are you a member of any type of social group or civil society organization? For how long?
- Do you own any capital? What kind (e.g., land, livestock, house)?
- Are you the head of your household? If not, who is (e.g., brother-in-law, mother, father, uncle)?
- How much does it cost per month to support your family?
- What kind of job do you want to have after this programme?

### 3. FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD

- What is your main responsibility inside the household?
- How many people live in your household?
- How many dependants do you have (age, gender, location, health status, e.g., disabled or/and chronically ill)?
- Who takes decisions about spending money within your household?
- Who is responsible for buying food, and getting water and fuel?
- Who is responsible for the health of your family?
- Who is responsible for the education of your children?
- What is your spouse's profession/economic activity?
- Who should receive the settling-in assistance for the family?
- Would you find it acceptable if part of the settling-in assistance were given directly to your spouse?
- What do you think your spouse/partner would do with the settling-in assistance?

### 4. MARITAL STATUS

- Are you married, a widow(er), or single?
- If you are married or a widow(er), when did you get married (before, during, after the conflict)? How did you get married (legal, customary, or no ceremony, i.e., 'bush marriage')?
- If you are married, are you the only spouse? If not, please elaborate.
- Did your spouse/partner participate in the conflict?
- Where is your spouse/partner now?
- Are you planning to stay with your spouse/partner after this programme?
- Where are you (and your spouse/partner) planning to return to after the programme?
- If you are separated from your spouse/partner, why?
- Is there any other information about your marital status that you consider important for us to know?  
[This gives an opportunity to talk about abduction and/or abuse.]

## Annex D: Gender-responsive DDR programme management frameworks and indicators

### 1. Gender-responsive field/needs assessment

Field/Needs assessment for female ex-combatants, supporters and dependants should be carried out independently of general need assessment, because of the specific needs and concerns of women. Those assessing the needs of women should be aware of gender needs in conflict situations. The use of gender-analysis frameworks should be strongly encouraged to collect information and data on the following:

- **Social and cultural context**
  - Gender roles and gender division of labour (both in public and private spheres)
  - Traditional practices that oppose the human rights of women
- **Political context**
  - Political participation of women at the national and community levels
  - Access to education for girls
- **Economic context**
  - Socio-economic status of women
  - Women's access to and control over resources
- **Capacity and vulnerability**
  - Capacities and vulnerabilities of women and girls
  - Existing local support networks for women and girls
  - Capacities of local women's associations and NGOs
- **Security**
  - Extent of women's participation in the security sector (police, military, government)
  - Level of sexual and gender-based violence
- **Specific needs** of female ex-combatants, supporters and dependants (economic, social, physical, psychological, cultural, political, etc.)

The methodology of data collection should be participatory, and sensitive to gender-related issues. The assessment group should include representatives from local women's organizations and the local community. This might mean that local female interpreter(s) and translator(s) are needed (also see IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design).

3.20 ◀▶

#### 1.1. Matrix to assess capacities and vulnerabilities

The Capacities and Vulnerabilities Framework<sup>21</sup> can be used to plan and measure the outcome of gender-responsive DDR programmes. This framework is also useful for assessing needs by mapping the strengths and weaknesses of the target population.

The matrix below is an example of how the framework can be used. A similar approach can be created in the field, based on collective interviews and/or focus groups with women's NGOs, community leaders, female ex-combatants and supporters:

- Capacities refer to the existing strengths of individuals and groups to cope with a crisis and to improve the quality of their lives;
- Vulnerabilities refer to factors that weaken the people's ability to create positive changes in their lives and community.



CAPACITIES AND VULNERABILITIES ANALYSIS MATRIX <sup>22</sup>				
VULNERABILITIES			CAPACITIES	
	Female ex-combatants and supporters	Community members and women's NGOs	Female ex-combatants and supporters	Community members and women's NGOs
<b>Physical/Material:</b> What productive resources, skills and hazards exist?				
<b>Social/Organizational:</b> What are the relationships among female ex-combatants, supporters and community members?  What are their organizational structures?				
<b>Motivational/Attitudinal:</b> How do female ex-combatants, supporters and the community view their ability to collaborate with each other to create positive changes?				

## 2. Gender-responsive programme design

The formulation of a project/programme should reflect the results of needs assessments of female ex-combatants and other FAAFGs. Gender dimensions should be included in the following components:

- programme goals;
- project objectives;
- outputs;
- indicative activities;
- inputs;
- indicators (for baseline data and monitoring and evaluation).

(Also see IDDRS 3.20 on DDR Programme Design.)

**Box 9 Example of project design for gender-related activities:**  
**Gender training for male ex-combatants**

OVERALL PROGRAMME	DDR
Gender-specific project within the programme	Gender training for male ex-combatants in demobilization camps
Objectives of the project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ To bring about a better understanding of gender issues, such as rape, trafficking, domestic violence and HIV/AIDS</li> <li>■ To discuss and redefine their gender identities, relations and roles (e.g., violent masculine identities) in the private and public spheres</li> </ul>
Issues/Needs	Gender trainings tend to be neglected in the current DDR programmes due to the lack of funds or/and the lack of understanding of the importance of gender
Activity 1	Lecture/workshops to educate male ex-combatants about gender issues and to reflect on their own experiences
Activity 2	Individual follow-up counselling to discuss masculine identities, violence and related issues
Expected outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Higher level of self-confidence among male ex-combatants and a rejection of violence masculinity</li> <li>■ Increase in their understanding of gender and sexual issues</li> </ul>
Indicators to measure output	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ % change in the number of male ex-combatants who have a high level of self-confidence without any association with the use of force/violence</li> <li>■ % change in the number of male ex-combatants who conduct safe sex (e.g., by using condoms, limiting the number of sexual partners)</li> </ul>
Expected outcome/result	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Decrease in gender-based violence</li> <li>■ Creation of gender-sensitive society</li> <li>■ Lower HIV infection rate</li> </ul>
Indicators to measure outcome	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Fewer incidents of rape and domestic violence reported</li> <li>■ Higher level of care for rape victims in individual households and community; less impunity for perpetrators</li> <li>■ Decrease in HIV/AIDS infection rate</li> </ul>
Expenditure (Year 1–Year 2)	Case-specific
Main inputs	Trainers, counsellors
Unit of cost (per female ex-combatant)	Case-specific
Source of revenue	Case-specific
Name(s) of donors	Case-specific

### 3. Gender-responsive budgeting in DDR programming

The formulation of a gender-responsive budget is a way of ensuring that female-specific interventions will be sufficiently funded. It also ensures that equal attention is paid to females and males by disaggregating costs by gender. Budgetary processes should ensure the participation of a DDR gender adviser, women's organizations and community members in order to encourage accountability and transparency.

In addition to objectives, indicators and outputs defined in the programme design, there is a need to specify the following categories within a results-based budgeting framework:

- female-specific activities (e.g., job training for female ex-combatants, counselling for the victims of gender-based violence) and its inputs (trained staff, adequate facilities);
- gender training (to programme staff, government officials, ex-combatants, supporters and dependants) and its inputs (trained staff, adequate facilities);
- gender adviser(s);
- unit cost (per participant) of all activities disaggregated by gender.

It is also advisable to ask donors to specify the allocation of funds to female-specific interventions and gender training (also see IDDRS 3.41 on Finance and Budgeting).

◀▶ 3.41

#### 4. Gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation

Gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is necessary to find out if DDR programmes are meeting the needs of women and girls, and to examine the gendered impact of DDR. At present, the gender dimensions of DDR are not monitored and evaluated effectively in DDR programmes, partly because of poorly allocated resources, and partly because there is a shortage of evaluators who are aware of gender issues and have the skills needed to include gender in their evaluation practices.

To overcome these gaps, it is necessary to create a primary framework for gender-responsive M&E. Disaggregating existing data by gender alone is not enough. By identifying a set of specific indicators that measure the gender dimensions of DDR programmes and their impacts, it should be possible to come up with more comprehensive and practical recommendations for future programmes. The following matrixes show a set of gender-related indicators for M&E (also see IDDRS 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes).

◀▶ 3.50

These matrixes consist of six M&E frameworks:

1. Monitoring programme performance (disarmament; demobilization; reintegration)
2. Monitoring process
3. Evaluation of outcomes/results
4. Evaluation of impact
5. Evaluation of budget (gender-responsive budget analysis)
6. Evaluation of programme management.

The following are the primary sources of data, and data collection instruments and techniques:

- national and municipal government data;
- health-related data (e.g., data collected at ante-natal clinics);
- programme/project reports;
- surveys (e.g., household surveys);
- interviews (e.g., focus groups, structured and open-ended interviews).

Whenever necessary, data should be disaggregated not only by gender (to compare men and women), but also by age, different role(s) during the conflict, location (rural/urban) and ethnic background.

Gender advisers in the regional office of DDR programme and general evaluators will be the main coordinators for these gender-responsive M&E activities, but the responsibility

will fall to the programme director and chief as well. All information should be shared with donors, programme management staff and programme participants, where relevant. Key findings will be used to improve future programmes and M&E. The following tables offer examples of gender analysis frameworks and gender-responsive budgeting analysis for DDR programmes.

Note: Female ex-combatants = FXC; women associated with armed groups and forces = FS; female dependants = FD

#### 4.1. Gender-responsive monitoring of programme performance

- **Purpose of monitoring:** To monitor programme performance for female ex-combatants, supporters and dependants at each stage of DDR:
  - monitoring of disarmament;
  - monitoring of demobilization;
  - monitoring of reintegration;
- **Data collection frequency:** Every month during the implementation of the programme.

##### 4.1.1. Monitoring of disarmament

Key questions to ask:

- To what extent did the disarmament programme succeed in disarming female ex-combatants?
- To what extent did the disarmament programme provide gender-sensitive and female-specific services?

##### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS

1. Number of FXC who registered for disarmament programme
2. % of weapons collected from FXC
3. Number of female staff who were at weapons-collection and -registration sites (e.g., female translators, military staff, social workers, gender advisers)
4. Number of information campaigns conducted specifically to inform women and girls about DDR programmes

##### 4.1.2. Monitoring of demobilization

Key questions to ask:

- To what extent did the demobilization programme succeed in demobilizing female ex-combatants and supporters?
- To what extent did the demobilization programme provide gender-sensitive and female-specific services?

##### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS

1. Number of FXC and FS who registered for demobilization programme
2. % of FXC and FS who were demobilized (completed the programme) per camp
3. Number of demobilization facilities created specifically for FXC and FS per camp (e.g., toilets, clinic)
4. % of FXC, FS and FD who were allocated to female-only accommodation facilities
5. Number of female staff in each camp (e.g., female translators, military staff, social workers, gender advisers)
6. Number of gender trainings conducted per camp

7. Average length of time spent in gender training
8. Number of FXC, FS and FD who participated in gender training
9. Number and level of gender-based violence reported in each demobilization camp
10. Average length of stay of FXC and FS at each camp
11. % of FXC, FS and FD who received transitional support to prepare for reintegration (e.g. health care, food, living allowance, etc.)
12. % of FXC, FS and FD who received female-specific assistance and package (e.g., sanitary napkins, female clothes)
13. % of FXC, FS and FD attending female-specific counselling sessions
14. Average length of time spent in counselling for victims of gender-based violence
15. Number of child-care services per camp
16. % of FXC, FS and FD who used child-care services per camp
17. Existence of medical facilities and personnel for childbirth
18. % of FXC, FS and FD who used medical facilities for childbirth

#### 4.1.3. Monitoring of reintegration

##### Key questions to ask:

- To what extent did the reintegration programme succeed in reintegrating female ex-combatants, supporters and dependants?
- To what extent did the reintegration programme provide gender-sensitive and female-specific services?

#### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS

1. Number of information/media campaigns conducted in each community to inform community members of issues associated with FXC, FS and FD
2. Number of information/media campaigns conducted in each community to inform female community members (e.g., wives of male ex-combatants) of benefits
3. Number of FXC, FS and FD who registered for reintegration programme
4. % of FXC, FS and FD who returned to their home community
5. % of FXC, FS and FD who went to new places rather than home community
6. Number of female-specific transportation services available
7. % of FXC, FS and FD who used those transportation services to return to community
8. Number of vocational trainings implemented for FXC, FS and/or FD
9. % of FXC, FS and FD who registered for vocational training
10. Average length of time spent in vocational training
11. % of FXC, FS and FD who completed vocational training
12. % of FXC and FS incorporated into the national army or police
13. % of FXC, FS and FD who gained the ownership of land and/or other property
14. Number of microcredit projects implemented for FXC, FS and/or FD
15. % of FXC, FS and FD who received microcredit
16. % of FXC, FS and FD who started income-generating activities based on microcredit
17. Number of literacy programmes implemented for FXC, FS and/or FD
18. % of FXC, FS and FD who completed the literacy programmes
19. Number of child-care services created for FXC, FS and FD (so that they can attend trainings)

20. % of FXC, FS and FD who use the child-care services
21. Number of community-based reintegration rituals/ceremonies conducted for FXC, FS and FD
22. % of FXC, FS and FD who attended community-based reintegration rituals/ceremonies
23. Number of female staff in each community (e.g., female translators, social workers, gender advisers)
24. Number of support networks created by FXC, FS and FD
25. % of FXC, FS and FD who joined support networks

#### 4.2. Gender-responsive monitoring of process

- **Purpose of evaluation:** To examine if and to what extent DDR programmes meet the needs of female ex-combatants, supporters and dependants, and to examine the level of participation of women;
- **Process:** (1) Reaching the right target population; (2) meeting the needs of stakeholders; (3) the dynamics of participation of stakeholders;
- **Gendered dimensions of process:** (1) Reaching female target population; (2) meeting the needs of women and girls; (3) equal participation of women and women's organizations;
- **Data collection frequency:** Every three weeks during the implementation of the programme.

Key questions to ask:

- To what extent did the DDR programme meet the needs of female ex-combatants, FAAGFs, and dependants?
- To what extent did the DDR programme encourage and support the participation of women and women's organizations at each stage of the programme?

#### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS

1. Level of satisfaction (ranking) among FXC, FS and FD who received benefits and services from the programmes
2. Level of satisfaction (ranking) among programme staff, including gender advisers
3. Number of and level of complaints that programme staff received from FXC, FS and FD
4. % of female participants at the peace process/negotiation (should be at least 30 percent — internationally agreed)
5. % of female participants at the risk/need assessment
6. Number of FXC, FS and FD who were interviewed during the risk/need assessment
7. Number of local women and/or women's organizations that were interviewed by programme staff to collection information on trading routes and hidden small arms and light weapons
8. Number of women's organizations that participated in monitoring weapons collection and destruction
9. Number of female leaders and women's organizations that participated in the planning and/or implementation of reintegration programme
10. Number of DDR programme meetings that included female leaders and women's organizations

#### 4.3. Gender-responsive evaluation of outcomes/results

- **Purpose of evaluation:** To examine the contribution of DDR programmes to the creation of security for female ex-combatants, FAAGFs and dependants;
- **Outcomes and intermediate results:** (1) Capacity-building of ex-combatants and community members; (2) human security; (3) social capital;

- **Gender dimensions of outcomes:** (1) Reduction of gender-based violence and discrimination against women and girls; (2) human security for women and girls; (3) capacity-building of female ex-combatants, FAAGFs and dependants;
- **Data collection frequency:** Every three months upon the completion of programme.

Key question to ask:

- To what extent did the DDR programme increase human security (physical, psychological, economic, social, political, cultural) for female ex-combatants, FAAGFs and dependants?

#### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS (COMPARED WITH THE BASELINE DATA)

1. % change in the number of female deaths, injuries, abductions, rapes and domestic violence cases reported among FXC, FS and FD
2. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who initiated and are maintaining income-generating activities
3. % change in the number of FXC and FS who joined the police services
4. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who are participating in peace-building activities
5. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who have access to health services (including counselling, contraceptives, family planning)
6. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who are participating in political activities
7. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who are participating in cultural activities
8. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who are participating in public/community meetings
9. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who have a higher level of self-confidence
10. % change in the HIV and other sexually transmitted disease infection rate among FXC, FS and FD
11. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who feel safe to live in their community
12. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who feel threatened by something or someone
13. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who feel a sense of belonging to their community

#### 4.4. Gender-responsive evaluation of impact

- **Purpose of evaluation:** To examine (1) the impact of DDR on empowerment of female ex-combatants, FAAGFs and dependants; (2) the contribution of DDR programme towards the creation of gender-responsive community development:
  - *Impact/Long-term goals:* (1) Community development; (2) sustainable peace;
  - *Gender dimensions of impact:* (1) Gender equality in community development and peace; (2) empowerment of women;
- **Data collection frequency:** Every six months for at least one to three years after the completion of the programme.

Key questions to ask:

- To what extent did the DDR programme empower female ex-combatants, FAAGFs and dependants?
- To what extent did the reintegration programme encourage and support the creation of gender-responsive community development?

#### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS (COMPARED WITH THE BASELINE DATA)

1. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who vote or/and stand for national and local elections in the concerned country
2. % change in the employment rate among FXC, FS and FD (in both formal and informal sectors)



3. % change in the literacy rate among FXC, FS and FD, and their children
4. % change in disposable income among FXC, FS and FD, and their household
5. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who are the members of any type of association, including women's NGOs and ex-combatant support networks
6. % change in the number of FXC, FS and FD who are involved in the implementation/management of community development programmes
7. % change in the number of women's organizations that receive(d) reintegration assistance and implement development-related programme/project(s)
8. % change in the number of female-specific development programmes supported by reintegration assistance to meet the needs of women and girls
9. % change in the number of female participants in development programmes who receive reintegration assistance.
10. % change in the number of communities with a high return rate of ex-combatants receiving reintegration assistance
11. % change in the number of awareness campaigns on women's human rights and gender-based violence supported by reintegration assistance
12. Community perception of FXC, FS and FD
13. Community perception of women's human rights and gender-based violence

#### 4.5. Gender-responsive evaluation of budget (gender-responsive budgeting analysis)

- **Purpose of evaluation:** To examine the level of gender mainstreaming in the DDR budget;
- **Budget:** Allocation of resources, balancing revenue and expenditure, cost efficiency;
- **Gender dimensions of budget:** (1) Allocation of sufficient resources for female-specific interventions and gender-related interventions, such as gender training; (2) equal treatment of male and female ex-combatants in the overall programmes; (3) participation of women and women's NGOs in budgetary processes;
- **Data collection frequency:** Every stage of the budget cycle (preparation, approval, appreciation, auditing, revision, reporting).

Key questions to ask:

- To what extent did the budget specify female-specific and gender-related activities, their inputs, and the cost?
- To what extent was the allocation of resources adequate to effectively implement female-specific and gender-specific activities?
- To what extent did gender specialists/advisers and women's organizations participate in the processes of the budget cycle (e.g., preparation, auditing)?

#### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS

1. % of resource allocation for general activities
2. % of resource allocation for female-specific activities
3. % of resource allocation for gender-related activities (e.g., gender training)
4. % of resource allocation for gender specialists and advisers (compared with other staff)
5. Number of donors that specify the use of funds for female-specific activities and/or gender training
6. Unit cost of each activity for numbers 1–4
7. Unit cost of each input for each activity
8. Duration of each activity
9. % of activities that were successfully completed

10. % of activities that could not be completed owing to lack of resources
11. % change in the number of women's organizations and gender advisers who participated in budget meetings at each stage of the budget cycle, including auditing
12. Number of budget meetings attended by women's organizations and gender advisers/specialists
13. % of budget revision on the advice of women's organizations and gender advisers/specialists

#### 4.6. Evaluation to assess the level of gender mainstreaming in programme management

- **Purpose of evaluation:** To examine the level of gender mainstreaming in each DDR programme/project cycle and its management;
- **Programme/Project cycle:** (1) Situational analysis and need assessment; (2) project design; (3) project appraisal; (4) secure funding; (5) project implementation; (6) M&E;
- **Gender dimensions of project cycle:** (1) Assessment of women's and girls' participation; (2) gender-responsive project design and M&E; (3) understanding and implementation of gender mainstreaming among programme staff;
- **Data collection frequency:** Every month during the implementation of the programme, and before and after the implementation of the programme.

Key question to ask:

- To what extent was gender mainstreamed in the DDR programme management and its project cycle?

#### KEY MEASURABLE INDICATORS

1. % of staff who have participated in gender training
2. % of staff who have used gender analysis framework in needs assessment, situational analyses or/and evaluation
3. % of staff who have interviewed girls and women for needs assessment, situational analyses or/and evaluation
4. % of staff who have worked with local women's organizations
5. % of staff who are in charge of female-specific interventions and/or gender training
6. % of the programme meetings attended by local women's organizations and female community leaders
7. % of staff who have carried out gender analysis of the DDR programme budget
8. % of indicators and data disaggregated by gender
9. % of indicators and data that reflects female specific status and/or issues
10. Number of gender trainings conducted for DDR programme staff
11. % of staff who are familiar with Security Council resolution 1325
12. % of staff who are familiar with gender issues associated with conflicts (e.g. gender-based violence, human trafficking)
13. % of training specifically aimed at understanding gender issues and use of gender analysis frameworks for those who conduct M&E
14. distribution of guidelines or manual for gender analysis and gender mainstreaming for DDR programme management

## Annex E: Further reading

This module was largely derived from: UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), *Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, UNIFEM, New York, October 2004.

Other key sources include:

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *'Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective into Multi-dimensional Peace Operations'*, DPKO Lessons Learned Unit, New York, July 2000, <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Gender%20Mainstreaming%202000.pdf>.

Farr, Vanessa, 'Gendering Disarmament as a Peace-building Tool', Paper No. 20, Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002, <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper20/paper20.pdf>.

March, Candida, Ines Smyth and Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, *A Guide to Gender-analysis Frameworks*, Oxfam Press, Oxford, 1999.

Mazurana, Dyan and Susan McKay, *Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, Canadian International Development Agency, Child Protection Research Fund, March 2004, <http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/Girls/girlsmainEN.html>.

Rehn, Elisabeth and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, *Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-building*, UNIFEM, New York, 2002.

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- 1 Nussbaum, Martha, *Women and Human Development*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
- 2 Mazurana, Dyan and Susan McKay, *Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, Canadian International Development Agency, Child Protection Research Fund, March 2004, <http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/Girls/girlsmainEN.html>.
- 3 From UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), *Gender Mainstreaming Implementation Framework*, 2002, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001318/131854e.pdf>.
- 4 <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsanddefinitions.htm>.
- 5 From UNESCO, op. cit.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Statistics on women's participation in peace operations available at 'Peacekeeping Watch', <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/pkindex.html>.
- 8 <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsanddefinitions.htm>.
- 9 From UNESCO, op. cit.
- 10 <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/asp/user/list.asp?ParentID=10314>.
- 11 March, Candida, Ines Smyth and Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, *A Guide to Gender-analysis Frameworks*, Oxfam Press, Oxford, 1999.
- 12 From UNESCO, op. cit.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e4devw.htm>.
- 19 This checklist is drawn partially from UN Inter-Agency Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security, *Gender Checklist for Peace Operations*, June 2003.
- 20 Some of the questions are drawn from De Watteville, Nathalie, *Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs*, World Bank, Washington, DC, May 2002, <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp33.pdf>.
- 21 March, Smyth and Mukhopadhyay, op. cit.
- 22 This matrix is based on ibid.

# 5.20 Youth and DDR

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#### NOTE

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# 5.20 Youth and DDR

## Summary

This module on youth — young people between the ages of 15 and 24 — is intended to give advice to policy makers and programme planners on the best ways to deal with the needs of a group that has historically been poorly served by disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Youth fall between the legal categories of child and adult, and their needs are not necessarily well served by programmes designed for mature adults or very young children. Young people in countries emerging from conflict are both a force for change and renewal in the country, and simultaneously a group that is vulnerable to being drawn into renewed violence. To manage their expectations and direct their energies positively, special attention has to be focused on involving youth in catch-up education programmes that improve their ability to earn an independent livelihood, restoring their hope in a better future and developing their capacity to contribute as upcoming leaders, entrepreneurs, parents and caregivers.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module advocates making the DDR process as a whole more youth-focused, as the majority of combatants in many countries are young. Specifically, it offers insights into the creation of viable livelihood programmes for youth.

The objective of this module is to provide guidance and standards on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of young people. This will ensure that particular nature of both the 15–24 age group and the contexts they will reintegrate into are taken into account in the planning, design and implementation of DDR assistance programmes.

The module focuses explicitly on offering guidance and setting standards to tackle the typical challenges of youth reintegration after war. In order to make DDR assistance more appropriate to young combatants, it explains how to make the most of their positive potential in order to reduce the risk of them becoming a security threat. The module will explicitly provide guidance on designing and implementing youth-focused DDR, so that it channels their ambitions and aspirations towards reconstruction and peace-building. It provides generic standards that will need to be adapted on the basis of detailed country-specific analyses.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

1.20 ◀▶



- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

### 3. Introduction

DDR programmes have increasingly been conducted in contexts where the majority of former combatants are youth, an age group defined by the United Nations (UN) as those between 15 and 24 years of age.<sup>1</sup>

There is no legal framework specifically dealing with youth (15–24 years). Legally, youth up to the age of 18 years are covered under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and other protective frameworks, such as International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 182 and the Optional Protocol of 2002 (also see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

With regard to admission to youth employment, of particular relevance is the ILO Minimum Age Convention of 1973 (No. 138), which contains provisions aimed at the effective abolition of child labour and the progressive raising of the minimum working age. It requires that a general minimum age for admission to work be set that is: (1) not lower than the end of compulsory schooling; and (2) cannot be below age 15, although developing countries could initially set a minimum age of 14. Exception is granted for work done in an appropriate vocational training framework, including apprenticeship from the age of 14, but a higher minimum age of 18 must be set for hazardous work that is likely to endanger the health, safety or morals of young persons. Each country determines its list of hazardous work and must take time-bound measures for the rehabilitation and social integration of children released from armed groups and forces, ensuring their access to health care, and to free basic education or vocational training, as appropriate.

Forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict, slavery and child prostitution is among the worst forms of child labour. DDR programmes should be based on the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention of 1999 (No. 182), which aims to put an end to the involvement of all girls and boys under 18 in the intolerable activities it defines. Accordingly, reintegration programmes for youth should avoid leading young people into jobs or activities that might not be permissible, taking into account the difference between those above and those under 18 (and also the difference between those above and those under the minimum working age).

Effectively, however, youth fall into — and in a sense, between — the legal categories of children and adults. The specific characteristic of this group is that they are neither children nor adults, but have unique needs because of their in-between status. Since they do not fit easily into pre-decided categories, past DDR programmes have largely proved inappropriate for young men and women of this age group. Those under 18 are regarded as child soldiers and are treated as children, disregarding the extended responsibilities many young people have as providers and caregivers. Those just above the age of 18 are treated as adults in programmes with a ‘livelihood’ focus, which usually tend to neglect their need for catch-up education and therefore fail to deal with their ambitions for a career and a better future.

Youth in a war-torn country often have to ‘grow up quickly’ and take on adult roles, such as taking responsibility for the survival of their family or fighting in the war. Conflict leads

to a weakening or breakdown of family and community networks, depriving young people of a secure environment and positive role models. Because of their age and their inability to protect themselves in unstable and violent societies, youth are extremely vulnerable to gender-based violence, unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS. When schools close and there are few chances of finding a decent job, many young people lose their sense of pride, trust and place in the community, as well as their hope for the future. While a significant number of young people are forced to join armed forces and groups, some join out of a sense of fear or despair, or a desire for revenge, or because they see it as a solution to their problems, to protect their family and/or to contribute to their small income.

After war, youth are mostly excluded from decision-making structures, and elders and government members pay little attention to them. In the destruction of economies during and after war, young people tend to be the first to be laid off and the least likely to find work. Education and training services are sometimes disrupted for long periods, and young people can become idle and frustrated if they are only able to do subsistence work in the informal economy. Health care services, especially reproductive health care services, are unavailable. The accumulation of these factors, particularly where insecurity exists, may push young people into a vicious cycle of poverty and social exclusion, and expose them to criminality, violence and re-recruitment into armed forces and groups, or gangs.

DDR programmes should analyse and deal with the reasons why young people join armed forces and groups, and their fears and worries after conflict has ended, in order to provide the type of DDR assistance that would make them feel secure. Failure to do so can easily result in repeated security threats in situations of fragile peace. DDR programmes should design specific measures for young ex-combatants, and not assume that their needs resemble those of older adults. In reality, their exposure to trauma and risky behaviour, and also their labour market disadvantages, are quite specific. They are at a critical stage in their life cycle, and will be permanently disadvantaged if they do not receive appropriate assistance in the transition and post-war periods. It is, of course, equally important to give chances to others in the community who, when faced with similar circumstances — including the lack of education and jobs — chose not to join armed forces or groups (or were fortunate enough to escape forced recruitment).

DDR programmes that have to deal with large numbers of young ex-combatants require integrated approaches that respond to the many different needs, experiences and disadvantages of this group. These may differ depending on age, gender, ethnicity, location, social class, household size, education and training levels, disability, health status, etc. A structured and coherent response should focus on young soldiers and civilian youth at the same time, building on the sense of solidarity that exists among young people and the recognition of their distinct identity and role, and looking forward to their future responsibilities in society.

Making DDR efforts responsive to the needs and aspirations of youth is indeed an enormous challenge. Neglecting them, however, is simply unacceptable, as youth are likely to make up the majority of DDR programme participants. DDR policy makers and implementers should recognize young people's resilience, coping strategies and distinct experiences in conflict situations and make every effort to open up opportunities to them for changing their

Youth in a war-torn country often have to 'grow up quickly' and take on adult roles, such as taking responsibility for the survival of their family or fighting in the war.

future. Such people can provide leadership and inspiration to their societies if they are given opportunities. It is important that young ex-combatants find meaningful roles in the post-conflict period that are similar in terms of responsibility and status to those they played during conflict, but do not rely on using force to get what they need, and they should have a stake in the post-conflict social order so that they support rather than undermine it.

## 4. Guiding principles

The guiding principles for UN-supported DDR have specific implications for, and relevance to, youth. While national ownership is essential for the success and sustainability of DDR programmes, this goal cannot be said to have been met unless youth's aspirations have been identified and appealing solutions have been offered to problems that affect them in particular, such as the right kind of health care services, education and livelihood opportunities to allow them to live independently and well, and the safety and security they need to go about their daily lives. Youth need to participate in political decision-making processes as the age of majority in their country permits, and to feel empowered and included in post-conflict reconstruction and renewal.

Youth DDR programmes must be effectively coordinated with those for children and adults in order to deal with the particular needs of this 'in-between' group and make sure that people who started out as child soldiers but are now over 18 receive proper support. Long-term sustainability should be ensured by designing DDR assistance to contribute to full reintegration rather than separating young ex-combatants from their peers. The ultimate objective is to 'do no harm' by planning for a smooth transition from DDR to national youth policies and action plans, and to recognize youth as an asset in the reconstruction period. Specifically, this implies: analysing and dealing with root causes of youth's participation in armed conflicts; understanding the youth labour market and increasing the employability of youth so they are not trapped in poverty; addressing the health needs of youth, particularly with regard to reproductive health care and HIV prevention, as well as providing long-term care for those with AIDS; assisting youth who have child-care responsibilities; and opening up opportunities for further education and training.

In all programmes, the different needs of young women and men should receive attention; as recommended in Security Council resolution 1325, specific care should be taken to increase the involvement of young women in national and local politics and decision-making, and to help them achieve self-sufficiency (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

◀▶ 5.10

## 5. Root causes of youth participation in armed conflicts

For DDR efforts to be sustainable, socio-economic reintegration assistance should be based on a clear understanding of the reasons why young people join armed forces and groups, and should be able to deal with these underlying issues to prevent the re-recruitment of young combatants after the completion of DDR programmes. Country-specific assessments that are specifically designed for regional, rural/urban, age, sex, ability and other demographic differences should be carried out for this purpose.

While many young people are recruited by force, a large number might appear to have 'chosen' to join armed forces and groups; it is important, of course, to try to assess how 'voluntary' this decision was, given the highly degraded circumstances in which many

young people live. The decision of young people to arm themselves is largely influenced by the context they are living in. Growing up in a conflict zone or in a family or community where gun possession is regarded as necessary or desirable, and where weapons are easily accessible, increases the risk of young people turning to violence. The desire for protection is an important incentive to join, as are anger and the desire for revenge. Young people may also be attracted by the risk and perceived thrill and power of taking up arms, or driven by poverty, physical and/or sexual abuse at home, lack of alternatives and unemployment, or having to work under unbearable circumstances. Although an increasing number of young women and girls are involved, membership of an armed force or group is still overwhelmingly attractive to young men and boys. This pattern is most often a result of societal gender expectations that value aggressive masculinity and peaceable femininity. But whatever the final incentive was for them to get hold of a gun, a whole series of underlying causes have already prepared a young person to take the final decision to join an armed force or group.

Young people are not all making exactly the same choices, however. Even when they are faced with similar circumstances, some are more likely to take to arms than others. It is important to understand both their reasons for joining up and their reasons for resisting, through analysing root causes, related causes and triggers that make them behave as they do. Before starting DDR planning, participatory research studies on the situation of adolescents and youth in conflict and post-conflict situations should be conducted to establish a clear understanding of why young men and women participate in violence.<sup>2</sup>

In order to gather and systematize data on the reasons why young people take up arms, or resist doing so, it is useful to ask questions on this subject that deal with broad categories of their reasons for doing so, such as war and insecurity, poverty, education, family and friends, politics and ideology, identity, and culture and tradition.<sup>3</sup> This research will prevent future problems: if, for example, young people join an armed force or group to escape from a violent or abusive home, family tracing and placing them in their old environment will not prevent them from joining an armed force or group again as soon as the next opportunity arises.

International organizations must learn more about youth from youth themselves in order to have a positive impact on young people's decision-making processes — whether these concern their 'choice' to fight or to start a business.

## 6. Preventing youth from participating in armed conflict

Beyond supplying their basic needs, the successful socio-economic reintegration of youth means giving them opportunities that are appealing to them. 'Appealing' is the key word: it includes their visions of a secure life path, a career and ways of achieving a better future.

Given appealing opportunities, youth will contribute to peace, stability and growth. This is essential for long-term stability, as they take their beliefs, values and experiences with them into the future. Concrete initiatives and strategies for providing long-lasting employment opportunities for energetic but underutilized and underequipped young people must be identified.

In the framework of an integrated DDR process, the most urgent need is to absorb unemployed youth in order to prevent their recruitment (or re-recruitment) into armed forces and groups, or gangs. Youth unemployment and underemployment must be tackled at all levels (local, national, cross-border and regional), applying an integrated approach towards

young (ex-)combatants and civilian youth. Governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations aiming to foster sustainable youth (re)integration should:

- utilize the dynamism of young people and build on their capacity for taking risks;
- involve youth in short-term employment, until sustainable jobs can be found;
- develop multifaceted strategies for dealing with youth reintegration, using a comprehensive set of measures involving all social actors;
- ensure that development programmes are equally benefiting the youth of all provinces and regions, and reaching young women and men alike;
- ensure that youth development projects place young people firmly in nurturing environments where they are both able to receive care and guidance, and to support and care for others.

## 7. Youth and security

The emphasis of DDR programmes is to create a secure environment. To achieve this goal, analysing the security threat both posed by and faced by youth is necessary. Time and resources should be made available to study the complexity of youth as security threats and potential risks, rather than automatically regarding them as trouble-makers. It is important to remember, however, that DDR is only one of a series of interventions to create long-term stability, and to utilize information on youth systematically in all aspects of security sector reform (SSR).

Youth make up a unique group of actors in security issues, and may not only be found in formally organized armed groups and forces. They are also in self-defence groups or armed gangs, and working in private security firms or as mercenaries. Even when these other armed groups are not included in formal peace agreements or formal DDR programmes, care should be taken to develop programmes for youth that can assist those left out of such formal arrangements before they become a greater security threat in the post-conflict phase.

The right of youth — including young women — to understand security issues and participate in discussions and planning of SSR, to be trained and employed in the security sector, and to contribute to the security and development of their communities and nation should be recognized and supported through processes that encourage youth leadership, participation and decision-making. Youth also have a right to feel secure and supported, so they can take advantage of every opportunity to lead a better life in the future.

### 7.1. Violent youth

Without gainful employment, a sense of political involvement or access to education, young people can contribute to the political destabilization of a country or region. For example, large numbers of young men in West Africa earn their living by working as mercenaries, moving from conflict to conflict. It is clear that frustrated young men in particular are attracted to subcultures that encourage violence by appealing to their sense of alienation and marginalization, and offering them access to power and status. The violent gang culture that is widely found in many conflict-affected regions — both before and after war — is straining the fragile social fabric within countries and contributing to regional instability by threatening to spread into other countries that are not yet at war.



This problem can only be dealt with through the creation of strategic links between:

- DDR programmes and broader youth strategies and action plans;
- DDR programmes and broader employment policies and programmes;
- DDR programmes and SSR and justice sector reform;
- DDR programmes in neighbouring countries.

SSR processes should start early in order to guarantee that a reintegration process takes place in a local setting in which law and order are largely restored and in which violent youth groups can actually be punished. Particular care must be taken, especially in the disarmament phase, to inform youth carefully, through public information campaigns, about what they can realistically expect to happen. Up to now, many DDR processes have become derailed by tensions over promised but undeliverable services, and youth have reacted violently because these promises were not kept.

## 7.2. Youth and small arms

The proliferation of cheap, small and easy-to-use weapons has enabled armed forces and groups to recruit young and inexperienced combatants. Furthermore, the possession of small arms carries high symbolic value among youth in many societies, with associations of individual or group pride, empowerment, masculinity, belonging to a group, status and recognition, or wealth. There are considerable gender differences in both attitudes to and use of small arms. While girls may be less likely to use and own weapons, in keeping with societal ideas about appropriately feminine behaviour, many boys are caught up in stereotypical images of masculinity that emphasize brutality and strength, and are fascinated by all things military as a result. Fictional images presented by the media can become real-life role models, or young men can be drawn in through meeting international, national or individual local soldiers or militias.

DDR and small arms management planners should focus more on developing programmes that enable youth to contribute actively to disarmament and reconstruction efforts (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and IDDRS 4.11 on SALW Control, Security and Development). Generating youth employment through the reconstruction process should be given priority attention. In addition, the symbolic value of small arms for men, women, boys and girls must be determined, and where possible, substitute status symbols put in their place. Recreational activities such as sports events, music festivals and theatre can raise awareness about the dangers of the increase in the numbers and use of small arms and light weapons, especially for youth.

In addition, strategies should be developed to disarm and reintegrate non-demobilized youth. The eligibility criteria established for every DDR programme exclude certain groups of armed youth. Other suitable measures are needed to disarm these groups and to assist them to find their place in society.

## 8. Socio-economic reintegration strategies for young ex-combatants

Guidance on the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants is provided elsewhere; those standards also apply to young ex-combatants (see IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration). However, as is highlighted in this section, there are a number of issues that are particularly relevant to young people.

4.11 ◀▶ ■ 4.10 ◀▶


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Efforts to create stable employment and income-generating opportunities so that young people gain a sustainable livelihood must be at the centre of socio-economic reintegration programmes. Successful reintegration depends both on the capacity of the economy to create these opportunities and on the ability of DDR programmes to increase the employability of young former combatants, as well as creating employment.

The socio-economic reintegration of young ex-combatants depends largely on their successful transition into the world of work. DDR programmes designed for younger combatants have proved to be more complex than those for adults. Armed conflict has influenced young people during their formative years; in fact, many young combatants have never lived in a peaceful society and have no reference to, or memory of, such times. In response, DDR programmes should focus on teaching youth to give up violent behaviour learned during the war period; offer education and training, including apprenticeship programmes; support young people who have young children of their own with child-care services so they can take advantage of retraining opportunities; and, finally, heal psychological and physical wounds and deal with other health concerns to increase young people's employability and facilitate their transition to decent work.

Looking at the socio-economic reintegration of young ex-combatants as part of the normal human life cycle may provide a useful analytical framework for policy and programme development. This approach sees youth as one stage of life that is influenced by and also affects other stages of life (see figure 1). During childhood, adolescence and youth, personal development takes place that can affect whether an individual 'succeeds' or 'fails' in the later

Figure 1 **Decent work in the life cycle**



Source: ILO Gender Promotion Programme



stages of life. If children are in the military rather than in school, they will grow up with greater limitations and fewer prospects for decent work. In turn, they will be less able to positively influence the lives of their own children — hence the passing on of multiple disadvantages from generation to generation, often linked with the passing on of poverty from generation to generation.<sup>4</sup>

### 8.1. Matching aspirations with opportunities

Youth-based DDR should strike a balance between building on the aspirations and positive potential of youth and the establishment of stability and security. Not all ex-combatant youth have peaceful intentions for the future of their countries. In order to ensure participatory youth-based approaches that will help reach the overall objectives of DDR, the following key issues should be taken into account:

- Reintegration programmes shall be sensitive and avoid offering reintegration opportunities in job areas that are regarded as hazardous, even if a young person wants to do this type of work. Youth up to the age of 18 are protected under the ILO's Conventions on Child Labour (Nos. 138 and 182);
- Training ex-combatants in areas they might identify as their preference should be avoided if the jobs they choose are not required in the labour market. The feeling of frustration and helplessness that caused people to take up arms in the first place only increases when they cannot find a job after training. This makes them more open to re-recruitment. Counselling and career guidance should be offered to help youth understand why careers they might have heard of or regard as glamorous may not be sustainable in the environment in which they find themselves. To assure their participation, young people need to feel informed, included and capable of making an appropriate choice when they are offered a range of possible options after demobilization;
- Paternalistic approaches to youth should be avoided. Their successful socio-economic integration relies on offering them opportunities that are appealing to them. For example, family tracing and reunification (see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR) need to be followed immediately by programmes aimed at job creation, offering appropriate learning opportunities and recreational activities in the areas to which young people return. Training and apprenticeship programmes should be adapted to young people's abilities, interests and needs, to enable them to complete the programme, which will both boost their employment prospects and bolster their self-confidence. A commitment to motivating young people to realize their potential is a vital part of successful programming and implementation;
- Activities should be offered that reach and involve large numbers of youth. Theatre, music, arts and sports are popular activities with great social benefits and employment potential. Life skills can also be improved when these activities are linked to a useful social message, e.g., the prevention of HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the media and Internet offer a range of interesting possibilities worth exploring, such as magazines or programmes produced by young people;
- Space should be created for young people to interact with each other, such as centres that allow them to meet off the streets. Well-trained mentors who act as role models should manage these centres. Activities should include finding opportunities for generating employment. These spaces can also be a place for integrating youth with special needs, such as those with disabilities, or for offering support to young mothers. They

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may contribute to the effective empowerment of youth by protecting them from forced recruitment, giving them perspective on employment, furthering their personal development and providing a space in which they can express an opinion. Informal youth drop-in centres may also attract young former combatants who did not go through formal DDR because of fear or misinformation, or because they managed to escape and look for help by themselves. DDR for youth and children needs to be flexible and innovative in its design, so that young people can exercise their right to receive help and support when an armed force or group is disbanded, even if they do not at first trust the formal processes that are planned, or cannot wait for them to be put in place.

## **8.2. Planning socio-economic reintegration programmes**

Reintegration planning should be linked to the national reconciliation strategy on the one hand and to national socio-economic reconstruction on the other. Young demobilized combatants are an important human resource. Their youth and energy can be harnessed for reconstruction and recovery activities after conflict ends.

A vital part of reintegration planning is the situation analysis, where data and analysis on the social and economic profile and expectations of ex-combatants, and on the available (self-)employment possibilities are gathered. This analysis should be used to define how the reintegration process is going to work and be at the centre of reintegration strategies (see Annex D).

## **8.3. Data collection and labour market information**

DDR programme planners should identify the specific issues relating to reintegration of young former combatants and collect data to help design programme components and strategies that cover their specific needs. The lack of availability or problems with sharing of data and information relevant for reintegration programmes can cause major planning difficulties. In cases where the responsibilities for demobilization and reintegration of youth lie with separate organizations, coordination and sharing arrangements for data collection and analysis should be established. Insufficient employment-related information will undermine the overall effectiveness and relevance of reintegration programmes.

The collection, analysis and distribution of labour market information (e.g., on the availability of employment and self-employment opportunities, and the identification of sectors where youth employment is more likely) is vital, as it provides indications for the planning, design, monitoring and evaluation of DDR programmes. The distribution of this information helps to inform young ex-combatants about realistic employment opportunities so that they can make appropriate decisions and plan their career paths.

In most post-conflict countries, the availability of labour market information is limited, and both collection and analysis are difficult tasks. Preliminary labour market surveys can be conducted to overcome these shortcomings and make data and analysis available quickly. The adaptation of existing questionnaires developed in other post-conflict contexts can speed up this task.<sup>5</sup> Rapid assessments can be conducted by the public employment services that exist in the country, with people at the community level providing the necessary information. Data on both labour supply and demand should be built into the overall DDR information management system. This system should provide data disaggregated by age, sex, educational level, location, type of disadvantage, etc.

## 8.4. Programme design

Reintegration programmes designed to assist youth to make the transition to peace and decent work will vary from one country to another and be shaped by several socio-economic factors. There is no one-size-fits-all process, and the design of DDR programmes for the reintegration of youth should depend on the outcomes of a range of assessments. However, it is possible to identify some of the main components that may often appear in DDR programmes in different settings. Lessons learned from their implementation in several countries indicate that in order to achieve a positive impact on youth, DDR should be:

- well targeted and specifically designed to suit individual needs. Programmes that identify and are designed both for the individual characteristics (e.g., age, sex, educational level, sociocultural background) and for the labour market disadvantages faced by young demobilized soldiers have been the most effective. Ways that allow young people to re-enter education should have preference in order to improve their employability in the future;
- conceived to connect young ex-combatants with other participants. The connection with non-combatants exposes young former soldiers to non-military rules and behaviour and encourages their inclusion in the community and society at large. Broad programmes that include components focusing on young ex-combatants but that also address other groups of youth have been successful in breaking through the segregation that hinders many reintegration processes;
- designed to respond to labour market requirements. Careful design that responds to the labour market (e.g., skills that are in demand, self-employment and microenterprises) facilitates the transition to work in growth industries and occupations;
- part of a comprehensive package of services covering labour demand and supply. Reintegration programmes that combine measures dealing with both labour demand (e.g., tax incentives, local economic development) and supply (e.g., career guidance and other job-search assistance, education and training) are more effective in easing the transition to peace and work;
- linked with work experience. Programmes linked with the world of work (e.g., apprenticeships, in-company training, job placement) increase employability of inexperienced young ex-combatants. The most successful programmes place participants with private sector employers;
- based on community approaches and empowerment. Since reintegration takes place at the local level, it is essential to involve the receiving communities in programme design and implementation. Community-based planning approaches shall explicitly include youth;
- designed to involve all social partners. Employers' and workers' organizations can help link reintegration programmes to the world of work. Their involvement in the design and implementation of reintegration programmes increases both their relevance and effectiveness.

## 9. Main components of reintegration programmes for young ex-combatants

The design and development of youth-related reintegration components of DDR programmes should be flexible, based on labour market requirements and designed to meet the needs

of participants. The function of these measures is to link labour supply and demand; to lessen the impact of education and labour market failures; and to increase the levels of efficiency, equity, growth and social justice for lasting peace. Reintegration programmes should be based on integrated approaches that link them to broader reconstruction and recovery plans; deal with issues of labour demand and supply; and take into account not only the creation of jobs, but also the quality of the jobs created. This section will focus on a number of areas that are relevant to socio-economic reintegration, demonstrating that both the combination of different measures and the order in which they are put in place will depend on the specific labour market and other disadvantages faced by young ex-combatants. These measures are listed in the socio-economic reintegration part of the table in Annex D.

### 9.1. Catch-up education

A young person's level of education will often decide whether he/she makes a successful transition into the world of work. In general, the least-educated and the least-skilled people are jobless, although some countries face the problem of the 'educated unemployed'.<sup>6</sup> Although the lack of primary education is normally a problem that only affects younger children, in an increasing number of war-affected countries, low literacy has become a major problem among youth.<sup>7</sup> There is also evidence that keeping young people in school slows the transmission of HIV/AIDS.

Time spent in the army results in loss of educational opportunities. As explained in detail in IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR, upon demobilization, young people try to further their education. However, in many cases, youth are reluctant to resume formal basic education because they feel embarrassed to attend schools with children of a much younger age, or their care-giving responsibilities are simply too heavy to allow them the time to study without earning an income. Youth should not feel stigmatized because they lost the opportunity to acquire an education, because they served in armed forces and groups, became refugees or were not able to attend school for other reasons, and they should not be prevented from attending school because they themselves are parents. The best solution is to provide youth who have missed out on education with accelerated learning programmes compatible with and recognized by the formal system of education.

Vocational training should preferably only be part-time, so that it is possible to use the rest of the week for regular catch-up education. The mix of education and vocational training provides former combatants with a better and broader basis for finding long-term employment than simple vocational training. This system has the additional advantage of increasing the number of places available at training centres, which exist only in a limited number, as trainees will only attend two half-days of training a week, allowing many more people to be trained than if only one group attended full-time.

Child-care facilities should be established at all schools offering education for youth, to allow young mothers and youth who are household heads with responsibilities for dependants to attend. Childcare should be free and include a feeding programme.

### 9.2. Learning and training

Vocational education and training can play a key role in the successful reintegration of young ex-combatants into normal life by increasing their chances to effectively participate in the labour market. Training can also contribute to breaking down military types of behaviour, as well as allowing young people to develop values and norms based on peace and democracy.

The acquisition of a set of ‘employable skills’ and the willingness to work increases self-esteem and builds the confidence of young ex-combatants, while helping them (re)gain respect and appreciation from the community. Skills training that leads to employment will reduce risky behaviour, violence and crime.

Most armed conflicts result in the disruption of education and training systems, and the destruction of facilities and institutions that provide young people with learning opportunities. In addition, because of time spent in armed forces or groups, most young ex-combatants have not acquired skills that lead to a job. At the same time, the reconstruction and recovery of a war-torn country requires large numbers of skilled persons. The planning and design of vocational training that supplies labour market requirements present a number of problems that are related to the volatile environment, and lack of systematic and reliable labour market information, data on quantitative and qualitative capacities of training providers, and so on (also see IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration).

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Young people require learning strategies that allow them to learn at their own pace and to acquire communication and other skills that make them more employable. Programmes that offer these benefits have been successful in counteracting behaviours developed during the conflict that are based on hierarchical systems that reduce creativity and destroy individual initiative. Life skills training — including civic education, parenting skills, rights at work, prevention of HIV / AIDS and education to counter interpersonal violence — should also be part of all programmes designed for young people.

Training of trainers should avoid traditional supply-driven and instructor-oriented methods, encouraging instead more interactive learning approaches. DDR managers should plan staff development activities that aim at training the existing or newly recruited trainers on how to deal with young ex-combatants. The role of the trainer involved in these programmes should be that of a facilitator who encourages active learning, supports teamwork and provides a positive adult ‘role model’ for young participants.

To prepare young people with no previous work experience for the highly competitive labour market, they should be offered apprenticeship and/or ‘on-the-job’ training places. They can then combine the skills they are learning with practical experience of norms and values, productivity and competition in the world of work.

### Main features of employment training programmes for youth

Employment training programmes for youth have the following characteristics:

- labour market-driven;
- a modular approach;
- flexible timing both on delivery, and entrance and exit into programmes;
- learner-centred;
- teaching multiple skills;
- training programmes oriented towards concrete job opportunities;
- competency-based;
- supported by life skills training;
- taught by good role models;
- assessment to industry standards;
- recognition of prior learning;
- practical work experience through on-the-job training or apprenticeship.

### 9.3. Employment services, career guidance and job-search assistance

Programmers should aim to strike the right balance between the aspirations of young ex-combatants and their chances of finding a job in the labour market. Young people can experience further frustration and hopelessness when they do not find a job after having been involved in ineffective training and employment programmes. These feelings can make their re-recruitment more likely.

Employment counselling and career guidance should match the skills and aspirations of young ex-combatants with employment or education and training opportunities. They are an important instrument for managing the transition to civilian life and the world of work. If offered at the first stage of DDR programmes, guidance and counselling can play a key role in designing employment programmes, identifying education and training opportunities, and helping young ex-combatants make realistic choices.

For young people specifically, a major problem is that they have never had opportunities to gain work experience, have no experience of dealing with civilian institutions, have no experience of looking for employment and do not know what they can do, or even want to do. Employment counselling, career guidance and labour market information help young former combatants to:

- manage the change from the military to civilian life and from childhood to adulthood;
- understand the labour market;
- identify opportunities for work and learning;
- build important attitudes and life skills;
- make decisions;
- plan their career and life.

Employment services including counselling, career guidance, and directing young people to the appropriate jobs and educational institutions should not be set up only for ex-combatant youth, but should be open to all young people looking for jobs. Employment services must build on existing national structures, and are normally under the control of the ministry of labour and/or youth. Reintegration should start at the project level, where young ex-combatants are directed to jobs and training opportunities open to all young job-seekers. However, staff of career centres and employment services should receive training on the specific problems faced by ex-combatants.

### 9.4. Youth entrepreneurship

Starting a business or income-generating activity is increasingly seen as part of a strategy to deal with the youth employment challenge. Three elements are necessary for an all-inclusive strategy to encourage youth entrepreneurship: first, support for an entrepreneurial culture; second, the drawing up of policies and regulations that allow the strategy to work; and third, the provision of support services. Encouraging the development of an entrepreneurial culture should start while young people are still in education and training; the correct policies, regulations and support services are essential to help young people who are setting up their own business.

Youth-specific programmes are likely to be more effective if they are supported by policies and regulations that encourage youth entrepreneurship. For example, efficient and fair regulations for business registration will help young people start a business in the formal economy. To make up for their lack of experience and weak business networks, mentor support



is particularly effective for young entrepreneurs during the first years of business start-up, since this is when youth enterprises tend to have high failure rates. Employers' organizations can play an important role in providing one-on-one mentoring to young entrepreneurs.<sup>8</sup>

Microfinance programmes designed specifically for youth cannot be successful unless they are accompanied by other support services, including business training and other non-financial services such as business development services, information and counselling, skills development, and networking. Group-based youth entrepreneurship brings together skills and experience that support each other and that are valuable for starting and running an enterprise. Cooperatives are another important way of providing decent jobs for young ex-combatants, because many of the obstacles that young entrepreneurs face could be overcome by working in a team with other people. In recognition of this, DDR programmes should encourage business start-up in small groups, although there should be a balance between former combatants and civilians to reduce the risk of re-establishing military hierarchies, structures and bonds. The programme should empower these youth businesses by monitoring their performance and defending their interests through business advisory services, including them in employers' and workers' organizations, giving them access to micro-finance and creating a favourable environment for business development.

Business development services and availability of finance are very important, but other issues need to be dealt with as well, including: safety (is the environment and new equipment safe?); the need for investment in premises and equipment (a warehouse, marketplace, cooling stores, workplace, equipment); and, above all, the size and nature of the local market (purchasing power and availability of raw materials) and economic infrastructure (roads, communications, energy). Given that such issues go beyond the scope of DDR programmes, there should be direct links between DDR and other development initiatives or programmes to encourage national or international investments in these areas. Where possible, the DDR programme should buy products and services from local suppliers (school benches, tool-kits, office equipment maintenance, etc.).

### 9.5. Microfinance for youth

The success of microfinance lies in its bottom-up approach, which allows for the establishment of new links among individuals, NGOs, governments and businesses. Unfortunately, youth have largely been denied access to microfinance. While some young people are simply too young to sign legal contracts, there is also a perception that young ex-combatants are a high-risk group for credits or investments. They are seen as unpredictable and volatile. These prejudices tend to disempower them, turning them into passive receivers of assistance rather than enabling them to take charge of their own lives. Microfinance, however, holds great potential for young people.

Youth should be allowed access to loans within small cooperatives in which they can buy essential assets as a group. When the group members have together been able to save or accumulate some capital, the savings or loans group can be linked to, or even become, a microfinance institution with access to donor capital.

Governments should assist youth to get credits on favourable terms to help them start their own business, e.g., by guaranteeing loans through microfinance institutions or temporarily subsidizing loans. In general, providing credit is a controversial issue, whether it aims at creating jobs or making profits. It is thus important to determine which lending agencies can best provide the specific needs of young entrepreneurs. With adequate support, such credit agencies can play an important role in helping young people to become successful entrepreneurs. Depending on the case, the credit can either be publicly or privately funded.<sup>9</sup>



Micro- or small credit programmes should be created for young people who do not meet the eligibility conditions for most programmes, such as security, collateral and experience (guarantee funds are an important way of doing this). Microcredit remains an important source of financial help for people who do not meet the criteria for regular bank loans.<sup>10</sup>

## 9.6. Business training and business development services

Because of severe competition in post-conflict labour markets, very few young ex-combatants will have access to existing jobs. The large majority will need to start their own businesses, in groups or individually. To increase their success rate, DDR programmes should do the following:

- develop young people's ability to deal with the problems they will face in the world of work through business development education.<sup>11</sup> They should learn the following sets of skills:<sup>12</sup>
  - being enterprising — learning to see and respond to opportunities;
  - business development skills — learning to investigate and develop a business idea;
  - business management skills — learning how to get a business going and manage it successfully;
- encourage business people to support young (or young potential) entrepreneurs during the vital first years of their new business by transferring their knowledge, experience and contacts to them. They can do this by providing on-the-job learning, mentoring, including them in their networks and associations, and using youth businesses to supply their own businesses.<sup>13</sup> The more support a young entrepreneur receives in the first years of his/her business, the better his/her chances of creating a sustainable business or of becoming more employable.

## 9.7. Psychological trauma and tensions

Reintegration programmes have to assist young combatants to overcome the bad effects of the experiences they have been exposed to at an important time in their development. With little life experience beyond war, all the problems faced by individuals in violent societies are made worse for young people.

DDR programme planners should use a variety of innovative strategies to help young people deal with trauma; some of these strategies could result in the establishment of new businesses run by ex-combatants and civilian youth. Useful techniques include increasing the use of music and theatre to spread information, raise awareness and empower youth. Forum theatre and 'theatre of the oppressed' are particularly helpful for this purpose.<sup>14</sup> Sports and cultural events can strongly attract young people. They are popular activities with great social benefits, and programme planners should be aware that this sector can provide employment as well. Youth radio should be supported through the supply of equipment and professional trainers, since it is an excellent way of allowing youth to communicate with each other. Radio can contact and inform many people, and is accessible even to difficult-to-reach groups such as young women in domestic labour and youth in militias. Both the quantity and quality of information for youth should be increased, especially to cater for graduating students, young entrepreneurs, young farmers and those taking care of young children.

Public Internet and telecommunications cafés may be used or even established as a reintegration programme activity, especially in rural areas. Rural cinemas can also assist young people.

The capacity of the health sector to assist youth with war trauma and reproductive health matters, including contraception, HIV / AIDS and other STIs, should be improved. Young people can also learn about security sector matters such as disarmament and new gun laws, receive human rights education and learn about politics through messages that are specifically aimed at them. Many of the strategies mentioned above are excellent ways of transmitting such information.

## 10. Creating reintegration opportunities for youth

DDR programmes have increasingly taken steps to create employment opportunities designed to help young ex-combatants reintegrate into society and bridge the gap between short-term relief and long-term recovery. Labour-based public and community works, job-placement schemes and subsidies, and enterprise creation are the most common types of job-creation programmes that can be used to absorb young ex-combatants. Annex B contains lessons learned from the implementation and evaluation of these measures that should be used in the design of DDR programmes. Their design and implementation requires a variety of different methods to be used in the correct combination and in the correct order, and should be carefully combined with measures focusing on labour demand and supply.

### 10.1. Labour-intensive physical and social infrastructure development

Public works and community services (improvement of public infrastructure, temporary work in public services, etc.) are job-creation measures that can easily be designed for groups of demobilized combatants. There is always urgent work to be done in priority sectors — such as essential public facilities — and geographical areas, especially those most affected by the conflict. Job-creation schemes may provide employment and income support to young ex-combatants and, at the same time, develop physical and social infrastructure. They can also benefit the local economy and businesses if cash (instead of food alone) is paid for work done. Although these programmes offer only a limited number of long-term jobs, they can, in the short term, increase the productivity of low-skilled young ex-combatants, help young participants gain work experience and raise their social status from destroyers to constructors. Another important benefit is that such schemes provide immediate employment and can keep youth occupied in the interim period before more sustainable job opportunities are in place. The chosen schemes could be part of special reconstruction projects to directly benefit youth, such as training centres, sports facilities, places where young people can play and listen to music, and so on. Such projects can be developed within the local construction industry and assist groups of youth to become small contractors. Short-term employment opportunities should preferably mix ex-combatants with other youth and be made available equally to young women and men.

The creation of employment-intensive work for youth should include other components such as flexible training, mentoring and community services to support their integration into society. As discussed above, providing employment opportunities for young people mainly result from a mix of several elements.

Public works and community services programmes shall be started quickly, involving young ex-combatants in productive activities and working immediately after demobilization. With good planning, labour-based projects should replace the cash payments provided to combatants after demobilization (which have caused tensions), spreading the message that work, not guns, pays.

## **10.2. Wage incentives**

The transition of former combatants to work may be encouraged by offering wage subsidies and other incentives (e.g., tax exemptions for a limited period) to employers who hire young ex-combatants. This can, for example, pay for the cost of initial training required for young workers. These subsidies allow disadvantaged and excluded young combatants to be provided with useful work, including those with disabilities.

There are many schemes for sharing initial hiring costs between employers and government. The main issues to be decided are: the length of the period in which young people will be employed; the amount of subsidy or other compensation employers will receive; and the type of contracts that young people will be offered. In many DDR programmes, employers receive the same amount as the wage of each person hired or apprenticed. Others programmes combine subsidized employment with limited-term employment contracts for young people. Work training contracts might provide incentives to employers who recruit young ex-combatants and provide them with on-the-job training. Care should be taken to make sure that this opportunity is provided only to demobilized youth. Furthermore, DDR planners should develop an efficient monitoring system to make sure that training and employment incentives are used to improve employability, rather than turn youth into a cheap source of labour.

## **10.3. Competition in the labour market for people with little or no experience**

One of the clearest lessons learned from past DDR programmes is that even after training, young combatants do not succeed in economies that have been damaged by war. Businesses owned by former combatants regularly fail because of intense competition with highly qualified people already running the same kinds of businesses and because of the very limited cash available to pay for goods and services in post-war societies.

DDR programmes should become more innovative to prevent these problems. They should more effectively empower youth by combining several skills in one course, e.g., driving can be combined with basic car repair skills; and home economics with tailoring, pastry or soap-making, etc. The possession of many skills greatly improves the employability of young people. Also, providing easy-to-learn skills such as mobile phone repair makes young people less vulnerable and more adaptable to rapidly changing market demands.

Employers should be given incentives to hire youth or create apprenticeship places. For example, construction companies could receive certain DDR-related contracts on condition that their labour force includes a high percentage of youth or even a specific group of youth, such as girls who are ex-combatants. Tax reductions could also be used as an incentive.

Training programmes should be offered in new skills that are not on the market yet and are appealing to young people, which will have the additional benefit of stimulating investment in new or growing industries of interest to young people, such as music, radios, the Internet, computers, sports, etc.<sup>15</sup>

## 11. Gender issues

The term 'youth' is often assumed to mean males, whereas female youth are simply considered 'young women', particularly if they are married or have children.

Girls and young women are rarely seen as a specific group in their own right in most DDR programmes, although they do form a large and increasing share of armed forces and groups in many violent armed conflicts. Large numbers of female youth have been involved in conflicts in Sri Lanka, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Eritrea, Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, the Philippines and Nepal.

The roles males and females play in conflict are often seen as opposites that balance each other: men and boys as seen as aggressors, women and girls as victims. A more careful examination, however, reveals a complex dynamic in which war is experienced differently between and within the sexes. Violent armed conflict tends to aggravate sexual abuse, because gender-based violence is all too often used as a weapon. Boys are often a target for sexual violence, but sexual violence against girls has reached epidemic proportions in many conflict zones. Young women carry extra burdens of unwanted pregnancies and higher chances of contracting STIs and HIV/AIDS as a result of sexual violence.

Young female combatants tend to be already disadvantaged in comparison with their male colleagues before the conflict, and they have more difficulties in taking advantage of possible benefits during and after the conflict. The specific needs and capacities of young female ex-combatants are often poorly catered for, especially if DDR is treated purely as a security issue, when only the young males, who are seen as 'potential trouble-makers', need to be disarmed, demobilized and kept busy. Evidence from many war zones shows, however, that young women former combatants are equally capable of returning to violence if other ways of getting ahead after conflict fail.

### 11.1. Reasons for joining armed forces and groups

In order to protect themselves from violence, some young women decide to take up arms because they hope that having a gun might make them less vulnerable to gender-based violence. Many young men take up arms because they want to protect the female members of their family from sexual abuse. Some young women also say that they were given few possibilities to express their opinions in public or participate in decision-making processes of the communities, and, faced with this gender-based discrimination, saw violence as one way of making their voices heard and of asserting their equality with males.<sup>16</sup> Many girls and young women are brought into armed forces and groups involuntarily, as they are abducted to be forced labourers or sexual slaves.

### 11.2. Disarmament and demobilization of girls and young women

DDR eligibility should not be based on the handing in of weapons, since this excludes those who have played non-combat roles, even though they have gone through similar experiences in supporting roles. They are eligible for DDR, even if they have self-demobilized or were pre-disarmed by their superiors. In some cases, commanders have been asked to provide lists of combatants under their command, but have left out girls and young women whom they consider dependants of male combatants.<sup>17</sup> In other cases, commanders have ordered young women to leave their weapons behind in the bush in order not to be seen as combatants in public. There are also instances of commanders hiding young women

The UN is responsible for protecting young women from abuse by its own staff members.

and even girls aged under 18, because they see them as 'wives' and claim their children, even though they are aware that their presence in the armed force or group is illegal.

Although there is no general method of

doing this at present, the ways in which young women become excluded from access to DDR programmes should be analysed and dealt with as a matter of urgency.

In the past, DDR planners and other members of the international community who carry out reconstruction activities have not helped to curb this practice of hiding young women, and have made no effort to find them, consult with them and plan for their needs, or provide secure sites for their cantonment, relocation to interim care centres and reintegration. Given the high levels of gender inequality in armed groups and forces, UN agencies involved in DDR programming are responsible for finding, identifying and securing the release of young women. The UN is also responsible for protecting young women from abuse by its own staff members.

Young women have difficulty accessing demobilization for a number of other reasons, including resistance to being recognized as combatants, because they are afraid of social exclusion and stigmatization. The opposition of male soldiers and commanders to their demobilization is also an important factor, as men may want to keep young women to make up for their loss of power after war, or use them for household and family tasks, and may claim their children.<sup>18</sup> As a result, young women may be reluctant to take their children to encampment sites, even if there are child-care facilities there.

Excluding young women, or failing to intervene when they exclude themselves from demobilization, often has many negative effects, as they will miss out on opportunities for support and empowerment. To avoid this, DDR programmes should find out about their motives for mobilizing if they were mobilized voluntarily, their various roles in armed forces and groups, and their reasons for or against demobilizing, and help them leave safely if they were abducted or forced into joining armed forces and groups. Appropriate services must be made available to meet the needs of girls and young women who may have experienced sexual and gender-based violence, or may be infected with HIV/AIDS or other STIs as a result of sexual violence. Girl mothers, and girls and young women who provide care for others not related to them must be adequately included in programmes and their health and livelihoods should be supported. Measures should be taken to empower ex-combatant young women to become valuable social, political and economic members of the new society, starting at the demobilization phase.

### 11.3. Reintegration of girls and young women

Women who participated in conflicts are confronted with a number of additional difficulties during their reintegration process, as they are often faced with the community's negative perception of their involvement.

In many societies, military activities are considered 'unsuitable' for girls. As a result, many face rejection by their families and in-laws upon return from the conflict, which means that they risk being excluded from traditional community-based social support systems. The discrimination against them as job-seekers or new entrepreneurs is also a problem, and as a result, some prefer to settle in areas where their personal history is not known — a decision that further removes them from family and community support.



Many young women former combatants have children born during the war, which may prevent their social acceptance and economic integration, and, of course, causes them additional health and psychological problems resulting from forced sexual activity, childbirth and abortion.<sup>19</sup> Carrying children born of rape, being abandoned by their 'bush husbands', or indeed, being forced into staying in illegal or socially unsanctioned marriages even if their family wants them to return are all tremendous problems. The large burden of care placed on young women makes it difficult to compensate for their lack of basic education, as they often simply lack the time, energy and/or financial means to attend the education and training courses that could improve their living conditions.

While girl combatants might have been the equals of boys as comrades in armed groups and forces, many careers are denied to them as girls during peacetime, so they are forced into a narrow range of industries and occupations that are generally lower skilled and lower paid.<sup>20</sup>

In addition, young women often face even greater discrimination than adult women in the labour market, as it is believed that they will soon get married and leave their employment or become less productive if they become pregnant or have young children. Gendering DDR has often meant only the provision of some special measures for women, such as vocational training courses in 'women's skills'. DDR programmes should, however, invest time and resources to find young women previously associated with armed groups and forces and evaluate not only their potential and their vulnerabilities, but also their dreams and ambitions. This should be done before DDR programmes are designed and started. Specific methodologies have been developed for collecting data of this type in conflict contexts.<sup>21</sup>

DDR planners should also carry out detailed assessments of the reintegration needs of girls and young women, taking into account differences in age, status in the armed forces or groups, exposure to gender-based violence, profiles and ambitions, and design assistance projects that take the problems faced by different subgroups of young women into account.

Higher-ranked young women could be offered specifically designed assistance to give them access to important jobs in the post-conflict period.

If young women are to be provided with sustainable livelihood, it is important that claims and demands for land by ex-combatants also consider their needs.<sup>22</sup> In many cases, women do not have access to land, especially if they are unmarried and have children. This is a complicated issue that needs to be explicitly dealt with in the post-conflict period, by a wide range of actors.

Finally, no reintegration processes for girls should go ahead without an analysis of, and measures to deal with, the reasons why they participated in the conflict. Young women must not be put back into abusive situations in their family or community if their reintegration is to succeed over the long term.

While girl combatants might have been the equals of boys as comrades in armed groups and forces, many careers are denied to them as girls during peacetime, so they are forced into a narrow range of industries and occupations that are generally lower skilled and lower paid.

#### 11.4. Disarmament and demobilization of young men

It should be recognized that ex-combatants as a group often largely consist of young men in their prime. As a workforce, they can contribute enormously to the huge reconstruction

challenges faced by post-war societies. If managed well, they have been very effective in the reconstruction of roads, bridges and hospitals, and in converting military installations to civilian use. Although they might need skills upgrading and psychological assistance to help change their attitudes from military ones to those of civilian employees, employers and society as a whole often underestimate what they have to offer.<sup>23</sup>

However, to improve what these young men have to offer, finding alternatives to violent ways of expressing masculinity is vital in periods of transition from war to peace. While outsiders have to struggle with the question of whether, and how much, they can and should interfere in local expressions of femininity, masculinity and gender relations, it is possible for DDR programmes to start dealing with some of the challenges related to changing violent masculinity. The process of changing attitudes to gender equality may take generations, but DDR programmes can make a small contribution to this process by developing programmes to change cultural attitudes and world-views specifically for the young generation, even if quick solutions to prevent widespread expressions of violent masculinity by youth are not possible, and the existing socio-economic environment decides to a large extent whether change is possible.

DDR programmes require the specialized services of gender experts to analyse gender relations, including masculinity, before, during and after conflict, and design suitable programmes to reinforce positive gender values. UN agencies involved in DDR also have a specific responsibility not to reinforce or even reintroduce pre-conflict gender inequalities and violent masculinity through their programmes, planning and styles of working with local communities (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

◀▶ 5.10 ■ ▶▶ 5.30

## 12. Socio-political reintegration

### 12.1. Authority and intergenerational conflicts at the community level

“It is a paradox that while children . . . are highly valued by adults, the ability, and perhaps even the interest, to care for them declines as they become adolescents. Poverty and destitution, violence, migration, AIDS, and the breakdown of the family also contribute to this [problem].”<sup>24</sup>

Social and family structures change as a result of the war, so that many youth, who have yet to find their role and place in society, lack a sense of direction and purpose. The authority of the parents (and any other form of authority, including that of the State) is destroyed. Youngsters tend to trust and respect their peers most of all, and many lose any hope of achieving their previous ambitions and projects.

“It is a paradox that while children . . . are highly valued by adults, the ability, and perhaps even the interest, to care for them declines as they become adolescents. Poverty and destitution, violence, migration, AIDS, and the breakdown of the family also contribute to this [problem].”

As DDR programmes are normally designed, judged and financed by adults, there is a tendency to take a rather paternalistic approach to youth and to exclude them from analysis and planning processes. As a result, disarmament and reintegration programmes do not deal with the issues that youth themselves feel are important, and therefore have a limited impact. Their failure shows how



important it is to understand what the aspirations of youth are, how they view the world, and how they analyse ongoing social and political processes.

Youth dissatisfaction has led to the creation of a number of youth groups in war-affected countries. While some are working to improve their communities, others are not as constructive and have been described as a grouping of youth trying to replace their elders within the current political system rather than a means to reform the system, or as a base for trouble-makers.

Before DDR programmes are established, it is necessary to study and analyse conflicts between generations in the country, which may differ from region to region and in towns and rural areas. Although youth in most countries are better educated than their parents, in several countries with long-lasting conflicts, a whole generation of illiterate youth has grown up, even though their parents were literate. The tensions between the generations in a specific country should be analysed, and reconciliation measures can be set up to improve the relationship and respect between generations. This is vital because, while no DDR programme can fully reintegrate youth, families and communities can do so.

Youth often do not have the right to speak at meetings of local community representatives, and therefore their views, needs and aspirations will not automatically be reflected in participatory processes that aim to identify possible community-based or community-driven projects. To ensure their inclusion, a deliberate effort should be made to focus on youth, especially young women, when any reintegration or recovery project is planned and implemented.

## **12.2. Voice and representation**

In many war-affected societies, youth are excluded from decision-making processes or barred from leadership roles in community forums. After serving in armed groups or forces in which they had status and even power, young ex-combatants are likely to experience a sudden drop in their influence in families and communities. Young men and women should be explicitly involved in the decision-making structures that affect the DDR process, to allow them to express their specific concerns and needs, and to build their sense of ownership of post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Furthermore, there is a tendency in most countries to fill senior political positions with older males, resulting in large parts of society not being represented, particularly young men and all women. Warring factions and violent youth gangs exploit the sense of alienation and marginalization felt by jobless and frustrated young men in many poor countries, and may at the same time create stereotypes that encourage young women to support and admire young men who turn to violence. Although girl and women combatants might have been leaders in military structures, they are seldom represented in peace negotiations. While political positions are given to their male colleagues, female military leaders are generally ignored and security-related matters such as DDR and SSR are left to men. Discriminatory gender-based power relationships are reinforced in this way, and at the same time an opportunity is missed to reassess gender relations and find ways to make them supportive of a more peaceful society. Many revolutionary movements have at first included gender equality as one of their goals, as a way of mobilizing women, but have broken their promises in peace negotiations and in the post-conflict political order, but the UN and other international organizations have also been guilty of encouraging this exclusion, because they neither bring female mediators or negotiators to the negotiating table, nor demand that women are adequately represented (i.e., that a minimum of 30 percent of those at the peace table are

women). Building on the leadership experience and status of higher-ranked female combatants by assisting them to obtain key positions in the post-conflict society will increase gender equality in the new society and provide positive role models for many other women and girls.

To overcome the problems that result when traditional leadership hierarchies go unchallenged and social structures remain unreformed, DDR planners should empower and involve youth to break the cycles of poverty, social exclusion and violence in which many are trapped. Failure to involve youth in a meaningful way in decision-making structures in the post-conflict period makes it more likely that regional and national development and peace efforts will fail. Seeing youth as positive assets for society and acting on that new perception is vital to preventing them from becoming alienated and turning to activities that destabilize society.

Providing young people with safe spaces to meet off the street where they can experience non-violent excitement can encourage the reintegration of young ex-combatants and other alienated youth into civil society by allowing them to meet with other people of their age in a non-military environment. In addition to the social benefits, these centres and clubs can help with training and employment efforts by, for example, organizing job information fairs and supporting youth in the design and implementation of their work and business plans.

Governments must be convinced that youth are an important and special category of people, and should be convinced of the 'added value' of youth involvement in reconstruction activities and of the positive reasons for investing in youth.<sup>25</sup>

It is also necessary to use an integrated and comprehensive local economic development approach that pays particular attention to young people, including young ex-combatants. The creation of a local/regional forum as a way of building consensus in a community is a useful tool, as long as efforts are made to ensure that the various groups of youth have a voice in these forums (also see IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration).

◀▶ 4.30

### **12.3. Youth and the use of harmful substances**

Many adolescents and young people are traumatized as a result of the violence they have witnessed or committed during the conflict, and some choose to 'deal' with this trauma by escaping into drug and alcohol abuse. Many have already habitually taken drugs as combatants; in some war zones, commanders routinely give drugs to youngsters to make them more obedient and reduce their resistance to committing violent acts or crimes. The future well-being of young people is badly affected because of the ongoing effects of trauma and the use of harmful substances that result, and their tendency towards violence and criminals acts is made worse.

DDR programmes should make a particular effort to deal with the issue of the harmful use of drugs and alcohol by young combatants. In many countries, the use of such substances seriously undermines the effective implementation of youth employment and reintegration programmes. Too often, young combatants are provided with money to start their businesses while they are not fully detoxified and rehabilitated from drugs they were using during combat. A fear that they are habitual drug users is also an important reason why employers are so unwilling to recruit ex-combatants (also see IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

◀▶ 5.70

### **12.4. Youth and HIV/AIDS**

More than half of those newly infected with HIV today are between 15 and 24 years old. Educating young people about HIV and teaching them skills in negotiation, conflict reso-

lution, critical thinking, decision-making and communication improve their self-confidence and ability to make informed choices about their own reproductive health.

Since the involvement of parents, extended families, communities, schools and peers is vital in guiding and supporting young people to make safe choices about their health and well-being, DDR programme planners must be careful to consult with other agencies involved in HIV prevention strategies and ensure that the health component of DDR benefits works together with other community-based strategies to avoid transmission of HIV and to care for those infected with HIV or who are AIDS patients. Studies have shown that a consistent, positive, emotional relationship with a caring adult helps young people feel safe and secure, allowing them to develop the resilience needed to manage the challenges in their lives and to protect their sexual well-being. Mentors in DDR training programmes should therefore be trained as educators and counsellors on HIV.

Young women are much more likely to be infected with HIV than are young men, especially when they live in conditions of poverty, are being exploited by older men, or carry out sex work to survive. Nonetheless, interventions to control HIV must aimed at both boys and girls. Proper respect for each other can protect both young men and young women from the dangers of forced or unwanted sex and enable them to feel comfortable discussing sexual matters and negotiating safety and protection.

Youth-friendly services within DDR programmes should offer treatment for STIs and access to condoms, and help young people become responsible for their sexual and reproductive health. Voluntary and confidential HIV counselling and testing services allow young people to find out their HIV status and to choose safe ways of behaving, whether they are uninfected or infected.<sup>26</sup>

## 13. Beyond DDR

### 13.1. Youth development policies

Youth development policies generally include different combinations of social, economic, environmental and health objectives relating to young women and men. In some countries, youth programmes focus on education and training; in others, they focus on youth, sports and other recreational activities, cultural heritage, prevention of substance abuse and HIV/AIDS, and population planning. The variety of approaches is reflected in different institutional frameworks that include several ministries — such as education, health, labour and sports — and, in some countries, a ministry of youth affairs. Some governments make employment a part of their overall youth development planning. Working according to the human life cycle (see figure 1, above), a number of related employment issues (education, training and entrepreneurship) are dealt with to assist the integration of youth into the labour market.

Youth-focused DDR programmes should develop their short-term security and development strategies to fit in with national youth policies and programmes. This requires emphasis on capacity-building to strengthen national ownership of these programmes. Partners include the ministry of labour (especially the employment services section); the ministry of defence; the ministries of youth, health, gender/family, housing, and sports; the ministry of education (including the vocational training service, especially for youth on-the-job training programmes); vocational training providers; business training providers; chambers of commerce and business associations; private sector actors that can create apprenticeship places; microfinance institutions; and national commissions/committees on reintegration.

Without input from a wide range of sources, youth programmes started as part of the DDR programme will be unsustainable. Youth-focused DDR programmes may develop these inputs in the following ways:

- Provide advisory services to government on youth policies within the framework of DDR, but also as part of the overall reconstruction process;
- Restart and improve higher education to prevent further 'brain drain' from the region and to encourage the return of more highly educated refugees and members of the diaspora as teachers, trainers and entrepreneurs. It is crucial to have highly educated youth who have the potential to fill leadership positions in the public and private sectors in the future;
- Develop the entrepreneurial potential of the large number of youth who are active in the informal economy and reduce their vulnerability. The informal economy has been termed informal because it is not recognized or protected under legal and regulatory frameworks, and workers in this sector are extremely vulnerable. The quality of work in the informal economy is usually substandard compared with recognized, protected, secure, formal employment;<sup>27</sup>
- Assist governments to review legislation to make sure that it provides adequate protection and support for young people. Ways of enforcing these laws must also be in place, as should authorities that young people can safely turn to when their rights have been violated;
- Assist governments to design suitable macroeconomic policies in combination with programmes dealing with the specific problems faced by youth. A macroeconomic framework using fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate growth and employment-intensive investments is essential;
- Assist governments to make equal opportunities for young women and men an important part of all public policies, especially in education, training and employment. Governments should combat wage discrimination, enforce policies that control sexual harassment, support young women's efforts to organize and ensure adequate protection against exploitation;
- Develop partnerships for action at the national level, including both governments and employers', workers' and youth organizations, but also alliances and networks at the international and regional levels, to encourage the exchange of experience, good practices and resource mobilization;
- Invite young people into decision-making processes and, more importantly, listen to and act upon their advice. Participation and being able to exert real influence have positive effects on people's sense of belonging, the legitimacy of policies and programmes, and their ultimate success;
- At the global level, international agencies should collaborate within the UN Secretary-General's Youth Employment Network (YEN). International organizations such as the ILO and the World Bank should assist and support, if requested, the efforts of governments to carry out national youth employment reviews and action plans, and carry out global analysis and evaluations of progress being made.<sup>28</sup>

### 13.2. National stakeholders

Unfortunately, youth policies are often drawn up by different institutions with little coordination among them. For this reason, there should be much more cooperation among these

institutions, with different responsibilities assigned to different actors. Specific goals should be set and programmes designed so that they work together and support each other. Many problems confronting youth are complex, yet interrelated, and need integrated solutions that support each other.

The setting up of a national commission on DDR (NCDDR) allows the process of co-ordination and integration to take place, creates synergies and will help to ensure continuity in strategies from DDR to reconstruction and development. To ensure that youth issues are effectively dealt with, the NCDDR should make sure that a wide range of people and institutions take part, including representatives from the ministries of youth, gender, family, labour, education and sports, and encourage local governments and community-based youth organizations to play an important part in the identification of the specific youth priorities, in order to ensure bottom-up approaches that encourage the inclusion and participation of young people. A coherent set of policy objectives must be drawn up, and a strategy and action plan for young people developed on the basis of the priorities and aspirations identified by youth. A committee that includes young people among its members and that aims to find and create decent work for youth — within the organizations represented on the committee and in the local community — should be set up.

Beyond the specific matters dealt with by the NCDDR, a broader framework for social dialogue is important in the development of policies for the socio-economic reintegration of youth. Dialogue has a positive effect on the legitimacy and ownership of policies, and increases the likelihood that the needs of youth will be met. The involvement of employers' and workers' organizations in designing and implementing programmes for youth makes it more likely that they will be sustainable.

Employers' organizations are an important partner, as they may identify growth sectors in the economy, and provide assistance and advice to vocational training agencies. They can help draw up a list of national core competencies or curricula and create a system for national recognition of these competencies/curricula. Employers' organizations can also encourage their members to offer on-the-job training to young employees by explaining the benefits to their businesses such as increased productivity and competitiveness, and reduced job turnover and recruitment expenses.

Trade unions should identify and share examples of good practice for organizing and recruiting young people. These include youth-recruiting-youth methods, networks of young trade union activists for sharing experiences, and other informal networks for exchanging information. Youth committees and working groups from different unions should be set up in order to share information, identify the needs and problems of young people, and implement relevant policies and strategies. Young members can learn from other unions about how to open up job opportunities and improve working conditions. Tripartite consultations and collective bargaining can be used by unions to pressurize governments and employers to deal with questions of youth employment and make youth issues part of policies and programmes. It is also a good idea to work with governments and workers' organizations to develop and implement strategies for youth reintegration that everyone involved supports. Decent work for youth can be made part of collective agreements negotiated by unions.

Unions can also provide advice on workplace issues and proposed legislation, support and encourage the provision of social protection for both young people and adults, put pressure on employers and employers' organizations to prevent child labour, and make sure that young workers are informed about their rights and the role of trade unions.



The private sector can play an important role in the DDR process, not only through employers' organizations, but also because individual companies can contribute to the economic reintegration of young people. There are a great many potential initiatives that the private sector could contribute, ranging from strategic dialogue to high-risk arrangements.

The private sector should sponsor scholarships and support education by, for example: sponsoring young people working toward higher qualifications that provide relevant skills for the labour market; sponsoring special events or school infrastructure, such as books and computers or other office equipment; and establishing meaningful traineeships that provide young people with valuable work experience and help them reintegrate into society. The private sector should also be encouraged to support young entrepreneurs during the critical first years of their new business; large firms could introduce mentorship or coaching programmes, and offer practical support such as providing non-financial resources by allowing young people to use company facilities (fax, Internet, printer, etc.), which is a low-cost yet effective way of helping them to start their own businesses or apply for jobs. Volunteer work at a large business provides young entrepreneurs with valuable expertise, knowledge, experience and advice. This could also be provided in seminars and workshops. The private sector can also provide start-up capital, for example, by holding competitions to provide young people who develop innovative business ideas with start-up funding.

Networks of small businesses run by young people should be helped to cooperate with each other and with other businesses, as well as with institutions such as universities and specialized institutions in particular sectors of the economy, so that they can compete with large, well-established companies better. They can cooperate and reduce costs by sharing the costs of buying more expensive equipment, as well as experiences and knowledge.

Finally, public-private partnerships could assist demobilized youth, e.g., by working together to provide employment service centres for young people. Training centres, job centres and microfinance providers should be linked to members of the private sector, be well informed on the needs and potential of youth, and adapt their services to help this group.

In a post-conflict environment, youth organizations, working with other civil society groups, often have the potential to direct the energy and ability of young people towards rebuilding a prosperous and fair society. Youth organizations should be set up to help the reintegration of young ex-combatants into civil society by allowing them to meet with other people of their age in a non-military environment. Youth solidarity can mean that ex-combatants, regardless of what they did during the conflict, are more easily accepted by people of their own age than by other groups in society. Peer-to-peer counselling at youth centres can support the social and economic reintegration of young ex-combatants, as they are familiar with current youth culture and attitudes and therefore can gain the respect and attention of former fighters. Youth clubs and centres can be focal points for training and employment efforts by offering computer or language classes, and training in essential professional skills such as management or communications; organizing job information fairs; and enabling young people to design and implement their own youth projects, etc., in an environment that is safe and friendly. Finally, youth organizations can help change perceptions of young people's role in society by presenting them as positive role models through their active participation in community projects that benefit wider society. Not only can they stimulate social dialogue as a way of linking young people, civil society, and political organizations and actors, but they can also enable young people to participate in societies that have so far largely denied them the influence that their numbers and roles in society (as breadwinners, fighters and parents) should justify.

Conflict, however, severely reduces the ability of youth organizations to carry out their functions effectively, and in most post-war situations they often have only limited access and resources, and lack the capacity to mobilize and become active partners in the transition and reconstruction process. The UN should work to support the capacity-building of youth organizations and insist on their active participation in DDR processes, although a careful assessment of their ideology should be carried out first.

### **13.3. Coordination and implementation**

With so many different stakeholders, coordination is essential to achieving long-lasting solutions to the problems of youth DDR. A system of coordination that brings different actors together from the planning and design stage of DDR programmes will also achieve increased credibility and be in a better position to effectively implement and monitor programmes and policies. The YEN has a good track record of combining and using the skills and experience of many different partners at the national, regional and international levels. For example, the YEN provides the opportunity for setting up broad national coalitions of young people, civil society and government to sit around the table and discuss youth employment, within DDR programmes, in an integrated way, and also to make use of regional and international partnerships for knowledge sharing and capacity-building.



## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Absorption capacity:** The ability of a community, economy and/or country to include ex-combatants as active full members of the society. Absorption capacity is often used in relation to the capacities of local communities, but can also refer to social and political reintegration opportunities.

**Business development services:** A set of ‘business services’ that include any services that improve the performance of a business and its access to and ability to compete in markets.<sup>29</sup>

**Employability:** A combination of skills, knowledge and attitudes that improve a person’s ability to secure and retain a job, progress at work and cope with change, secure alternative employment if he/she so wishes or has been laid off, and enter more easily into the labour market at different periods of his/her working life.

**Receiving communities:** The communities where the ex-combatants will go, live and work. Within this concept, often the social network of a small community is referred to, and also the bordering local economy.

**Vulnerability:** The high probability of exposure to risks and reduced capacity to overcome their negative results. Vulnerability is normally classified as sociocultural and economic. In the light of DDR, the term vulnerability is used in relation to the risk of socio-economic exclusion.

**Working age:** The Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) contains provisions aimed at protecting young persons against hazardous or exploitative activities or conditions of work.<sup>30</sup> It requires the setting not only of a general minimum age for admission to work — which cannot be less than age 15 and, according to its accompanying Recommendation No. 146, should be progressively raised to age 16 — but also of a higher minimum age of 18 for admission to work likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons.

**Worst forms of child labour:** The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) aims at putting an end to the involvement of all persons under age 18 in the harmful activities it lists. Forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict is part of forced labour and listed as one of the worst forms of child labour.

**Youth:** Within the UN system, young people are identified as those between 15 and 24 years of age. However, this can vary considerably between one context and another. Social, economic and cultural systems define the age limits for the specific roles and responsibilities of children, youth and adults. Conflicts and violence often force youth to assume adult roles such as being parents, breadwinners, caregivers or fighters. Cultural expectations of girls and boys also affect the perception of them as adults, such as the age of marriage, initiation and circumcision practices, and motherhood. Such expectations can be disturbed by conflict.

**Youth Employment Network (YEN):** A partnership under the leadership of the UN, the World Bank and the ILO that brings together leaders in industry, youth, civil society representatives and policy makers to tackle the issue of youth employment at the global, national and local levels.

### Abbreviations

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/standards

<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>NCDDR</b>	national commission on DDR
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>SIYB</b>	Start and Improve Your Business
<b>SSR</b>	social security reform
<b>STI</b>	sexually transmitted infection
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>YEN</b>	Youth Employment Network

## Annex B: Examples of youth-focused interventions

### Example 1: Radios in Congo

In Ituri, Congo, youth radios have been successful in encouraging inter-ethnic dialogue, and have also been the centre of the United Nations Development Programme/Norwegian Agency for Development AIDS prevention programme. Radios can allow a fairly large number of young people to express themselves, and can show them and their audience that there is something more than the militias, and that the various activities discussed provide alternative potential occupations.

### Example 2: Targeting young ex-combatants and youth in situations of risk in Kosovo

To deal with the training and employment needs of youth in situations of risk in post-conflict Kosovo, including demobilized young combatants, the ILO implemented a pilot integrated employment and training programme, including cost-sharing arrangements with private enterprises hiring young people facing discrimination and social exclusion.

Managed by the local employment services, the programme consisted of comprehensive employment counselling and career guidance for young people, participation in competency-based training courses, subsidized wage employment in private enterprises and the establishment of cooperatives for youth. Before they were recruited, most of the beneficiaries had no, or limited, work experience and some were receiving social assistance benefits. Nearly all the companies that employed young people voluntarily renewed their employment contracts after the incentive period (ranging from 12 to 24 months) was over.

The programme also included a capacity-building component and technical assistance for public employment service staff in: the identification of youth in situations of risk; use of the best counselling and guidance skills and techniques for working with disadvantaged youth; persuading employers to hire 'hard-to-place' workers; and monitoring and evaluating effectiveness and impact. One of the tools developed by the Ministry of Labour with the technical support of the ILO is a labour market information database that links the network of employment offices and matches job applicants with vacancies. The system can look for certain characteristics, such as type of disadvantage, age or sex, and assist the most vulnerable groups to find employment and training opportunities.

Given the success in creating permanent and quality employment for youth in situations of risk, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare decided to expand the programme in order to reach a greater number of vulnerable young people.<sup>31</sup>

### Example 3: Youth voice in the promotion of peace and democracy in Sierra Leone

The United Network of Young Peacebuilders Sierra Leone Network was established in 1992. In 2002 it organized the first post-conflict nationwide gathering of 70 youth leaders. The conference discussed reconciliation, leadership and NGO/project management and made a contribution to the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001–2010).

### Example 4: West African Youth Network

The West African Youth Network, established in 2001, is based in Liberia. It operates as an advocacy mechanism and a voice influencing public policy and advancing the causes of

young people in West Africa. It empowers them to get involved in practical projects dealing with peace-building, human rights, conflict resolution, good governance and HIV/AIDS prevention.

## Annex C: Programmes focusing on labour demand for youth: Opportunities and challenges

PROGRAMME	OPPORTUNITIES	CHALLENGES
Temporary public works and community services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Help youth enter the labour market</li> <li>■ Improve physical and social infrastructure, especially if combined with (local) development strategies and policies for particular sectors</li> <li>■ Increase employability if combined with training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Low labour market integration capacity</li> <li>■ Young workers can be trapped in temporary public works programmes</li> <li>■ Often biased against women and girls</li> </ul>
Wage incentives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Can create employment if designed to meet specific needs (e.g., compensate for initial lower productivity and training) and help groups of disadvantaged youth (e.g., unskilled persons or those with disabilities)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ High losses and substitution effects (if not carefully designed)</li> <li>■ Employment may last only as long as the subsidy</li> </ul>
Encouragement of entrepreneurship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Can have high employment potential [bullet]May meet youth aspirations (e.g., flexibility, independence)</li> <li>■ More effective if combined with financial and other services, including mentoring</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Can cause displacement</li> <li>■ May have high failure rate that limits the capacity to create sustainable employment</li> <li>■ Often difficult for youth owing to lack of networks, business experience, know-how and collateral</li> </ul>

Source: International Labour Organization, *Starting Right: Decent Work for Young People*, background paper for the tripartite meeting on 'Youth Employment: The Way Forward', Geneva, 2004.

## Annex D: Managing the socio-economic reintegration of young ex-combatants: Key aspects

<b>Characteristics of young ex-combatants</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ age (at the time of recruitment and at the time of demobilization)</li> <li>■ sex</li> <li>■ psychosocial status</li> <li>■ physical conditions (e.g., disability) and health status (e.g., HIV/AIDS)</li> <li>■ literacy, education and skills levels</li> <li>■ socio-economic background (before and after the conflict)</li> <li>■ presence of dependants</li> </ul>
<b>Reintegration environment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ political priority</li> <li>■ family reunification</li> <li>■ community involvement in the reintegration process</li> <li>■ economic opportunities</li> <li>■ legal, social or cultural restrictions placed on employment or education due to ex-combatant's sex and social gender expectations</li> </ul>
<b>Factors affecting socio-economic reintegration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ behaviour and aspirations</li> <li>■ time spent in the military</li> <li>■ reasons for joining the armed force/group and type of recruitment (voluntary or forced)</li> <li>■ roles assigned in the military</li> <li>■ demographic trends</li> <li>■ aggregate demand</li> <li>■ labour market institutions and regulations</li> <li>■ education and training outcomes</li> <li>■ work experience</li> <li>■ entrepreneurship options</li> <li>■ representation and voice</li> </ul>
<b>Socio-economic reintegration</b>	<p>Labour supply (employability):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ transition to peace programmes (e.g., discharge programmes, life skills training)</li> <li>■ catch-up education</li> <li>■ vocational education and training</li> <li>■ work experience</li> <li>■ self-employment and entrepreneurship training</li> </ul> <p>Labour demand (employment opportunities):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ priority given to pro-employment and pro-youth approaches (general)</li> <li>■ private sector development (general)</li> <li>■ sectors with high youth employment elasticity (specific)</li> <li>■ recruitment quotas for young ex-combatants in publicly funded tenders (specific)</li> <li>■ labour-intensive infrastructure reconstruction and development</li> <li>■ community services (targeted)</li> <li>■ local economic development in receiving communities</li> <li>■ job-placement programmes and other incentives (targeted)</li> <li>■ incentives for self-employment and microenterprise development, including cooperatives (specific)</li> </ul>
<b>Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ coordination of several government agencies at national and local level.</li> <li>■ involvement of employers' and workers' organizations communities and the civil society, including associations of youth and war veterans</li> </ul>

## Annex E: Further reading

Abbink Jon and Ineke van Kessel (eds), *Vanguards or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa, African Dynamics*, Vol. 4, Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2005.

Achio, Françoise and Irma Specht, 'Youth in Conflict', in *Jobs after War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*, Eugenia Date-Bah (ed.), ILO Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction, Geneva, 2003, pp. 153–166.

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), *Training and Education on Small Arms*, module on 'Youth and Small Arms and Light Weapons', BICC, Bonn, 2005.

Boyden, Jo and Joanna de Berry (eds), *Children and Youth on the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conflict and Displacement*, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 2004.

Brett, Rachel and Irma Specht, *Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight*, ILO, Geneva, 2004.

Corbanese, Valli and Gianni Rosas, *Youth Transition to Decent Work: Evidence from Kosovo*, ILO, Geneva, forthcoming.

International Labour Organization (ILO), *Improving Prospects for Young Women and Men in the World of Work: A Guide to Youth Employment*, ILO, Geneva, 2004, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/yen/download/guidelines.pdf>.

——, *Starting Right: Decent Work for Young People*, background paper presented to the tripartite meeting on youth employment, 'The Way Forward', Geneva, 2004.

Kemper, Yvonne, *Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of International Organizations*, Berghof Report No. 10, Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, January 2005.

United Nations, *The Global Situation of Young People*, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 2003.

——, *World Youth Report 2003*, report of the Secretary-General, 2004.

——, *United Nations World Youth Report 2005*, Report of the Secretary-General, A60/61; E2005/7, 2005.

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC), *Untapped Potential: Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict: A Review of Programs and Policies*, WCRWC, New York, January 2000.

——, *Youth Speak Out: New Voices on the Protection and Participation of Young People Affected by Armed Conflict*, WCRWC, New York, September 2004.

Youth Employment Network (YEN), Web site, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/yen/>.



## Annex G: Tools and training materials

In addition to the tools and guides listed in IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR, IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR and IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, which will also be of relevance to youth, the following tools are also available through the IDDRS resource centre:

Brewer, Laura, *Youth at Risk: The Role of Skills Development in Facilitating the Transition to Work*, Skills Working Paper No. 19, ILO, Geneva, 2004, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/crisis/download/gender3.pdf>.

International Labour Organization (ILO), *Handbook on Modules of Employable Skills Training*, ILO, Geneva, 1992.

——, *Community Based Training for Employment and Income Generation: A Guide for Decision-makers*, ILO, Geneva, 1994.

——, *Community Based Training for Employment and Income Generation: A Training Manual*, ILO, Geneva, 1997.

——, *Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-combatants*, ILO, Geneva, 1997.

——, *Introduction to Microfinance in Conflict-affected Communities: A Training Manual*, ILO/ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva, 2002.

——, *Local Economic Development in Post-crisis Situations: An Operational Guide*, ILO, Geneva, 2004.

Other relevant material is available from:

- Youth Employment Network;
- UN Children's Fund;
- UN Development Programme.

## Endnotes

- 1 See Annex E for preliminary statistical data on youth in DDR programmes.
- 2 Excellent examples of participatory research methods exist; see, for example, research conducted by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children.
- 3 See Brett, Rachel and Irma Specht, *Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight*, ILO, Geneva, 2004.
- 4 ILO, *Starting right: Decent Work for Young People*, background paper presented at the tripartite meeting on youth employment, 'The Way Forward', Geneva, 2004, p. 40.
- 5 See ILO, *Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-combatants*, Geneva, 2003, annex 2 (c): 'Labour market analysis support document'; and ILO, *Guidelines for Establishing Emergency Public Employment Services*, Geneva, 2003. The school-to-work-transition survey is a generic statistical tool that could also be adapted to analyse the post-conflict youth labour market. For more information on this tool, see <http://www.ilo.org/youth>.
- 6 ILO, *Working out of Poverty*, report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference 91<sup>st</sup> Session, ILO, Geneva, 2003, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc91/pdf/rep-i-a.pdf>.
- 7 International Crisis Group, *Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils*, Africa Report No. 75, Freetown/Brussels, 30 January 2004, p. 24.
- 8 See ILO, *Meeting the Youth Employment Challenge: A Guide for Employers*, ILO, Geneva, 2001.
- 9 'Youth Unemployment Workshop', Goree Institute, Goree, Senegal, 12–13 February 2004, summary of discussion, 2004.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Among several business training methods, Start your Business, for start-ups, and Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) help train people who train entrepreneurs and, through this multiplier effect, reach a large number of unemployed or potential business starters. SIYB is a sustainable and cost-effective method that equips young entrepreneurs with the practical management skills needed in a competitive business environment. It has been successfully used in DDR programmes. If the illiteracy rate among young combatants is very high, other methods are available, such as Grassroots Management Training.
- 12 ILO, *Consolidated Outcome of the High-Level Panel's Working Groups on Employability, Equal Opportunities Employment Creation and Entrepreneurship*, draft for discussion at the Second Meeting of the High-Level Panel of the Secretary-General's Youth Employment Network, ILO, Geneva, 30 June–1 July 2003.
- 13 *Towards a Global Alliance for Youth Employment: The Next Five Steps*, recommendations on policy and process 2003–2005 of the Second Meeting of the High-Level Panel of the Secretary-General's Youth Employment Network, 30 June–1 July 2003, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/yen/download/outcome.pdf>.
- 14 Picker, Marie-Claire, *What Is the Theater of the Oppressed?* <http://www.toplab.org/docs/WITTOTO.htm>.
- 15 'Youth Unemployment Workshop', op. cit.
- 16 Brett and Specht, op. cit.
- 17 De Watteville, Nathalie, *Demobilization and Reintegration Programs: Addressing Gender Issues*, Findings, No. 227, World Bank, 2003, <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/English/find227.pdf>.
- 18 Brett and Specht, op. cit.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Date-Bah, Eugenia, 'Women and Gender Concerns in Post-conflict Reconstruction and Job Promotion Efforts', in *Jobs after War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*, Eugenia Date-Bah (ed.), ILO, Geneva, 2003, pp. 111–152.
- 21 For example, ILO's methodology designed for profiling child soldiers in the Great Lakes region, as presented in ILO, *Wounded Childhood: The Use of Armed Children in Armed Conflict in Central Africa*, ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva, April 2003, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipecc/publ/childsoldiers/woundedchild.htm>. A more qualitative method was developed by Brett and Specht, op. cit., and can be found in appendix 1, pp. 137–162.

- 22 Gleichmann, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson, *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*, Swedish National Defence College, Norwegian Defence International Centre, GTZ and Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2004.
- 23 Specht, Irma, 'Jobs for Rebels and Soldiers', in *Jobs after War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*, Eugenia Date-Bah (ed.), ILO, Geneva, 2003, p. 100.
- 24 Abbink, Jon, 'Being Young in Africa', in *Vanguards or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa*, Jon Abbink and Ineke van Kessel (eds), African Dynamics, Vol. 4, Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2005, p. 2.
- 25 Curtain, Richard, *The Case for Investing in Young People as Part of a National Poverty Reduction Strategy*, paper commissioned by the United Nations Population Fund, New York, n.d., [http://www.curtainconsulting.net.au/download\\_controlled/Youth%20&%20Development/InvestinginYoungPeopleCurtain14Oct04.pdf](http://www.curtainconsulting.net.au/download_controlled/Youth%20&%20Development/InvestinginYoungPeopleCurtain14Oct04.pdf); Knowles, James C. and Jere R. Behrman, *Assessing the Economic Returns to Investing in Youth in Developing Countries*, HNP Discussion Paper, IBRD/World Bank, Washington, DC, March 2003, [http://www1.worldbank.org/hnp/Pubs\\_Discussion/Knowles-AssessingTheEconomic-whole.pdf](http://www1.worldbank.org/hnp/Pubs_Discussion/Knowles-AssessingTheEconomic-whole.pdf).
- 26 See UNICEF, UNAIDS and WHO, *Young People and HIV AIDS: Opportunity in Crisis*, 2002.
- 27 ILO, *Consolidated Outcome of the High-Level Panel's Working Groups on Employability*, op. cit.
- 28 ILO, *Improving Prospects for Young Women and Men in the World of Work: A Guide to Youth Employment*, ILO, Geneva, 2004, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/yen/download/guidelines.pdf>.
- 29 Gasser, Martin, Carmela Salzano, Roberto Di Meglio and Alfredo Lazarte-Hoyle, *Local Economic Development in Post-crisis Situations: Operational Guide*, Geneva, ILO, 2004, p. 231.
- 30 Protection of youth and employment promotion are two major aspects of the mandate assigned to the ILO by its Constitution that are reflected in a number of international labour standards adopted over the years. For more information, see ILO, *Starting Right*, op. cit.
- 31 Corbanese, V. and G. Rosas, *The Transition of Young People to Decent Work: Evidence from Kosovo*, ILO, Geneva, forthcoming.

# 5.30 Children and DDR

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#### NOTE

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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## 5.30 Children and DDR

### Summary

This module on children and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is based on relevant provisions of international law, field experience and lessons learned by the United Nations Children's Fund and its partners over the past 15 years in its programmes for the prevention of recruitment and the demobilization and reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups.

There is a growing international consensus that the forced or compulsory recruitment of children — girls and boys under the age of 18 — and their use in hostilities by both armed forces and armed groups is illegal and one of the worst forms of child labour. The recruitment and use of children under 15 is a war crime. This consensus is expressed in a comprehensive set of international legal instruments, such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, and is reinforced by a series of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions (for a detailed normative and legal framework, see Annex B).

Unlike adults, children cannot legally be recruited; therefore, measures that aim to prevent their recruitment, or that attempt to reintegrate them into their communities, should not be viewed as a routine component of peacemaking, but as an attempt to prevent or redress a violation of children's human rights. This means that child DDR is not the same as that for adults. Rather, it is a specific process with its own requirements, several of which are fundamentally different from adult demobilization programmes.

Child DDR requires that the demobilization (or 'release') and reintegration of children, especially girls, be actively carried out at all times, even during a conflict, and that actions to prevent child recruitment should be continuous. When DDR exercises have made the presentation of a weapon for disarmament as a criterion for eligibility for DDR, children, especially girls, have been excluded — whether intentionally or not. Because children are associated with armed forces and groups in a variety of ways, not only as combatants, some may not have access to weapons. These children must still be considered child soldiers, released by the groups that recruited them, and receive reintegration support.

Child DDR has a different scope and time-frame from that for peacekeeping operations and national reconstruction efforts. It must not wait until a mechanism for adult DDR is established. Efforts should be made to ensure that child DDR is not contingent on adult DDR or the conclusion of broader security sector reform (SSR) and power-sharing negotiations, because interdependency between child and adult DDR programmes has negative consequences for children associated with armed forces and groups. Children should not be exploited by being recruited in order to swell the ranks of armed groups who have over-reported their numbers, as a way of influencing power-sharing agreements. It is also essential to protect child DDR structures and mechanisms from setbacks in SSR reform, including a lack of funding, so that child DDR continues to take place even if progress on adult DDR is slow. Equally, because children can be associated with armed forces and groups in a variety of ways, child-specific DDR mechanisms should remain in place after national reintegration

of adult soldiers is complete. This will ensure that all children associated with armed forces and groups — not just those who fought as combatants — can benefit from the process.

Peace processes offer an opportunity to highlight the needs of children affected by armed conflict, and their rights should be identified as an explicit priority in peacemaking, peace-building and conflict resolution processes, both in the peace agreement and in DDR plans. The commitment to stop the recruitment of children and to release children from armed forces and groups, with specific attention to girls, should be stated within peace agreements.

Child-specific reintegration shall allow a child to access education, a livelihood, life skills and a meaningful role in society. The socio-economic and psychosocial aspects of reintegration for children are central to global DDR programming and budgeting. Successful reintegration requires long-term funding of child protection agencies and programmes to ensure continuous support for education and training for children, and essential follow-up/monitoring once they return to civilian life. For sustainability, and to ensure that the whole community can benefit from a child's return and reintegration, while avoiding tension, stigmatization or envy when a child is returned to a village with a reintegration package containing material goods that are unavailable to others, reintegration must be based on broader community development processes. There is no simple formula for the DDR of children that can be routinely applied in all circumstances, so each programme needs to be context-specific and developed and managed in order to be sustainable.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module provides policy makers, senior management, operational staff and DDR officers with guidance on the planning and implementation of a child-specific demobilization and reintegration programmes for children associated with armed forces and groups in a peacekeeping environment. It covers guiding principles, definitions, the role of child protection agencies and key issues to be covered when designing and implementing programmes for the release and reintegration of children in times of continuing conflict and the prevention of (re-)recruitment, with specific attention to girls.

The module is intended to be applied specifically in a peacekeeping environment, i.e., with a peace accord providing the overall framework for DDR operations. It can also be used more generally, as a response to the specific needs of children in post-conflict environments.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."



### 3. Introduction

Girls and boys under the age of 18 are involved in most major conflicts in the world today, associated with both government armed forces and non-State armed groups. Children typically represent 10 to 50 percent of the armed forces' or groups' strength.

Child recruitment into armed forces and groups is illegal in international law. Therefore, child demobilization (or 'release') and reintegration is a human rights issue and is not contingent on any other political negotiation. The mechanisms and structures for the release and reintegration of children should be set up before a formal peace agreement is signed, a peacekeeping mission deployed and an adult DDR structure established. Progress should be made by armed forces and groups on child release before more complex and national processes begin, such as SSR.

Children should not be included in the count of members of any armed force or group at the time of SSR or power-sharing negotiations, and apparent legitimacy should not be given to child recruitment through the integration of children into adult DDR processes, even though, for the purposes of planning the budget and the DDR programme itself, children should be included in the count of persons qualifying for demobilization/release and reintegration assistance.

Sufficient funding for child DDR should be made available to child protection agencies through a funding mechanism that is independent of, and managed separately from, adult demobilization, and specialized child protection agencies should be called upon for the necessary political, technical and operational leadership within the framework of the UN mission or the UN country team.

While DDR programmes in general must include the community to which former combatants return, child-specific programmes must in particular be community-based so that adequate services are provided to communities to enable them to care better for children. Because conflicts affect all children in the countries where they occur, communities may resent any special attention given to children associated with armed forces and groups, especially when cash allowances are given to such children at the time of demobilization. To avoid problems, it is important to ensure that the work of child protection agencies and programmes in communities includes all children, is independent and flexible, does not stigmatize children formally associated with armed forces and groups, and builds and reinforces community-based solutions and capacities.

### 4. Background

Armed forces and groups recruit children for many reasons. When conflicts last a long time, fewer adults may volunteer to fight. Children may be unprotected because there may be no national legislation dealing with the use of children as soldiers, or it may not be enforced or understood. Children may be easy to hide in armed groups or forces, because the birth registration system may be inefficient or identity documents may not be available. Both girls and boys can be associated with armed forces and groups in various ways: they can be present in command posts; as part-time informers, cooks and porters; or as combatants. Girls, who can make up a large proportion of recruits, are vulnerable to recruitment because of gender expectations that they can do any kind of useful work. They perform a variety of functions, including forced sex work, although they are rarely acknowledged and even less often taken into consideration in demobilization and reintegration processes. Small arms and light weapons can be easily handled by children, and children can be easily manipulated

to use weapons, so armed groups usually carry out a systematic strategy of recruitment and training to ensure that children become completely dependent on them.

Recruitment — whether into governmental forces or armed groups — can take various forms: the abduction of children from schools, public markets and streets; parental or community pressure; media manipulation; recruitment by force; recruitment to escape from poverty; and lack of alternative opportunities. Very often, a child's need for security leads him/her to join an armed force or group to find protection. Children might also wish to be associated with armed forces or groups because of political or ideological motivations; cultural, social and economic exclusion; family, community or peer pressure; idleness; lack of educational opportunities; a lack of peaceful and safe ways to participate in civic life; the attraction of powerful arms; the need for protection, care and belonging; the wish to escape a difficult environment; or a desire for justice or revenge.

Regardless of the kind and level of involvement of children in armed forces and groups, their recruitment has many consequences, both in the short and long term, for them, their families and their communities. Children in armed forces and groups are exposed to extreme physical and emotional risks, are often neglected, can be abused and mistreated, and can witness or become involved in killings, rapes, etc. The environment in which they operate, their often-bad living conditions, and the training they receive all seriously hinder their development.

Prevention of recruitment, and the demobilization and reintegration (PDR) of children is a continuous, ongoing process, and reintegration programmes should offer viable alternatives to military life for all war-affected children. The aim of PDR programmes for children associated with armed forces and groups is to ensure their effective and sustainable reintegration. The elements of the process work together and support each other: prevention is an ongoing activity supported by reintegration; demobilization is a tool to achieve reintegration; and reintegration aims to prevent re-recruitment.

## 5. Guiding principles

### 5.1. Guiding principles from the Convention on the Rights of the Child

The following guiding principles should be applied at all stages, from situation analysis through to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programme:

- *The child's right to life, survival and development:* The right to life, survival and development is not limited to ensuring a child's physical well-being, but includes the need to ensure full and harmonious development, including at the spiritual, moral and social levels, where education plays a key role;
- *Non-discrimination:* States shall ensure respect for the rights of all children within their jurisdiction — including non-national children — regardless of race, sex, age, religion, ethnicity, opinions, disability or any other status of the child, the child's parents or legal guardians;
- *Child participation:* Children should be allowed to express their opinions freely, and those opinions should be "given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child". Children should be consulted at all stages of the demobilization and reintegration process, and actions that affect them should be in their best interests and take into account their needs and concerns. In particular, children should participate in making decisions concerning family reunification, and career and educational opportunities;

- *The child's best interests:* Actions that affect the child should be based on an assessment of whether those actions are in the child's best interests. A child should participate in determining what is in his/her best interests.

Actions that affect the child should be based on an assessment of whether those actions are in the child's best interests. A child should participate in determining what is in his/her best interests.

## 5.2. Programming

When programmes are developed, the following issues should be considered.

- *Technical and operational leadership by specialized child protection agencies:* Prevention, demobilization and reintegration programmes for children — girls and boys — require a specialized approach, and child protection agencies shall provide the required technical and operational leadership in decision-making and programme implementation;
- *Ensuring inclusive programming for all war-affected children:* Conflicts harm all children, whether they have been recruited or not. An inclusive approach that provides support to all war-affected children shall be adopted to encourage reintegration, avoid stigmatization or a sense that children formerly associated with armed forces and groups are privileged, and prevent further recruitment;
- *Ensuring age-appropriate interventions for each age group:* Wherever possible, children should be provided with an opportunity to access formal education. Where this is not possible, appropriate income-generating opportunities will have to be developed, while non-formal and informal learning opportunities may also be offered to children;
- *Strengthening existing local capacities:* Programmes aimed at children associated with armed forces or groups require a longer implementation period than others during a peace-keeping operation. Their long-term success depends on the capacities of local actors and communities, which can be strengthened by, for instance, involving them in the prevention of child recruitment. Training and monitoring should be offered by field agencies, along with advocacy at various levels of national structures;
- *Participatory and decentralized consultation* should be encouraged so that common strategies can be designed and programmes can be more responsive to local realities. National frameworks, including guiding principles, norms and procedures specific to the local and regional contexts, should be established. Clear roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder, including engagement and exit strategies, should be agreed upon by all actors;
- *Government should be a key partner/owner* in the official overall DDR process, in order to ensure long-term sustainability. The level of responsibility and national ownership will depend on the context and the terms of the peace accord. PDR requires that basic social services be efficient, sustainable, and designed and implemented so that they achieve what they are meant to achieve. Appropriate ministries, such as ministries of education, social affairs, families, women, labour, etc., as well as any national DDR commission that is set up, need to be involved in the planning and design of PDR programmes;
- *Systems of coordination and information-sharing systems* must be established and continuously implemented, so that all concerned parties can work together and support each other, particularly in the case of contingency and security planning;
- *Training in all matters relating to children* should be provided for all personnel (civilian and military) involved in the operational aspects of DDR programmes. Training should increase awareness of children's rights and protection, and it should empower people

to monitor violations and uphold the principles laid out in the Secretary-General's bulletin on *Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*. Given the high turnover of peacekeeping staff, training should be ongoing, and should be provided automatically to newly arrived personnel. Child protection advisers play a key role in ensuring that this training is carried out effectively within a peacekeeping mission;

- *Staff should gather and process information on children* when creating databases, while obeying ethical rules and maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the security of the children and their relatives. Government armies often try to obtain military information on armed opposition groups from demobilized children. This is illegal, places children in danger and undermines the demobilization process. A clear commitment shall be obtained from governments that military information will not be sought from children under any circumstances;
- *Protective rules have to be established* when collecting testimonies from children through post-conflict justice mechanisms, a truth and reconciliation commission, or the International Criminal Court. It is essential to protect the identity of child witnesses, not to require children to re-live traumatic experiences as they testify, and to make it clear in criminal cases that their testimony may or may not succeed in convicting the accused, so that they do not have unrealistic expectations;
- *The media should respect rules governing reporting on and interviewing children*. Particular attention should be paid to making the media aware of the consequences of discussing sensitive issues that could have implications for the reintegration of children, e.g., HIV prevalence rates (real or perceived) among demobilized children;
- *The reintegration of children is a long-term process*: Demobilization and reintegration programmes for children should be expected to extend over a period of five years or more, and require sufficient funding early on in the process in order to build capacity, especially in the community to which a child returns. Immediate start-up financial support should be made available to child protection agencies, and independent and flexible mechanisms are required to allow separate child demobilization and reintegration activities where needed.

### 5.3. Situation analysis

A detailed situation analysis of the country should examine:

- the root causes of the conflict;
- the ideology, command structure/management/hierarchy of the armed group or force;
- the circumstances, patterns, causes, conditions and extent of child recruitment;
- the emotional and behavioural consequences of children's living conditions and experiences;
- the attitudes of families and communities regarding the conflict, and the extent of their resilience and capacities;
- the extent of children's participation in armed forces and groups;
- children's expectations (see Annex C).

Emphasis is often placed on the need to estimate the numbers of children in armed forces and groups in order to plan actions. While this is important, policy makers and planners should also recognize that it is always difficult to obtain accurate figures. Inaccurate estimates during planning should not prevent programmes from being implemented,

however. DDR personnel should also be aware that the act of recording children's and communities' wishes can in itself raise expectations, which can only be managed by being honest about what services or assistance may or may not ultimately be provided.

#### 5.4. Planning

Planning includes — but is not limited to — carrying out the situation analysis; developing ways to implement the programme, and to monitor and evaluate it; specifying the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders; making sure that funding is sustainable; and developing strategies of engagement and exit. The best interests of the child should guide all assumptions and decisions made during planning.

Outside of an official national DDR operation, unplanned, spontaneous self-demobilization may take place as a result of opportunities arising from the geographical, political, security or even health conditions of armed forces and groups, and this should be taken into account in the planning process. Contingency plans should be established and sites and equipment for the reception of released children pre-located, if this is feasible. Agencies should ensure that community reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are in place throughout the conflict area, and should encourage the population to identify and deal with the needs of displaced children and those who leave an armed force or group on their own initiative in order to return directly to their communities or find refuge elsewhere. Flexible planning is needed to allow children to receive reintegration support in any places where they look for help, such as churches, health centres and so on. If a child has successfully found help by him-/herself, it may be in the best interests of the child to remain outside a formal DDR programme rather than be uprooted when formal reintegration takes place. In such cases, community-based approaches to reintegration should help ensure that the child continues to receive proper care and assistance.

#### 5.5. Communication and awareness-raising

Awareness-raising and communication are essential at all stages and levels to manage expectations and create clear lines of communication among all actors involved in DDR. This involves exchanging and listening to opinions, and not misleading or manipulating people's opinions for political advantage. Be wary of members of armed forces and groups and DDR actors making promises to children that cannot be kept. Communication programmes must be active and constantly ready to respond to changing events, perceptions or declarations, so that the DDR process can continue in the best possible conditions. Strategies should include providing opportunities for people to ask questions about the DDR process, and involve credible and legitimate local actors (community leaders, etc.).

Awareness-raising should target the following groups with specific information:

- *Children* should receive information about their rights and the DDR process that they can understand, so that they can become positively engaged in the process;
- *Members of armed forces and groups and actors in the demobilization exercise* must not make promises to children about DDR that cannot be kept;
- *Armed forces and groups* should receive information on the rule of law and child protection, including the prohibition of child recruitment and its harmful consequences, so that they release all boys and girls without threatening them or making unrealistic promises, and do not try to re-recruit them;



- *Families, communities and civil society in general* should receive information about children's rights and protection, the demobilization process, the living conditions of children associated with armed forces and groups, and the difficulties they face, so that they can play a protective and supportive role in the children's reintegration. Community sensitization activities help to ensure that the communities' expectations are realistic before a former child soldier returns;
- *DDR staff (national and international)* should be aware of children, especially girls, in armed groups and forces, understand what steps to take to obtain their immediate release and know how to assist them after release.

## 5.6. Advocating for children's needs to be taken into account at peace negotiations

Parties to a conflict rarely acknowledge the presence of children in their ranks, so children are often excluded from the benefits linked to DDR. Despite declarations of intent, the issue of children is often neglected during negotiations to set up a general DDR programme. UN personnel shall actively call for children's needs to be taken into account in peace negotiations, and make sure that this does in fact happen.

Advocacy of this kind aims to keep the issue of child soldiers on the agenda of peace negotiations and to ensure that the roles played by girls and boys in conflict situations are identified and acknowledged from the moment the negotiations start. Children's rights and protection should be explicitly discussed during the negotiation of peace accords and enforced in peacekeeping and conflict resolution processes, including DDR programmes. Advocacy for this should take place at all levels, through both formal and informal discussions; UN agencies, foreign missions, donors and representatives of parties should be involved; and it should be linked to existing civil society actions if possible.

The unconditional release of all girls and boys associated with armed forces and groups should be stated in peace agreements. The willingness of parties to a conflict to release children early and to stop further child recruitment should be a way of measuring the seriousness of their commitment to peace negotiations.

## 5.7. Access of children to DDR programmes

Children, especially girls, are not always considered to be full members of an armed force or group; nor are DDR staff properly trained to identify them and cater for their needs. As a result, children do not get access to essential services. Sometimes children themselves do not want to be identified as coming from an armed force or group, in order to avoid discrimination against them. Some may not know they have the right to benefit from any kind of support (e.g., children who flee and hide, and consider themselves deserters). The challenge is to encourage girls and boys to benefit from DDR programmes while avoiding any damaging effects.

To achieve this, those in positions of authority over children (e.g., government ministries, child-focused non-governmental organisations and child protection agencies) should monitor the recruitment of children in order to understand recruitment patterns and the roles played by children, and to gain direct and free access to them. This is necessary to allow authorities and agencies to collect information concerning the child's release and to implement child-specific programmes. These authorities can raise awareness among children, the military and other DDR actors about the services available and how to access them, and establish procedures to identify boys and girls associated with armed forces and groups.

## 5.8. Criminal responsibility

Former child soldiers are victims of criminal policies for which adults are responsible. Any judicial proceedings for children should take place in the context of juvenile and restorative justice in order to assist children's physical, psychological and social recovery, in line with article 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Mitigating circumstances should be taken into account, and children shall not be prosecuted or detained for military crimes (such as desertion, insubordination, etc.) or for criminal acts committed while associated with armed forces or groups. The detention of a child shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time (CRC, art. 37).

While some processes of determining accountability serve the best interests of a child that has carried out a crime, international child rights and juvenile justice standards require that alternatives to normal judicial proceedings in criminal courts should be applied, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected (CRC, art. 40[3b], rule 11, 'Beijing Rules') (see Annex B). For example, restorative justice — achieved through finding alternatives to criminal courts — involves the child offender understanding and taking responsibility for his/her actions and it also aims to achieve reconciliation among the offender, the victim and the wider community through reparations.

## 6. Girls

Girls are recruited and abducted by armed groups and forces to perform specific functions, but they can also take on the same responsibilities as boys. Gender inequality makes girls vulnerable to abduction or forced recruitment, as well as sexual violence within armed groups and forces. Indeed, violence supported and carried out by the State, including sexual violence by State forces; the absence of educational opportunities; mistreatment or exploitation in the family; a lack of opportunities to attend school, earn a livelihood or express themselves; negligence; and a need for improved security and empowerment are all factors that make girls vulnerable to recruitment. Therefore, prevention strategies for girls need to take into account that girls' vulnerability, while similar to that of boys, is not exactly the same.

Particular attention should be given to respecting girls' rights and ensuring their access to basic services in order to build and sustain a 'protective environment' by:

- ensuring government commitment to girls' rights and building capacity to uphold those rights;
- introducing legislation and enforcing it, especially to create and protect gender equality for children, as well as adults;
- protecting children's rights, especially the right of girls to bodily integrity, education and health care, and providing essential services to support these rights;
- ensuring participatory discussion with girls about programmes designed for their reintegration, as called for in Security Council resolution 1325;
- providing children with life skills and knowledge, especially to counter gender-based violence;
- building the capacity of families and communities to take care of and encourage girls;
- monitoring, reporting and overseeing all programmes for girls, including monitoring staff (national and international) responsible for caring for girls, and taking speedy action to punish abusers.



## 6.1. Identification and access to demobilization processes

Guaranteeing girls' access to PDR programmes is a major challenge. Like women, girls are generally 'invisible' and neglected, both by members of armed forces and groups and by DDR planners and programme staff. DDR planners have been unaware of the presence and roles of girls associated with fighting forces, are ill informed about appropriate responses to their needs, and therefore often design programmes that unintentionally prevent girls' entrance to these programmes and damage their chances of long-term recovery. At the same time, members of armed forces and groups are increasingly aware of the fact that the use and recruitment of children is a violation of international law, and they try to hide all children associated with their fighting forces and groups. Members of armed forces or groups are often reluctant to give up their girl captives, who may be serving them as forced wives and domestic servants. One of the biggest security threats at cantonment sites is fights between family members who have come to rescue captured girls and commanders who claim these children as wives: family members are often forced to retreat because of the threat of violence against them. Another important problem is that girls often do not know about, or do not wish to come forward for DDR, because of shame or fear of being punished. Thus, PDR programmes for girls must be designed to minimize shame and stigma and to maximize security.

DDR personnel should always assume that girls are present in armed forces and groups, even if they are not visible. No distinction should be made between combatants and non-combatants when eligibility criteria are determined, as these differences are unclear in armed forces and groups where children, and girls in particular, perform numerous combat, combat support and non-combat roles that are essential to the functioning of the fighting force. To make DDR programmes more gender-sensitive, women's groups should be involved in raising awareness about the programmes, female staff should be recruited, all staff should be trained to deal with girls and know how to assist girl and young mothers in particular, and respected members of the community (both men and women) should be involved in mediation to release girls, in particular, from armed groups and forces. Training on gender equality should be provided to staff and others working with demobilized girls and boys.

Mechanisms should be developed to find girls and inform them about the benefits they might be entitled to through PDR, and girls should be able to access PDR programmes and benefits in other ways than through cantonment sites; e.g., through institutions they are already involved with and other groups or organizations that focus on their needs, such as health care facilities (particularly those dealing with reproductive health), religious centres and organisations that assist survivors of sexual violence. Finally, specific attention needs to be paid to girls' health and psychological needs, as they are far more likely than boys to have been subjected to sexual violence, sometimes over long periods of time.

## 6.2. Cantonment sites and temporary facilities

In cantonment sites, girls are particularly vulnerable, because most sites are designed to attract and house large numbers of adult male combatants. The construction of such sites tends to allow or even encourage the exploitation and abuse of women and girls, e.g., through lack of adequate protection measures; overcrowded conditions; poor lighting; lack of safe spaces and privacy for girls; the expectation that they will cook, which requires them to fetch wood and water from outside the camp boundaries; and so on. Moreover, girl and young mothers struggle to properly take care of their children in cantonment sites, as most sites make no provisions for infants or young children (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR).

To minimize these problems, the time spent by girls in cantonment sites should be as short as possible (days not weeks), and the transfer of girls and mothers with young children to temporary or interim care centres (ICCs) should happen immediately. Women and girls must be represented on the management committees of cantonment sites. Separate accommodation must be provided for females, with specific health services, including reproductive health services, separate washing and toilet facilities, hygiene kits adapted to their needs and clean birthing kits. Since a number of the girls are likely to be mothers, sites should also be designed to provide proper food and health care for infants and young children, with child-care assistance provided for mothers unable to care for their children. Particular attention should be given to the safety and protection of girls in cantonment sites, through measures such as regulated access of male former combatants to the sites, proper lighting, and regular surveillance and patrolling by security forces in which women are a majority. Girls should know they have the right not to be abused and that they have the right and ability, through adapted and efficient reporting and complaints mechanisms, to report abuse.

Abuse, particularly sexual abuse, and exploitation by adults is a possible threat at all stages of the DDR process, including in cantonment sites and ICCs, but remains hidden because girls are reluctant or afraid to report it. When girls do report abuse or exploitation by staff or adult caregivers, they should not be stigmatized or made to feel 'disloyal' in any way, and their complaints must be acted on immediately through mechanisms designed and put in place to protect them from such exploitation and to punish the offenders to the fullest extent possible. Mechanisms should be established to prevent offenders from working again with girls (and boys) in similar situations.

In the transit facilities and during the follow-up in their community of return, if girls say they want such a service, they should be given space and time to share their emotions and reflect on their experiences to health workers trained in psychotherapeutic assistance. In general, and particularly in the transit facilities, children should see equal relationships between men and women, based on dignity and respect: this modelling is important for helping children to adapt to a peacetime environment. In the transit facilities, night accommodation for girls should continue to be separate from that of boys, and girls' facilities should still be protected with adequate lighting near all toilet and shower facilities. Appropriate recreational activities should be provided so that girls and boys are not idle.

If children are placed with caregivers who are not their relatives during the transition period, particular attention should be paid to the safety and protection of girls through careful selection of caregivers, close follow-up and monitoring, and the availability of secure and confidential reporting mechanisms for those who feel unsafe.

### **6.3. Reintegration support**

Reintegration is the most difficult phase of any DDR process. Girls face great difficulties during the process of being accepted back into their families and communities, with girl mothers and their children experiencing the highest levels of rejection and abuse upon return. Girls have complex relationships with men within the fighting forces, including their former captors, during reintegration phases; these relationships need to be dealt with in sensitive ways to ensure that the girls' rights are upheld and that they remain secure. Many girls want to return to their education or receive training to be economically self-sufficient.

In some instances, girls associated with armed forces and groups may have had the same responsibilities as boys (e.g., taking part in decision-making, having subordinates,



Adolescent boys, among them former child soldiers, learn to make machetes during a vocational training workshop run by the UNICEF-assisted Family Homes Movement of St. Peter's Church in the town of Calaba, a suburb of Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1998. Photo: R. Grossman, UNICEF

experiencing some independence, sometimes learning a trade). If so, the reintegration environment may be disappointing and limiting, as it may not offer them as much independence and the same right to self-expression. Girls may feel dissatisfied with the traditional expectations of their community of return.

To assist them concretely and help them to learn how to cope, the plans for the reintegration of girls should be decided with their full participation, should be shaped by what they want to do with their lives, and, if applicable, should build on any skills they developed during their time in the armed force or group. Throughout, there should be a focus on encouraging girls to be independent, and developing their ability to make decisions and build up their self-esteem. Girls need to be shown respect and given responsibilities and tasks valued by the community, and should be provided with education and professional training activities adapted to their situation and appropriate to the local economy. Relationships between girls and older women in the community should be encouraged if this is helpful to the girl.

Where appropriate, girls should be encouraged to learn non-traditional skills; but this may mean that reintegration opportunities in rural areas are too limiting, offering little opportunity for growth and adaptation to civilian life. If so, girls should be encouraged to reintegrate in a town or city.

#### **6.4. Violence, sexual abuse and exploitation**

Sexual abuse and exploitation in humanitarian crises is a serious and widespread problem, and violates not only the physical integrity and security of individuals, but also their dignity and sense of self-worth. Gender-specific forms of violence result from unequal power relationships, often exacerbated in times of widespread and systematic violence and mass

displacement, which lead to the breakdown of traditional family and social structures and values, and the weakening or loss of legal and governance systems. The economic and social inequalities confronting women and children increase their risk of exploitation by those in positions of power, particularly in State and non-State armed groups and forces where interpersonal relationships are characterized by violence, dominance and a lack of discipline.

As soon as possible after their release from an armed group or force, and then for as long as necessary, girls who survived sexual violence, abuse and exploitation should receive medical and psychosocial care. This care shall include a long-term commitment to the welfare of the child, including girls who are HIV-positive or living with full-blown AIDS. Confidential services should be offered to survivors by staff trained to protect their dignity and security.

Sexual and physical abuse of girls in fighting forces and groups is widespread. Cantonment sites and ICCs should, without exception, provide medical health screening, including sexual health screening, to all girls, and provide necessary treatments. Girls should be assisted by staff trained to deal with children who may be unable or unwilling to describe their symptoms.

Whether or not they have been abused, social practices and cultural beliefs about the sexual purity of females mean that girls are much more likely than boys to be stigmatized when they leave an armed force or group. Caregivers in the environment to which they are returning should be sensitized so they can actively work to counter and reduce this stigma, and in some cases, communities should not even be told that girls were associated with an armed group or force, provided the girls themselves know where to go if they need help.

All UN staff, including peacekeeping forces, shall be aware of, and are required to abide by, the Secretary-General's bulletin on *Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*. All staff should receive training on the six core principles of the code of conduct developed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in Humanitarian Crises. These principles include a prohibition against any form of sexual activity with children, regardless of the age of majority or age of consent in a particular country. Believing that a child is over the age of consent is not a defence. UN staff members are prohibited from exchanging money, employment, goods or services for sex.

## **6.5. Girl mothers and their children**

Girl mothers and their children are particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, and should be cared for with particular attention paid to the protection of the children. On release, children of girls associated with armed forces and groups should be registered, where birth registration is available, to allow them to gain access to basic services.

After return to civilian life, even when families are ready to accept the return of girls, these girls may be reluctant to accept their own children, who may have been born of rape, or else they may reject them because their fathers are unknown or from the opposing forces. A warm reception is the best guarantee that a girl will remain with her family, so families and communities should be sensitized about the vulnerabilities of girl mothers and their children and encouraged and assisted to protect and support them. Particular support should be offered to families to protect girls and their children from being re-abducted into marriages that have not been recognized through customary and national law.



If, however, sensitization and mediation processes do not succeed, girls may choose to leave their family and move to towns or cities where they are less likely to be stigmatized and they may have greater access to organizations offering support. Girl mothers see access to education for themselves and their children as a priority, and want to find a job that enables them to support themselves and their children. They also see reliable access to community health services and psychosocial support as a priority. To prevent cycles of violence, girl mothers should be enabled to learn positive parenting skills so their children grow up in a nurturing household that is free of violence (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR).

◀▷ 5.10

◀▷ 5.20

## 7. Prevention of recruitment and re-recruitment of children

Prevention of recruitment should take place continuously throughout a conflict, and programmes should be based on an analysis of the dynamics of recruitment and its underlying causes, and include an advocacy strategy that is directed at all levels of governance. Prevention of (re-)recruitment of children can start at any time, and should continue well beyond adult DDR. Although difficult, it is possible to carry out prevention activities during an ongoing conflict.

### 7.1. Documentation and identification of risks of recruitment

Many emergencies create favourable conditions for recruitment: insecurity, displacement, breakdown in family and social structures, family separations, erosion of traditional value systems, a culture of violence, weak governance, absence of accountability, lack of access to basic social services, etc. Some children are particularly vulnerable to recruitment because of inadequate protection, such as children living in conflict zones, child refugees or those



Marc, 14, was forcibly recruited into a rebel faction army spending six months in a training camp before being demobilized. Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003. Photo: C. Nesbitt, UNICEF

who have been internally displaced, unaccompanied children, orphans or those separated from their families, and children with very young parents. Careful analysis of the situation, attention to children most at risk, and an understanding of the various risk factors are essential measures to help prevent recruitment; and although preventive activities are difficult to develop, they are effective in the long term.

Girls and boys are at greater risk of being recruited in certain locations, such as zones of intense conflict; areas frequently crossed by troops; and public places with concentrations of children such as markets, schools, refugee camps or camps for internally displaced persons, and places where children go to fetch wood or water. All necessary measures need to be taken to avoid the separation of children from their families, particularly whenever populations are in transit to displacement camps, and to support families and communities working to prevent the displacement of children.

## **7.2. Prevention of recruitment through the creation of a protective environment**

Certain forms of recruitment are used more intensely and in a more focused way, according to geographical areas and political, social, economic and cultural realities. Understanding this allows for the development of activities to help create a vigilant environment that protects all children from recruitment and use in armed conflict. Supporting families and/or establishing community-based child protection networks for the care and protection of children within communities is an effective preventive measure.

Child recruitment is not always a sudden occurrence, but can take place gradually, progressing from initial contact into formal association. Children may start with occasional visits to the camps of armed forces or groups to look for food, polish shoes or carry out other tasks. Increasingly, they are given more responsibilities, then may seek shelter at these camps, and eventually start to take part fully in military life. Preventing this kind of ‘voluntary’ recruitment is a specific challenge, so action should be taken to avoid children having any contact and any form of association with an armed force or group, even if it appears harmless.

## **7.3. Sensitizing combatants, ex-combatants and commanders**

Members of armed forces or groups may express regret for recruiting children, often arguing that they were unfamiliar with legal norms and unaware of its harmful effects on child development. However, awareness that child recruitment is illegal may also lead them to actively try to hide children, especially girls. Regardless of how the child was originally recruited (voluntarily or by force), or any perceptions about the strategic value of children to an armed force or group, its adult members should be made aware of, and be responsible for, preventing the negative effects of militarization on children. Combatants, ex-combatants and their commanders should be sensitized and informed, whether during the time they spend in demobilization sites or before their integration into new security forces, of protection measures and the prosecution of anyone who violates children’s rights. This sensitization and training of adults in armed groups and forces to child-related issues means that they can no longer justify the recruitment of children, and makes the environment safer for children.

## **7.4. Community-level advocacy**

Communities and the family can prevent a child’s association with armed forces and groups. Protecting communities and working with them to identify how to protect children

and understand why children might join armed forces and groups, explaining the developmental effects of children joining armed forces and groups, and assisting these communities with the development and establishment of community-based child protection networks will all help prevent recruitment.

### **7.5. National-level advocacy against recruitment**

Advocacy directed at national decision makers raises awareness of the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, and can lead to new laws being introduced, including such measures as the ratification and implementation of international legal instruments on child protection, or the reinforcement of these legal instruments; the adaptation of laws related to the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict; and the end of impunity for those who recruit and/or use children in armed conflict. Appropriate sanctions can then be implemented and enforced against people who continue to recruit children.

### **7.6. Security sector reform**

Where a national security sector reform (SSR) programme is carried out after DDR, the composition of new security forces is frequently negotiated according to the numbers of combatants in each faction. Children are often included in these figures. Negotiations on SSR and force reduction must include releasing all children and ensuring that they are not counted, because the presence of children is illegal and including them may encourage more recruitment of children in the period before negotiations, in order to increase the numbers of armed groups and forces to achieve political advantages.

The establishment or strengthening of child protection services and legal and police support services for children should receive specific focus in SSR processes.

### **7.7. Monitoring and reporting on the use and recruitment of children**

Paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) requests the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring and reporting system for children affected by armed conflict. The new mechanism requires both governments and armed groups to use time-bound plans of action to end the use and recruitment of child soldiers, and requires the UN system to monitor and report on serious violations against children, including the killing or maiming of children; the recruitment or use of child soldiers; attacks against schools or hospitals; rape and other forms of sexual violence; abduction of children; and denial of humanitarian access. The resolution requires that this mechanism should operate with the participation of, and in cooperation with, the national government of the country concerned and relevant UN and civil society actors. The monitoring mechanism will be reviewed in July 2006, and a report of the Secretary-General will be submitted to the Security Council in November 2006. Application of the monitoring mechanism will begin with parties in situations of armed conflict listed in the annexes to Secretary-General's report S/2005/72 that are on the agenda of the Security Council: those in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan; and then, in close consultation with the countries concerned, it will apply to parties in other situations of armed conflict listed in the annexes to report S/2005/72: those in Colombia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Uganda.



The resolution also established a Security Council Working Group (para. 8) to which the mechanism will report. The Working Group will review progress in the development and implementation of action plans called for in paragraph 5 (a) of Security Council resolution 1539 (2004), which called on the parties concerned to prepare concrete, time-bound action plans to halt the recruitment and use of children in violation of international obligations.

## 8. Disarmament and demobilization

Article 6 of the Optional Protocol to the CRC asserts that: “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service”.

Demobilization is, however, a transition point during which children face pressure, abuse and uncertainty about the future. Conflicting information can confuse or mislead a child and raise unrealistic expectations, while programme mismanagement can jeopardize his/her progress. A full understanding of the circumstances affecting the decisions a child makes is necessary, e.g., is a commander of the armed force or group making unrealistic promises to a child? Is the child being threatened with punishment if he/she ever talks about revealing his/her experiences?

Agreeing on child-specific demobilization procedures serves two purposes: (1) it avoids further possible abuse and exploitation of children, especially for political or tactical gain; and, (2) it prepares children for separate and specific child-related reintegration programmes.

### 8.1. Disarmament

Children with weapons should be disarmed, preferably by a military authority rather than a child protection agency, but need not prove that they know how to use a weapon. Eligibility should never be based on the handing in of a weapon or proof of familiarity with weaponry, because not all children have used a weapon or been a combatant while in the armed forces or groups, and children should enter the demobilization and reintegration process irrespective of whether they present themselves at the assembly points with weapons or ammunitions. They should be given the option of receiving a document certifying the surrender of their weapons if there is a procedure requiring them to do so, and if this is in their best interests, i.e., if it can protect the child against any doubt over his/her surrender of the weapon, but not if it will be seen as an admission of guilt and participation in violence in an unstable or insecure environment.

### 8.2. Cantonment and interim care centres

The time spent by children in cantonment sites should be as short as possible, and every effort should be made to identify and register them, and supply them with their immediate needs rapidly. Where possible, children should be identified before arrival so that the documentation process (identification, verification, registration, medical needs) and other procedures that apply to them in the reception and care phases last no longer than 48 hours, after which they should be transferred to an ICC or to another location under civilian control.

Admission lists of children that are submitted by commanders should be treated warily and supported by a screening system that is established before individuals go through verification processes. Children should be separated physically from adult soldiers, and a



security system should be established to prevent adult access to them. Girl mothers, however, should not be separated from their children. In situations of forced marriage, girls and young women should remain secure and separated from their partner, to give them time both to be reunited with family members and to think about whether or not to rejoin their partner. Violent protests from men separated from their 'wives' should be expected and planned for. Assembly areas and cantonment sites for girls should be far enough from conflict zones to ensure security for children and prevent re-recruitment. Trained child protection staff should carry out activities aimed at children.

ICCs are not necessary in all DDR situations, especially when a placement there delays family and community reunification. However, they can be used when necessary, as they provide a secure space to help children cut their links with armed groups and forces, allow time for family tracing and verification, and allow medical support to be provided.

ICCs should be run in the same way as cantonment sites, with the same rules of staffing, care and security in place and an emphasis on removing children to their families or alternative care solutions as quickly as possible. Only children under 18 should be accommodated in ICCs, and they should be grouped according to age (unless they are girl mothers). Tracing, verification, reunification and monitoring should be carried out at ICCs to allow the return of children to their communities (including community outreach). Health check-ups and specialized health services should be provided, e.g., reproductive health and antenatal services, diagnosis of sexually transmitted infections, and voluntary and confidential HIV testing and counselling, while nutritional deficiencies and war-related injuries should receive treatment. Children should receive counselling, including help to overcome trauma, develop self-esteem and learn life skills; learn about reintegration and livelihood opportunities; and receive peace education and training in non-violent conflict resolution to help them regain a sense of the social norms and routines of civilian life. Age- and gender-appropriate



sports, cultural and recreational activities should be provided to keep children occupied and help them build trust, but there should be no formal education or training activities apart from assessments of literacy.

The following table gives the advantages and disadvantages of ICCs:

ADVANTAGES OF ICCs	DISADVANTAGES OF ICCs
■ Provide a stable and protected temporary environment	■ Assistance channelled to ICCs reduces assistance available to families and communities
■ Allow for medical treatment and the identification of other specific needs	■ The impact on the child (positive or negative) has not been definitively proved
■ Provide first steps in breaking ties to a military hierarchy	■ May discourage a family from assuming responsibility for a child
■ Provide time for family tracing, verification, and community sensitization and preparation	■ May unnecessarily delay family or community reunification and reintegration
■ Allow for in-depth reintegration planning	■ Create the temptation to provide longer-term support, which delays reintegration

### 8.3. Transition from military to civilian life

Transition from military to civilian life may be difficult for children, because in spite of the difficulties they encountered, they may have found a defined role, responsibility, purpose and power in an armed force or group. For children who have been in an armed force or group for many years, it may at first seem impossible to conceive of a new life; this is parti-



A man instructor teaches girls to prepare straw for weaving in a vocational training workshop at a centre run by the Christian Brothers, a local NGO that works with unaccompanied, abused and street children, as well as former child soldiers, in the southern town of Bo, Sierra Leone, 1998. Photo: G. Pirozzi, UNICEF

cularly true of younger children or children in armed forces or groups that have been indoctrinated to believe that the military life is best for them.

Agencies must work together to give priority to physically removing children from contact with adult combatants, and a quick and clear-cut break with the military must take place, which can be made real to the child concerned by symbolic actions such as the removal of military clothing. Providing civilian documentation such as identity papers is also symbolic, and may in some circumstances help the child reintegrate more easily. Children, especially girls, need immediate reassurance that there are fair and realistic alternatives to military life and should receive information that they can understand about the programmes, benefits and entitlements of DDR, as well as the different steps of the DDR process.

Programmes aimed at children associated with armed forces and groups cannot deal with the needs of adults who have been recruited during their childhood, though it is important to recognize the harmful effect that recruitment had on their development. Those who are near 18, especially young adults with infants, need special assistance (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR).

#### 8.4. Spontaneous demobilization

An estimated 30 percent of child combatants never enter formal DDR, either because they are not aware of their rights, or choose to go to places that they recognize as providing safety, or because they are deliberately excluded — as is often the case with girls who are



victims of forced marriages, children who have fled the armed force or group, and those who went through a demobilization process, but did not receive any support for reintegration. Flexible systems should be put in place to link to other reintegration and recovery procedures and activities, so that children who demobilize spontaneously can also benefit from the care and protection services they need.

Children who have already found their way back home to their families and communities should under no circumstances be removed in order to enter cantonment sites and join a formal demobilization process. Instead, these children must be helped through alternative community-wide reintegration programmes that are designed both to reduce disruption in the lives of children previously associated with armed groups and forces and to benefit other war-affected children around them.

### **8.5. Cash payments and benefits packages**

Whereas DDR programmes have, in the past, concentrated mainly on providing immediate transition benefits for adults, child-focused programmes make a longer-term commitment to reintegration. When adult compensation packages were provided to children in the same way as to adults, these longer-term reintegration objectives were not achieved. Indeed, the general population — who themselves were in need of assistance — regarded with hostility and suspicion children who received adult compensation packages, and thought that they were being rewarded for the time they had spent with an armed force or group. In some cases, the promise of demobilization payments and benefits has actually acted as an incentive for children to join armed groups and forces, or led to other forms of corruption such as commanders forcing children to share their transitional allowance, taking a child's weapon to give to family members so they can claim benefits, or selling weapons to children to get them into DDR programmes for a share of the benefits.

To avoid situations like these, no monetary payments should be given to children during the demobilization phase. Children, families and communities should be clearly informed about the benefits provided by programmes during the reintegration phase, and they should understand who these benefits are for, and why. All benefits and services should support the development of the child within the community.

### **8.6. Documentation**

Official documentation marking their demobilization may help to protect children from abuse by authorities or armed forces and groups that are still active. However, staff should ensure that such documents cannot be wrongly seen as an admission of guilt or wrongdoing, especially in situations of ongoing conflict or self-demobilization. Official identification documents certifying their demobilization can be provided to children when this protects them from re-recruitment and assures them access to reintegration programmes. Civilian documents proving the identity of the child with no mention of his/her participation in an armed force and group should be made available as soon as possible.

### **8.7. Transport**

Children are particularly vulnerable when their physical protection is no longer secured, mainly during troop movements between camps and cantonment sites or between cantonment sites and transitional structures. Sufficient, appropriate and secured means of transportation

Jean, 16, the first of seven children, was forcibly recruited into a rebel faction army when he was 14, serving five months before he escaped. "One week later, the military came to fetch me, saying that I was a deserter", Jean reports. Escaping again, he went to Goma to secure a demobilization order so he could return home. Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003. Photo: C. Nesbitt, UNICEF



should be planned in order to transport them in the shortest time possible, and they should be attended by civilian child protection staff. Children should be informed, clearly and in advance, of all movements arranged for them.

### 8.8. Data management

Information on children's identity, their family, the history of their recruitment and their special needs should be collected as early as possible and safely stored. Standards of information management and common procedures should be developed for all actors involved with data-gathering from children, including strict rules of confidentiality to ensure their protection. All children should be informed in their mother tongue about why information is being collected, of its confidentiality, and about what will happen to them at each stage of the process, and they should give their consent for the use of information they give. Female staff should hold individual interviews with girls away from their superiors, peers or 'husbands'.

Some information can be sensitive, and children who provide it might be subjected to threats or pressures. Since they are usually fully aware of the threats they face, they may provide misleading information to try and protect themselves. Their fears should be identified and measures developed to deal with them, and staff should pay attention to, and have plans to safeguard children from, anyone who might intimidate or threaten them.

Information collected from children should be used only for counselling and family tracing activities carried out by specialized agencies, with the child participating in the research as much as possible. No information should be extracted from them regarding their stay in the ranks of armed forces or groups, and no authority (whether governmental or not) should be allowed to obtain from any child military intelligence relating to military movements, location of weapons or any similar matters.

## 8.9. Family tracing and reunification

Family tracing should be started at the earliest possible stage and can be carried out at the same time as other activities. Family reunification will follow after mediation and an assessment of the situation to ensure that it is quick, but thorough enough not to threaten or cause discomfort to the child. Children can feel worried about returning to their family or community because of acts they might have committed during their time with fighting forces or armed groups, or for any number of other reasons, e.g. those who committed acts of violence against their families and/or communities; and girls who have been victims of sexual violence, abuse or exploitation, especially if they have children born from those experiences, are most at risk.

The approach to tracing and family reunification shall be based on the *Inter-agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children*.<sup>1</sup> Family reunification is not simply a matter of returning a child to its family, but requires mediation, including ceremonies of return if the people concerned want them to take place, to help the family recognize and deal with problems of alienation, addiction, aggression and resistance to civil forms of authority, and involve them in decisions regarding the child's readaptation, education, learning and training. Children need to be reassured that their families want them back and accept them as they are. Assistance should not only consist of money and other forms of material assistance, but also include social support and follow-up.

In some cases, family reunification may not be in the best interests of the child, because of difficult security or family conditions that do not provide the child with any protection. It should also be recognized that poor family conditions may have been the reason why the child left and joined the armed forces or groups in the first place. If these conditions remain unchanged, children are at risk of being re-recruited.

Children who have become heads of households may become afraid and feel abandoned; therefore, if possible and desirable, they should be reunited with a relative other than a parent or, if necessary, fostered by a member of the extended family or another reliable adult caregiver, to re-establish family ties and social links. Placing a child with a family is better than placing it in an institution, or, of course, losing children to street life. However, when children — and girls in particular — are placed outside their own families, they need more follow-up care and monitoring to ensure they are not being subjected to violence, abuse or exploitation.

Institutionalization is harmful for children, and this option should be a last resort, although for adolescents who find it difficult to reintegrate into a family other than their own, placement in a small group care situation, a live-in apprenticeship or supervised independent living can be the best thing for them.

### Finding out a child's age

#### What is the issue?

It is a serious breach of international humanitarian law, human rights law and international criminal law to use children as soldiers under the age of 15, and in most circumstances to use children under 18. The use of children as soldiers, and therefore also their demobilization, is as a result not only an issue of peace and security, but one of protecting children's human rights.

It is important to manage the identification and separation of children in a coordinated way. Failure to do so may lead to serious unintended consequences, such as the re-recruitment of children, recruitment of children not formerly associated with armed forces and groups, children claiming to be adults and adults claiming to be children.



### **The UN's advocacy position**

No person under 18 shall be recruited into or used in armed forces or groups. Plans for immediate and long-term reintegration of all persons must be made at the same time as the disarmament and demobilization process in order to avoid real or perceived fears arising that unequal benefits are provided to different age groups.

### **Local customs and traditions**

In accordance with the standards of international law, the age of a person must be the key factor in deciding whether he/she is considered to be a child or not, rather than what is considered to be the customary understanding of childhood or adulthood in his/her culture. Reintegration schemes shall be designed to ensure that appropriate support is provided to children as persons under the age of 18.

### **Implications and challenges**

Children may be tempted to claim to be older than they are if they believe this will lead to extra benefits and, similarly, some people aged over 18 may claim to be younger than this. Fairness in the handling of persons of different age groups reduces any tension surrounding the removal of children from armed groups or forces.

### **Principles**

Technical and operational leadership in relation to determining children's ages should be assigned to child protection agencies. children need a specialized approach:

- If in doubt, assume that the person is below 18;
- Identification of children should take place at the earliest possible moment. Processes established to distinguish combatants from non-combatants can be harmful for children. If children are not identified early on in the process they can be excluded from important reintegration and rehabilitation opportunities to which they are entitled, and which are suited to their age and circumstances;
- Identification must be carried out first, before disarmament. A child protection adviser or agency should be given access to the disarmament site to identify children.

### **Considerations**

It is important to plan the reintegration of all groups, children and adults very carefully, to ensure that the process of finding out ex-combatants' ages is not affected by false claims of age based on incorrect ideas about different reintegration benefit packages.

Questions about important stages/events in the child's development may provide evidence of his/her approximate age, e.g., "In what year did you leave school?" "Do you remember how old you were?" "Do you remember how old you were when XXX happened in the country?"

Starting the process of dealing with children early and informing them of the support they are entitled to receive will ensure that they do not claim to be adults because they hope to obtain the short-term demobilization packages provided to adults.

### **Dos and don'ts**

- Interviews should be confidential: the person being interviewed should be able to answer questions without fear of being overheard by others in his/her unit.
- The identification of children should be carried out before any other identification process. Children should not be required to show that they can use a weapon.
- Children should not be counted as part of the total number of armed forces in negotiations. Doing so may lead to more children being enlisted in order to increase the numbers serving in armed forces and groups before a demobilization agreement is finalized.
- The role that the individual has played in the armed force or group should not be used to decide whether he/she is a child.

## 9. Reintegration

The aim of child-based reintegration is to offer children a participatory support programme that has been specifically designed for their needs and gives them a viable, long-term alternative to military life.

Circumstances or an attempt to be fair often dictates that the same support is offered to all children, but programmes should be planned to take into account differences in age, sex, individual resilience, the capacity of the child to make informed decisions, the length of stay and individual experiences within the armed force or group, and reintegration opportunities in an environment that will inevitably have changed during the child's absence. Transitional or safety net allowances have sometimes been given to children in order to help them start a new life. This practice causes several problems and should never be considered as an alternative for sustainable reintegration programmes.

The aim of child-based reintegration is to offer children a participatory support programme that has been specifically designed for their needs and gives them a viable, long-term alternative to military life.

### 9.1. Psychosocial support and special care

Many children have serious psychological problems when they re-enter their communities, because of the tremendous effort required to adapt to the environment in which they used to live. The problems they experience result from anxiety and uncertainty, idleness, stigmatization, fear of being rejected, poverty, lack of livelihood, etc.

Psychosocial support should be offered instead of individual therapy to help children develop new patterns of behaviour, improve their self-esteem, develop their capacity to make decisions about the future and enable them to express emotions should they want to do so. Children and communities do, with support, have the capacity to cope with the distress caused by war. Psychosocial support activities build upon a child's natural resilience, and family and community support mechanisms, and encourage coping and positive development, despite the suffering children have experienced. The more children are supported within and through their new reintegration environment, the more reintegration is likely to succeed.

Children are the main actors in their reintegration. They have their own internal resources, or resilience, which helps them cope, confront difficult circumstances and recover after stressful experiences. To develop their resilience, children need reliable, positive adult role models outside of the military, and a sense of solidarity with and being useful to and responsible for others (e.g., by doing things that benefit the community). They also need to be capable of making important choices (e.g. they should participate in making decisions that affect them).

Communities also have resilience, and support programmes should take this capacity into account and reinforce it, in particular communities' capacity and desire to protect their children. Psychosocial reintegration is based on a community approach that does more than provide individual therapy by supporting families and communities, schooling or learning opportunities, integration in youth group activities, healing and reconciliation.

Some children may need specific assistance to overcome particularly negative or harmful experiences during their stay with an armed force or group. Injured and disabled children and the terminally ill, in particular, need care that is specifically adapted to their needs

and environment, which should include assistance for community-based rehabilitation and long-term care projects.

## **9.2. Inclusive programming for all war-affected children**

While it is obvious that children associated with armed forces and groups are victims of conflict, the needs of other war-affected children should also be identified and dealt with, in particular through the restoration of basic social services. An inclusive approach to support war-affected children allows their sustainable reintegration, prevents stigmatization and avoids the impression that joining an armed force or group brings rewards. It can take the form of assistance for existing schooling systems or vocational training institutions, health care systems, youth groups, apprenticeships or other work opportunities, etc. Reintegration efforts originally intended for demobilized children, such as accelerated learning programmes, may be adapted to help community development more broadly.

## **9.3. The role of communities**

Community acceptance is essential for a child's reintegration, but preconceived ideas and expectations about children coming out of armed forces or groups, or the scars of violence committed against families and/or communities could severely limit community support. To prevent reprisals, communities have to be prepared for returning children through awareness-raising and education, which can start with sensitization of community leaders, strengthening of local child protection networks, peace and reconciliation education, and events aimed at encouraging a lasting reintegration of the children.

Cultural, religious and traditional rituals can play an important role in the protection and reintegration of girls and boys into their communities, such as traditional healing, cleansing and forgiveness rituals; the development of solidarity mechanisms based on tradition; and the use of proverbs and sayings in sensitization and mediation activities. Care should be taken to ensure that religious beliefs serve the best interests of the child, especially in areas where religion or cultural values may have played an important role in recruitment.

Reconciliation ceremonies can offer forgiveness for acts committed, allow children to be 'cleansed' of the violence they have suffered, restore cultural links and demonstrate children's involvement in civilian life. Such ceremonies increase the commitment of communities to the children's reintegration process. Children should contribute to the creation of appropriate reintegration mechanisms to improve their sense of belonging and capacity. However, it is also essential to understand and neutralize community traditions that are physically or mentally harmful to a child.

Particular attention should be paid to the information that circulates among communities about returning boys and girls, so that harmful rumours, e.g., about real or presumed rates of HIV/AIDS among them, can be effectively countered and a nurturing environment created to receive children, especially those who really are terminally ill.

## **9.4. Education, training and livelihoods**

The higher a child's level of education, the more their reintegration is likely to succeed. It is therefore important for children to try to reach (or recover) as high a level of education as possible, often starting with basic literacy. However, returning to school is often difficult and even impossible, not only for financial reasons, but also because of the adjustments both teachers and learners have to make.

After a relatively long stay within armed forces or groups, or because of the difficulties they previously experienced in school, children may not be able to adapt to traditional teaching methods. Schooling programmes should be developed in liaison with the ministry of education that are specifically designed for such children, and that achieve the same results as other official programmes, and teachers should receive specific training in order to provide better support to children with learning difficulties.

Short-term accelerated learning classes and other remedial schooling programmes for children who have been out of school for long periods can provide catch-up education. However, even with the assistance of such programmes, some children may not be able to return to the regular school system. In such cases, programmes should be designed to include vocational training activities (skills training and apprenticeship) that are suited to local conditions (the type of jobs that are available, etc.). There should be a wide range of professional training options available to children to help them adapt successfully to civilian life, but income-generating activities for children should be in line with laws on child labour (minimum age, working conditions, etc.).

It will not be possible to deal with all children in the same way. There are important differences between children who are aged 10 and those aged 16; those who have voluntarily joined an armed force or group and those who have been forced to do so; those who have made decisions and been given responsibilities when they were members of armed forces and groups and those who have been slaves; and those who have a family waiting for them and those who cannot return. Not all children will require the same level of attention, the same approach, or the same support. Workable ways of dealing with each particular situation need to be developed. Programme options (formal education, non-formal education, vocational training and income generation) should therefore be planned to take differences in age into account (e.g., below 12, 12–14, and 14 and above). (Also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR.)

5.20 ◀▶

Some children need to start earning a living immediately they return to their family and community, and should be helped to earn an income or receive benefits while they obtain professional training and/or an education. For example, the sale of things they have made during their training could allow them to buy the tools they need for their future work. Boys and girls, particularly those of legal working age, should benefit from an adapted version of socio-economic support programmes designed for demobilized adults. Families can be offered economic support through income-generating activities, which can be provided in such a way that the money they receive is not the main attraction of caring for children.

To make the transition from military to civilian life, children also need to receive training about their political rights and, eventually, responsibilities. They need to understand good citizenship, communication and teamwork, non-violent conflict resolution methods, etc. Such activities can prepare them to play a socially useful role that is acknowledged by the community. Special efforts should be made to include girls in this training.

## 9.5. Follow-up and monitoring

Family and community reunification is only the beginning of the reintegration process. Follow-up and monitoring are essential and require careful planning, enough funding, and the collaboration of key governmental bodies, UN agencies and NGOs. More staff are likely to be needed when large numbers of children are reunited with their families, because follow-up visiting and other support activities become more labour-intensive and time-consuming as children are dispersed from a few central locations to scattered communities. Regular

follow-up or monitoring activities by professional social workers should occur through visits to children's homes, schools and community, including meetings with families, peers, teachers, community leaders, etc. Regular monitoring of the living conditions of the child, the quality of his/her relationship with family members and the level of reintegration in the community will allow disputes to be resolved when necessary. Community-based child protection networks and community leaders, especially women, should be actively involved in monitoring the safety and well-being of reunited children, and should increasingly assume greater responsibility for ongoing monitoring to ensure a smooth takeover of this work by the community.

## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**Children associated with armed forces and groups:** The definition commonly applied to children associated with armed forces and groups in prevention, demobilization and reintegration programmes derives from the *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices* (1997), in which the term ‘child soldier’ refers to:

“Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.”

In his February 2000 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General defined a child soldier “as any person under the age 18 years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capacity and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members, as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage”. The CRC specifies that a child is every human below the age of 18.

The term ‘children associated with armed forces and groups’, although more cumbersome, is now used to avoid the perception that the only children of concern are combatant boys. It points out that children eligible for release and reintegration programmes are both those associated with armed forces and groups and those who fled armed forces and groups (often considered as deserters and therefore requiring support and protection), children who were abducted, those forcibly married and those in detention.

Access to demobilization does not depend on a child’s level of involvement in armed forces and groups. No distinction is made between combatants and non-combatants for fear of unfair treatment, oversight or exclusion (mainly of girls). Nevertheless, the child’s personal history and activities in the armed conflict can help decide on the kind of support he/she needs in the reintegration phase.

**Child demobilization, release, exit from an armed force or group:** The term ‘demobilization’ refers to ending a child’s association with armed forces or groups. The terms ‘release’ or ‘exit from an armed force or group’ and ‘children coming or exiting from armed forces and groups’ rather than ‘demobilized children’ are preferred.

Child demobilization/release is very brief and involves removing a child from a military or armed group as swiftly as possible. This action may require official documentation (e.g., issuing a demobilization card or official registration in a database for ex-combatants) to confirm that the child has no military status, although formal documentation must be used carefully so that it does not stigmatize an already-vulnerable child.

The term ‘child soldier’ refers to: “Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.”

**Prevention of recruitment, and demobilization and reintegration:** Child-focused agencies use the term ‘prevention of recruitment, and demobilization and reintegration’ (PDR) rather than DDR when referring to child-centred processes.

**Recruitment:** Includes compulsory, forced and voluntary recruitment or captivity into any kind of labour in any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group.

**Reintegration of children:** The provision of reintegration support is a right enshrined in article 39 of the CRC: “State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote . . . social reintegration of a child victim of . . . armed conflicts”. Child-centred reintegration is multi-layered and focuses on family reunification; mobilizing and enabling care systems in the community; medical screening and health care, including reproductive health services; schooling and/or vocational training; psychosocial support; and social, cultural and economic support. Socio-economic reintegration is often underestimated in DDR programmes, but should be included in all stages of programming and budgeting, and partner organizations should be involved at the start of the reintegration process to establish strong collaboration structures.

### Abbreviations

<b>CRC</b>	Convention on the Rights of the Child
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>ICC</b>	interim care centre
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>OP</b>	Optional Protocol (to the CRC)
<b>PDR</b>	prevention of recruitment, and demobilization and reintegration
<b>UN</b>	United Nations



## Annex B: Legal and normative framework

International legal instruments exist to prevent the recruitment of children and ensure their demobilization and reintegration after release from armed groups and forces. These instruments are used to:

- protect children in armed conflicts;
- prevent the recruitment of children and secure their release from armed forces and groups;
- reintegrate children within their families and their communities;
- protect children within the judicial framework;
- prosecute those who are responsible for recruiting children for military purposes.

Global or regional instruments for protecting children such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child offer a framework for protecting children during conflicts and within the judicial system in order to prevent their recruitment. In addition, it should be noted that all human rights instruments also apply to children and that, in times of conflict, human rights law remains applicable, in addition to international humanitarian law.

There are a certain number of legal instruments and normative standards specifically regarding the prevention of the recruitment of children and their release:

### **The Convention on the Rights of the Child**

- According to article 38 of the CRC, governments shall take all feasible measures to ensure that children under the age of 15 do not take a direct part in hostilities. Article 39 calls on States Parties to take appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of armed conflict.
- Article 40 of the CRC states that, whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as, having infringed the penal law should be sought without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected. According to article 37, the detention of a child shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.

### **Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict**

On 25 May 2000, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Optional Protocol (OP) to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict. The OP raises the age for direct participation in hostilities from 15 to 18 years. The OP prohibits conscription or forced recruitment and use by governments below the age of 18 and calls on States Parties to raise the minimum age for voluntary recruitment to 15 and above. It prohibits all recruitment — voluntary or compulsory — of children under 18 by armed forces and groups. Under article 6, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service. States Parties shall, when necessary, provide such persons with all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration. The OP entered into force on 12 February 2002.

### **International Labour Organization Convention No. 182**

- Under International Labour Organization Convention No. 182, States Parties shall take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, which includes the forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict (a child being defined as a person under the age of 18).

### **Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions**

- The Additional Protocols I (arts. 77[2] and 77[3]) and II (art. 4-3 c) to the Geneva Conventions call for the protection of children in armed conflict, forbid the recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 in conflict, and provide special treatment for children in detention.

### **African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child**

- The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) forbids the recruitment or the direct participation in combat of any person under the age of 18 (art. 22).

### **The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court**

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes it a war crime, leading to individual criminal prosecution, to conscript or enlist children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or use them to participate actively in hostilities, in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ('The Beijing Rules') adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/33 of 29 November 1985 provides guidance for the arrest or detention of children. Children retain all the rights already covered for adults if arrested. The rules contain a provision of 'Last Resort' whereby arrest, detention or imprisonment of children should be avoided whenever possible and is a measure of last resort. When children are arrested and detained, their cases are to be given the highest priority and handled as fast as possible to ensure the shortest possible period of detention prior to trial.

### **United Nations Security Council resolutions**

The UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions on children in armed conflict, with specific provisions about children associated with armed forces and groups: resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005).

#### **Resolution 1261 (1999) on the Protection of Children and Armed Conflict**

- Article 13 urges States and all relevant parts of the UN system to intensify their efforts to ensure an end to the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law through political and other efforts, including promotion of the availability of alternatives for children to their participation in armed conflict.

#### **Resolution 1314 (2000) on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict**

- Article 3 urges all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict, in particular the Geneva Con-

ventions of 1949 and the obligations applicable to them under the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

- Article 11 requests parties to armed conflict to include, where appropriate, provisions for the protection of children, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child combatants, in peace negotiations and in peace agreements and the involvement of children, where possible, in these processes.
- Article 13 underlines the importance of giving consideration to the special needs and particular vulnerabilities of girls affected by armed conflict, including, *inter alia*, those heading households, orphaned, sexually exploited and used as combatants, and urges that their human rights, protection and welfare be incorporated in the development of policies and programmes, including those for prevention, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
- Article 16 (f) urges Member States to consider declaring regional initiatives towards full implementation of the prohibition of the use of child soldiers in violation of international law.
- Article 17 encourages Member States, relevant parts of the UN system and regional organizations and arrangements to undertake efforts to obtain the release of children abducted during armed conflict and their family reunification.

#### Resolution 1379 (November 2001) Untitled

- Article 1 expresses its determination to give the fullest attention to the question of the protection of children in armed conflict when considering the matters of which it is seized.
- Article 8 calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to: (. . .) e) provide protection of children in peace agreements, including, where appropriate, provisions relating to the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation of child soldiers and the reunification of families, and to consider, when possible, the views of children in those processes.
- Article 11 requests the agencies, funds and programmes of the UN to: (. . .) b) take account of ways of reducing child recruitment that is contrary to accepted international standards when formulating development assistance programmes; (c) devote particular attention and adequate resources to the rehabilitation of children affected by armed conflict, particularly their counselling, education and appropriate vocational opportunities, as a preventive measure and as a means of reintegrating them into society; (d) ensure that the special needs and particular vulnerabilities of girls affected by armed conflict, including those heading households, orphaned, sexually exploited and used as combatants, are duly taken into account in the design of development assistance programmes, and that adequate resources are allocated to such programmes.

#### Resolution 1460 (30 January 2003) Untitled

- Article 3 calls upon all parties to armed conflict, who are recruiting or using children in violation of the international obligations applicable to them, to immediately halt such recruitment or use of children.
- Article 4 expresses its intention to enter into dialogue, as appropriate, or to support the Secretary-General in entering into dialogue with parties to armed conflict in violation of the international obligations applicable to them on the recruitment or use of children

in armed conflict, in order to develop clear and time-bound action plans to end this practice.

- Article 5 notes with concern the list annexed to the Secretary-General's Report, and calls on the parties identified in this list to provide information on steps they have taken to halt their recruitment or use of children in armed conflict in violation of the international obligations applicable to them, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 9 of its resolution 1379 (2001).
- Article 13 calls upon Member States and international organizations to ensure that children affected by armed conflict are involved in all disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, taking into account the specific needs and capacities of girls, and that the duration of these processes is sufficient for a successful transition to normal life, with a particular emphasis on education, including the monitoring, through, *inter alia*, schools, of children demobilized in order to prevent re-recruitment.

#### 1539 (20 April 2004) Untitled

- Article 1 strongly condemns the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties to armed conflict in violation of international obligations applicable to them, killing and maiming of children, rape and other sexual violence mostly committed against girls, abduction and forced displacement, denial of humanitarian access to children, attacks against schools and hospitals as well as trafficking, forced labour and all forms of slavery and all other violations and abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict.
- Article 8 reiterates its requests to all parties concerned, including UN agencies, funds and programmes as well as financial institutions, to continue to ensure that all children associated with armed forces and groups, as well as issues related to children, are systematically included in every disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, taking into account the specific needs and capacities of girls, with a particular emphasis on education, including the monitoring, through, *inter alia*, schools, of children demobilized in order to prevent re-recruitment and bearing in mind the assessment of best practices, including those contained in paragraph 65 of the Report of the Secretary-General.

#### Resolution 1612 (26 July 2005)

- Paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) requests the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring and reporting system for children affected by armed conflict. The mechanism requires both governments and armed groups to use time-bound plans of action to end the use and recruitment of child soldiers and requires the UN system to monitor and report on egregious violations against children, including the killing or maiming of children; recruitment or use of child soldiers; attacks against schools or hospitals; rape and other forms of sexual violence; abduction of children; and denial of humanitarian access. The resolution requires that such a mechanism operates with the participation of, and in cooperation with, national government and relevant UN and civil society actors. Application of the monitoring mechanism will begin with parties in situations of armed conflict listed in the annexes to Secretary-General's Report (S/2005/72) that are on the agenda of the Security Council: parties in Burundi, Côte

d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan, and then, in close consultation with countries concerned, will apply to parties in other situations of armed conflict listed in the annexes to Secretary-General's Report (S/2005/72): Colombia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Uganda.

### **Additional relevant legislation and standards**

- In a recent decision, the Special Court in Sierra Leone affirmed that the recruitment of children under the age of 15 was a war crime entailing individual criminal responsibility under customary international law, even before this principle was codified with the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998.
- At the judicial level, juvenile justice rules are applied to children, in particular the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (1995), UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles deprived of their Liberty (1990), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976, arts. 6 and 10).
- Domestic legal instruments raising the age of recruitment into armed forces to the age of 18 years are the components making up national legal frameworks: the child protection code, family code, labour code or penal code.
- The *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices* was adopted in April 1997 at the symposium on the prevention of recruitment of children into armed forces and on demobilization and social reintegration of child soldiers in Africa. The Cape Town principles are most noted for reaching agreement on the definition of a child soldier: "Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms."

## Annex C: Situation analysis: Some key questions

- *Contextual analysis:* What are the social, political, economic, cultural origins of the conflict? Is it perceived as a struggle for liberation? Is it limited to a particular part of the country? Does it involve particular groups or people, or is it more generalized?
- *What is the ideology of the armed force or group?* Do its members have a political ideology? Do they have political, social or other goals? What means does the armed force/group use to pursue its ideology? Who supports the armed force/group? What is the armed force's/groups' level of legitimacy?
- *How is the armed force or group structured?* Where is the locus of power? How many levels of hierarchy exist? Does the leadership have tight control over its forces? Who do child soldiers report to? How is authority/rank established? Who makes decisions regarding the armed force's/group's movements? Has the armed force/group had foreign sponsors (companies, organizations)?
- *Does the armed force/group focus on particular ethnic, religious, geographic or socio-economic groups for recruitment?* Are girls and boys targeted equally? Where does the armed force/group do most of its recruitment? Is recruitment 'voluntary', forced or compulsory? Looking back over 3, 6 and 12 months, has recruitment been increasing or decreasing, and does it differ over the year? Are children promised anything when they join up (e.g., promises of protection for their families, money, goods, weapons, etc.)? What is the proportion of children in the armed force/group?
- *What living conditions did the children experience while in the armed force/group?* How do the children feel about their conditions? Was there exploitation or abuse, and if so, for how long and of what kind? How are boys and girls affected differently by their recruitment and use as child soldiers? What kind of work did children perform in the armed force/group? How has children's behaviour changed as a result of being recruited? Have their attitudes and values changed? What were the children's expectations of the armed force/group before recruitment? How do children recruited understand their role in the conflict? What are their expectations of the future? How can their experience be harnessed for productive purposes?
- *What do the communities feel about the impact of the conflict on children?* How do communities view the role of children in the armed groups and forces? What impact is this likely to have on the children's reintegration? How has the conflict affected perceptions of roles of girls and women? What is the people's understanding of children's responsibility in the conflict? What social, cultural and traditional practices exist to help children's reintegration into their communities? How familiar are children with these practices?



## Annex D: Management guidelines for interim care centres

Interim care centres (ICCs) are not a necessary step in all DDR situations. Indeed, it is a widely held view among protection agencies that children should be reunited with their families and communities as soon as possible, and it is feared that an ICC may delay this reunification. Nevertheless, while in some circumstances, immediate reunification and support can involve the families and communities without using a transit centre, in others, a centre can provide a protected temporary environment before family reunification.

Other advantages to ICCs include the following: they provide the necessary space and time to carry out family tracing and verification; they provide a secure space in an otherwise insecure context before reunification; they allow medical support to be provided; and they provide additional time to children to cut their links with the military.

### Guiding principles and implementation strategies

The decision to open a centre should be based on the following conditions:

- the level of insecurity in community of origin;
- the level of success in tracing the child's family or primary caregiver;
- the level of medical assistance and follow-up required before integration;
- the level of immediate psychosocial support required before reintegration.

### Management guidelines

The following management guidelines apply:

- child protection specialists should manage the centres;
- children should only stay a limited amount of time in interim care centres, and documentation and monitoring systems should be established to ensure that the length of stay is brief (weeks not months);
- at the end of their stay, if family reunification is not feasible, children should be cared for in different ways (such as in foster families, extended family networks, etc.);
- systems should be established to protect children from abuse, and a code of conduct should be drawn up and applied;
- an adequate number of male and female staff should be available to deal with the different needs of boys and girls;
- staff should be trained in child gender-based violence and exploitation, norms of confidentiality, child psychosocial development, tracing and reunification;
- ICCs should only accommodate children under 18. Some flexibility can be considered, based on the best interests of the child, e.g., in relation to girl mothers with infants and children or on medical grounds, on a case-by-case basis. In addition, young children (under 14) should be separated from adolescents in order to avoid any risk of older children abusing the younger ones;
- sanitation and accommodation facilities should separate girls from boys, and be sensitive to the needs of infants and girl mothers;
- ICCs should be located at a safe distance from conflict and recruitment areas;
- external access to the centre should be controlled (e.g., entry of adult combatants and fighters, and the media can be disruptive, and can expose children to additional risks);
- security should be provided by peacekeepers or neutral forces.



### Activity guidelines

- tracing, verification, reunification and monitoring should be carried out;
- temporary care should take place within a community-based tracing and reintegration programme to assist the return of children to their communities (including community outreach), and to encourage the protection and development of war-affected children in general. Experience has showed that when only care is offered, centres present a risk of children becoming 'institutionalized' and dependent;
- health check-ups and specialized health services should be provided when necessary, e.g., reproductive health and antenatal services, diagnosis of sexually transmitted infections, voluntary and confidential HIV testing with appropriate psychosocial support, and health care for nutritional deficiencies and war-related injuries;
- basic psychosocial counselling should be provided, including help to overcome trauma and develop self-esteem and life skills;
- information and guidance should be provided on the reintegration opportunities available;
- activities should focus on restoring the social norms and routines of civilian life;
- age- and gender-appropriate sports, cultural and recreational activities should be provided;
- community sensitization should be carried out before the child's arrival;
- formal education or training activities should not be provided at the ICC; however, literacy testing can be conducted;
- communities near the ICC should be sensitized about the ICC's role. Children in the centres should be encouraged to participate in community activities to encourage trust;
- peace education should be part of the everyday life during temporary care. It should also be part of the formal programmes, and cover principles and objectives of peace education, and values related to the non-violent resolution of conflicts.

## Annex E: Select further reading and tools

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— and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict*, [http://www.unicef.org/publications/index\\_19025.html](http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_19025.html).

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## Endnotes

- 1 International Committee of the Red Cross, *Inter-agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children*, Geneva, 2004.

# 5.40 Cross-border Population Movements

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#### NOTE

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# 5.40 Cross-border Population Movements

## Summary

This module offers advice to policy makers and operational staff of agencies dealing with combatants and associated civilians moving across international borders on how to work closely together to establish regional strategies for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes.

Armed conflicts are increasingly characterized by ‘mixed population movements’ of combatants and civilians moving across international borders, as well as lines of conflict spilling over and across State boundaries. Because many previous DDR programmes lacked a regional dimension that took this reality into account, the ‘recycling’ of combatants from conflict to conflict within a region and even beyond has become an increasing problem. However, combatants are not the only people who are highly mobile in times of complex emergency. Given that the majority of people fleeing across borders are civilians seeking asylum, it remains vital for the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum to be preserved by host States, with the support of the international community. Combatants must therefore be separated from civilians in order to maintain States’ internal and external security and to safeguard asylum for refugees, as well as to find appropriate long-lasting ways of assisting the various population groups concerned, in accordance with international law standards.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module attempts to answer the following questions:

- What are the population groups connected with combatants moving across international borders?
- What are the standards and legal frameworks governing their treatment?
- What are recommendations for action on both sides of the border?
- What are the roles and responsibilities of international and national agencies on both sides of the border?

The module discusses issues relating to foreign adult combatants, foreign women associated with armed groups and forces in non-combat roles, foreign children associated with armed groups and forces, civilian family members/dependants of foreign combatants, and cross-border abductees. Their status at various phases — upon crossing into a host country, at the stage of DDR and repatriation planning, and upon return to and reintegration in their country of origin — is discussed, and ways of dealing with those who do not repatriate are explored.

The module’s aims to provide guidance to agencies supporting governments to fulfil their obligations under international law in deciding on the appropriate treatment of the population groups connected with cross-border combatants.

The principles in this module are intended to be applied not only in formal DDR programmes, but also in situations where there may be no such programme (and perhaps no

United Nations [UN] mission), but where activities related to the identification of foreign combatants, disarmament, demobilization, internment, repatriation and reintegration or other processes are nevertheless needed in response to the presence of foreign combatants on a State's territory.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

## 3. Introduction

This module is intended primarily for policy makers and operational staff of agencies dealing with combatants and associated civilians moving across international borders, regardless of whether or not there are DDR programmes on either side of the border. The guidelines offered in it are also aimed at assisting governments to fulfil their international obligations, and at guiding donors in making funding decisions. They are based on relevant provisions of international law, field experience and lessons learned from a number of operations, particularly in Africa.

This module on cross-border population movements has been included in the integrated DDR standards because of the regional and international dimensions of conflicts and the impact on population movements: wars lead to both combatants and civilians crossing borders; there are regional and international causes and actors; and cross-border combatants can pose a threat to regional and international security. At the end of a conflict, repatriation and sustainable reintegration are needed for both combatants and civilians, contributing to the creation of properly functioning communities in the country of origin. For some, local integration in the host country — or, in exceptional cases, third-country resettlement — will be the appropriate long-term course of action.

## 4. Guiding principles

International law provides a framework for dealing with cross-border movements of combatants and associated civilians. In particular, neutral States have an obligation to identify, separate and intern foreign combatants who cross into their territory, to prevent the use of their territory as a base from which to engage in hostilities against another State. In considering how to deal with foreign combatants in a DDR programme, it is important to recognize that they may have many different motives for crossing international borders,



and that host States in turn will have their own agendas for either preventing or encouraging such movement.

No single international agency has a mandate for issues relating to cross-border movements of combatants, but all have an interest in ensuring that these issues are properly dealt with, and that States abide by their international obligations. Therefore, DDR-related processes such as identification, disarmament, separation, internment, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, as well as building State capacity in host countries and countries of origin, must be carried out within an inter-agency framework. Annex B contains an overview of key international agencies with relevant mandates that could be expected to assist governments to deal with regional and cross-border issues relating to combatants in host countries and countries of origin.

Foreign combatants are not necessarily ‘mercenaries’ within the definition of international law; and since achieving lasting peace and stability in a region depends on the ability of DDR programmes to attract and retain the maximum possible number of former combatants, careful distinctions are necessary between foreign combatants and mercenaries. It is also essential, however, to ensure coherence between DDR processes in adjacent countries in regions engulfed by conflict in order to prevent combatants from moving around from process to process in the hopes of gaining benefits in more than one place.

Foreign children associated with armed forces and groups should be treated separately from adult foreign combatants, and should be given special protection and assistance during the DDR process, with a particular emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration. Their social reintegration, recovery and reconciliation with their communities may work better if they are granted protection such as refugee status, following an appropriate process to determine if they deserve that status, while they are in host countries.

Civilian family members of foreign combatants should be treated as refugees or asylum seekers, unless there are individual circumstances that suggest they should be treated differently. Third-country nationals/civilians who are not seeking refugee status — such as cross-border abductees — should be assisted to voluntarily repatriate or find another long-term course of action to assist them within an applicable framework and in close consultation/collaboration with the diplomatic representations of their countries of nationality.

At the end of an armed conflict, UN missions should support host countries and countries of origin to find long-term solutions to the problems faced by foreign combatants. The primary solution is to return them in safety and dignity to their country of origin, a process that should be carried out in coordination with the voluntary repatriation of their civilian family members.

When designing and implementing DDR programmes, the regional dimensions of the conflict should be taken into account, ensuring that foreign combatants who have participated in the war are eligible for such programmes, as well as other individuals who have crossed an international border with an armed force or group and need to be repatriated and included in DDR processes. DDR programmes should therefore be open to all persons

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who have taken part in the conflict, regardless of their nationality, and close coordination and links should be formed among all DDR programmes in a region to ensure that they are coherently planned and implemented.

As a matter of principle and because of the nature of his/her activities, an active foreign combatant cannot be considered as a refugee. However, a former combatant who has genuinely given up military activities and become a civilian may at a later stage be given refugee status, provided that he/she applies for this status after a reasonable period of time and is not 'excludable from international protection' on account of having committed crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes outside the country of refuge before entering that country, or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assists governments in host countries to determine whether demobilized former combatants are eligible for refugee status using special procedures when they ask for asylum.

## 5. The context of regional conflicts and cross-border population movements

Forced displacement is mainly caused by the insecurity of armed conflict. Conflicts that cause refugee movements across international borders by definition involve neighbouring States, and thus have regional security implications. As is evident in recent conflicts in Africa in particular, the lines of conflict frequently run across State boundaries, because they are being fought by people with ethnic, cultural, political and military ties that are not confined to one country. The mixed movements of populations that result are very complex and involve not only refugees, but also combatants and civilians associated with armed groups and forces, including family members and other dependants, cross-border abductees, etc.



Refugees from Kosovo arrive in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, March 1999. Photo: R. LeMoyné, UNHCR



The often-interconnected nature of conflicts within a region, recruitment (both forced and voluntary) across borders and the ‘recycling’ of combatants from conflict to conflict within a region has meant that not only nationals of a country at war, but also foreign combatants may be involved in the struggle. When wars come to an end, it is not only refugees who are in need of repatriation and reintegration, but also foreign combatants and associated civilians. DDR programmes need to be regional in scope in order to deal with this reality.

Enormous complexities are involved in managing mass influxes and mixed population movements of combatants and civilians. Combatants’ status may not be obvious, as many arrive without weapons and in civilian clothes. At the same time, however, especially in societies where there are large numbers of weapons, not everyone who arrives with a weapon is a combatant or can be presumed to be a combatant (refugee influxes usually include young males and females escaping from forced recruitment). The sheer size of population movements can be overwhelming, sometimes making it impossible to carry out any screening of arrivals.

Whereas refugees by definition flee to seek sanctuary, combatants who cross international borders may have a range of motives for doing so — to launch cross-border attacks, to escape from the heat of battle before regrouping to fight, to desert permanently, to seek refuge, to bring family members and other dependants to safety, to find food, etc. Their reasons for moving with civilians may be varied — not only to protect and assist their dependants, but also sometimes to exploit civilians as human shields and to prevent

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voluntary repatriation, to use refugee camps as a place for rest and recuperation between attacks or as a recruiting and/or training ground, and to divert humanitarian assistance for military purposes. Civilians may be supportive of or intimidated by combatants. The presence of combatants and militarized camps close to border areas may provoke cross-border reprisals and risk a spillover of the conflict. Host countries may also have their own reasons for sheltering foreign combatants, since complete neutrality is probably rare in today's conflicts, and in addition there may be a lack of political will and capacity to prevent foreign combatants from entering a neighbouring country. In their responses to mixed cross-border population movements, the international community should take into account these complexities.

Experience has shown that DDR processes directed at nationals of a specific country in isolation have failed to adequately deal with the problems of combatants being recycled from conflict to conflict within (and sometimes even outside) a region, and with the spillover effects of such wars. In addition, the failure of host countries to identify, disarm and separate foreign combatants from refugee populations has contributed to endless cycles of security problems, including militarization of and attacks on refugee camps and settlements, xenophobia, and failure to maintain asylum for refugees. These issues compromise the neutrality of aid work and pose a security threat to the host State and surrounding countries.

The disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and repatriation of combatants and associated civilians therefore require a stronger and more consistent cross-border focus, involving both host countries and countries of origin and benefiting both national and foreign combatants. This dimension has increasingly been recognized by the UN in its recent peacekeeping operations.<sup>1</sup>

## 6. International law framework governing cross-border movements of foreign combatants and associated civilians

International law lays down obligations for host countries with regard to foreign combatants and associated civilians who cross their borders. This framework is derived from the laws of neutrality, international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law, as well as international principles governing the conduct of inter-State relations. These different areas of law provide grounds for the identification and separation of foreign combatants from civilians who cross an international border, as well as for the disarmament and internment of foreign combatants until either they can be repatriated or another course of action can be found at the end of the conflict.

As long as a host country fulfils its obligations under international law, it may also rely on its national law: e.g., the criminal law can be used to prosecute cross-border combatants in order to protect national security, prevent subversive activities, and deal with illegal arms possession and forced recruitment.

### 6.1. The Charter of the United Nations

Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the UN, States have an obligation to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (this is regarded as customary international law binding on all States).



This article should be read and interpreted within the wider spirit of the Charter, and particularly article 1, which includes among the aims of the UN the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations and the resolution of international problems. Therefore, in addition to refraining from actions that might endanger peace and security, States also have a duty to take steps to strengthen peace and encourage friendly relations with others. Article 2(4) provides the foundation for the premise that States have an obligation to disarm, separate and intern foreign combatants.

UN General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, which adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, prohibits the indirect use of armed force, through assisting, encouraging or tolerating armed activities against another State by irregular forces, armed bands or individuals, whether nationals or foreigners.<sup>2</sup>

## **6.2. The law of neutrality**

The law of neutrality requires neutral States to disarm foreign combatants, separate them from civilian populations, intern them at a safe distance from the conflict zone and provide humane treatment until the end of the war, in order to ensure that they no longer pose a threat or continue to engage in hostilities. Neutral States are also required to provide such interned combatants with humane treatment and conditions of internment.

The Hague Convention of 1907 dealing with the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, which is considered to have attained customary law status, making it binding on all States, sets out the rules governing the conduct of neutral States. Although it relates to international armed conflicts, it is generally accepted as applicable by analogy also to internal armed conflicts in which foreign combatants from government armed forces or opposition armed groups have entered the territory of a neutral State. It contains an obligation to intern such combatants, as is described in detail in section 7.3.7 of this module.

## **6.3. International humanitarian law**

In accordance with article 4(B)2 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, foreign combatants interned by neutral States are entitled to treatment and conditions of internment given to prisoners of war under the Convention.

Additional Protocol II, relating to Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, provides in Part II for humane, non-discriminatory treatment for those who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted.

These standards are discussed in section 7.3.7 of this paper dealing with the internment of adult foreign combatants.

## **6.4. Human rights law**

The 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment contains a broad non-refoulement provision, which states that: “No State shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”

(art. 3[1]). As there are no exceptions to this non-refoulement provision, foreign combatants may benefit from this prohibition against forcible return to a country of origin in situations where there are grounds to believe that they would be at risk of torture if returned. “For the purposes of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violation of human rights” (art. 3[2]).

Several UN and regional conventions protect children caught up in armed conflict, including the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (for details, see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

International law standards on detention are relevant to internment of foreign combatants, e.g., the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,<sup>3</sup> UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,<sup>4</sup> and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners.<sup>5</sup>

## 6.5. Refugee law

A refugee is defined in the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees as a person who:

- is outside his/her country of origin;
- has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
- is unable or unwilling to avail him-/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, owing to the well-founded fear of persecution.

Later regional instruments extended this definition. The 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa repeats the 1951 Convention’s definition of a refugee, but also covers any person who, “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (art. 1[2]). This means that in Africa, persons fleeing civil disturbances, widespread violence and war are entitled to refugee status in States parties to the OAU Convention, whether or not they have a well-founded fear of persecution. In Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, although not binding, recommends that the definition of a refugee used in the region should include, in addition to those fitting the 1951 Convention definition, persons who fled their country “because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. Some Latin American States have incorporated this definition into their national legislation.

The 1951 Convention — and also the 1969 OAU Convention — explicitly defines those who do not deserve international protection as refugees, even if they meet the above definitions. These exclusion clauses are particularly relevant in the case of former combatants who have committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, etc., and are discussed in more detail in section 13.3.4.

The instruments of refugee law set out a range of obligations of States parties, as well as rights and duties of refugees. The fundamental obligation of a country of asylum is not to “expel or return (*refouler*) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (art.e 33[1] of the 1951 UN Convention). However, there is an exception to this rule, permitting return to the country of origin in the case of “a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country” (art. 33[2]).

While the humanitarian character of asylum is implicit in the 1951 UN Convention, its definition of a refugee describes a victim of serious human rights violations, and it provides an obligation for refugees to obey the laws and public order measures of the host country. It does not, however, deal explicitly with issues relating to combatants. Nevertheless, principles relating to the humanitarian and civilian character of asylum have been developed in the OAU Refugee Convention and in recommendations of UNHCR’s Executive Committee (the governing body of representatives of States) and have been reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly.

The OAU Convention specifies that “the grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State” and highlights the need to make “a distinction between a refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of fomenting subversion from outside” and to be “determined that the activities of such subversives should be discouraged, in accordance with the Declaration on the Problem of Subversion and Resolution of the Problem of Refugees adopted in Accra in 1965”. Under article III of the OAU Convention, refugees not only have a duty to obey the laws of the country of asylum, but must also abstain from subversive activities against other countries. Parties to the OAU Convention undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their countries from attacking other countries, by any activities likely to cause tensions with other countries. Under article II, countries of asylum have an obligation “as far as possible [to] settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin”.

The UNHCR Executive Committee has formulated a number of conclusions, providing guidance for protection during mixed population movements. Conclusion 94 on preserving the humanitarian and civilian character of asylum is attached as Annex C. It recommends, among other things, that States receiving influxes of refugees and combatants should take measures as early as possible to:

- disarm armed elements;
- identify and separate combatants from the refugee population;
- intern combatants.

These recommendations are reaffirmed in various UN General Assembly resolutions. The General Assembly has “urge[d] States to uphold the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, consistent with international law, *inter alia*, through effective measures to prevent the infiltration of armed elements, to identify and separate any such armed elements from refugee populations, to settle refugees at safe locations, where possible away from the border, and to ensure prompt and unhindered access to them by humanitarian personnel”.<sup>6</sup> The General Assembly has also “welcom[ed] the increased attention being given by the United Nations to the problem of refugee camp security, including



through the development of operational guidelines on the separation of armed elements from refugee populations”.<sup>7</sup> In a report to the General Assembly, the UNHCR Executive Committee has recommended that the international community “mobiliz[e] . . . adequate resources to support and assist host States in maintaining the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum, including in particular through disarmament of armed elements and the identification, separation and internment of combatants”.<sup>8</sup>

The exclusively civilian and humanitarian character of asylum serves several purposes: it reduces potential tensions between countries of asylum and origin; it provides refugees with better protection; it allows the identification and separation of armed elements; and it helps to deal with internal and external security problems. A foreigner planning or carrying out military-related activities in the host country is therefore not a refugee, and the host country must prevent foreign armed elements from using its territory to attack another State and prevent genuine refugees from joining them.

## 7. Adult foreign combatants and DDR issues in host countries<sup>9</sup>

### 7.1. Context

The varying reasons for the arrival of foreign combatants in a host country, as well as whether or not that country is involved in armed conflict, will be among the factors that determine the response of the host country and that of the international community. For example, foreign combatants may enter a country directly involved in armed conflict; they may be in a country that is a neutral neighbouring State; or they may be in a non-neutral country not directly involved in the conflict. Host countries may have political sympathies or State interests with regard to one of the parties to a conflict, and this may affect their policies or responses to influxes of combatants mixed in with refugees. Even if the host

country is not neutral, international agencies should highlight the benefits to the host country and the region of complying with the international law framework described above. Awareness-raising, training and advocacy efforts, as well as individual country strategies to deal with issues of State capacity, cooperation and compliance with international obligations and recommended actions, should be carried out.

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### 7.2. Key agencies

Key international agencies that could assist governments with issues relating to adult combatants include the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNHCR, the UN High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Key national agencies that deal with these issues are those concerned with defence, armed forces, police, DDR, refugee/humanitarian activities and foreign affairs.

## 7.3. Key actions

### 7.3.1. Coordination

Identification, disarmament, separation, internment, demobilization and eventual repatriation and reintegration of foreign combatants (as well as other interventions) are multi-State processes that require the participation and cooperation of multiple actors, including the host State, countries of origin, local communities, refugee communities, donor States, international and national agencies, regional organizations, and the political and military parts of the UN system. Therefore coordination within a host State and cross-border is vital.

At the national level, it may be helpful for key government and international agencies to set up an inter-agency forum for coordination and collaboration. This will be particularly useful where the capacity and resources of the host country are limited, and there is a need for the international community to provide large amounts of assistance. It is recommended that such a forum be restricted to essential and operational agencies present in the host country. The forum could arrange for and manage coordination and collaboration in matters of advocacy, awareness-raising, providing policy guidance, capacity-building, and setting up and supervising the methods used for the separation and internment of combatants, as well as later repatriation. Such a forum may also provide assistance with the maintenance of State security and with the mobilization of resources, including funding.

### 7.3.2. Advocacy

Advocacy by agencies should be coordinated. Agencies should focus on assisting the host government to understand and implement its obligations under international law and show how this would be beneficial to State interests, such as preserving State security, demonstrating neutrality, etc.

#### What key points should be highlighted in advocacy on international obligations?

- The government must respect the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement for all persons seeking asylum, including acceptance at the frontier;
- The government must take measures to identify, disarm and separate combatants from refugees as early as possible, preferably at the border;
- The government of a neutral State has an obligation to intern identified combatants in a safe location away from the border/conflict zone;
- An active combatant cannot be considered as a refugee. However, at a later stage, when it is clear that combatants have genuinely and permanently given up military activities, UNHCR would assist the government to determine the refugee status of demobilized former combatants using special procedures if any apply for refugee status;
- Foreign children associated with armed forces and groups should be dealt with separately from adult foreign combatants and should benefit from special protection and assistance with regard to disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration. They should first be properly identified as persons under the age of 18, separated from adult combatants as soon as possible, and should not be accommodated in internment camps for adult combatants. They may be given the status of refugees or asylum seekers and accommodated in refugee camps or settlements in order to encourage their rehabilitation, reintegration and reconciliation with their communities;
- Civilian family members of combatants should be treated as *prima facie* refugees or asylum seekers and may be accommodated in refugee camps or settlements;
- Special assistance should be offered to women or girls abducted/forcibly married into armed groups and forces and then taken over borders.

### 7.3.3. Security screening and identification of foreign combatants

Security screening is vital to the identification and separation of combatants. This screening is the responsibility of the host government's police or armed forces, which should be present at entry points during population influxes.

International personnel/agencies that may be present at border entry points during influxes include: peacekeeping forces; military observers; UN Civilian Police; UNHCR for reception of refugees, as well as reception of foreign children associated with fighting forces, if the latter are to be given refugee status; and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) for general issues relating to children. UNHCR's and/or UNICEF's child protection partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may also be present to assist with separated refugee children and children associated with armed forces and groups. Child protection agencies may be able to assist the police or army with identifying persons under the age of 18 years among foreign combatants.

Training in security screening and identification of foreign combatants could usefully be provided to government authorities by specialist personnel, such as international police, DPKO and military experts. They may also be able to help in making assessments of situations where there has been an infiltration of combatants, providing advice on preventive and remedial measures, and advocating for responses from the international community. The presence of international agencies as observers in identification, disarmament and separation processes for foreign combatants will make the combatants more confident that the process is transparent and neutral.

Identification and disarmament of combatants should be carried out at the earliest possible stage in the host country, preferably at the entry point or at the first reception/transit centre for new arrivals. Security maintenance at refugee camps and settlements may also lead to identification of combatants.

If combatants are identified, they should be disarmed and transported to a secure location in the host country for processing for internment, in accordance with the host government's obligations under international humanitarian law.

### 7.3.4. Methods of identifying foreign combatants

#### What methods are there for identification?

*Self-identification.* Especially in situations where it is known that the host government has facilities for foreign combatants, some combatants may identify themselves voluntarily, either as part of military structures or individually. Providing information on the availability of internment camp facilities for foreign combatants may encourage self-identification. Groups of combatants from a country at war may negotiate with a host country to cross into its territory before actually doing so, and peacekeepers with a presence at the border may have a role to play in such negotiations. The motivation of those who identify themselves as combatants is usually either to desert on a long-term basis and perhaps to seek asylum or to escape the heat of battle temporarily.

*Appearance.* Military uniforms, weapons and arriving in troop formation are obvious signs of persons being combatants. Even where there are no uniforms or weapons, military and security officials of the host country will often be skilful at recognizing fellow military and security personnel — from appearance, demeanour, gait, scars and wounds, responses to military language and commands, etc. Combatants' hands may show signs of having carried guns, while their feet may show marks indicating that they have worn boots. Tattoos may be related to the various fighting factions. Combatants may be healthier

and stronger than refugees, especially in situations where food is limited. It is important to avoid arbitrarily identifying all single, able-bodied young men as combatants, as among refugee influxes there are likely to be boys and young men who have been fleeing from forced military recruitment, and they may never have fought.

*Security screening questions and luggage searches.* Questions asked about the background of foreigners entering the host country (place of residence, occupation, circumstances of flight, family situation, etc.) may reveal that the individual has a military background. Luggage searches may reveal military uniforms, insignia or arms. Lack of belongings may also be an indication of combatant status, depending on the circumstances of flight.

*Identification by refugees and local communities.* Some refugees may show fear or wariness of combatants and may point out combatants in their midst, either at entry points or as part of relocation movements to refugee camps. Local communities may report the presence of strangers whom they suspect of being combatants. This should be carefully verified and the individual(s) concerned should have the opportunity to prove that they have been wrongly identified as combatants, if that is the case.

*Perpetrators of cross-border armed incursions and attacks.* Host country authorities may intercept combatants who are launching cross-border attacks and who pose a serious threat to the country. Stricter security and confinement measures would be necessary for such individuals.

### 7.3.5. Disarmament

Once combatants are identified, they will usually be taken into the custody of the army of the host country and/or peacekeepers. They should be disarmed as soon as possible. International military and police personnel may need to assist in this process. Weapons should be documented and securely stored for destruction or handing over to the government of the country of origin at the end of the internment period (e.g., at the end of the conflict). Other items such as vehicles should be kept in safe locations, also to be handed over at the end of the internment period. Personal items may be left in the possession of the owner.

After they have been disarmed, foreign combatants may be handed over to the authority responsible for their transportation to an internment facility — usually the police or security forces. The assistance of peacekeeping forces and any other relevant agencies may be required.

### 7.3.6. Demobilization

The host country, in collaboration with UN missions and other relevant international agencies, should decide at an early stage what level of demobilization of interned foreign combatants is desirable and within what time-frame. This will depend partly on the profile and motives of internees, and will determine the types of structures, services and level of security in the internment facility. For example, keeping military command and control structures will assist with maintaining discipline through commanders. Lack of demobilization, however, will delay the process of internees becoming civilians, and as a result the possibility of their gaining future refugee status as an exit strategy for foreign combatants who are seeking asylum. On the other hand, discouraging and dismantling military hierarchies will assist the demobilization process. Reuniting family members or putting them in contact with each other and providing skills training, peace education and rehabilitation programmes will also aid demobilization. Mixing different and rival factions from the country of origin, the feasibility of which will depend on the nature of the conflict and the reasons for the fighting, will also make demobilization and reconciliation processes easier.

### 7.3.7. Internment<sup>10</sup>

#### The nature of internment

Article 11 of the 1907 Hague Convention provides that: “A Neutral Power which receives on its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them, as far as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war. It may keep them in camps and even confine them in fortresses or in places set apart for this purpose. It shall decide whether officers can be left at liberty on giving their parole not to leave the neutral territory without permission.” Internment therefore does not necessarily require complete loss of liberty, and host States could grant internees varying degrees of freedom of movement, as long as the foreign combatants can no longer participate in hostilities from the neutral States’ territory. The host government should therefore decide what level of freedom of movement it wants to allow internees and set up a system to regulate movement in and out of internment camps. In order to be able to monitor the movement of internees properly and prevent them from engaging in unlawful activities, including use of the host country’s territory for military purposes, it is likely to be necessary for internment to involve at least some level of confinement. Depending on the local circumstances (mainly the extent of the security risk), this may range from a closed camp with no external freedom of movement to systems that provide for freedom of movement (e.g., a pass system that permits visits outside the camp or a system of reporting to authorities).

Article 12 of the Convention lays down the conditions of treatment for internees as follows: “In the absence of a special convention to the contrary, the Neutral Power shall supply the interned with the food, clothing, and relief required by humanity. At the conclusion of peace the expenses caused by the internment shall be made good.”

#### Standards of internment

The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 lays down minimum rights and conditions of internment to be granted to captured combatants. These rights also apply by analogy to foreign combatants interned in a neutral State.

### What are the basic standards under the Third Geneva Convention?<sup>11</sup>

- Internees must be treated humanely at all times and are entitled to respect for their person (art. 3);
- There must be no harmful discrimination among internees (art. 16);
- Female internees must be treated in a way that caters for their specific needs and must be given treatment as favourable as that given to men (art. 14);
- Internees must be provided, free of charge, with the necessary maintenance and medical attention required by their state of health (art. 15);
- No physical or mental torture, or any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on them to get information of any kind (art. 17);
- Internees must be provided with an identity card (art. 17);
- After they are separated from civilians, combatants must be evacuated as soon as possible to camps a safe distance away from the combat zone, and these evacuations must be carried out humanely (i.e., evacuees must be given sufficient food, drinking water and necessary clothing and medical attention) (arts. 19 and 20);
- Interned combatants must not be accommodated in prisons (art. 22);
- Places of internment must be hygienic and healthy places to live. Internees’ quarters must be protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted

(conditions must not harm their health). Camps must be kept clean, and proper sanitary measures should be taken to prevent epidemics (arts. 22, 25 and 29);

- Female internees must be accommodated separately from men, and separate dormitories and hygienic supplies should be provided for them (arts. 25 and 29);
- Daily food rations must be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep internees in good health, and their habitual diet must also be taken into account (art. 26);
- Internees must enjoy complete freedom in the exercise of their religion and in the practice of sports and intellectual activities (arts. 34–38);
- Internees must be permitted to receive and send letters, as well as individual parcels or collective shipments (e.g., of food, clothing) (arts. 71–73);
- Internees' working conditions should be properly regulated (arts. 49–57);
- Internees must have the right to make requests to the authorities internment them regarding their conditions of captivity (art. 78).

Additional Protocol II relating to Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts provides in Part II for humane, non-discriminatory treatment for those who do not take a direct part in, or who have ceased to take part in, hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted. Such persons may include internees.

### What are applicable standards under Additional Protocol II?

- Internees must receive similar treatment to the local civilian population regarding provision of food and drinking water, health and hygiene, and protection against the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict (art. 5[1][b]);
- They must be allowed to receive individual or collective relief (art. 5[1][c]);
- They must have freedom to practise their religion (art. 5[1][d]);
- If made to work, they must have the benefit of working conditions and safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population (art. 5[1][e]);
- They should be allowed to send and receive letters and cards (art. 5[2][b]);
- Places of internment must not be located close to the combat zone (art. 5[2][c]);
- Internees must be evacuated under conditions of safety if the internment site becomes exposed to danger arising out of the armed conflict (art. 5[2][c]);
- Internees are entitled to free medical examinations and treatment (art. 5[2][d]);
- Internees' physical or mental health and integrity must not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission (art. 5[2][e]);
- Women must be accommodated in separate quarters and be under the supervision of women, except where they are accommodated with male family members (art. 5[2][a]);
- If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures must be taken to ensure their safety (art. 5[4]).

Assistance by the international community

At least at the early stages of setting up and managing an internment camp, it is likely that host governments will lack capacity and resources for the task. International agencies have an important role to play in acquiring and supplying resources in order to assist the host



government to provide internees with the “relief required by humanity” (as required under the Hague Convention):

- In collaboration with the host government, international agencies should assist with awareness-raising and lobbying of donors, which should take place as soon as possible, as donor funding often takes time to be made available. Donors should be informed about the resource needed to separate and intern combatants and the benefits of such policies, e.g., maintaining State security, helping the host government to keep borders open for asylum seekers, etc.;
- International agencies should favourably consider contributing financial grants, material and other assistance to internment programmes, especially in the early phases when the host government will not have donor funding for such programmes. Contributing assistance, even on an *ad hoc* and temporary basis, will make international agencies’ advocacy and advisory roles more effective. The following are some illustrations of ways in which international agencies can contribute:

*Food.* WFP may assist with providing food. Given the inability of internees to feed themselves because of their restricted freedom of movement, each internee should be entitled to a full food ration of at least 2,100 kilocalories per day.

*Health care.* International agencies’ partners (e.g., local Red Cross societies) may be able to provide mobile health clinics, to supplement hospital treatment for more serious medical matters. Medical care should include reproductive health care for female internees.

*Non-food items.* Items such as plastic sheeting, plates, buckets, blankets, sleeping mats, soap, etc. will be needed for each internee and agency contributions will be essential. Agencies such as UNHCR and ICRC, if they have the resources, may be able to give extra assistance at least temporarily until the government receives regular donor funding for the internment initiative.

*Registration and documentation.* Agencies could help the host government to develop a system for registration and issuing of identity documentation. Agencies will often need the data themselves, e.g., ICRC in order to arrange family tracing and family visits, and UNHCR for the purpose of getting information on the profiles of internees who may later come within their mandate if, at a later stage, internees apply for refugee status. ICRC may issue its own documentation to internees in connection with its detention-monitoring role.

*Skills training.* To combat the problem of idleness and to provide rehabilitation and alternative skills for internees, as well as to maintain order and dignity during internment, agency partners must try to provide/fund vocational skills training programmes as soon as possible. In order for demobilization and reintegration to start in internment camps, it is essential to have skills training programmes that could help internees to become rehabilitated. Social skills training would also be helpful here, such as sensitization in human rights, civic education, peace-building, HIV/AIDS, and sexual and gender-based violence.

*Recreation.* Sufficient space for recreation and sporting equipment should be provided for the purpose of recreation.

*Re-establishing family links.* ICRC, together with national societies, should try to trace family members of internees, both across borders and within the host country, which will allow family links to be re-established and maintained (e.g., through exchange of Red Cross messages). Where civilian family members have also crossed into the host country, arrangements should be made for maintaining family unity. There are various options: families could be accommodated in internment camps, or in a separate nearby facility, or in a refugee camp or settlement. If family members are voluntarily accommodated



together with or near to internees, this has the advantage of preserving family unity, helping to break down military hierarchies in internment camps, reducing risks of local/refugee community retaliation against the family members on account of their connections to combatants, and minimizing the chances of combatants moving to civilian sites in order to be with their family members. However, the family members may face security risks, including physical violence and sexual harassment, from internees. Where civilian spouses and children are not accommodated with internees, regular and adequate family visits to internment camps must be arranged by ICRC, UNHCR or other relevant agencies.

*Monitoring.* ICRC should be able to carry out regular, confidential monitoring of internment camps, including the treatment of internees and the standards of their internment, in accordance with its mandate for persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to armed conflict. Reports from monitoring visits will be provided on a confidential basis to the government of the host country.

*Host communities.* The involvement and support of host communities will be vital to the internment process. Therefore, agencies should consider providing host communities with community-based development assistance programmes.

### Nationality issues

In view of the chaotic conditions usually found in conflict situations and the difficulties in setting up an adequate identification programme that could be operational immediately, combatants may be admitted to separation, disarmament and internment processes regardless of their nationality. Hence, it would be more practical to deal with problems of nationality at the end of internment, in order to decide, in consultation with the former combatants, the country in which they would undergo a DDR programme and the country to which they would finally return. This will require liaison between the governments involved, and should be closely monitored/supervised by the relevant agencies.

### Special requirements of female combatants

Internment camps should provide gender-appropriate facilities, including separate accommodation, washing and toilet facilities, as well as sex-specific health services, including reproductive health care. This must include sanitary kits and clean birthing kits for women. Women with babies should be given the means to care for their own children. With the exception of young babies, accommodating children in internment camps should be avoided and alternative accommodation should be found for them and their mothers. When internees are transported, sufficient vehicles should be provided to offer women the option of being transported separately from men, if their personal safety is threatened. Protection from sexual harassment and other violence should be ensured at all times (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

5.10 ◀▶

### Redressing incorrect internment decisions

In the internment camps, authorities should have flexibility to review and change incorrect decisions regarding who has been interned on a case-by-case basis. For this purpose, agencies with a protection mandate, such as ICRC, UNHCR, UNHCHR and UNICEF, should have confidential access to internees.

Persons incorrectly interned include:

- civilians who have not participated in military activities, and who could therefore be regarded as refugees or asylum seekers;
- civilians who have not participated in military activities and who were abducted by combatants (including women and girls abducted for the purpose of sexual slavery

- and men abducted for medical or other labour services), but who do not fall within the definition of a refugee. Such persons will usually be voluntarily repatriated;
- children associated with armed forces and groups who were not identified as children during the separation process, incorrectly ending up in internment camps for adult combatants;
- persons who do not fit the definition of combatant, and who were separated and interned on the basis of criteria other than those established for the separation process.

#### Exit strategies

It is important, whenever possible, to plan for exit strategies for internment programmes, although where the conflict in the country of origin lasts a long time, internment may also be lengthy. Exit strategies may include:

- including internees in DDR programmes in the country of origin at the end of the conflict;
- deciding whether internees who are considered to have become civilians after a period of demobilization and who apply for refugee status should be given that status.

#### 7.3.8. Mercenaries

International law makes special provision for and prohibits the recruitment, use, financing or training of mercenaries. A mercenary is defined as a foreign fighter who is specially recruited to fight in an armed conflict, is motivated essentially by the desire for private gain, and is promised wages or other rewards much higher than those received by local combatants of a similar rank and function.<sup>12</sup> Mercenaries are not considered to be combatants, and are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. The crime of being a mercenary is committed by any person who sells his/her labour as an armed fighter, or the State that assists or recruits mercenaries or allows mercenary activities to be carried out in territory under its jurisdiction.

Not every foreign combatant meets the definition of a mercenary: those who are not motivated by private gain and given high wages and other rewards are not mercenaries. It may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between mercenaries and other types of foreign combatants, because of the cross-border nature of many conflicts, ethnic links across porous borders, the high levels of recruitment and recycling of combatants from conflict to conflict within a region, sometimes the lack of real alternatives to recruitment, and the lack of a regional dimension to many previous DDR programmes.

Even when a foreign combatant may fall within the definition of a mercenary, this does not limit the State's authority to include such a person in a DDR programme, despite any legal action States may choose to take against mercenaries and those who recruit them or assist them in other ways. In practice, in many conflicts, it is likely that officials carrying out disarmament and demobilization processes would experience great difficulty distinguishing between mercenaries and other types of foreign combatants. Since the achievement of lasting peace and stability in a region depends on the ability of DDR programmes to attract the maximum possible number of former combatants, it is recommended that mercenaries should not be automatically excluded from DDR processes/programmes, in order to break the cycle of recruitment and weapons circulation and provide the individual with sustainable alternative ways of making a living.

DDR programmers may establish criteria to deal with such cases. Issues for consideration include: Who is employing and commanding mercenaries and how do they fit into the conflict? What threat do mercenaries pose to the peace process, and are they factored

into the peace accord? If there is resistance to account for mercenaries in peace processes, what are the underlying political reasons and how can the situation be resolved? How can mercenaries be identified and distinguished from other foreign combatants? Do individuals have the capacity to act on their own? Do they have a chain of command? If so, is their leadership seen as legitimate and representative by the other parties to the process and the UN? Can this leadership be approached for discussions on DDR? Do its members have an interest in DDR? If mercenaries fought for personal gain, are DDR benefits likely to be large enough to make them genuinely give up armed activities? If DDR is not appropriate, what measures can be put in place to deal with mercenaries, and by whom — their employers and/or the national authorities and/or the UN?

## 8. Foreign children associated with armed forces and groups and DDR issues in host countries

### 8.1. Context

In many armed conflicts, it is common to find large numbers of children among combatants, especially in armed groups and in long-lasting conflicts. Priority shall be given to identifying, removing and providing appropriate care for children during operations to identify and separate foreign combatants. Correct identification of children among combatants who enter a host country is vital, because children shall benefit from separate programmes that provide for their safe removal, rehabilitation and reintegration.

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### 8.2. Key agencies

UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC will be particularly involved in helping governments to deal with foreign children associated with armed forces and groups. Key national agencies include those concerned with children's issues, social welfare, and refugee and humanitarian affairs.

### 8.3. Key actions

#### 8.3.1. Agreement with host country government on the status and treatment of foreign children associated with armed forces and groups

Agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC should advocate with the host country for foreign children associated with armed forces and groups to be given a legal status, and care and protection that promote their speedy rehabilitation and best interests, in accordance with States' obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

An appropriate status for children may include refugee status, because of the illegality of and serious child rights violations involved in the under-aged recruitment of children,

as well as the need for children to be removed, rehabilitated and reintegrated in their communities as soon as possible. Refugee status can be given on a prima facie and collective basis in cases of large-scale arrivals, as and if applicable. Where the refugee status of individuals must be decided, reasons for giving refugee status in the case of children fleeing armed conflict may include a well-founded fear of illegal recruitment, sexual slavery or other serious child rights violations.

Agreement should be reached with the host government on the definition of a 'child' for the purpose of providing separate treatment for children associated with armed forces and groups. In view of the development of international law towards the position that persons under age 18 should not participate in hostilities, it is recommended that advocacy with host governments should be for all combatants under the age of 18 to be regarded as children.

### 8.3.2. Identification of children among foreign combatants

When agreement is reached with the host country government about the definition of a child and the methods for providing children with separate treatment from adults, this information should be provided to all those involved in the process of identifying and separating combatants (i.e., army, police, peacekeepers, international police, etc.).

It is often difficult to decide whether a combatant is under the age of 18, for a range of reasons. The children themselves may not know their own ages. They are likely to be under the influence of commanders who may not want to lose them, or they may be afraid to separate from commanders. Questioning children in the presence of commanders may not, therefore, always provide accurate information, and should be avoided. On the other hand, young adult combatants who do not want to be interned may try to falsify their age. Child protection agencies present at border entry points may be able to help army and police personnel with determining the ages of persons who may be children. It is therefore recommended that agreement be reached with the government of the host country on the involvement of such agencies as advisers in the identification process (also see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

◀ ▶ 5.30


### 8.3.3. Separation of foreign children associated with armed forces and groups

Once identified, children should be disarmed if necessary, removed from commanders and handed over to the custody of relevant agencies present at the border such as UNHCR, UNICEF and child protection NGOs.

### 8.3.4. Demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration

Children should not be accommodated in internment camps with adult combatants, unless a particular child is a serious security threat. This should only happen in exceptional circumstances, and for no longer than absolutely necessary.

Where the government has agreed to recognize children associated with fighting forces as refugees, these children can be accommodated in refugee camps or settlements, with due care given to possible security risks. For example, a short period in a refugee transit centre or appropriate interim care facility may give time for the child to start the demobilization process, socialize, readjust to a civilian environment, and prepare to transfer to a refugee camp or settlement. Temporary care measures like these would also provide time for agencies to carry out registration and documentation of the child and inter-camp tracing for family members, and find a suitable camp for placement. Finally, the use of an interim facility will allow the organization of a sensitization campaign in the camp to help other refugees to



accept children associated with armed forces and groups who may be placed with them for reintegration in communities.

Children associated with armed forces and groups should be included in programmes for other populations of separated children rather than being isolated as a separate group within a refugee camp or settlement. The social reintegration of children associated with fighting forces in refugee communities will be assisted by offering them normal activities such as education, vocational skills training and recreation, as well as family tracing and reunification. Younger children may be placed in foster care, whereas ‘independent/group living’ arrangements with supervision by a welfare officer and ‘older brother’ peer support may be more appropriate for older adolescents.

#### 8.3.5. Prevention of military recruitment

Prevention of (re-)recruitment, especially of at-risk young people such as children previously associated with armed forces and groups and separated children, must be an important focus in refugee camps and settlements. Preventive measures include: locating camps and settlements a safe distance from the border; sufficient agency staff being present at the camps; security and good governance measures; sensitization of refugee communities, families and children themselves to assist them to avoid recruitment in camps; birth registration of children; and adequate programmes for at-risk young people, including family-tracing activities, education and vocational skills programmes to provide alternative livelihood options for the future.

#### 8.3.6. Specific needs of girls

In many conflicts, there is a significant level of war-related sexual violence against girls. (NB: Boys may also be affected by sexual abuse, and it is necessary to identify survivors, although



this may be difficult.) Girls who have been associated with armed groups and forces may have been subjected to sexual slavery, exploitation and other abuses and may have babies of their own. Once removed from the armed group or force, they may continue to be at risk of exploitation in a refugee camp or settlement, especially if they are separated from their families. Adequate and culturally appropriate sexual and gender-based violence programmes should be provided in refugee camps and communities to help protect girls, and community mobilization is needed to raise awareness and help prevent exploitation and abuse. Special efforts should be made to allow girls access to basic services in order to prevent exploitation (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

◀▷ 5.20 ■ ▶▷ 5.10

## 9. Civilian family members or other dependants of combatants and DDR issues in host countries

### 9.1. Context

Foreign combatants entering a host country may sometimes be accompanied by civilian family members or other dependants. Family members may also independently make their way to the host country. If the family members have entered the host country to seek asylum, they should be considered as refugees or asylum seekers, unless there are individual circumstances to the contrary.

### 9.2. Key agencies

UNHCR is the mandated UN agency for refugees. Key national agencies include those dealing with refugees and humanitarian affairs.

### 9.3. Key actions

#### 9.3.1. Providing safe asylum and accommodation

When civilian family members of combatants enter a country of asylum, they should be directed to UNHCR and the host government's refugee agency, while the adult combatants will be dealt with by the army and police. Family members or dependants may be accommodated in refugee camps or settlements or urban areas (depending on the policy of the government of the host country). Accommodation placements should be carried out with due regard to protection concerns, e.g., family members of a combatant should be protected from other refugees who may be victims of that combatant.

#### 9.3.2. Maintaining family links with foreign combatants

It is important to try to establish family links between refugee family members and combatants in internment camps, since separation and internment policies may create many female-headed households. Family links can be maintained through family tracing, exchanges of Red Cross messages and family visits to internment camps, which should be organized by ICRC, Red Cross national societies and UNHCR. Women and girls who have been forcibly abducted and are married under circumstances not recognized by customary or national law have the right, with their children where applicable, to be safely separated from their 'husbands' (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

◀▷ 5.10

### 9.3.3. Preserving the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum

It is essential to ensure that refugee camps and settlements do not become militarized through the infiltration of combatants, which may lead to camps and settlements becoming the focus of security problems, including military attacks. Preventing this problem is primarily the responsibility of the government of the host country, but international agencies should support the government, and donor support will be essential.

Security in and around refugee camps and settlements can be achieved through:

- locating refugee camps and settlements a safe distance away from the border (generally at least 50 kilometres) and conflict zones;
- the systematic identification, disarmament, separation and internment of combatants;
- the screening of persons being relocated to refugee camps to ensure that only civilians are admitted;
- prohibiting armed elements from residence in, transit through or visits to refugee camps and settlements;
- prohibiting all military activities in refugee camps, including recruitment, training and providing support to combatants;
- prohibiting the holding, trading and bringing of weapons and ammunition into refugee camps and settlements by unauthorized persons;
- ensuring the presence of enough agency staff in camps and settlements;
- enforcing law and order in camps and settlements;
- enforcing security measures such as stationing police in and around camps and settlements;
- involving refugees in ensuring their own security and the peaceful and humanitarian character of camps and settlements, e.g., through community-based neighbourhood watch schemes and good governance measures in camps and settlements;
- enforcing properly functioning camp rules and by-laws to regulate the conduct of refugees, resolve disputes, etc., in order to supplement the laws of the host country (to which refugees are also subject);
- correctly designing the size and physical layout of camps and settlements;
- encouraging good neighbourliness between refugee camps/settlements and host communities.

## 10. Cross-border abductees and DDR issues in host countries

### 10.1. Context

In the context of regionalized conflicts, cross-border attacks and movements of combatants across borders, experience has shown that within the households of combatants, or under their control in other ways, will be persons who have been abducted across borders for the purposes of forced labour, sexual exploitation, military recruitment, etc. Their presence may not become known until some time after fighting has ended.

### 10.2. Key agencies

Cross-border abductees do not necessarily come within the mandate of any specific international agency. However, agencies such as UNHCR and ICRC are encouraged to assist such third-country nationals on humanitarian grounds in view of their situation of external displacement. Key national agencies include those concerned with humanitarian affairs.



### 10.3. Key actions

#### 10.3.1. Identification, release, finding long-lasting solutions

The main ways in which agencies can protect and assist cross-border abductees are for them to: (1) identify those who have been abducted (they may often be ‘invisible’, particularly in view of their vulnerability and their marginalization from the local community because of their foreign nationality, although it may be possible to get access to them by working through local, especially women’s organizations); (2) arrange for their release if necessary; and (3) arrange for their voluntary repatriation or find another long-term way to help them. Foreign abductees should be included in inter-agency efforts to help national abductees, such as advocacy with and sensitization of combatants to release abductees under their control (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

#### 10.3.2. Eligibility for DDR

Cross-border abductees should be considered as eligible to participate in reintegration programmes in the host country or country of origin together with other persons associated with the armed forces and groups, regardless of whether or not they are in possession of weapons. Although linked to the main DDR process, such programmes should be separate from those dealing with persons who have fought/carried weapons, and should carefully screen refugees to identify those who are eligible.

#### 10.3.3. Issues relating to women and girls

Women and girl abductees, including forced wives of combatants and those with children conceived during their captivity, are likely to be in a particularly difficult situation, both in the host country and in the country of origin. They will need special attention in protection, reintegration and reconciliation activities.



#### 10.3.4. Local integration and empowerment

Cross-border abductees who do not want to repatriate, or are not in a position to make a decision to separate themselves from abductors/combatants, should be included in humanitarian assistance programmes in these locations, in order to empower them so that they can make decisions about their future, as well as to help them integrate into the host country, if that is what they want to do.

#### 10.3.5. Re-establishing family links

Cross-border family links should be established and coordinated in collaboration with ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Cres-

Repatriation, Republic of Congo, 2005. Photo: J. Ose, UNHCR

cent societies (which have a mandate for tracing people across international borders) or other relevant agencies. This service will assist cross-border abductees to make decisions about their long-term future (e.g., by helping them to assess the reaction of family members to their situation) and will help to bring about future family reunification. Both abductees and family members are likely to be in need of counselling before family reunification.

## 11. Planning for foreign combatants' voluntary repatriation and inclusion in cross-border DDR operations

### 11.1. Regional dimensions to be taken into account in setting up DDR programmes

Since lasting peace and stability in a region depend on the ability of DDR programmes to attract the maximum possible number of former combatants, the following principles relating to regional and cross-border issues should be taken into account in planning for DDR:

- DDR programmes should be open to all persons who have taken part in the conflict, including foreigners and nationals who have crossed international borders. Extensive sensitization is needed both in countries of origin and host countries to ensure that all persons entitled to participate in DDR programmes are aware of their right to do so;
- close coordination and links among all DDR programmes in a region are essential. There should be regular coordination meetings on DDR issues — including, in particular, regional aspects — among UN missions, national commissions on DDR or competent government agencies, and other relevant agencies;
- to avoid disruptive consequences, including illicit cross-border movements and trafficking of weapons, standards in DDR programmes within a region should be harmonized as much as possible. While DDR programmes may be implemented within a regional framework, such programmes must nevertheless take into full consideration the political, social and economic contexts of the different countries in which they are to be implemented;
- in order to have accurate information on foreign combatants who have been involved in a conflict, DDR registration forms should contain a specific question on the nationality of the combatant.

DDR programmes should be open to all persons who have taken part in the conflict, including foreigners and nationals who have crossed international borders.

### 11.2. Repatriation agreements

As part of regional DDR processes, agreements should be concluded between countries of origin and host countries to allow both the repatriation and the incorporation into DDR programmes of combatants who have crossed international borders. UN peacekeeping missions and regional organizations have a key role to play in carrying out such agreements, particularly in view of the sensitivity of issues concerning foreign combatants.

Agreements should contain guarantees for the repatriation in safety and dignity of former combatants, bearing in mind, however, that States have the right to try individuals for criminal offences not covered by amnesties. In the spirit of post-war reconciliation,

guarantees may include an amnesty for desertion or an undertaking that no action will be taken in the case of former combatants from the government forces who laid down their arms upon entry into the host country. Protection from prosecution as mercenaries may also be necessary. However, there shall be no amnesty for breaches of international humanitarian law during the conflict.

Agreements should also provide a basis for resolving nationality issues, including methods of finding out the nationality those involved, deciding on the country in which former combatants will participate in a DDR programme and the country of eventual destination. Family members' nationalities may have to be taken into account when making long-term plans for particular families, such as in cases where spouses and children are of different nationalities.

### **11.3. Information and sensitization campaigns**

UN missions, with the support of agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR, should lead extensive information campaigns in host countries to ensure that foreign combatants are provided with essential information on how to present themselves for DDR programmes. The information should enable them to make free and informed decisions about their repatriation and reintegration prospects. It is important to ensure that refugee family members in camps and settlements in the host country also receive relevant information.

UN missions should help arrange voluntary contacts between government officials and foreign combatants. This will assist in encouraging voluntary repatriation and planning for the inclusion of such combatants in DDR programmes in their country of origin. However, foreign combatants who do not want to meet with government officials of their country of origin should not be forced to do so.

The government of the country of origin, together with the UN mission and relevant agencies, should sensitize receiving communities in areas to which former combatants will be repatriating, in order to encourage reintegration and reconciliation. Receiving communities may plan traditional ceremonies for healing, forgiveness and reconciliation, and these should be encouraged, provided they do not violate human rights standards.

### **11.4. Identification of foreign combatants and disarmament**

Apart from combatants who are confined in internment camps, there are likely to be other former or active combatants living in communities in host countries. Therefore, national security authorities in host countries, in collaboration with UN missions, should identify sites in the host country where combatants can present themselves for voluntary repatriation and incorporation in DDR programmes. In all locations, UNICEF, in collaboration with child protection NGOs, should verify each child's age and status as a child soldier. In the event that female combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups are identified, their situation should be brought to the attention of the lead agency for women in the DDR process. Where combatants are in possession of armaments, they should be immediately disarmed by security forces in collaboration with the UN mission in the host country.

### **11.5. Voluntary repatriation**

In keeping with the principle that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution",<sup>13</sup> repatriation should be voluntary. However, where

an application for refugee status has been rejected according to fair procedures and the individual has been assessed as not being in need of international protection, he/she may be returned to the country of origin even against his/her will (see section 10.6). The fact that repatriation is voluntary could be verified by UN missions in the case of adult combatants, and by UNICEF and child protection agencies in the case of children associated with armed forces and groups. Where children associated with armed forces and groups are living in refugee camps, the fact that repatriation is voluntary shall be verified by UNHCR.

### **11.6. Maintaining family unity during repatriation**

Every effort should be made to ensure that family unity is preserved in repatriation movements. UN missions should support the governments of the host country and country of origin by assisting with transportation. Where combatants have family members or other dependants in refugee camps, there should be close consultation with UNHCR so that the voluntary repatriation of family members can be coordinated and carried out according to the wishes of the family members and with full respect for their safety and dignity. In cases where it is not possible to repatriate combatants and family members/dependants as family units, mechanisms to reunite the family upon return should be established.

Spouses and children who are not citizens of the country to which they are travelling should be allowed by the government concerned to enter and live in that country with an appropriate legal status. This applies equally to spouses and children of 'traditional marriages' and legally recognized marriages.

### **11.7. Repatriation movements**

Governments and UN missions will be responsible for repatriation movements of foreign combatants, while UNHCR will provide transportation of family members. Depending on the local circumstances, the two repatriation operations could be merged under the overall management of one agency.

The concerned governments should agree on travel documents for foreign former combatants, e.g., DDR cards for those who have been admitted to a disarmament programme in the host country, or ICRC travel documents or host country documentation for those who have been interned.

To allow the speedy repatriation of foreign former combatants and their family members, the governments involved should consider not requesting or obliging those being repatriated to complete official immigration, customs and health formalities.

### **11.8. Factors affecting foreign children associated with armed forces and groups**

Particular care should be taken with regard to whether, and how, to include foreign children associated with armed forces and groups in DDR programmes in the country of origin, especially if they have been living in refugee camps and communities. Since they are already living in a civilian environment, they will benefit most from DDR rehabilitation and reintegration processes. Their level of integration in refugee camps and communities is likely to be different. Some children may be fully integrated as refugees, and it may no longer be in their best interests to be considered as children associated with armed forces and groups in need of DDR assistance upon their return to the country of origin. Other children may not yet have made the transition to a civilian status, even if they have been living in a civilian

environment, and it may be in their best interests to participate in a DDR programme. In all cases, stigmatization should be avoided.

It is recommended that foreign children associated with armed forces and groups should be individually assessed by UNHCR, UNICEF and/or child protection partner NGOs to plan for the child's needs upon repatriation, including possible inclusion in an appropriate DDR programme. Factors to consider should include: the nature of the child's association with armed forces or groups; the circumstances of arrival in the asylum country; the stability of present care arrangements; the levels of integration into camp/community-based civilian activities; and the status of family-tracing efforts. All decisions should involve the participation of the child and reflect his/her best interests. It is recommended that assessments should be carried out in the country of asylum, where the child should already be well known to, and should have a relationship of trust with, relevant agencies in the refugee camp or settlement. The assessment can then be given to relevant agencies in the country of origin when planning the voluntary repatriation of the child, and decisions can be made about whether and how to include the child in a DDR programme. If it is recommended that a child should be included in a DDR programme, he/she should receive counselling and full information about the programme (also see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

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## 12. Foreign combatants and DDR issues upon return to the country of origin

### 12.1. Assurances upon return

Governments must ensure that former combatants and their dependants are able to return in conditions of safety and dignity.

Return in safety implies a guarantee of:

- *legal security* (e.g., appropriate amnesties or public assurances of personal safety, integrity, non-discrimination and freedom from fear of persecution);
- *physical security* (e.g., protection from armed attacks, routes that are free of unexploded ordnances and mines);
- *material security* (e.g., access to land or ways to earn a living).

Return in dignity implies that returnees should not be harassed on departure, on route or on arrival. If returning spontaneously, they should be allowed to do so at their own pace; should not be separated from family members; should be allowed to return without pre-conditions; should be accepted and welcomed by national authorities and local populations; and their rights and freedoms should be fully restored so that they can start a meaningful life with self-esteem and self-confidence.

In keeping with the spirit of post-war reconciliation, it is recommended that the government of the country of origin should not take disciplinary action against former combatants who were members of the government armed forces and who laid down their arms during the war. They should benefit from any amnesties in force for former combatants in general.

### 12.2. Inclusion in DDR programmes

In accordance with agreements reached between the country of asylum and the country of origin during the planning for repatriation of former combatants, they should be included





Liberian former combatants, who were interned in Sierra Leone during the Liberian civil war, listen to speeches of welcome upon their repatriation and incorporation in the Liberia DDR programme in 2005. Returning home is usually the best solution for cross-border combatants. Photo: T.Sharpe, UNMIL/UNHCR

in appropriate DDR programmes in their country of origin. Entitlements should be synchronized with DDR assistance received in the host country, e.g., if disarmament and demobilization has been carried out in the host country, then reintegration is likely to be the most important process for repatriated former combatants in the country of origin. Lack of reintegration may contribute to future cross-border movements of combatants and mercenaries.

### 12.3. Reintegration

Entitlements under DDR programmes are only a contribution towards the process of reintegration. This process should gradually result in the disappearance of differences in legal rights, duties and opportunities of different population groups who have rejoined society — whether they were previously displaced persons or demobilized combatants — so that all are able to contribute to community stabilization and development.

Agencies involved in reintegration programming should support the creation of economic and social opportunities that assist the recovery of the community as a whole, rather than focusing on former combatants. Every effort shall be made not to increase tensions that could result from differences in the type of assistance received by victims and perpetrators. Community-based reintegration assistance should therefore be designed in a way that encourages reconciliation through community participation and commitment, including demobilized former combatants, returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other needy community members (also see IDDRS 4.30 on Social and Economic Reintegration).

Efforts should be made to ensure that different types of reintegration programmes work closely together. For example, in countries where the ‘4Rs’ (repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction) approach is used to deal with the return and reintegration of displaced populations, it is important to ensure that programme contents, methodologies and approaches support each other and work towards achieving the overall objective of supporting communities affected by conflict (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).<sup>14</sup>

Links between DDR and other reintegration programming activities are especially relevant where there are plans to reintegrate former combatants into communities or areas alongside returnees and IDPs (e.g., former combatants may benefit from UNHCR’s community-based reintegration programmes for returnees and war-affected communities in the main areas of return). Such links will not only contribute to agencies working well together and supporting each other’s activities, but also ensure that all efforts contribute to social and political stability and reconciliation, particularly at the grass-roots level.

In accordance with the principle of equity for different categories of persons returning to communities, repatriation/returnee policies and DDR programmes should be coordinated and harmonized as much as possible.

## 12.4. Monitoring

The disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants should be monitored and reported on by relevant agencies as part of a community-focused approach (i.e., including monitoring the rights of war-affected communities, returnees and IDPs, rather than singling out former combatants for preferential treatment). Relevant monitoring agencies include UN missions, UNHCHR, UNICEF and UNHCR. Human rights monitoring partnerships should also be established with relevant NGOs.

In the case of an overlap in areas of return, UNHCR will usually have established a field office. As returnee family members of former combatants come within UNHCR’s mandate, the agency should monitor both the rights and welfare of the family unit as a whole, and those of the receiving community. Such monitoring should also help to build confidence.

### What issues should be monitored?

- Non-discrimination: Returned former combatants and their families/other dependants should not be targeted for harassment, intimidation, extra-judicial punishment, violence, denial of fair access to public institutions or services, or be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any basic rights or services (e.g., health, education, shelter);
- Amnesties and guarantees: Returned former combatants and their families should benefit from any amnesties in force for the population generally or for returnees specifically. Amnesties may cover, for example, matters relating to having left the country of origin and having found refuge in another country, draft evasion and desertion, as well as the act of performing military service in unrecognized armed groups. Amnesties for international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and serious violations of international humanitarian law, are not supported by the UN. Former combatants may legitimately be prosecuted for such crimes, but they must receive a fair trial in accordance with judicial procedures;
- Respect for human rights: In common with all other citizens, the human rights and fundamental freedoms of former combatants and their families must be fully respected;



- Access to land: Equitable access to land for settlement and agricultural use should be encouraged;
- Property recovery: Land or other property that returned former combatants and their families may have lost or left behind should be restored to them. UN missions should support governments in setting up dispute resolution procedures on issues such as property recovery. The specific needs of women, including widows of former combatants, should be taken into account, particularly where traditional practices and laws discriminate against women's rights to own and inherit property;
- Protection from landmines and unexploded ordnances: Main areas of return may be at risk from landmines and unexploded ordnances that have not yet been cleared. Awareness-raising, mine clearance and other efforts should therefore include all members of the community;
- Protection from stigmatization: Survivors of sexual abuse, and girls and women who have had to bear their abusers' children may be at risk of rejection from their communities and families. There may be a need for specific community sensitization to combat this problem, as well as efforts to empower survivors through inclusion in constructive socio-economic activities.

## 13. Foreign former combatants who choose not to repatriate: Status and solutions

### 13.1. Refugee status

Foreign combatants should not be included in the *prima facie* awarding of refugee status to large groups of refugees, as asylum should be granted to civilians only. UNHCR recommends that where active or former combatants may be mixed in with refugees in population influxes, host countries should declare that *prima facie* recognition of refugee status does not apply to either group.

After a reasonable period of time has been allowed to confirm that former combatants have genuinely renounced armed/military activities, UNHCR will support governments of host countries by helping to determine the refugee status (or helping governments to determine the refugee status) of former combatants who refuse to repatriate and instead ask for international protection. These assessments should carefully take into account the 'excludability' of such individuals from international protection as provided by article 1 F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

### 13.2. Sustainable plans for the future

Determining refugee status must be linked to making sustainable long-term future plans for former combatants. These could be:

- *Repatriation*: Voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation to the country of origin at the end of the conflict or other event that gave rise to refugee claims is considered the best response for most population influxes;
- *Local integration*: For former combatants who are protected as refugees and therefore cannot be repatriated, the best option will be local integration, since options for third-country resettlement are likely to be limited. UNHCR negotiates with countries of asylum for local integration, and this process should be supported by UN missions and agencies. Local integration involves:
  - *Legal processes*: Refugees are granted an increasingly wider range of rights and entitlements identical to those enjoyed by other citizens, e.g., freedom of move-

ment; family reunification in the country of asylum; access to education, the labour market, public relief and assistance, including health facilities; the possibility of acquiring and disposing of property; and the capacity to travel out of and return to the country of asylum with valid travel and identity documents. This process should gradually lead to permanent residence rights and the option to apply for citizenship in accordance with national laws;

- *Economic processes:* Refugees become increasingly less reliant on humanitarian assistance or State aid, achieving a growing degree of self-reliance and having permanent jobs, thus contributing to the economic life of the host country;
- *Social and cultural processes:* These are interactive processes involving refugees feeling more and more at home in their new country, and local communities accepting their presence with greater ease, which allow refugees to live among the host population without fear of discrimination and contribute actively to the social life of their country of asylum;
- *Resettlement:* Third-country resettlement may be appropriate for certain refugees who were formerly combatants, e.g., where the refugee has protection needs that cannot be met in the country of asylum, is unlikely to integrate into the host country, etc. However, despite UNHCR advocacy for assistance from the international community, it is often difficult to find resettlement opportunities for refugees who were former combatants. Some resettlement countries do not take former combatants, with sometimes varying definitions of what exactly a former combatant is. Therefore, resettlement to a third country is unlikely to be a viable option for large numbers of former combatants, although it may be a solution in individual cases. The fact that very few countries take former combatants could be used to encourage the host country to accept them for local integration.

### 13.3. Determining refugee status

#### 13.3.1. Timing and sequence of applications for refugee status

UNHCR recommends that applications for refugee status by former combatants should not be encouraged in the early stages of influxes into the host country, because it is not practical to determine individual refugee status when large numbers of people have to be processed. The timing of applications for refugee status will be one of the factors that decide what will eventually happen to refugees in the long term, e.g., voluntary repatriation is more likely to be a viable option at the end of the conflict.

Where a peace process is under way or is in sight and therefore voluntary repatriation is feasible in the foreseeable future, the refugee status should be determined after repatriation operations have been completed for former combatants who wish to return at the end of the conflict. Former combatants who are afraid to return to the country of origin must be given the option of applying for refugee status instead of being repatriated against their will.

Where voluntary repatriation is not yet feasible because of unsafe conditions in the country of origin, the determination of refugee status should preferably be conducted only after a meaningful DDR process in the host country, in order to ensure that former combatants applying for refugee status have achieved civilian status through demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives in the host country.

In order to determine whether former combatants have genuinely given up armed activities, there should be a reasonable period of time between an individual laying down

arms and being considered for refugee status. This ‘cooling-off period’, during which former combatants will be monitored to ensure that they really have given up military activities, will vary depending on the local circumstances, but should not be too long — generally only a matter of months. The length of the waiting period could be decided according to the profile of the former combatants, either individually or as a group (e.g., length of service, rank and position, type of recruitment (forced or voluntary), whether there are addictions, family situation, etc.), and the nature of the armed conflict in which they have been involved (duration, intensity, whether there were human rights violations, etc.). Determining the refugee status of children associated with armed forces and groups who have applied for refugee status shall be done as quickly as possible. Determining the refugee status of other vulnerable persons can also be done quickly, such as disabled former combatants whose disabilities prevent them from further participating in military activities.

#### 13.3.2. Requirements for refugee status for foreign former combatants

Refugee status determination for former combatants involves establishing three facts:

- that they have genuinely and permanently given up arms and become civilians;
- that they meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or regional instruments;
- that they are not excluded from being protected as refugees, according to the exclusion clauses of refugee conventions.

#### 13.3.3. Genuine and permanent giving up of military activities

The giving up of military activities by foreign former combatants is more likely to be genuine if they have been demobilized and they have a real chance of earning a living in civilian life, including through DDR programmes in the host country. Detention in internment camps without demobilization and rehabilitation activities will not automatically lead to combatants becoming civilians. Breaking up military structures; linking up families; and providing vocational skills training, counselling, rehabilitation and peace education programmes for foreign former combatants in the host country will make it easier for them to become civilians and be considered for refugee status some time in the future.

It needs to be carefully verified that individuals have given up military activities, including in situations where foreign former combatants are interned or where they have some degree of freedom of movement. Verification should include information gathered throughout the period of identification, separation and internment. For example, it will be easier to understand individual motives and activities if the movements of internees in and out of internment camps are monitored. Actions or attitudes that may prove that an individual has genuinely given up military activities may include expressions of regret for past military activities and for the victims of the conflict, signs of weariness with the war and a general feeling of homesickness, and clear signs of dissatisfaction with a military or political organization.

Internment camp authorities or other agencies that are closely in contact with internees should share information with UNHCR, unless such information must be kept confidential.

#### 13.3.4. Exclusion from refugee protection

Even if a foreign former combatant has a genuine fear of persecution, he/she may not be eligible for international protection as a refugee if he/she has committed acts that would mean that the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention would apply to him/her. This

is to prevent abuse of asylum by undeserving persons who have seriously abused the human rights of others.

The issue of exclusion from protection as a refugee will be particularly relevant if there are serious reasons for believing that an individual has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge before he/she was admitted to that country as a refugee, or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. As defined by international instruments and interpreted in case law, exclusion clauses would apply if an individual had committed any of the following:

- *crimes against peace*, e.g., planning or participating in an unlawful war;
- *war crimes involving grave breaches of international humanitarian law*, e.g., mistreatment of civilians and prisoners of war, infliction of unjustified property damage during wartime;
- *crimes against humanity involving fundamentally inhumane conduct on a widespread or systematic scale against a civilian population*, e.g., genocide, slavery, torture, rape, deportations;
- *serious non-political crimes committed outside the country of refuge prior to admission to that country as a refugee*: The purpose of this clause is to ensure that important fugitives from justice are not able to avoid the jurisdiction of a State in which they may lawfully face punishment for genuine, serious crimes, by claiming refugee status in another country;
- *acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN*: This clause covers, for example, high-level government officials (Heads of State, ministers, high officials) who have exploited their political authority to endanger the well-being of individuals, their country and/or the world community.

A foreign former combatant cannot be excluded from refugee protection simply because he/she is a member of an organization or political party involved in a conflict. It must be established whether he/she was personally responsible for excludable acts. However, affiliation with a particularly violent group or unit (that is known on the basis of clear and credible information from the country of origin to carry out serious crimes of the type included in the exclusion clauses) may not only be important evidence, but also give rise to a presumption that the individual has been involved in the excludable acts of that group. However, the procedure for determining refugee status must give the individual an opportunity to show that this is not the case. If an individual can defend his/her actions or claim mitigating circumstances, these should be taken into account in assessing whether to exclude an individual from refugee protection.

In examining refugee claims by foreign children associated with armed forces and groups, a child's age and maturity should be taken into account when assessing whether he/she had the mental capacity to be held responsible for crimes that may exclude him/her from protection as a refugee.

Refugee status may be cancelled if information comes to light that an individual, who was recognized as a refugee (either individually or on a prima facie basis), should have been subject to the exclusion clauses when the refugee status was accorded (i.e., where refugee status was obtained through fraudulent means or substantial misrepresentations).

Refugee status may be withdrawn if an individual who was properly recognized as a refugee later commits acts covered by the exclusion clauses.

### **13.4. Foreign former combatants who are given refugee status**

When foreign former combatants are recognized as refugees, UNHCR will try to integrate them into the country of asylum or resettle them in a third country. The refugee always has

the option to voluntarily repatriate in the future, when conditions in his/her country of origin improve.

Foreign former combatants who have been detained (e.g., in internment camps) should be reunited with their families as soon as they are found to be refugees and may be accommodated in refugee camps or settlements, but specific measures may be necessary to protect them.

### **13.5. Foreign former combatants who are excluded from protection as refugees**

Individuals who fall within the Refugee Convention's exclusion clauses are not entitled to international protection or assistance from UNHCR. As a matter of principle, they should not be accommodated in refugee camps or settlements. Practical solutions to manage them will depend on the host country's capacity and willingness to deal with matters such as separating them from refugee populations.

Foreign former combatants who are excluded from protection as refugees may be returned to their country of origin. However, the UN Convention Against Torture provides an obligation for host countries not to return an individual to his/her country of origin where there are serious reasons to believe he/she would be tortured or treated inhumanely in other ways. In such cases, the UNHCHR and UN missions, as well as any human rights organizations established in the host country, should advocate for the protection provided in the Convention Against Torture.

Foreign former combatants who have committed crimes that exclude them from being given refugee status should not only be excluded from refugee protection, but also be brought to justice, e.g., extradited to face prosecution in the domestic courts of the country of origin or international tribunals (*ad hoc* war crimes tribunals and the International Criminal Court). In exceptional cases of the most serious types of crimes (e.g., genocide, serious breaches of the laws of armed conflict, torture as defined in the Convention Against Torture), there have been an increasing number of prosecutions in the national courts of host countries, under the principle of universality, which recognizes that some crimes are so grave that all countries have an interest in prosecuting them.

### **13.6. Foreign former combatants who do not meet the criteria for refugee status and are not in need of international protection**

The term 'not in need of international protection' is understood to refer to persons who, after due consideration of their applications for refugee status in fair procedures, are found not to qualify for refugee status under refugee conventions, nor to be in need of international protection on other grounds after a review of protection needs of whatever nature, and who are not authorized to stay in the host country for other good reasons. Such persons include those for whom there are no serious reasons to believe that they would be tortured or treated inhumanely in other ways if returned to the country of origin, as provided for under the UN Convention Against Torture.

Foreign former combatants whose applications for refugee status have been rejected by fair procedures and who have been assessed not to be in need of international protection on any other basis may be returned to their country of origin, as an exercise of national sovereignty by the host country if it does not want them to be integrated into the local community. Return of persons not in need of international protection is necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the asylum system. The return of such persons is a bilateral matter

between the two countries. The UN mission and other relevant agencies (e.g., UNHCHR, IOM) should support governments in finding other options, such as repatriation and local integration, for foreign former combatants who are not in need of international protection.<sup>15</sup>



## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

(NB: For the purposes of this document, the following terms are given the meaning set out below, without prejudice to more precise definitions they may have for other purposes.)

**Asylum:** The grant, by a State, of protection on its territory to persons from another State who are fleeing persecution or serious danger. A person who is granted asylum is a refugee. Asylum encompasses a variety of elements, including non-refoulement, permission to remain in the territory of the asylum country and humane standards of treatment.

**Asylum seeker:** A person whose request or application for refugee status has not been finally decided on by a possible country of refuge.

**Child associated with armed forces and groups:** According to the *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices* (1997), “Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried weapons.” For further discussion of the term, see the entry in IDRRS 1.20.

1.20 ◀▶

**Combatant:** Based on an analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts, a combatant is a person who:

- is a member of a national army or an irregular military organization; or
- is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or
- is involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or
- holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization; or
- arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or
- having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes.

**Exclusion from protection as a refugee:** This is provided for in legal provisions under refugee law that deny the benefits of international protection to persons who would otherwise satisfy the criteria for refugee status, including persons in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime, or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.

**Ex-combatant/Former combatant:** A person who has assumed any of the responsibilities or carried out any of the activities mentioned in the above definition of ‘combatant’, and has laid down or surrendered his/her arms with a view to entering a DDR process.

**Foreign former combatant:** A person who previously met the above definition of combatant and has since disarmed and genuinely demobilized, but is not a national of the country where he/she finds him-/herself.

**Host country:** A foreign country into whose territory a combatant crosses.

**Internally displaced persons (IDPs):** Persons who have been obliged to flee from their homes “in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of



generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (according to the definition in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).

**Internee:** A person who falls within the definition of combatant (see above) who has crossed an international border from a State experiencing armed conflict and is interned by a neutral State whose territory he/she has entered.

**Internment:** An obligation of a neutral State to restrict the liberty of movement of foreign combatants who cross into its territory, as provided for under the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Case of War on Land. This rule is considered to have attained customary international law status, so that it is binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to the Hague Convention. It is applicable by analogy also to internal armed conflicts in which combatants from government armed forces or opposition armed groups enter the territory of a neutral State. Internment involves confining foreign combatants who have been separated from civilians in a safe location away from combat zones and providing basic relief and humane treatment. Varying degrees of freedom of movement can be provided, subject to the interning State ensuring that the internees cannot use its territory for participation in hostilities.

**Mercenary:** A mercenary is defined in article 1 of the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989) in the following terms:

“1. A mercenary is any person who:

- a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
- c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
- e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:

- a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
  - (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or
  - (ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
- b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise of payment of material compensation;
- c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;
- d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
- e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.”

**Non-refoulement:** A core principle of international law that prohibits States from returning persons in any manner whatsoever to countries or territories in which their lives or freedom may be threatened. It finds expression in refugee law, human rights law and international humanitarian law and is a rule of customary international law and is therefore binding on

all States, whether or not they are parties to specific instruments such as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

**Prima facie:** As appearing at first sight or on first impression; relating to refugees, if someone seems obviously to be a refugee.

**Refugee:** A refugee is defined in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as a person who:

- “Is outside the country of origin;
- Has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
- Is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.”

In Africa and Latin America, this definition has been extended. The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa also includes as refugees persons fleeing civil disturbances, widespread violence and war. In Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, although not binding, recommends that the definition should also include persons who fled their country “because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”.

**Refugee status determination:** Legal and administrative procedures undertaken by UNHCR and/or States to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a refugee in accordance with national and international law.

**Returnee:** A refugee who has voluntarily repatriated from a country of asylum to his/her country of origin, after the country of origin has confirmed that its environment is stable and secure and not prone to persecution of any person. Also refers to a person (who could be an internally displaced person [IDP] or ex-combatant) returning to a community/town/village after conflict has ended.

## Abbreviations

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/standards
IDP	internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCHR	UN High Commission on Human Rights
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children’s Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

## Annex B: Overview of some key operational international agencies that could assist governments to deal with cross-border aspects of combatants and related populations

AGENCY	HOST COUNTRY	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
UN DPKO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Identification of combatants</li> <li>■ Disarmament and demobilization</li> <li>■ Collection and destruction/disposal of weapons</li> <li>■ Support to security activities</li> <li>■ Construction of internment sites</li> <li>■ Departure packages</li> <li>■ Transportation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Lead agency for peacekeeping operations</li> <li>■ Identification of combatants</li> <li>■ Disarmament and demobilization</li> <li>■ Collection and destruction/disposal of weapons</li> <li>■ Support to security activities</li> <li>■ Construction of cantonment sites</li> <li>■ Departure packages</li> <li>■ Transportation</li> </ul>
UNHCR <sup>16</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Preserving civilian and humanitarian character of asylum and monitoring application of refugee law, including respect for non-refoulement (e.g., ensuring non-rejection at the border)</li> <li>■ Representing the interests of refugee/asylum seeker family members of foreign combatants, ensuring their safe asylum and finding long-term options for their future</li> <li>■ Representing the interests of children associated with armed forces and groups who have the status of refugees or asylum seekers, encouraging their reintegration into refugee communities and finding long-term options for their future</li> <li>■ Support to mass information sensitization campaigns that encourage combatants and their families to take part in DDR programmes</li> <li>■ Collaborating with ICRC in organization of refugee/asylum seeker family visits to combatants in internment camps</li> <li>■ Assistance with voluntary repatriation of demobilized former combatants and family members</li> <li>■ Determining refugee status of former combatants who have returned to civilian life and are seeking international protection, and finding long-term options for their future for those who are classified as refugees</li> <li>■ Advice and logistic support regarding internment site planning and camp design, as well as advice on camp management</li> <li>■ Material assistance (e.g., plastic sheeting and other non-food item assistance)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Pre-cantonment phase: Logistical support regarding site planning and camp design, as well as practical advice on camp management</li> <li>■ Pre-positioning of material assistance (e.g., plastic sheeting and other non-food items)</li> <li>■ Assistance with monitoring the disarmament process, as a confidence-building measure</li> <li>■ Disarmament and demobilization phase: Support to family members to the extent they are related to refugee/returnee populations, with particular emphasis on vulnerable cases, including accommodation and material assistance</li> <li>■ Reception of returnees linked to former combatants (family members and children associated with armed forces and groups)</li> <li>■ Upon return to areas of origin: Inclusion of former combatants and their families in community-based reintegration activities that target returning refugees, IDPs and other war-affected populations</li> <li>■ As part of returnee monitoring efforts, monitoring the reintegration of former combatants and their families upon return to their homes, which could serve as a confidence-building measure in encouraging DDR, repatriation and reintegration</li> <li>■ Support to mass information sensitization campaigns encouraging combatants and their families to take part in DDR and which will also target communities that will receive former combatants and their families, with the aim of ensuring reintegration and reconciliation</li> </ul>
UNICEF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Advocacy for child protection in armed conflict</li> <li>■ Insisting on the immediate demobilization of children associated with armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Design and implementation of reintegration programmes for children leaving armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Family reunification</li> <li>■ Prevention of recruitment of children</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Lead agency for children's DDR programmes</li> <li>■ Advocacy for child protection in armed conflict</li> <li>■ Insisting on the immediate demobilization of children associated with armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Design and implementation of reintegration programmes for children leaving armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Family reunification</li> <li>■ Prevention of recruitment of children</li> </ul>

UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Providing support to reintegration activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Formulation and implementation of demobilization programmes aimed at creating a sustainable environment in communities of return and assisting with the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants and their families</li> <li>■ Putting into place measures to deal with small arms questions, including the reduction of the presence of small arms in communities of return</li> </ul>
WFP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Providing food aid for combatants in internment camps and civilian dependants in refugee camps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Providing support to cantonment, demobilization and reintegration</li> <li>■ Providing food aid for disarmed military personnel, their dependants and other affected civilian populations in a context of comprehensive DDR programmes</li> <li>■ Providing transport, communications and logistic support</li> <li>■ Providing support for reintegration into civil society</li> </ul>
IOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Transfer of persons in need of internal or international migration services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Resettlement and reintegration of former combatants, including establishment and management of assembly areas, profiling and database development, logistic support for transportation, helping create and find employment opportunities, reintegration grants projects, setting up of information, counselling and referral services</li> </ul>
ICRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Monitoring the application of international humanitarian law</li> <li>■ Monitoring the treatment and conditions of detention of persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to armed conflict (e.g., internees)</li> <li>■ Re-establishing family links for families dispersed by armed conflict — tracing of missing family members, exchange of family news via Red Cross messages, arranging family visits to internment camps, cross-border family reunification for separated children</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Monitoring the application of international humanitarian law</li> <li>■ Re-establishing family links for families dispersed by armed conflict — tracing of missing family members, exchange of family news via Red Cross messages, arranging family visits to internment camps, cross-border family reunification for separated children</li> <li>■ Monitoring treatment and conditions of persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to armed conflict</li> </ul>
UNHCHR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Advocacy to uphold human rights standards</li> <li>■ Monitoring of human rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Advocacy to uphold human rights standards</li> <li>■ Monitoring of human rights</li> </ul>

## Annex C: UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion on the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum No. 94 (LIII)

The Executive Committee,

*Remaining* seriously concerned by the continuing occurrence of military or armed attacks and other threats to the security of refugees, including the infiltration and presence of armed elements in refugee camps and settlements;<sup>17</sup>

*Recalling* the relevant provisions of international refugee law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law;

*Recalling* its Conclusion No. 27 (XXXIII) and Conclusion No. 32 (XXXIV) on military attacks on refugee camps and settlements in Southern Africa and elsewhere; Conclusion 72 (XLIV) on personal security of refugees; Conclusion No. 48 (XXXVIII) on military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements; Conclusion No. 47 (XXXVIII) and Conclusion No. 84 (XLVII), on refugee children and adolescents, as well as Conclusion 64 (XLI) on refugee women and international protection;

*Recalling* also United Nations Security Council resolution S/RES/1208 (1998) and S/RES/1296 (2000), and the two reports of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict<sup>18</sup>, noting in particular the recommendations made therein with respect to enhancing the security of refugee camps and settlements;

*Welcoming* the discussion which took place on the civilian character of asylum in the context of the Global Consultations on International Protection;<sup>19</sup>

*Noting* that several international meetings have recently been held, aimed at identifying effective operational strategies for maintaining the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum;<sup>20</sup>

*Reiterating* that refugee camps and settlements should have an exclusively civilian and humanitarian character, that the grant of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act which should not be regarded as unfriendly by another State, as stated in the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and a number of EXCOM Conclusions, and that all actors, including refugees themselves, have the obligation to cooperate in ensuring the peaceful and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements;

*Recognizing* that the presence of armed elements in refugee camps or settlements; recruitment and training by government armed forces or organized armed groups; the use of such camps, intended to accommodate refugee populations on purely humanitarian grounds, for the internment of prisoners of war; as well as other forms of exploitation of refugee situations for the purpose of promoting military objectives are likely to expose refugees, particularly women and children, to serious physical danger, inhibit the realization of durable solutions, in particular voluntary repatriation, but also local integration, jeopardize the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum and may threaten the national security of States, as well as inter-State relations;

*Recognizing* the special protection needs of refugee children and adolescents who, especially when living in camps where refugees are mixed with armed elements, are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by government armed forces or organized armed groups;

*Reaffirming* the importance of States, UNHCR and other relevant actors, integrating safety and security concerns from the outset of a refugee emergency into refugee camp management in a holistic manner;

- (a) *Acknowledges* that host States have the primary responsibility to ensure the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum by, *inter alia*, making all efforts to locate refugee camps and settlements at a reasonable distance from the border, maintaining law and order, curtailing the flow of arms into refugee camps and settlements, preventing their use for the internment of prisoners of war, as well as through the disarmament of armed elements and the identification, separation and internment of combatants;
- (b) *Urges* refugee-hosting States to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps by preventing their use for purposes which are incompatible with their civilian character;
- (c) *Recommends* that action taken by States to ensure respect for the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum be guided, *inter alia*, by the following principles:
  - (i) Respect for the right to seek asylum, and for the fundamental principle of *non-refoulement*, should be maintained at all times;
  - (ii) Measures for the disarmament of armed elements and the identification, separation and internment of combatants should be taken as early as possible, preferably at the point of entry or at the first reception/transit centres for new arrivals;
  - (iii) To facilitate early identification and separation of combatants, registration of new arrivals should be conducted by means of a careful screening process;
  - (iv) Refugee camps and settlements should benefit from adequate security arrangements to deter infiltration by armed elements and the strengthening of law and order;
  - (v) Once identified, disarmed and separated from the refugee population, combatants should be interned at a safe location from the border;
  - (vi) Where the granting of refugee status is based on group determination, civilian family members of combatants should be treated as refugees and should not be interned together with them;
  - (vii) Combatants should not be considered as asylum-seekers until the authorities have established within a reasonable timeframe that they have genuinely and permanently renounced military activities. Once this has been established, special procedures should be put in place for individual refugee status determination, to ensure that those seeking asylum fulfil the criteria for the recognition of refugee status. During the refugee status determination process, utmost attention should be paid to article 1F of the 1951 Convention, in order to avoid abuse of the asylum system by those who do not deserve international protection;
  - (viii) Former child soldiers should benefit from special protection and assistance measures, in particular as regards their demobilization and rehabilitation;
  - (ix) Where necessary, host States should develop, with assistance from UNHCR, operational guidelines in the context of group determination to exclude those individuals who are not deserving of international refugee protection;
- (d) *Further* to para 3 (b) above, *calls* upon UNHCR to convene a meeting of experts in support of the elaboration of measures for the disarmament of armed elements and the identification, separation, and internment of combatants, including the clarification of relevant procedures and standards, in consultation with States, United Nations Secre-

tariat entities and agencies, and interested organizations, such as the ICRC, and report back to the Executive Committee on progress achieved;

- (e) *Calls upon* States to ensure that measures are taken to prevent the recruitment of refugees by government armed forces or organized armed groups, in particular of children, taking into account also that unaccompanied and separated children are even more vulnerable to recruitment than other children;
- (f) *Calls upon* the relevant United Nations organs and regional organizations, in pursuance of their respective mandates, as well as the international community at large, to mobilize adequate resources to support and assist host States in maintaining the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum, in line with the principles of international solidarity, co-operation, burden and responsibility sharing;
- (g) *Calls upon* UNHCR and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat to enhance collaboration on all aspects of this complex matter, and as appropriate, to deploy, with the consent of host States, multi-disciplinary assessment teams to an emerging crisis area in order to clarify the situation on the ground, evaluate security threats for refugee populations and consider appropriate practical responses;
- (h) *Calls upon* UNHCR to explore how it may develop, in consultation with relevant partners, its own institutional capacity to address insecurity in refugee camps, *inter alia* by assisting States to ensure the physical safety and dignity of refugees, building, as appropriate, upon its protection and operational expertise.



## Annex D: Sample agreement on repatriation and reintegration of cross-border combatants

### **Agreement between the Government of [country of origin] and the Government of [host country] for the voluntary repatriation and reintegration of combatants of [country of origin]**

#### Preamble

Combatants of [country of origin] have been identified in neighbouring countries. Approximately [number] of these combatants are presently located in [host country]. This Agreement is the result of a series of consultations for the repatriation and incorporation in a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme of these combatants between the Government of [country of origin] and the Government of [host country]. The Parties have agreed to facilitate the process of repatriating and reintegrating the combatants from [host country] to [country of origin] in conditions of safety and dignity. Accordingly, this Agreement outlines the obligations of the Parties.

#### Article 1 – Definitions

#### Article 2 – Legal bases

The Parties to this Agreement are mindful of the legal bases for the [internment and] repatriation of the said combatants and base their intentions and obligations on the following international instruments:

[If applicable, in cases involving internment] The Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (Annex 1)

[If applicable, in cases involving internment] The Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (Annex 2)

[If applicable, in cases involving internment] The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 12 December 1977 (Annex 3)

Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951 (Annex 4)

[If applicable, in cases involving African States] The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Annex 5)

#### Article 3 – Commencement

The repatriation of the said combatants will commence on [ ].

#### Article 4 – Technical Task Force

A Technical Task Force of representatives of the following parties to determine the operational framework for the repatriation and reintegration of the said combatants shall be constituted:

National Commission on DDR [of country of origin and of host country]

Representatives of the embassies [of country of origin and host country]

[Relevant government departments of country of origin and host country, e.g. foreign affairs, defence, internal affairs, immigration, refugee/humanitarian affairs, children and women/gender]

UN Missions [in country of origin and host country]

[Relevant international agencies, e.g. UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC, IOM]

#### Article 5 – Obligations of Government of [country of origin]

The Government of [country of origin] agrees:

- i. To accept the return in safety and dignity of the said combatants.
- ii. To provide sufficient information to the said combatants, as well as to their family members, to make free and informed decisions concerning their repatriation and reintegration.
- iii. To include the returning combatants in the amnesty provided for in article [ ] of the Peace Accord (Annex 6).
- iv. To waive any court martial action for desertion from government forces.
- v. To facilitate the return of the said combatants to their places of origin or choice through [relevant government agencies such as the National Commission on DDR and international agencies and NGO partners], taking into account the specific needs and circumstances of the said combatants and their family members.
- vi. To consider and facilitate the payment of any DDR benefits, including reintegration assistance, upon the return of the said combatants and to provide appropriate identification papers in accordance with the eligibility criteria of the DDR programme.
- vii. To assist the returning combatants of government forces who wish to benefit from the restructuring of the army by rejoining the army or obtaining retirement benefits, depending on their choice and if they meet the criteria for the above purposes.
- viii. To facilitate through the immigration department the entry of spouses, partners, children and other family members of the combatants who may not be citizens of [country of origin] and to regularize their residence in [country of origin] in accordance with the provisions of its immigration or other relevant laws.
- ix. To grant free and unhindered access to [UN Missions, relevant international agencies, etc.] to monitor the treatment of returning combatants and their family members in accordance with human rights and humanitarian standards, including the implementation of commitments contained in this Agreement.
- x. To meet the [applicable] cost of repatriation and reintegration of the combatants.

#### Article 6 – Obligations of Government of [host country]

The Government of [host country] agrees:

- i. To facilitate the processing of repatriation of the said combatants who wish to return to [country of origin].
- ii. To return the personal effects (excluding arms and ammunition) of the said combatants.
- iii. To provide clear documentation and records which account for arms and ammunition collected from the said combatants.

- iv. To meet the [applicable] cost of repatriation of the said combatants.
- v. To consider local integration for any of the said combatants for whom this is assessed to be the most appropriate durable solution.

#### Article 7 – Children associated with armed forces and groups

The return, family reunification and reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups will be carried out under separate arrangements, taking into account the special needs of the children.

#### Article 8 – Special measures for vulnerable persons/persons with special needs

The Parties shall take special measures to ensure that vulnerable persons and those with special needs, such as disabled combatants or those with other medical conditions that affect their travel, receive adequate protection, assistance and care throughout the repatriation and reintegration processes.

#### Article 9 – Families of combatants

Wherever possible, the Parties shall ensure that the families of the said combatants residing in [host country] return to [country of origin] in a coordinated manner that allows for the maintenance of family links and reunion.

#### Article 10 – Nationality issues

The Parties shall mutually resolve through the Technical Task Force any applicable nationality issues, including establishment of modalities for ascertaining nationality, and determining the country in which combatants will benefit from a DDR programme and the country of eventual destination.

#### Article 11 – Asylum

Should any of the said combatants, having permanently renounced armed activities, not wish to repatriate for reasons relevant to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, they shall have the right to seek and enjoy asylum in [host country]. The grant of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act.

#### Article 12 – Designated border crossing points

The Parties shall agree on border crossing points for repatriation movements. Such agreement may be modified to better suit operational requirements.

#### Article 13 – Immigration, customs and health formalities

- i. To ensure the expeditious return of the said combatants, their family members and belongings, the Parties shall waive their respective immigration, customs and health formalities usually carried out at border crossing points.
- ii. The personal or communal property of the said combatants and their family members, including livestock and pets, shall be exempted from all customs duties, charges and tariffs.

- iii. [If applicable] The Parties shall also waive any fees, passenger service charges as well as all other airport, marine, road or other taxes for vehicles entering or transiting their respective territories under the auspices of [repatriation agency] for the repatriation operation.

#### Article 14 – Access and monitoring upon return

[The UN Mission and other relevant international and non-governmental agencies] shall be granted free and unhindered access to all the said combatants and their family members in [the host country] and upon return in [the country of origin], in order to monitor their treatment in accordance with human rights and humanitarian standards, including the implementation of commitments contained in this Agreement.

#### Article 15 – Continued validity of other agreements

This Agreement shall not affect the validity of any existing agreements, arrangements or mechanisms of cooperation between the Parties. To the extent necessary or applicable, such agreements, arrangements or mechanisms may be relied upon and applied as if they formed part of this Agreement to assist in the pursuit of this Agreement, namely the repatriation and reintegration of the said combatants.

#### Article 16 – Resolution of disputes

Any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, or for which no provision is expressly made herein, shall be resolved amicably through consultations between the Parties.

#### Article 17 – Entry into force

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by the Parties.

#### Article 18 – Amendment

This Agreement may be amended by mutual agreement in writing between the Parties.

#### Article 19 – Termination

This Agreement shall remain in force until it is terminated by mutual agreement between the Parties.

#### Article 20 – Succession

This Agreement binds any successors of both Parties.

In witness whereof, the authorized representatives of the Parties have hereby signed this Agreement.

DONE at ....., this ..... day of ..... , in two originals.

For the Government of [country of origin]:

For the Government of [host country]:

## Endnotes

- 1 See, for example, *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002, section on 'Principles Involved in the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Foreign Armed Groups', pp. 6–7; *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia*, 11 September 2003, para. 49: "For the planned disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in Liberia to succeed, a subregional approach which takes into account the presence of foreign combatants in Liberia and Liberian ex-combatants in neighbouring countries would be essential . . . In view of the subregional dimensions of the conflict, any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for Liberia should be linked, to the extent possible, to the ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in Côte d'Ivoire. . ."; Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) establishing the United Nations Mission in Liberia, para. 1(f) on DDR: "addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants"; Security Council press release, 'Security Council Calls for Regional Approach in West Africa to Address such Cross-border Issues as Child Soldiers, Mercenaries, Small Arms', SC/8037, 25 March 2004.
- 2 "Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another state . . . Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force . . . No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State."
- 3 Adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 43/173, 9 December 1988.
- 4 Adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva 1955, and approved by the UN Economic and Social Council in resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977.
- 5 Adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 45/111, 14 December 1990.
- 6 UN General Assembly resolution 56/166, *Human Rights and Mass Exoduses*, para. 8, 26 February 2002; see also General Assembly resolution 58/169, para. 7.
- 7 UN General Assembly resolution 58/169, *Human Rights and Mass Exoduses*, 9 March 2004.
- 8 UN General Assembly, *Report of the Fifty-Fifth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme*, A/AC.96/1003, 12 October 2004.
- 9 Information on separation and internment of combatants in sections 7 to 10 draws significantly from papers presented at the Experts' Roundtable organized by UNHCR on the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum (June 2004), in particular the background resource paper prepared for the conference, *Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum* by Rosa da Costa, UNHCR (Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Department of International Protection, PPLA/2004/02, June 2004), as well as the subsequent UNHCR draft, *Operational Guidelines on Maintaining the Civilian Character of Asylum in Mass Refugee Influx Situations*.
- 10 Internment camps for foreign combatants have been established in Sierra Leone (Mapeh and Mafanta camps for combatants from the Liberian war), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Zongo for combatants from Central African Republic), Zambia (Ukwimi camp for combatants from Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC) and Tanzania (Mwisa separation facility for combatants from Burundi and DRC).
- 11 Da Costa, op. cit.
- 12 The full definition in the 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries is contained in the glossary of terms in Annex A. In Africa, the 1977 Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa is also applicable.

- 13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14. The article contains an exception “in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”.
- 14 For further information see UNHCR, *Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities*, Geneva, May 2004.
- 15 The UN General Assembly has “emphasiz[ed] the obligation of all States to accept the return of their nationals, call[ed] upon States to facilitate the return of their nationals who have been determined not to be in need of international protection, and affirm[ed] the need for the return of persons to be undertaken in a safe and humane manner and with full respect for their human rights and dignity, irrespective of the status of the persons concerned” (UN General Assembly resolution 57/187, para. 11, 18 December 2002).
- 16 Refer to UNHCR/DPKO note on cooperation, 2004.
- 17 For the purpose of this Conclusion, the term “armed elements” is used as a generic term in a refugee context that refers to combatants as well as civilians carrying weapons. Similarly, for the purpose of this Conclusion, the term “combatants” covers persons taking active part in hostilities in both international and non-international armed conflict who have entered a country of asylum.
- 18 S/1999/957; S/2001/331
- 19 EC/GC/01/8/Rev.1
- 20 Workshop on the Potential Role of International Police in Refugee Camp Security (Ottawa, Canada, March 2001); Regional Symposium on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Status, Camps and other locations (Pretoria, South Africa, February 2001); International Seminar on Exploring the Role of the Military in Refugee Camp Security (Oxford, UK, July 2001).

# 5.50 Food Aid Programmes in DDR

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#### NOTE

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# 5.50 Food Aid Programmes in DDR

## Summary

This module on food aid programmes in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) establishes the guiding principles and operational requirements for planning and implementing food aid programmes in support of United Nations (UN) integrated DDR programmes in peacekeeping environments. The module also introduces some information regarding food security issues in the post-conflict environment, and offers a rationale for using humanitarian food aid and food security interventions, when appropriate, to contribute to the broader coordinated efforts to support the lasting social and economic reintegration of former combatants and their dependants. Finally, the module offers some practical guidance and references to provide a general framework for the development of operational plans for food aid programmes in support of demobilization and reintegration.

## 1. Module scope and objectives

While the fundamental planning and operational concepts for food aid programming in DDR are introduced, this module also identifies, through references and annexes, key resources that will provide additional in-depth guidance in areas such as standard operating procedures for planning food aid programmes to support DDR, assessments, food distribution, logistics, transport and participation.

The objective of this module is to outline the guiding principles and rationale behind food aid programming in the context of integrated UN DDR programmes in peacekeeping environments. The module highlights a main planning and programming framework in order to contextualize, and provide guidance towards, the effective and most efficient provision of food assistance in future DDR programmes.

## 2. Terms, abbreviations and definitions

Annex A contains list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

1.20 ◀▶

### 3. Introduction

In countries and regions emerging from conflict situations, humanitarian food aid agencies are normally already engaged in large-scale life-saving and livelihood protection programmes to assist vulnerable and war-affected civilian communities and displaced populations. These same agencies may be asked to implement specifically designed food assistance programmes in support of DDR programmes during peacekeeping operations.

Experience has shown that the involvement of humanitarian food aid agencies with DDR is a complex and delicate process, requiring close coordination among all parties involved (including military, political, development-oriented and humanitarian actors) to ensure staff safety and prevent the programmes from having a destabilizing effect. Food aid programmes in support of DDR should be carried out according to the principles outlined in the IDDRS, particularly the principles of unity of effort and humanitarianism (see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR).

To achieve recovery, rehabilitation and progress towards self-reliance among war-affected populations, including the most vulnerable, and to ensure the lasting reintegration of former combatants into civilian life and peacetime livelihoods, food aid is generally offered to disarmed ex-combatants, women associated with armed groups and forces in non-combat roles, their families and dependants, as well as communities of resettlement during the vital and fragile period of transition. However, in accordance with humanitarian principles, food aid agencies shall not provide food aid to armed personnel at any stage of a DDR programme. As with all food aid programmes, those programmes in support of DDR — and particularly interventions to bring about lasting reintegration — should be based on a careful analysis of the food security situation and an understanding of the vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms of households and communities, to ensure the appropriateness and effectiveness of the assistance offered.

Once the advanced stages of peace negotiations have been reached, a Security Council resolution has been passed or a UN peace operation has been established, the process of re-examining existing food aid plans and working with the inter-agency DDR coordination structures should start. The operational approach should take the specific context into account and be based on quality data and analysis. To plan the programme and logistic aspects of the initial demobilization and reinsertion phases, food assistance agencies usually must rely on data provided by governments, the UN mission and/or the UN DDR unit, and should say what data they need as early as possible to ensure that cooperating partners are informed of these requirements. Generally, data on which reintegration programme planning is based consists of data collected in assessments carried out by humanitarian agencies as part of other food assistance programmes for war-affected populations.

Available and flexible resources are necessary for responding to the changes and unexpected problems that may arise during DDR programmes. A programme should not be implemented unless adequate resources and capacity are in place, including human, financial and logistics resources from donor funds and contributions and the UN mission assessed budget. Maintaining a well-resourced supply of food is essential, because DDR programmes are time-sensitive and volatile. When demobilization begins, food should be available to be pre-positioned and distributed, since delays causing shortage of food can increase the risk of violent responses from combatants waiting to enter DDR.

Generally the main participants in the programme during the disarmament and demobilization phases will be disarmed former combatants (men, women, youth and children who have served as combatants and/or in supporting functions in armed forces and groups,

militias, and/or civilian armed groups). Careful consideration must also be given to dealing with the needs of the dependants of ex-combatants. In line with IDDRS guidelines, as civilians, dependants should not be involved in the disarmament and demobilization phases of the programme. However, they should be screened and identified as dependants of an eligible combatant and offered reintegration assistance through processes taking place at the same time.

Food aid is used as one of several inputs during the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration phases of DDR. Nonetheless, humanitarian agencies shall not distribute food to armed personnel at any time. Any provision of food during actual disarmament should be coordinated by the national government, bilateral donors, the UN mission, and/or other actors not operating under an exclusively humanitarian mandate. During the reinsertion period — i.e., after demobilization at the very beginning of the reintegration period — food aid support (take-home rations) and other possible food-for-work and/or food-for-training programmes can be offered over a limited period of not more than one year. After this, the specific focusing on ex-combatants should be phased out in order to encourage self-reliance and identification with the communities of resettlement, while minimizing resentment from others in the community who do not have access to similar support. Any ongoing efforts to address the vulnerabilities of reintegrated former combatants and their dependants should take place through other programmes of assistance dealing with the needs of the broader war-affected population.<sup>1</sup>

Food aid programmes within DDR should be specifically aimed at reducing vulnerability and meeting the special nutritional and social needs of vulnerable people in the beneficiary population (e.g. children associated with armed forces and groups, war-disabled ex-combatants, pregnant and lactating women, and those beneficiaries affected by HIV/AIDS or other chronic illness). Staff should be aware of the specific issues facing vulnerable beneficiaries of the DDR programme, and plans should from the start be based on an understanding of legal and humanitarian protocols that explain how to meet the requirements of such people. Consistent with all food aid programmes, those established in support of DDR should be gender-sensitive and be appropriate to the rights and specific needs of women (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).<sup>2</sup>

5.10 ◀▶

Food aid agencies often provide on-site feeding programmes to support children associated with armed forces and groups, as well as take-home rations that can provide valuable encouragement to children to participate in demobilization and reintegration programmes. Food agencies must, however, offer such aid from the perspective of ‘do no harm’, and with awareness that offering benefits to children and their families might create an incentive for children to join, or re-join, armed forces and groups. Food aid programme staff should be aware of the relevant legal conventions protecting children, and work in close coordination with child protection specialists.

## 4. Guiding principles and operational requirements

Food aid programmes should be consistent with and guided by all the principles outlined in IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR. Of particular relevance to food aid programming in support of DDR are:

2.10 ◀▶

- the principle of unity of effort;
- humanitarian principles.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to these, there are some specific principles and operational requirements for providing food aid support to DDR programmes that should be adhered to in order to maximize the chance of success, and allow food assistance to be properly provided. In any circumstance where these conditions are not met, humanitarian agencies should carefully consider the appropriateness of offering food aid support to the programme. The principles and operational requirements are laid out below.

#### **4.1. 'Do no harm'**

Programmes should be designed on the basis of analysis of the political, social and economic context, with careful consideration given to how aid could potentially increase tensions and vulnerabilities, present possibilities for theft or manipulation of aid, or compromise the legitimacy of organizations and actors providing humanitarian and development aid. Decision-making staff should be highly aware of potential unintended negative consequences of their decisions, and every effort should be made to ensure that programmes work positively towards building peace.

#### **4.2. Exclusion of armed personnel**

In accordance with humanitarian principles, humanitarian agencies should not provide food aid to armed personnel at any stage of a DDR programme. All reasonable precautions and measures shall be taken to ensure that food aid donated to humanitarian agencies is not taken or used by combatants or warring factions. When food is provided to armed forces and groups during the pre-disarmament and disarmament phases of the programme, governments or peacekeeping actors and their cooperating partners, and not humanitarian agencies, should be responsible for all aspects of the feeding — from the acquisition of food to its distribution.

#### **4.3. Humanitarian food aid**

The DDR food assistance component must be designed in accordance with the principles laid down on the use of humanitarian food aid. Food aid should only be provided when assessment reveals that it is an appropriate form of assistance, and should not be used to replace other parts of the DDR programme designed to achieve the same thing. Furthermore, when food assistance is provided as part of DDR processes, the political requirements of the peacekeeping mission and the guiding principles on humanitarian assistance and development aid should be kept completely separate.

#### **4.4. Coordination**

Humanitarian agencies should only provide food aid to comprehensive, coordinated demobilization and reintegration programmes, in close consultation with all relevant UN components (peacekeeping, humanitarian and development), as well as with the government, third parties to the conflict, cooperating partner organizations and donors. Humanitarian agencies responsible for food aid programmes shall not support any DDR programmes if there is not a clear, established institutional and operational framework.

#### 4.5. Timing and exit strategy

Time-frames for each phase of the operation should be clearly defined before launching a food aid programme in support of DDR. In addition, the exit strategy for the UN mission should be defined as part of the overall DDR plan. The UN plan should focus on institutional capacity-building to enable a smooth transition from the short-term work of the UN peacekeeping mission to the medium-term objective of a gradual transfer of responsibilities to government partner institutions in the post-demobilization, social reinsertion phase. However, since DDR programmes can be delayed and schedules changed, flexibility in planning and management is essential for any DDR plan.

#### 4.6. Consultations and planning

The lead food agency (generally the World Food Programme — WFP) should participate in all phases of the negotiating and planning processes that may have a direct or indirect effect on the design and implementation of food assistance programmes during DDR. All cooperating and implementing partners in the food aid programme should be consulted during the planning process in order to establish the appropriate and necessary measures and methods for exchanging information and coordinating activities.

#### 4.7. Funding and resources

Resources and capacity must be available if the programme is to be effective. This includes human, financial and logistic resources from both the UN mission assessed budget and voluntary donations; the presence of adequate numbers of peacekeepers; and security provisions. In order to increase flexibility and ensure that the programme has adequate capacity, *ad hoc* funds should be made available through donor voluntary contributions and the UN assessed budget to deal with any unexpected problems that may arise. The lead food agency (usually WFP) should support the UN mission administration in defining scenarios and predicting operational costs for such unexpected problems.

#### 4.8. Humanitarian priorities

Humanitarian agencies should be involved in DDR only when they have enough capacity and can do the job better than other actors. Participation in DDR should not undermine a humanitarian food agency's capacity to deal with other urgent humanitarian problems/crises, nor should it badly affect the process of prioritizing food assistance.

#### 4.9. Reintegration

Experience has shown that when there is a lack of will and/or resources to support long-term reintegration among the governments, donors, funds, agencies and departments involved in DDR, the programme is in danger of failing to meet the objective of supporting a sustainable peace. Food aid should be used to support DDR only if a credible, coordinated and resourced post-demobilization reinsertion programme is in place. Plans for rehabilitation should be included in the overall programme framework, and plans and programmes to start the process of reinsertion and reintegration activities should be finalized, and resources allocated to them in advance.



#### 4.10. Dependants

In deciding how a particular food aid programme will operate (depending on the particular circumstances of the situation that has to be dealt with), careful consideration must be given to how the needs of dependants and relatives of ex-combatants should be met, and, as part of this process, how the disarmament and demobilization programme should most appropriately link to other programmes of assistance that are happening at the same time. This must be guided by an understanding of the type of vulnerabilities that exist, the socio-political and economic context, and the human security / protection problems and concerns in each situation. Contingency plans should be drawn up in case there are dependants needing special care (e.g., those accompanying combatants to the disarmament and demobilization camps; infants and young children of women fighters; and women associated with armed groups and forces in non-combat roles, etc.).

#### 4.11. Vulnerable people

Plans for the cantonment, demobilization and reintegration of former troops should be based, from the start, on an understanding of the urgent legal and humanitarian requirements of the vulnerable groups in DDR programmes, including: children associated with armed forces and groups; pregnant and/or lactating women; people affected by HIV / AIDS; and disabled ex-combatants. Food aid should be nutritionally appropriate and specifically planned to support specialized programmes designed to meet the needs of these groups.<sup>4</sup>

### 5. Encouraging recovery and creating food security in post-conflict settings


Destroying food supplies and driving people from their lands have long been tactics in war. As a result, when a peace accord is signed, food is generally scarce among the war-affected population, including demobilizing combatants and their dependants. Both armed forces and armed groups often lack the most basic items as a result of the collapse of military supply systems and wartime mechanisms for acquiring food supplies.

Participants in DDR programmes who receive food assistance are eligible not only because the disruption or collapse of their support systems makes them vulnerable, but also because their status as members of armed groups and forces accustomed to using violence to survive increases the threat that they will return to wartime methods for acquiring food. It is well documented that people who are without food take risks and are aggressive.<sup>5</sup> This means that hungry former combatants are a threat to others and could potentially disrupt the peace through attacks and banditry. To minimize the risk that hungry former fighters will raid civilian communities for food, food aid is given as part of the transitional support offered by DDR programmes. The ultimate goal, however, when offering assistance to former combatants, their family dependants and receiving communities, should

still be to encourage and assist recovery, rehabilitation and progress towards sustainable self-reliance. Ultimately, hunger and food insecurity limit or prevent human development and the realization of peace, security and human rights.

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Generally speaking, in planning food aid programmes, the concept of food security should be broadly applied at both the macro- and household levels, and should take into account not only food supply issues, but also issues of distribution and access, as well as vulnerability to risks that threaten household food security.<sup>6</sup> In other words, assistance in the form of food aid should be considered part of the wider strategy to deal with the structural and long-term vulnerabilities of the entire war-affected population. It is both a stopgap (temporary) measure and a preventive, peace-building measure aimed at reducing future deterioration of food security.

Food aid support to a DDR programme is normally just one of many food aid activities that are taking place in a particular country or region during post-conflict transition, and, as with all programmes, it should be based on an understanding of the food security situation, and the vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms of households and communities. It should be seen as part of a coherent, broad strategy to improve the livelihoods, coping mechanisms and food-management skills that already exist in communities so that former combatants are well placed to become contributing members to local food security in the long term.

### 5.1. Food aid planning data

Food aid programmes as part of DDR will be context-specific; should adopt the appropriate local, country, and /or regional approach to assistance; and should be based on good-quality data and analysis of the social, political and economic context. Food aid should be provided only when an assessment shows that it is a needed, appropriate form of assistance. Often in crisis situations, however, such as post-conflict situations and complex emergencies, food aid relief must initially be based on partially complete information, owing to, among other things, the urgency of the problem, security concerns and access issues. For the purposes of putting together the initial phases of food assistance to the demobilization phase of a DDR process and other assistance programmes, the lead food agency (generally WFP)

must often base information about the type of people needing help and logistics and distribution plans on secondary data provided by governments, the UN mission and/or the UN peacekeeping DDR unit.

Nonetheless, as with the planning of other forms of assistance programmes designed to meet the needs of war-affected populations, interventions supporting reinsertion and longer-term reintegration should ideally be based on more accurate data and analysis, to ensure that the programme is designed according to as full an understanding as possible of food security issues in the particular context in which the operation will take place. Generally, data collected through assessments carried out by humanitarian agencies to inform the other forms of assistance involving food aid (refugee and internally displaced persons [IDPs] resettlements, vulnerable groups, food for work [FFW], food for training [FFT], etc.) will be used as the basis for reintegration planning. In all planning of food aid assistance, vulnerability assessments should be carried out if possible at the regional, community and/or household levels to gather data on areas that are particularly vulnerable, as well as communities and households experiencing food insecurity.

Tools available for assessment and analysis may include:

- joint WFP–Food and Agriculture Organization crop assessments;
- WFP vulnerability assessment mapping analysis and composite household food economy surveys to identify vulnerable geographical areas;
- rapid assessments (RAs) and participatory rural assessments (PRAs), both to identify vulnerable communities and to better understand local food management practices.

These assessment methods provide the basis for identifying the needs of communities in specific locations and provide detailed information on food availability, food consumption, coping strategies and causes of food insecurity. When possible, households should be assessed using community-level approaches, which take into account existing social structures, in order to identify the most vulnerable people and to assist in food distribution. Community-based organizations such as women’s organizations and village relief committees can help identify vulnerable households and causes of food insecurity, and are also a resource to help establish better long-term food management systems that will contribute to food security.<sup>7</sup>

## 6. Planning food aid assistance to DDR

### 6.1. Events and circumstances that start the process


The process of re-examining existing food aid plans in place for DDR or the development of a new plan for a country or region should be proactive, and should start in specific circumstances, including:

- when a ceasefire agreement or peace accord has been concluded, or an advanced stage of peace negotiations has been reached;
- when a Security Council mandate (including the establishment of a UN peace operation or deployment of a peacekeeping mission) has been approved;
- when a peace process supported by the active engagement of one or two Member States, a regional body or a combination that includes the UN has been approved.

These events/circumstances should also signal the need for the lead food agency to begin inter-agency coordination, in order to ensure that coordination and the operational requirements of food aid programmes supporting DDR are fully included in the integrated programme framework.

## 6.2. Coordination

Post-conflict demobilization is a complex logistics operation involving many actors carrying out a large number of interrelated tasks. Effective division of labour and communication among actors is vital if the programme is to be efficient and properly coordinated. The establishment of effective mechanisms for sharing information among the leading food agency (generally WFP) and other UN agencies, as well as peacekeeping actors, donors and cooperating partners, is essential for the safe and successful carrying out of food aid programmes in the context of DDR.





As the lead food aid agency and a major actor in providing other forms of support to the overall DDR programme — among other things, logistic support, road repair, common air services (provided by UN Humanitarian Air Services — UNHAS) and humanitarian demining — WFP should normally become involved in the earliest stages of the integrated planning process at both the country level (through consultation with the Secretary-General's Special Representative and participation on the DDR task force; and, when appropriate, through the presence of liaison staff in the DDR unit in the field structure) and the Headquarters level (through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Integrated Mission Task Force and DDR subgroup) (also see IDDRS 2.30 on Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners).

### 6.3. Cooperation

Food aid programmes in support of DDR are most often implemented in cooperation with national or international non-governmental partner organizations, making early involvement with cooperating partners an important aspect of programme coordination. At the earliest possible stages, cooperating partner organizations should be brought into the inter-agency planning and coordination process to ensure that information is properly shared and structures are in place for programme monitoring and support.

### 6.4. Programme components

Before the assembly phase begins, the following parts of the programme should be finalized in the food aid programme plan, and made a part of the inter-agency approach to the DDR programme:

- agreement on ration and food basket for assembly and reinsertion periods;
- the identification of programme resources;
- the establishment of viable distribution mechanisms;
- putting plans and resources in place for special feeding programmes (e.g., school/interim care centre [ICC] feeding, HIV/AIDS therapeutic feeding);
- making preparations for special project activities (e.g., FFW, FFT, etc.);
- the development of a logistics plan;
- the establishment of monitoring and reporting systems;
- the development of contingency plans;
- the establishment of security measures.

### 6.5. Eligibility for food aid in DDR

Most often, food aid is distributed by agencies with humanitarian mandates, which provide assistance to beneficiaries according need or livelihood, prioritizing assistance for the most vulnerable populations. In a DDR process, owing to the central social and political goals of supporting peace, those who receive assistance (e.g., food, cash allowances or training) may be eligible not just because they are vulnerable, but because they are members of a particular group identified by the DDR programme. This does not mean to say that ex-combatants do not have real humanitarian needs. It should be assumed that vulnerable groups with specific nutritional and other programme needs will be included among the demobilizing groups.

### 6.5.1. Ex-combatants

Generally, the main participants in the programme during the disarmament and demobilization phases will be disarmed former combatants (men, women, youth and children who have served in any capacity in armed forces and groups, militias and/or civilian armed groups). Depending on the specific eligibility criteria of the programme, participants who have served in support roles to armed forces and groups (administrators, porters and other supporters, or other non-combatants who form part of the armed force or group) will also be registered as participants in the disarmament and demobilization part of the programme.

Within the ex-combatant category, participants with special needs should receive more specifically designed forms of assistance that is appropriate to their nutritional and social situation. Categories of participants with special needs include:

- under-age ex-combatants/children associated with armed forces and groups;
- pregnant and/or lactating women;
- disabled combatants;
- people living with HIV/AIDS.

### 6.5.2. Dependants

Careful consideration must also be given to how to best meet the food aid requirements and other humanitarian needs of the dependants (partners, children and relatives) of ex-combatants. Whenever possible, meeting the needs of this group should be part of broader strategies that are developed to improve food security in receiving communities.

Dependants are eligible for assistance for the DDR programme if they fulfil the vulnerability criteria and/or if their main household income was that of the combatant. The criteria for eligibility for food aid and to assess vulnerability should be agreed upon and coordinated among key national and agency stakeholders in the DDR programme, with humanitarian agencies playing a key role in this process.

Because dependants are civilians, it is not recommended that they be involved in the disarmament and demobilization phases of the programme. However, they should be screened and identified as dependants of an eligible combatant. If disarmament and demobilization are taking place outside the community of origin, this presents several logistics problems.

Food aid distribution/feeding for dependants may be implemented in one of two possible ways. The first of these would involve dependants being cantoned in a separate, nearby camp while combatants are disarmed and demobilized. The second would involve dependants being taken or being asked to go directly to their communities of resettlement. These two approaches would require different methods for distributing food aid. A clear, coordinated approach to inter-agency procedures for meeting the needs of dependants should be outlined for all agency partners that will be involved during the programme-planning process ahead of programme implementation.

It is also essential, when planning food aid benefits for dependent participants, that assistance provided for the reinsertion and reintegration of all DDR beneficiaries (ex-combatants and dependants) be balanced against assistance provided to other returnees as part of the wider recovery programme. When possible, and depending on the operational context of the programme, the needs of dependants might best be met by linking to other programmes of food aid assistance happening at the same time that are designed to assist the recovery of war-affected populations (such as those for vulnerable populations, IDPs or refugee resettlements). This approach should be considered as one of the programming options.

To achieve this coordination effectively, it is necessary to link DDR-related food aid programming assistance to the broader recovery strategy for the country concerned. This should be included in the earliest stages of inter-agency DDR planning and negotiations, so that eligibility criteria and the necessary processes for receiving assistance are clearly communicated to all concerned. It is also essential to work with humanitarian coordinating structures (the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) to ensure that these links work properly.

It should be noted that inclusion of dependants in the DDR programme can be difficult to manage. Programme planners may face problems when planning the overall operation and the resources that will be needed, and generally should be prepared to deal with delays and large differences between the actual numbers of participants and the numbers planned for.

## 6.6. Data needed for planning

Basic quantitative data regarding the number and strength of combatants, and their armaments and location are generally provided by the UN peacekeeping force after consultation with the parties to the peace accord. On the basis of these data, plans are made for the identification and preparation of suitable assembly sites, and for cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. These data can also assist in planning food aid support in coordination with other related programmes, such as those assisting groups with special needs.

Early in the integrated planning process, food agencies should provide details of the data they need to the lead coordinating actors so that information can be collected in the early phases of preparing for the programme. Agencies should also be careful to ask for data about less visible groups (e.g., abducted girls) so that these groups can be included in the estimates. It should be noted, however, that acquiring certain data (e.g., accurate numbers and descriptions of members of armed forces and groups) is not always possible, because of the tendency of parties to hide children, ignore (leave out) female associates who were not in combat positions, and increase or reduce figures for political, financial or strategic reasons. Therefore, actual plans are often made according to a best estimate that can only be verified when the operation is in progress, and programmes should be prepared for unexpected or unplanned events/circumstances (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR)

The following data are essential for food aid programme planning as part of DDR, and should be provided to, or collected by, the lead agency (generally WFP) at the earliest possible stages of planning:

- numbers of beneficiaries (disaggregated by sex and age, and with specific assessments of the numbers and characteristics of vulnerable beneficiaries);
- numbers of dependants (partners, children, relatives);
- beneficiary profiles (i.e., who they are, what their special needs are);
- basic nutritional data;
- logistics corridors/supply routes;
- roads and infrastructure information;
- information regarding demining;
- other security-related information.

◀ ▶ 5.10

◀ ▶ 5.20

Qualitative data that will be especially useful in planning reintegration activities are also collected before the start of the DDR programme, normally through *ad hoc* surveys carried out among combatants, associates and their dependants on the initiative of the UN humanitarian co-ordinating body and partner UN agencies. This process is generally carried out in consultation with the national government and third parties. These surveys identify the main features of the social profile of the intended participants. Preliminary data gathered through surveys can be checked and verified at a later stage; e.g., during the identification and registration process carried out in the assembly areas.

Data on food habits and preliminary information on nutritional requirements may also be collected by WFP or other food agencies through *ad hoc* surveys before, or immediately following, the start of the cantonment process (also see IDDRS 3.10 on Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures).

3.10 ◀▶

## 6.7. Participation

As with all parts of an integrated DDR programme, the food aid planning process should involve, as far as possible, the participation of leaders of stakeholder groups (local government, leaders of armed forces and groups, representatives of civil society and vulnerable groups), in order to better understand the sociopolitical and economic contexts in which DDR-related food assistance programmes are operating, and to create consensus and raise awareness of the benefits offered and procedures for participation. Although the extent to which any group participates should be decided on a case-by-case basis, even limited consultations can improve programme security and increase the appropriateness of the assistance, distribution and monitoring. Such participation builds confidence among ex-combatant groups, improves the programme's ability to meet the needs of vulnerable groups and helps strengthen links with the receiving community.

In the project design, it should be specified who will participate, how they will work together, and what factors will aid or hinder the process. Participation is a complex process for which there are few principles or approaches that can be used in all situations. However, country offices are encouraged to plan strategically so as to increase participation at different stages of the project cycle.

## 7. Resources, funding and maintaining the food supply pipeline

In a recent survey of WFP food aid assistance to DDR programmes, it was found that inadequate access to resources was a basic limitation affecting most food assistance programmes supporting DDR.<sup>8</sup> The availability and flexibility of resources are essential when responding to the changes and unexpected problems that should be expected when implementing DDR programmes.

### 7.1. Funding food aid to DDR

Once food aid programme requirements have been identified, the lead food agency (generally WFP) should take part in the drawing up of budget proposals and funding appeals. DDR food aid programmes are often funded as a part of the wider strategy of assistance and recovery, though possible increases in the costs of a DDR food aid programme will depend largely on the resources and organizational capacity in place in each context. A food



aid programme in support of DDR should not be implemented in the absence of adequate resources and capacity, including human, financial and logistic resources from donor funds and contributions and the UN mission assessed budget. The UN mission assessed budget should be available to support food aid programme costs and should be designed to take into account unexpected changes to the length of the programme, delays, and other changes that require sufficient and flexible funding (also see IDDRS 2.20 on Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks).

## 7.2. Maintaining a healthy food supply pipeline

Because of the unexpected changes to the length of the programme, delays, changes in beneficiary numbers, and other unexpected events that food aid programmes face in DDR, maintaining a well-resourced food supply pipeline is essential. DDR programmes are time-sensitive and volatile, and food should be available for pre-positioning and distribution to prevent the risks caused by delays. The pipeline should also have enough resources not only to meet the needs of the present situation, but for other possible circumstances outlined in contingency planning. Voluntary donor contributions and the UN assessed budget should meet the needs of the programme and ensure the availability of adequate food stocks to support the programme.

## 7.3. Logistics strategy

The primary logistic goal in food aid programmes, including those in support of DDR, is to deliver food supplies to the right place, at the right time and cost, in good condition and with no loss. The main elements of the logistics strategy include:

- port(s) of entry — identifying the most appropriate unloading port with the best location, capacity and costs;
- location for/of the warehouses in transit and recipient countries;
- logistics corridors/routes and means of transport.

The logistics strategy should plan for the following:

- organizing transport;
- setting up and managing warehouses;
- identifying additional needs (in some cases, short-term staff/services needed to provide base camps and vehicles can be arranged through WFP when there is a need to deal with sudden increases in the demand for supplies);
- special operations;
- recommended logistic arrangements;
- cost analysis.

The logistics strategy should be based on the logistics capacity assessment, which gives a detailed overview of the logistics infrastructure of the country, and is generally carried out and updated by the WFP country office annually.

### 7.3.1. Inter-agency coordination of logistics for DDR

WFP provides logistics to its own operations, but also manages the UN Joint Logistics Centre and UNHAS, which offer inter-agency services that provide support to the humanitarian

community. Once the agencies and partners in the DDR programme have been identified, an assessment of their logistics capacity is prepared through discussions, consultations and, if necessary, negotiations, in order to develop the logistics strategy for the DDR operation.

Agreements agreed upon and signed by all the organizations and agencies concerned provide the basis for logistics planning. All partners should formally define their logistics roles and responsibilities, including the reporting and financial obligations of each. Every agreement must deal with logistic issues and clearly define the logistics responsibilities of all participating partners. Results of the assessments of partners' capacity and WFP structures carried out during the preparation phase should provide the basis for the agreements and eventually should be reflected in them. Particular attention should be given to identifying ways in which WFP can contribute to logistics knowledge and capacity-building during the DDR programme.

## 8. Designing food aid programmes in support of DDR

### 8.1. Overview of objectives and activities by phase

Although a national or regional DDR programme operates in different overlapping phases in different localities, food assistance support given to the different phases of DDR (pre-disarmament, assembly following registration and disarmament, demobilization, transitional support and reintegration) each phase has its own particular objectives and therefore takes a different form.

Table 1 **The phases of food aid**

PHASE	OBJECTIVES	POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES
Cantonment/Assembly	To provide food assistance to demobilizing combatants (and in some cases dependants) in order to meet immediate needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Food assistance to demobilizing troops and dependants</li> <li>■ Supplementary and therapeutic feeding projects for groups with special needs</li> <li>■ Feeding at ICCs and transit centres for children associated with armed forces and groups</li> <li>■ Support to educational, civic training and information projects</li> <li>■ Logistic support to the humanitarian community (WFP)</li> </ul>
Demobilization, reinsertion	To provide food specifically for reinsertion assistance as part of a transitional safety net benefit package, with the aim of increasing the food security of beneficiaries until economic reintegration allows for a phasing-out of the food assistance component	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Food aid for reinsertion (take-home reinsertion package)</li> </ul>

Reintegration, rehabilitation	<p>To provide rehabilitation and development aid through projects to supply the aid requirements and needs of a wider group of beneficiaries, including meeting needs in receiving communities, among returning IDPs and refugees, and of former demobilized combatants through community-based, participatory rehabilitation efforts</p> <p>To provide focused assistance to vulnerable categories (war-disabled ex-combatants, children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, HIV/AIDS-affected people) in order to increase and support their reintegration efforts and strategies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Expanded emergency rehabilitation and reintegration projects</li> <li>■ PRAs</li> <li>■ Income- and employment-generation projects (FFW)</li> <li>■ Agriculture-based activities to support food security</li> <li>■ Infrastructure rehabilitation (FFW)</li> <li>■ Feeder roads reconstruction (FFW)</li> <li>■ Household food security projects (urban/rural FFW initiatives)</li> <li>■ Ad hoc projects for vulnerable groups</li> <li>■ Training and skills development projects (FFT, education, adult literacy)</li> </ul>
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## 8.2. Selecting commodities for rations

A cereal that is familiar to beneficiaries, pulses and oil are the basic foods included in most rations. Other items are included to provide extra nutrients if people have no access to fresh foods. When selecting the types of food that will be supplied during encampment and for take-home rations for the reinsertion package, it is important to consider the following issues.

### 8.2.1. Nutritional and dietary requirements

The mix of food must provide the nutrients required to ensure that beneficiaries are supplied with adequate energy, protein, fat and micronutrients, taking account of what they can acquire from other sources. Particular consideration should also be given to beneficiaries with special nutritional needs (HIV/AIDS-affected, children, pregnant and/or lactating women, etc.).

### 8.2.2. Local food habits

Foods should be familiar to beneficiaries, be similar to their traditional dietary habits and respect any religious taboos.

### 8.2.3. Children and elderly people

Families must be able to prepare easily digestible energy-dense foods for young children. Easily chewed and digestible foods are also needed for elderly people.

### 8.2.4. Ease of transport, storage and use

Foods should be reasonably easy to transport, capable of being stored (including in the average household) and simple to prepare using as little fuel as possible. They must be adapted to the cooking facilities, water and cooking fuel that are available.

### 8.2.5. Cost-effectiveness, attractiveness and local value

Costs must be taken into account for each of the various items that could be provided:

- in relation to the nutrient value the food supplies to beneficiaries;
- in relation to local (resale) value: beneficiaries may trade limited quantities of some items to obtain other essential items, e.g., fruits and vegetables from the local market;
- with regard to whether some items are more likely to be misappropriated (i.e., stolen, etc.) than others; items that do not reach the groups they are intended for, or that are stolen from them, are of no benefit.

### 8.2.6. Availability of local commodities

It should be taken into account whether any suitable items can be bought locally or whether they can be obtained in exchange for food aid supplies (especially bulk wheat); the quality and shelf-life of the food available should also be considered. Determine whether whole grains or milled cereals should be provided and whether fortified blended foods might be produced locally rather than being imported.<sup>9</sup>

### 8.2.7. Equity with other programmes of assistance

For the reinsertion phase, the principle of equity should be applied when selecting food-stuffs. Food aid benefits provided for reinsertion and reintegration of all DDR participants (ex-combatants and dependants) should be balanced against assistance provided to other returnees as part of the wider recovery programme to avoid treating some war-affected groups unfairly. For instance, careful consideration should be given when offering a more attractive commodity (such as rice) to ex-combatants when the programmes serving the broader communities are providing a less attractive commodity such as bulgur.

## 8.3. Rations

The primary aims of supplying food aid in most DDR programmes are, in addition to simply feeding hungry people, to encourage ex-combatants and other participants to join the programme, and to provide a transitional safety net in support of reintegration, which means the value and appropriateness of the rations offered are extremely important.

### 8.3.1. Setting expectations

Before the programme begins, the lead food agency, normally WFP, should distribute information about the benefits (i.e., the rations) offered through the programme and ideally gain buy-in among, and raise awareness through, key leaders and/or representatives of the groups participating in DDR. This is essential if the food aid component of the programme is to be carried out safely and successfully. In the past, wrong or misleading information has created dissatisfaction with some of the food items offered to beneficiaries. This has created security threats and, as far as possible, should be avoided in the future.

### 8.3.2. Resources for food aid

Having one lead agency in food assistance in DDR programmes will permit a more cost-effective operation and minimize coordination problems. Generally, WFP takes the lead role and will supply standard rations for food aid programmes in the context of DDR. In

some cases, to improve the quality and variety of the food that is provided, extra supplies may be contributed by donors and other agencies. These actors can also provide non-food items required for the preparation and distribution of food (e.g., cooking pots, charcoal, paper plates, condiments, etc).

Experience has shown that the sharing of responsibilities between humanitarian and government actors in the provision of food must be done with care, and only in very special circumstances. In countries emerging from conflict situations, governments generally have limited capacity and/or resources to ensure timely and regular food aid supplies.

### 8.3.3. Food rations during the assembly phase

During the assembly phase, food assistance has both nutritional and incentive functions. Demobilizing combatants have very limited buying power, and when they are grouped in camps, their access to alternative sources of income and food security is restricted. In addition, their health may be poor after the prolonged isolation they have experienced and poor food they have eaten during wartime.

Internationally donated food aid is usually the only food available at assembly areas, which are generally isolated from outside commercial food supply networks (shops, supermarkets, etc.). Former combatants see the regular provision of food assistance as proof of the commitment by the government and the international community to support the transition to peace. On the other hand, insufficient, irregular or below-standard food assistance can disturb the process and become a source of friction and protest. Every reasonable measure should be taken to ensure that, at the very minimum, standard rations are distributed during this phase.

During cantonment, the type of food supplied to demobilizing personnel should normally be more varied than in standard WFP emergency operations, and the rations better than standard requirements. However, standard WFP emergency food baskets can be supplied to family dependants if they are included as programme beneficiaries (the identification of dependant beneficiaries will often take place outside of the disarmament and demobilization camps). When a very long stay in the camps is expected, a more expensive commodity (e.g., oil) should also be included in the basket, whenever possible, which can be sold or exchanged for other supplies, allowing households to manage their food supplies better.

The following is an example of a recommended food basket for ex-combatants and dependants during the disarmament and demobilization phase (including supplemental food):<sup>10</sup>

Table 2 **A recommended food basket during disarmament and demobilization**

EX-COMBATANTS (PER PERSON PER DAY)	FOODS	DEPENDANTS AND FAMILIES (PER PERSON PER DAY)
300 g	Maize/Wheat/Sorghum	450 g
200 g	Rice	0
50 g	Canned fish/meat	0
5 g	Iodized salt	5 g
20 g	Sugar	20 g
40 g	Vegetable oil	25 g
50 g	Pulses	50 g

In the example above, the overall nutritional value of the food baskets for the ex-combatants and their family dependants is, respectively, 2,550 and 2,100 kilocalories (kcal) per day. While the diet may vary, depending on local markets and food habits, the above nutritional values should give a basic idea of what should be supplied.

Fresh vegetables and fruit, or other foods to increase the nutritional value of the food basket, should be supplied when alternative sources can be found and if they can be stored and distributed.

#### 8.3.4. Prepared meals during encampment

Although generally the programmes should not encourage demobilized ex-combatants and/or dependants to stay for long periods in the demobilization camps, prepared foods may be served in the camps when it is more appropriate than creating cooking spaces and/or providing equipment for participants to prepare their own food. In recent programmes in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi, food has been supplied by WFP and partner agencies have been responsible for preparing and serving the meals. In Liberia, for example, each adult ex-combatant received through a wet feeding programme: 450 grams (g) of rice; 50 g pulses; 30 g vegetable oil; 5 g sugar; and 5 g salt. Doing this will not be appropriate in all cases, and it should be carefully thought out in each specific context — taking into account security, resources and the fact that providing a food basket encourages participants to become more self-reliant, because they have to prepare the food themselves.

#### 8.3.5. Post-demobilization and social reinsertion take-home rations

Once demobilization has been completed and during the period when ex-combatants rejoin civilian society, food aid is part of a broader resettlement and social reinsertion package made available by governments and the international community. Food aid can provide a form of transitional safety net and supports the establishment of medium-term household food security. The following is an example of a food basket for the reinsertion phase, providing the recommended overall nutritional value for food aid during this phase of approximately 2,100 kcal per day.

Table 3 **A recommended take-home ration**

TAKE-HOME RATION (DAILY)	
Maize	450 g
Pulses	50 g
Oil	30 g
Salt	5 g

A general guideline is that food should be provided for three months; however, benefits should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and should be appropriate to a particular context. The following should be taken into account when deciding on the length of time that the take-home ration should cover:

- whether ex-combatants will be transported by vehicle to the area of resettlement or whether they will have to carry the ration;
- level of assistance when they reach the community of resettlement;
- resources available to the DDR food aid programme;

- the timing and expected yields/production of the next harvest;
- the prospects for the re-establishment of employment and other income-generating activities, or the creation of new opportunities;
- the overall food policy for the area, taking account of the total economic, social and ecological situation and related recovery and development activities.

The aim must always be to encourage the re-establishment of self-reliance from the earliest possible moment — minimizing the possible negative effects of distributing food aid over a long period of time.

#### 8.3.6. Equity with other assistance programmes

Standard rations should be used during the reinsertion stage. Even during the early stages of reintegration support, assistance to DDR programme participants should, in principle, be equal to the assistance received by other beneficiaries being assisted through other programmes offering relief and recovery food assistance (IDPs, returning refugees, etc.). Provision of special rations to DDR programme participants (though possibly effective in increasing the incentives for them to take part in DDR) should always be seen in the context of the needs and resources of the broader populations. If communities think that preferential treatment is being given to ex-combatants, this can cause resentment in these communities, and there is the danger that aid organizations will no longer be seen as being neutral. It is extremely important to manage public information and community perceptions when sensitizing the receiving community. Every effort to achieve an equal standard of living for ex-combatants, dependants and other members of the community of resettlement should be made in order to minimize the risks that benefits given through DDR could fuel tensions among these groups.

#### 8.3.7. How long assistance lasts

The strategic objective of food aid support during these early stages of reintegration is to assist beneficiaries to achieve household food security and economic self-reliance. As part of the reinsertion process, if possible, there should be several occasions when food assistance is distributed (i.e. it should not be distributed all at once), but it should not be provided for longer than a year — though other forms of specifically focused assistance may be provided to ex-combatants through other programmes delivered by agencies with different mandates, including agriculture programmes that try to build up long-term food security (also see IDDRS 2.10 on the UN Approach to DDR).<sup>11</sup>

It should be noted that ex-combatants and their dependants will probably continue to receive food aid as beneficiaries of other food aid programmes designed for the broader war-affected population. Moving beneficiaries of the targeted DDR food aid programmes into the broader programmes serves two purposes. First, it supports the goal of integrating ex-combatants into receiving communities by identifying them as part of the community (instead of as ex-combatants). In addition, as ex-combatants and their dependants often settle in new locations after demobilization, it generally ceases to be economically viable to continue to provide food aid to these individuals specifically. Integration into broader programmes of assistance is a more efficient approach in the reintegration period, and this is what should be aimed for.

#### 8.3.8. Rations for vulnerable groups and groups with special needs

When providing food aid to DDR programme participants with special needs, it should be decided on a case-by-case basis how rations and/or distribution methods should be best



adapted to each individual. Children, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly and HIV/AIDS-affected individuals may have specific nutritional needs. In many cases, ex-combatants with special needs should be referred as soon as possible to specialized programmes running at the same time (such as therapeutic feeding programmes for HIV/AIDS-affected people, or the ICCs for children associated with armed forces and groups coordinated by the UN Children's Fund [UNICEF], or special programmes for female-headed households, especially those headed by very young women or girl mothers), where they will receive the appropriate food aid assistance and other relevant support.

Feeding and rations selected for vulnerable groups and groups with special needs should be in line with the nutritional requirements for these groups given in the *WFP Programme Guidance Manual*. To be granted access to this manual, email PGM.HelpDesk@wfp.org (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR; IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR; IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR; IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR; and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

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5.70 ◀▶

## 8.4. Distribution mechanisms

Generally, DDR programmes distribute food aid in two different contexts: the cantonment context, when the participants are concentrated in specific locations; and the reinsertion–reintegration context, when the demobilized personnel and their dependants have returned to home areas and are spread over a very wide area. These two contexts require the establishment of different distribution mechanisms.

### 8.4.1. Distribution during cantonment

When participants are grouped in specific cantonments, food aid is distributed in a way similar to that in a typical encampment relief situation. Under ideal conditions, when all the necessary preparations have been made and there are no external circumstances that are negatively affecting the plan, food distribution programmes in assembly areas should not cause any particular operational problems.

### 8.4.2. Distribution during reintegration

The food aid for the reinsertion/reintegration part of the DDR programme can be distributed entirely during demobilization, through a one-off distribution, or in two or more phases, with the first part issued during demobilization from the assembly areas (i.e., the food for reinsertion take-home package), and a follow-up distribution during the social adjustment and reinsertion period in the provinces or regions of resettlement.<sup>12</sup>

### 8.4.3. Distributing food to vulnerable groups

As far as possible, feeding, rations, FWW and other programmes should specifically try to reduce vulnerability and meet the special needs of the more vulnerable beneficiaries.

Staff, including those working on the food aid part of DDR programmes, should be aware of the specific difficulties facing the different types of vulnerable individuals among the DDR programme participants.

As far as possible, feeding, rations, FWW and other programmes should specifically try to reduce vulnerability and meet the special needs of the more vulnerable beneficiaries.

Plans for the cantonment, demobilization and reintegration of troops should, from the start, deal with the legal and humanitarian requirements of the vulnerable groups in DDR programmes (e.g., children associated with armed forces and groups, war-disabled ex-combatants and participants with chronic illnesses). Although all women may not make up a vulnerable group, the nutrition of women who are lone heads of household or sole caregivers of children often suffers when there is a scarcity of food: special attention should therefore be paid to food aid for households with female heads (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women and Gender; IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR; IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR; IDDRS 5.60 on HIV / AIDS and DDR; and IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

< 5.10  
 < 5.20 ■ < 5.30  
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Table 4 **Possible interventions for food aid support specifically for vulnerable groups**

CHILDREN AFFILIATED WITH FIGHTING FORCES AND GROUPS	HIV/AIDS-AFFECTED EX-COMBATANTS AND RECEIVING COMMUNITIES	DISABLED COMBATANTS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Food distributions/Take-home rations</li> <li>■ Support to families through take-home rations</li> <li>■ Supplementary feeding in ICCs</li> <li>■ Food for education/FFT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Food distributions/Take-home rations</li> <li>■ Therapeutic feeding for HIV/AIDS-affected populations</li> <li>■ Food support to community-based education programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Food distributions/Take-home rations</li> <li>■ Support to families through take-home rations</li> <li>■ Food for education/FFT</li> </ul>


## 8.5. Children associated with armed forces and groups

It is the stated position of the international community, including child protection specialists dealing with children in armed conflict, that dealing with children during DDR programmes shall not be dependent on adult DDR taking place, nor shall it be reliant on political negotiations. Therefore, food aid support may be offered to child demobilization and reintegration programmes taking place either within or outside the context of a peacekeeping environment.

In a peacekeeping situation where there is a formal integrated DDR programme in place, the parts of the programme for children associated with armed forces and groups are generally linked and carried out at the same time as the processes of the adult DDR programme. Children and young people associated with armed forces and groups are generally immediately brought into ICCs, where UNICEF or another specialized agency takes the lead in coordinating the reintegration programmes. Food aid agencies often provide on-site feeding programmes and take-home rations, which can provide both a valuable incentive to participate, as well as important nutritional support.

In DDR programmes in the past, children have been excluded from receiving benefits through formal programmes, and offering supplemental humanitarian food aid has been a key part of support during demobilization and reintegration. Children associated with armed forces and groups are particularly vulnerable to re-recruitment, and, because of this, food aid can provide valuable support for programmes of education, training, rehabilitation and reunification with their families and communities.

However, choosing the appropriate programme benefits that will be provided, particularly when dealing with children associated with armed forces and groups, including former child combatants, should only be done after careful analysis of the situation and context, and guided by the principle of 'do no harm'. Although food aid benefits can in some cases offer these children incentives to reintegrate into their communities, agencies



Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003: Demobilized children associated with armed forces and groups spent about four months at this centre (run by the NGO SOS Grands Lacs) where they were offered education, counseling, and vocational training. They were eventually reconciled with their families after up to five years away. Photo: WFP

must consider the possible increased risks that offering benefits could cause by creating an incentive for children to join, or re-join, fighting forces and groups. Also, these benefits might have the effect of recruiting non-associated children into the programme, as was reported in Liberia.

Food aid programme staff should be aware of the relevant legal conventions and the key issues and vulnerabilities that have to be dealt with when assisting children associated with armed forces and groups, and work closely with child protection specialists when developing programmes. In addition, appropriate reporting mechanisms should be established in advance with specialized agencies to deal with problems relating to

child protection and other issues that arise during child demobilization (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

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5.30 ◀▶

## 8.6. Women

It is important to note that in each context in which DDR takes place, women, men, girls and boys will have different needs, and food aid programmes in support of DDR should be designed to take this into account. In particular, humanitarian staff should be aware of the nutritional needs of women and girls and of protection/human rights issues of special relevance to women and girls that may arise in DDR encampment sites.

As with other benefits offered through the DDR programme, the programme should ensure that women are the direct recipients of their food aid benefits; that they are able to keep any help that they receive; and that they are able to make their own choices about their lives during the reintegration phase. In order to achieve this, it is essential that women and women's groups, as well as child advocacy groups, be closely involved in DDR programme planning and implementation.

### 8.6.1. Gender principles in humanitarian programmes

DDR programmes offer support to female ex-combatants, women and girls associated with armed forces and groups in supporting roles, and female dependent participants, and in line with other programmes offering humanitarian assistance, the food aid part of DDR should apply the following principles:

- actively support and encourage gender equality and the equal protection of women's and men's human rights;

- in carrying out humanitarian and peace-building activities, pay special attention to the violation of women's rights and try to remedy this;
- ensure equal representation of women and men in peace mediation and decision-making at all levels and stages of humanitarian assistance;
- guarantee participation of women's organizations in capacity-building for humanitarian response, rehabilitation and recovery.<sup>13</sup>

#### 8.6.2. Nutritional needs of pregnant and lactating women

During pregnancy and nursing, unless women receive the required calorie and nutrient intake, their own health and that of their unborn or newborn children are at risk. Children exposed to such early malnutrition are likely to die or fail to develop to their full physical and mental potential, thus continuing the pattern of malnutrition and poverty passed on from generation to generation.

#### 8.6.3. Female beneficiaries and protection and human rights issues

Humanitarian staff should also be aware of problems concerning protection and human rights that are especially relevant to women and girls that may arise in DDR encampment sites. Codes of conduct and appropriate reporting and enforcement mechanisms should be established in advance among the UN agencies and the appropriate human rights, child protection and other relevant actors to deal with gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and human rights abuses. There should also be strict procedures in place to protect women and girls from sexual exploitation by those who control access to food supplies. Staff and participants alike should be aware of the proper channels available to them for reporting cases or attempted cases of abuse linked to food distribution.

Food distribution arrangements should also be designed in consultation with women to avoid putting them at risk. In cases where rations are to be collected from distribution points, a gendered assessment of where food distribution points are to be located should take place in order to allow women to collect the rations themselves and to avoid difficult and unsafe travel. It should also be determined whether special packaging is needed to make the collection and carrying of food rations by women easier. Women should be encouraged to receive the food themselves, but should be given the right to formally designate someone to collect the rations on their behalf (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).<sup>14</sup>



Nsimenya, 15, right sits with her young child at Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003. She was treated for malnutrition and sexually transmitted diseases after being abducted and raped by rebel soldiers. Photo: L. Waselchuk, Galbe.com

## 9. Food aid during reintegration

The link between learning and nutrition is well established, and inter-agency collaboration should ensure that all former combatants who enter training and education programmes in the transition period are properly nourished. As the programme moves into the reintegration phase, providing food aid to DDR programme participants should be gradually phased out, as they become better assimilated into receiving communities and achieve standards of living similar to these communities. DDR programme participants should eventually be included in a community-based rehabilitation approach, and should get their food in the same way as members of these communities, rather than receive special supplies of food as demobilized combatants. Ultimately, they should be seen as part of the community and take part in programmes covering broader recovery efforts.

In broader operations in post-conflict environments during the recovery phase, in which there are pockets of relative security and political stability and greater access to groups in need, general free food distribution is gradually replaced by help directed at particular groups, to develop the ability of affected populations to meet their own food needs and work towards long-term food security. Activities should be closely linked to efforts to restart positive coping mechanisms and methods of households supplying their own food by growing it themselves or earning the money to buy it.

### 9.1. Reintegration activities

The following activities should be a part of programmes designed for the reintegration phase of DDR:

- providing employment through FFW activities that directly benefit the selected populations and restore food security (construction of feeder roads, infrastructure rehabilitation);
- providing support directed at specific vulnerable groups (feeding programmes at the ICCs for child soldiers and children associated with armed forces and groups, feeding for people affected by HIV / AIDS or food for HIV / AIDS education and awareness programmes, etc.);
- providing support to restore production capacity and increase food production by households;
- providing agricultural kits, including seeds and tools;
- supplemental nutritional programmes;
- providing support for local markets through buying supplies for DDR programmes locally, encouraging private sector involvement in food transport and delivery, and supporting social market outlets and community-based activities such as small enterprises for both women and men;
- encouraging participation in education and skills training (FFT, education, adult literacy);
- maintaining the capacity to respond to emergencies and setbacks;
- expanding emergency rehabilitation projects and reintegration projects;
- running household food security projects (urban/rural).

## 10. Monitoring and evaluation

To encourage accountability and to improve on the methods of implementing food aid programmes in support of DDR, mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation are essential parts of the food aid programmes. Arrangements for monitoring the distribution of aid should



be made in advance between the lead food agency (normally WFP) and the cooperating partner organizations implementing the programmes.

### 10.1. Monitoring food distribution

As with all food aid operations, programmes in support of DDR should monitor the food distribution process; the minimum requirement is for information gathered on:

- the receipt and delivery of commodities;
- the number (disaggregated by sex and age) of people receiving assistance;
- food storage, handling and the distribution of commodities;
- food aid availability and unmet needs;
- inequalities in distribution.

There are two main activities for gathering this information:

- *Distribution monitoring*: This type of monitoring includes several activities such as commodity monitoring, on-site monitoring and food basket monitoring. This monitoring is conducted on the day of distribution;
- *Post-distribution monitoring*: This monitoring takes place some time after the distribution, but before the next one. It includes monitoring of the way in which food aid is used in households and communities, and market surveys.

#### 10.1.1. Participant data collection and segmentation in DDR

As with other sector programmes included in DDR, for the purposes of increasing the effectiveness of current and future food aid programming, it is particularly important for data on participants to be collected so that they can be easily disaggregated. Numerical data should be systematically collected for the following categories: ex-combatants, associates and dependants (partners, dependants and relatives of ex-combatants); and every effort should be made to segment the data by:

- sex and age;
- vulnerable group category (children associated with armed forces and groups, HIV/AIDS affected people, disabled combatants);
- DDR location(s);
- armed force/group affiliation;
- non-combatants associated with armed forces and groups (if this is relevant to the programme).<sup>15</sup>

### 10.2. Programme evaluations

Also, identifying lessons learned, and post-programme evaluations of the short- and long-term impacts of DDR programmes help to improve the approach to delivering food aid within DDR programmes and the broader inter-agency approach to DDR. The country office of the lead food agency, generally WFP, should ensure that a comprehensive evaluation of the disarmament and demobilization phases of the food programme is carried out when the reintegration process is under way, and preferably not later than one year after the conclusion of the demobilization phase. The evaluation should provide an in-depth analysis of the food aid-related activity during the different phases of the DDR programme

and include information that will allow the activities carried out during the reintegration phase to be reviewed and, if necessary, redesigned/reoriented. Lessons learned should be recorded and shared with all relevant stakeholders to guide future policies and to improve the effectiveness of future planning of and support to operations.



## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

The following terms and definitions are taken from the *World Food Programme Design Manual*, unless otherwise cited.

**Coping mechanisms:** The methods by which members of households try to deal with a crisis. For example, at times of severe food insecurity, household members may (1) make greater use than normal of wild foods, (2) plant other crops, (3) seek other sources of income, (4) rely more on gifts and remittances, (5) sell off assets to buy food and (6) migrate. Coping mechanisms should be discouraged if they lead to disinvestment, if they reduce a household's capacity to recover its long-term capacity to survive, and if they harm the environment. Positive coping mechanisms should be encouraged and strengthened.

**'Do no harm':** An approach that tries to avoid unintended negative impacts of development and other interventions.

**Evaluation:** Evaluation is a management tool. It is a time-bound activity that systematically and objectively assesses the relevance, performance and success of ongoing and completed programmes and projects. Evaluation is carried out selectively, asking and answering specific questions to guide decision makers and/or programme managers. Evaluation determines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme or project.

**Food for training (FFT):** Programme in which food is supplied on condition that the recipient attends a training programme.

**Food for work (FFW):** FFW projects and activities are those in which food is given as full or part payment for work performed in the context of a supervised work programme.

**Food insecurity:** A situation where people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development, and an active and healthy life. Food insecurity may be caused by the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution, or inadequate use of food at the household level.

**Food security:** A situation where all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. (Note: This definition includes the following three key dimensions of food security: sufficient availability of food; adequate access to food; and appropriate utilization of food.)

**Livelihood:** The capabilities, assets (including both material and social assets) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, and maintain or improve its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base.

**Monitoring:** Monitoring is a management tool. It is the systematic oversight of the implementation of an activity that establishes whether input deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted outputs have proceeded according to plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct deficiencies.

**Participatory rural assessment (PRA):** Tool designed, in a WFP intervention, to assess rural people's perceptions, access to and control over resources, attitudes, benefits, decision-making positions, constraints and degree of involvement.

**Protection:** All activities that are aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual, in accordance with the letter and spirit of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.<sup>16</sup>

**Rapid assessment (RA):** Assessment that uses a variety of survey techniques for quick and inexpensive assessment. Rapid appraisals tend to be qualitative rather than quantitative, and they depend more on the ability and judgement of the person carrying out the survey than do other research methods that are more rigorous, but also slower and costlier.

**Sustainable livelihoods approach:** Approach that tries to ensure that households can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, and maintain and improve their capabilities and assets now and in the future.<sup>17</sup>

**Vulnerability:** In terms of food supply, the presence of factors that place people at risk of becoming food insecure or malnourished, including those factors that affect their ability to cope. Generally, vulnerability is a result of exposure to risk factors, and of underlying socio-economic processes, which reduce the capacity of populations to cope with risks.

## Abbreviations

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
FFT	food for training
FFW	food for work
g	gram(s)
ICC	interim care centre
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
IDP	internally displaced person
kcal	kilocalories
UN	United Nations
UNHAS	UN Humanitarian Air Services
WFP	World Food Programme

## Annex B: Further reading

Greenberg, Meagan, WFP (World Food Programme of the United Nations) *Assistance to Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes: A Survey*, WFP, Rome, 2004.

Kievelitz, U., T. Schaef, M. Leonhardt, H. Hahn and S. Vorwerk, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-conflict Situations*, a joint UN Development Group (UNDG), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank guide, prepared by Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) with the support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Eschborn, Germany, 2004.

Lassila, S. (WFP), A. Shotton (WFP) and M. Okumba (consultant), *Gender Sensitive Food Aid Programming Training Manual for WFP Gender Trainers*, WFP, Rome, 2000.

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———, *Humanitarian Principles Policy Paper*, WFP, Rome, 2004.

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———, *WFP Transport Manual*, WFP, Rome, 2004.

———, *WFP Programme Guidance Manual*, WFP, Rome, 2005.

## Endnotes

- 1 See WFP, *Transition from Relief to Development*, WFP/EB.A/2004/5-B, WFP Policy Paper, 2004.
- 2 See WFP, *Enhanced Commitments to Women to Ensure Food Security*, WFP/EB.3/2002/4-A, WFP Policy Paper, 2002.
- 3 See also WFP, *Humanitarian Principles*, WFP/EB.A/2004/5-C, WFP Policy Paper, 2004.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Morris, James T., 'Africa's Food Crisis as a Threat to Peace and Security', WFP Statement to the UN Security Council, 2003.
- 6 WFP, *Food Security, Livelihoods and Food Aid Interventions*, 1998, <http://www.wfp.org>.
- 7 See Kievelitz, U., T. Schaef, M. Leonhardt, H. Hahn and S. Vorwerk, *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-conflict Situations*, a joint UN Development Group (UNDG), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank guide, prepared by Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) with the support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Eschborn, Germany, 2004, <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/recovery/Documents/Practical%20Guide%20to%20MNA%20in%20Post-Conflict%20Situations.pdf>.
- 8 Greenberg, Meagan, *WFP Recent Assistance to Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Programmes: A Survey*, WFP, Rome, 2004.
- 9 See WFP, *Operational Toolkit for Emergencies: Food and Nutrition*, 2003, [http://epweb.wfp.org/epweb/otkwebpage/6Food\\_Nutrition.htm](http://epweb.wfp.org/epweb/otkwebpage/6Food_Nutrition.htm).
- 10 See WFP, *Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes (DRPs) in Countries Emerging from Conflict Situations*, WFP, Rome, 1998.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 WFP, *Food Distribution Guidelines*, WFP, Rome, 2003.
- 13 See WFP, *Enhanced Commitments to Women to Ensure Food Security*, WFP/EB.3/2002/4-A, WFP Policy Paper, 2002.
- 14 WFP, *Gender Sensitive Food Aid Programming Training Manual for WFP Gender Trainers*, WFP, Rome, 2002.
- 15 WFP, *Food Distribution Guidelines*, op. cit.
- 16 Definition put forward by the International Committee of the Red Cross and accepted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
- 17 Jaspars, S. and J. Shoham, *A Critical Review of Approaches to Assessing and Monitoring Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict and Political Instability*, ODI Working Paper No. 191, 2002, [http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working\\_papers/wp191.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp191.pdf).

# 5.60 HIV/AIDS and DDR

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#### **NOTE**

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# 5.60 HIV/AIDS and DDR

## Summary

The United Nations (UN) Security Council and General Assembly have noted that a number of converging factors make conflict and post-conflict settings high risk environments for the spread of HIV, and that there is an elevated risk of infection among uniformed services and ex-combatants. This module outlines the strategies to address HIV / AIDS during disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes, in the interests of the individuals concerned, the sustainability of reintegration efforts and general post-conflict recovery.

National beneficiaries should provide the lead for HIV / AIDS initiatives, and interventions should be as inclusive as possible, while acknowledging the limitations of DDR HIV / AIDS programmes. A risk-mapping exercise should include the collection of baseline data on knowledge, attitudes and vulnerability, HIV / AIDS prevalence, and identify existing capacity.

The basic requirements for HIV / AIDS programmes in DDR are:

- identification and training of HIV focal points within DDR field offices;
- the development of HIV / AIDS awareness material and provision of basic awareness training for target groups, with peer education programmes during the reinsertion and reintegration phases to build capacity. Awareness training can start before demobilization, depending on the nature of soldiers' / ex-combatants' deployment and organizational structure;
- the provision of voluntary confidential counselling and testing (VCT) during demobilization and reintegration. An HIV test, with counselling, should be routinely offered (opt-in) as a standard part of medical screening in countries with an HIV prevalence of 5 percent or more. VCT should be provided in all settings throughout the DDR process, building on local services. Undergoing an HIV test, however, should not be a condition for participation in the DDR process, although planners should be aware of any national legislation that may exclude HIV-positive personnel from newly formed military or civil defence forces;
- screening and treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), which should be a standard part of health checks for participants;
- the provision of condoms and availability of post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits during demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration;
- treatment for opportunistic infections and, where feasible, referral for anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment within the national health care system;
- the implementation of HIV / AIDS public information and awareness campaigns to sensitize 'receiving' communities, to raise general awareness and to reduce possible stigma and discrimination against returning combatants, including women associated with armed forces and groups, which could undermine reintegration efforts. Planning in communities needs to start in advance of demobilization.

In instances where the time allotted for a specific phase is very limited or has been reduced, as when there is a shortened cantonment period, it must be understood that the HIV / AIDS requirements envisaged are not dropped, but will be included in the next DDR phase.



## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module aims to provide policy makers, operational planners and DDR officers with guidance on how to plan and implement HIV/AIDS programmes as part of a DDR framework. It focuses on interventions during the demobilization and reintegration phases. A basic assumption is that broader HIV/AIDS programmes at the community level fall outside the planning requirements of DDR officers. Community programmes require a multisectoral

DDR programmes need to integrate HIV concerns and the planning of national HIV strategies need to consider DDR.

approach and should be sustainable after DDR is completed. The need to integrate HIV/AIDS in community-based demobilization and reintegration efforts, however, can make this distinction unclear, and therefore it is vital that the national and international partners responsible for longer-term HIV/AIDS programmes are involved and have a lead

role in DDR initiatives from the outset, and that HIV/AIDS is included in national reconstruction. DDR programmes need to integrate HIV concerns and the planning of national HIV strategies need to consider DDR.

The importance of HIV/AIDS sensitization and awareness programmes for peacekeepers is acknowledged, and their potential to assist with programmes is briefly discussed. Guidance on this issue can be provided by mission-based HIV/AIDS advisers, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

In the IDDRS series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- "a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action."

## 3. Introduction

AIDS is a global issue. Every region of the world is affected and all are reporting increases in HIV infection rates. There is still no cure and no vaccine. Access to ARV treatment, which mitigates the effects of the virus, is being scaled up in low- and middle-income countries; but an emphasis on preventing new infections remains paramount.

HIV/AIDS challenges human rights and gender relations, aggravates socio-economic crises and undermines 'human security'. In the most severely affected countries, AIDS threatens to deplete the supply of skilled labour, reverse economic progress and undermine food security. It overwhelms health systems and changes the demographic profile of

nations.<sup>1</sup> In July 2000, Security Council resolution 1308 (S/RES/1308) recognized that the “spread of HIV/AIDS can have a uniquely devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society”.

In addition, resolution 1308 recognized that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is “exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability”. DDR programmes often take place in areas of high HIV/AIDS prevalence or high-risk environments, and ex-combatants are considered a high-risk group. As noted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the very characteristics that define a complex emergency, such as conflict, social instability, poverty and powerlessness, are those that favour the spread of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Mass displacements can result in the movement of people between high and low HIV/AIDS prevalence areas, especially with migration towards urban settings. The breakdown of social networks and support mechanisms place women and children at an increased risk of violence, and can force them into having sex to gain access to basic needs such as food, water and security. The risk of HIV is further increased when rape and sexual abuse are used as tools of war, as illustrated by the recent conflicts in Haiti, Liberia and Sudan.

The UN General Assembly’s 2001 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, endorsed by General Assembly resolution A/RES/S-26/2, further emphasized the concern that conflicts contribute to the spread of HIV, and recognized that “populations destabilized by armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters, including refugees, internally displaced persons and in particular women and children, are at increased risk of exposure to HIV infection”. In some circumstances, however, conflict may actually slow the transmission of HIV in pockets of communities or specific areas, as it restricts access and trade routes, and it is the post-conflict phase including, potentially, the reintegration process, that sees an increase in HIV vulnerability.

DDR programmes often take place in areas of high HIV/AIDS prevalence or high-risk environments, and ex-combatants are considered a high-risk group.

## 4. UN institutional mandates and responsibilities

A number of UN resolutions and declarations highlight the obligation to include HIV/AIDS initiatives in responses to conflict and provide the legal framework for such a requirement:

- Security Council resolution 1308 (S/RES/1308) of 2000 and Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2005/33) of 2005;
- Security Council resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325) of 2000;
- UN General Assembly HIV/AIDS Declaration of Commitment of June 2001, endorsed by General Assembly resolution A/RES/S-26/2 and reiterated by General Assembly A/RES/60/262.

### 4.1. Security Council resolution 1308 and Presidential Statement 2005/33

Security Council resolution 1308 (2000) “on the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and international peace-keeping operations”,<sup>2</sup> calls for HIV/AIDS training and prevention programmes for peace-keeping personnel. In addition, by recognizing the devastating impact that HIV/AIDS has

on all sectors of society and by stressing that “the HIV / AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security”, the resolution points to a broader framework and obligation to integrate HIV / AIDS initiatives into post-conflict programmes, including DDR. Furthermore, the resolution stresses the importance of a coordinated approach among UN agencies, and essentially calls for the mainstreaming of HIV / AIDS into their respective mandates. Following discussions in 2005 on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2005/33) supported the efforts of peacekeeping missions to integrate HIV / AIDS awareness into their activities and outreach projects for vulnerable communities.

#### **4.2. Security Council resolution 1325**

Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) “on Women, peace and security”<sup>3</sup> encourages “all involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants”. Consideration of HIV / AIDS interventions and requirements comes under this obligation. Furthermore, the resolution makes specific reference for the need to provide HIV / AIDS training for military, civilian police, and civilian personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations.

#### **4.3. General Assembly Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and General Assembly resolutions A/RES/S-26/2 and A/RES/60/262**

The UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV / AIDS Declaration of Commitment (June 2001), endorsed by resolution A / RES / S-26 / 2 and reiterated in 2006 by resolution A / RES / 60 / 262, established a common set of targets and agreed strategies to reduce the spread of HIV and mitigate its impact. It called for HIV / AIDS components to be included in international assistance programmes in crisis situations. More specifically, in addition to training for personnel involved in peacekeeping operations, the Declaration called on Member States “by 2003 to have in place national strategies to address the spread of HIV among national uniformed services, where this is required, including armed forces and civil defence forces” (para. 77). The obligation to include strategies to address HIV / AIDS in DDR programmes is clear for two reasons. First, national uniformed (government) forces, directly referred to in the Declaration, and non-State combatants face HIV risks. Second, by extension, there is a need to consider HIV in broader security sector reform (SSR) initiatives and efforts to establish newly integrated national armed service and civil defence forces in post-conflict settings, as DDR is often closely linked to SSR. The Declaration also points to national uniformed services as being a possible resource in themselves for HIV / AIDS initiatives, calling on Member States to “consider ways of using personnel from these services who are educated and trained in HIV / AIDS awareness and prevention to assist with HIV / AIDS awareness and prevention activities, including participation in emergency, humanitarian, disaster relief and rehabilitation assistance” (para. 77).

#### **4.4. Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines on HIV/AIDS interventions in emergency settings**

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which is the primary mechanism for facilitating inter-agency decision-making in response to complex emergencies and natural disasters,

issued guidelines in 2004 for HIV/AIDS interventions in emergency settings. The guidelines are a practical handbook and planning tool to enable governments and cooperating organizations, including UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to make the minimum required multisectoral response to HIV/AIDS during the early phase of emergency situations, as well as during the stabilization phase.<sup>4</sup> Most of the recommended actions for vulnerable groups are also valid for DDR and addressing HIV/AIDS among DDR participants (see Annex B).

## 5. Rationale for HIV/AIDS integration into DDR programming

As noted in the introduction, a number of factors make conflict and post-conflict settings high-risk environments for the spread of HIV. The age range, mobility and risk taking ethos of armed forces and groups can make them high-risk to HIV — with some national militaries reporting higher rates of HIV than their civilian counterparts — and ‘core transmitters’ to the wider population.<sup>5</sup> Child soldiers are often (though not always) sexually active at a much earlier age and are therefore potentially exposed to HIV. Female combatants, women associated with fighting forces, abductees and dependants are frequently at high risk, given widespread sexual violence and abuse and because, in situations of insecurity and destitution, sex is often exchanged for basic goods or protection. In some conflicts, drugs have been used to induce in combatants a fighting spirit and a belief in their own invincibility. This not only increases risk behaviour but also, in the case of intravenous drug users, can directly result in HIV infection as the virus can be transmitted through the sharing of infected needles.

Integrating HIV/AIDS into DDR initiatives is necessary to meet the immediate health and social needs of the participant and the interests of the wider community, and it is important for the long-term recovery of the country. The impact of HIV/AIDS at every level of society undermines development and makes it more difficult for a country to emerge from conflict and achieve social and economic stability. The sustainability of reintegration efforts requires that HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention strategies be directed at DDR participants, beneficiaries and stakeholders in order to prevent increases in HIV rates or more generalized epidemics developing in countries where HIV infection may be mainly limited to particular high-risk groups.

Negative community responses to returning former combatants may also arise and make HIV a community security issue. To assist reintegration into communities, it is necessary to counter discrimination against, and stigmatization of, those who are (or are perceived to be) HIV-positive. In some instances, communities have reacted with threats of violence; such responses are largely based on fear because of misinformation about the disease.

In cases where SSR follows a DDR process, former combatants may enter into reintegrated/reformed military, police and civil defence forces. In many developing countries, ministries of defence and of the interior are reporting high HIV infection rates in the uniformed services, which are compromising command structures and combat readiness. Increasingly, there are national policies of screening recruits and excluding those who are HIV-positive. Engaging in HIV/AIDS prevention at the outset of DDR will help to reduce new infections, thus — where national policies of HIV screening are in place — increasing the

Former combatants have the potential to become ‘change agents’, assisting in their communities with HIV/AIDS prevention activities.

pool of potential candidates for recruitment, and will assist in planning for alternative occupational support and training for those found to be HIV-positive.<sup>6</sup>

DDR programmes offer a unique opportunity to target high-risk groups for sensitization. In addition, with the right engagement and training, former combatants have the potential to become 'change agents', assisting in their communities with HIV / AIDS prevention activities, and so becoming part of the solution rather than being perceived as part of the problem.

## 6. Guiding principles

*Lead to be provided by national beneficiaries/stakeholders.* HIV / AIDS initiatives within the DDR process will constitute only a small element of the overall national AIDS strategy (assuming there is one). It is essential that local actors are included from the outset to guide the process and implementation, in order to harmonize approaches and ensure that awareness-raising and the provision of voluntary confidential counselling and testing and support, including, wherever possible, treatment, can be sustained. Information gained in focus group discussions with communities and participants, particularly those living with HIV / AIDS, should inform the design of HIV / AIDS initiatives. Interventions must be sensitive to local culture and customs.

*Inclusive approach.* As far as possible, it is important that participants and beneficiaries have access to the same / similar facilities — for example, voluntary confidential counselling and testing — so that programmes continue to be effective during reintegration and to reduce stigma. This emphasises the need to link and harmonize DDR initiatives with national programmes. (A lack of national programmes does not mean, however, that HIV / AIDS initiatives should be dropped from the DDR framework.) Men and women, boys and girls should be included in all HIV / AIDS initiatives. Standard definitions of 'sexually active age' often do not apply in conflict settings. Child soldiers, for example, may take on an adult mantle, which can extend to their sexual behaviour, and children of both sexes can also be subject to sexual abuse.

*Strengthen existing capacity.* Successful HIV / AIDS interventions are part of a long-term process going beyond the DDR programme. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the capacity of communities and local actors in order for projects to be sustainable. Planning should seek to build on existing capacity rather than create new programmes or structures. For example, local health care workers should be included in any training of HIV counsellors, and the capacity of existing testing facilities should be augmented rather than parallel facilities being set up. This also assists in building a referral system for demobilized ex-combatants who may need additional or follow-up care and treatment.

*Ethical/human rights considerations.* The UN supports the principle of VCT. Undergoing an HIV test should not be a condition for participation in the DDR process or eligibility for any programme. HIV test should be voluntary and results should be confidential or 'medical-in-confidence' (for the knowledge of a treating physician). A person's actual or perceived HIV status should not be considered grounds for exclusion from any of the benefits. Planners, however, must be aware of any existing national legislation on HIV testing. For example, in some countries recruitment into the military or civil defence forces includes HIV screening and the exclusion of those found to be HIV-positive.

*Universal precautions and training for UN personnel.* Universal precautions shall be followed by UN personnel at all times. These are a standard set of procedures to be used in the care



of all patients or at accident sites in order to minimize the risk of transmission of blood-borne pathogens, including, but not exclusively, HIV. All UN staff should be trained in basic HIV/AIDS awareness in preparation for field duty and as part of initiatives on HIV/AIDS in the workplace, and peacekeeping personnel should be trained and sensitized in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention.

*Using specialized agencies and expertise.* Agencies with expertise in HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support, such as UNAIDS, the UN Development Programme, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization (WHO), and relevant NGOs and other experts, should be consulted and involved in operations. HIV/AIDS is often wrongly regarded as only a medical issue. While medical guidance is certainly essential when dealing with issues such as testing procedures and treatment, the broader social, human rights and political ramifications of the epidemic must also be considered and are often the most challenging in terms of their impact on reintegration efforts. As a result, the HIV/AIDS programme requires specific expertise in HIV/AIDS training, counselling and communication strategies, in addition to qualified medical personnel. Teams must include both men and women: the HIV/AIDS epidemic has specific gender dimensions and it is important that prevention and care are carried out in close coordination with gender officers (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

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*Limitations and obligations of DDR HIV/AIDS initiatives.* It is crucial that DDR planners are transparent about the limitations of the HIV/AIDS programme to avoid creating false expectations. It must be clear from the start that it is normally beyond the mandate, capacity and financial limitations of the DDR programme to start any kind of roll-out plan for ARV treatment (beyond, perhaps, the provision of PEP kits and the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (also see IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR). The provision of treatment needs to be sustainable beyond the conclusion of the DDR programme in order to avoid the development of resistant strains of the virus, and should be part of national AIDS strategies and health care programmes. DDR programmes can, however, provide the following for target groups: treatment for opportunistic infections; information on ARV treatment options available in the country; and referrals to treatment centres and support groups. The roll-out of ARVs is increasing, but in many countries access to treatment is still very limited or non-existent. This means that much of the emphasis still has to be placed on prevention initiatives. HIV/AIDS community initiatives require a long-term commitment and fundamentally form part of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development programmes.

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It is crucial that DDR planners are transparent about the limitations of the HIV/AIDS programme to avoid creating false expectations.

However, in the absence of a functioning national AIDS strategy or implementing partners in the relevant communities, there is a moral and operational challenge in DDR providing awareness, testing and prevention programmes only to demobilized personnel. Reducing HIV transmission relies on changing risk behaviours, so focusing on only one group during reintegration would ultimately be counter-productive. At the same time, extending the benefits beyond former combatants and associated groups becomes unmanageable within the DDR specific framework — again emphasising the need to link with national programmes. If HIV/AIDS programmes do not exist at the local level or are very limited, DDR officers should aim to support basic programmes in receiving communities for a minimum of 12

months as part of reinsertion, community security initiatives or reintegration. During this time there should be proactive efforts to involve partners in broader community-based programming.

## 7. Planning factors

### 7.1. Planning assessments

During the planning process, a risk mapping exercise and assessment of local capacities (at the national and community level) needs to be conducted as part of a situation analysis and to profile the country's epidemic. This will include the collection of qualitative and quantitative data, including attitudes of communities towards those being demobilized and presumed or real HIV infection rates among different groups, and an inventory of both actors on the ground and existing facilities and programmes.

There may be very little reliable data about HIV infection rates in conflict and post-conflict environments. In many cases, available statistics only relate to the epidemic before the conflict started and may be years out of date. A lack of data, however, should not prevent HIV / AIDS initiatives from being put in place. Data on rates of STIs from health clinics and NGOs are valuable proxy indicators for levels of risk. It is also useful to consider the epidemic in its regional context by examining prevalence rates in neighbouring countries and the degree of movement between states. In 'younger' epidemics, HIV infections may not yet have translated into AIDS-related deaths, and the epidemic could still be relatively hidden, especially as AIDS deaths may be recorded by the opportunistic infection and not the presence of the virus. Tuberculosis (TB), for example, is both a common opportunistic infection and a common disease in many low-income countries.

A situation analysis for action planning for HIV should include the following important components:

- *Baseline data:* What is the national HIV / AIDS prevalence (usually based on sentinel surveillance of pregnant women)? What are the rates of STIs? Are there significant differences in different areas of the country? Is it a generalized epidemic or restricted to high-risk groups? What data are available from blood donors (are donors routinely tested)? What are the high-risk groups? What is driving the epidemic (for example: heterosexual sex; men who have sex with men; poor medical procedures and blood transfusions; mother-to-child transmission; intravenous drug use)? What is the regional status of the epidemic, especially in neighbouring countries that may have provided an external base for ex-combatants?
- *Knowledge, attitudes and vulnerability:* Qualitative data can be obtained through key informant interviews and focus group discussions that include health and community workers, religious leaders, women and youth groups, government officials, UN agency and NGO/CBOs, as well as ex-combatants and those associated with fighting forces and groups. Sometimes data on knowledge, attitudes and practice regarding HIV / AIDS are contained in demographic and health surveys that are regularly carried out in many countries (although these may have been interrupted because of the conflict). It is important to identify the factors that may increase vulnerability to HIV — such as levels of rape and gender-based violence and the extent of 'survival sex'. In the planning process, the cultural sensitivities of participants and beneficiaries must be considered so that appropriate services can be designed. Within a given country, for example, the



acceptability and trends of condom use or attitudes to sexual relations outside of marriage can vary enormously; the country specific context must inform the design of programmes. Understanding local perceptions is also important in order to prevent problems during the reintegration phase, for example in cases where communities may blame ex-combatants or women associated with fighting forces for the spread of HIV and therefore stigmatize them.

- *Identify existing capacities:* The assessment needs to map existing health care facilities in and around communities where reintegration is going to take place. The exercise should ascertain whether the country has a functioning national AIDS control strategy and programme, and the extent that ministries are engaged (this should go beyond just the health ministry and include, for example, ministries of the interior, defence, education, etc.). Are there prevention and awareness programmes in place? Are these directed at specific groups? Does any capacity for counselling and testing exist? Is there a strategy for the roll-out of ARVs? Is there financial support available or pending from the Global Fund for AIDS, Malaria and TB, the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief or the World Bank? Do these assistance frameworks include DDR? What other actors (national and international) are present in the country? Are the UN theme group and technical working group in place (the standard mechanisms to coordinate the HIV initiatives of UN agencies)?

Basic requirements for HIV / AIDS programmes in DDR include:

- collection of baseline HIV / AIDS data;
- identification and training of HIV focal points within DDR field offices;
- development of HIV / AIDS awareness material and provision of basic awareness training, with peer education programmes during extended cantonment and the reinsertion and reintegration phases to build capacity;
- provision of VCT, both specifically within cantonment sites, where relevant, and through support to community services, and the routine offer of (opt-in) testing with counselling as a standard part of medical screening in countries with an HIV prevalence of 5 per cent or more;
- provision of condoms, PEP kits, and awareness material;
- treatment of STIs and opportunistic infections, and referral to existing services for ARV treatment;
- public information campaigns and sensitization of receiving communities as part of more general preparations for the return of DDR participants.

The number of those being processed through a particular site and the amount of time available would determine what can be offered before or during demobilization, what is part of reinsertion packages and what can be offered during reintegration. The IASC guidelines are a useful tool for planning and implementation (see section 4.4 of this module).

## 7.2. Design of DDR field offices

The design of DDR field offices responsible for the registration and reintegration process must take into account the need for capacity to address HIV / AIDS. Possible options include a central dedicated (but mobile) unit to coordinate HIV issues; the establishment of focal points in each region; and the secondment of experts to field offices from relevant UN agencies and NGOs or, in the case of national DDR field offices, from the national ministry

of health, National AIDS Control Programme and local NGOs. In many cases, field offices will play a key role in basic briefings to DDR participants and referrals to VCT, so it is essential that all personnel are trained in HIV awareness strategies and are fully aware of on available facilities.

### 7.3. Monitoring and evaluation

During planning, core indicators need to be developed to monitor the progress and impact of DDR HIV initiatives. This should include process indicators, such as the provision of condoms and the number of peer educators trained, and outcome indicators, like STI incidence by syndrome and the number of people seeking voluntary counselling and testing. DDR planners need to work with national programmes in the design and monitoring of initiatives, as it is important that the indicators used in DDR programmes are harmonised with national indicators. DDR planners, implementing partners and national counterparts should agree on the bench-marks against which DDR-HIV programmes will be assessed. The IASC guidelines include reference material for developing indicators in emergency settings.

## 8. HIV initiatives before and during demobilization

Depending on the nature of soldiers'/ex-combatants' deployment and organizational structure, it may be possible to start awareness training before demobilization begins. For example, it may be that troops are being kept in their barracks in the interim period between the signing of a peace accord and the roll-out of DDR; this provides an ideal captive (and

It may be possible to start awareness training before demobilization begins.

restive) audience for awareness programmes and makes use of existing structures.<sup>7</sup> In such cases, DDR planners should design joint projects with other actors working on HIV issues in the country. To avoid duplication or over-extending DDR HIV budgets, costs could be shared based on a proportional

breakdown of the target group. For example, if it is anticipated that 40% of armed personnel will be demobilized, the DDR programme could cover 40% of the costs of awareness and prevention strategies at the pre-demobilization stage. Such an approach would be more comprehensive, easier to implement, and have longer-term benefits. It would also complement HIV/AIDS initiatives in broader SSR programmes.

Demobilization is often a very short process, in some cases involving only reception and documentation. While cantonment offers an ideal environment to train and raise the awareness of a 'captive audience', there is a general trend to shorten the cantonment period and instead carry out community-based demobilization. Ultimately, most HIV initiatives will take place during the reinsertion phase and the longer process of reintegration. However, initial awareness training (distinct from peer education programmes) should be considered part of general demobilization orientation training, and the provision of voluntary HIV testing and counselling should be included alongside general medical screening and should be available throughout the reinsertion and reintegration phases.

During cantonments of five days or more, voluntary counselling and testing, and awareness sessions should be provided during demobilization. If the time allowed for a

specific phase is changed, for example, if an envisaged cantonment period is shortened, it should be understood that the HIV/AIDS minimum requirements are not dropped but are instead included in the next phase of the DDR programme. Condoms and awareness material/referral information should be available whatever the length of cantonment, and must be included in 'transitional packages'.

### 8.1. Planning for cantonment sites

The safety and protection of women, girls and boys must be taken into account in the planning for cantonment sites and interim care centres (ICCs), to reduce the possibility of sexual exploitation and abuse (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

Medical screening facilities should ensure privacy during physical check-ups, and shall ensure that universal precautions are respected.

An enclosed space is required for testing and counselling. This can be a tent, as long as the privacy of conversations can be maintained. Laboratory facilities are not required on site.

### 8.2. HIV/AIDS awareness training

Initial HIV awareness training should be provided to DDR participants, covering the basic facts of HIV transmission and prevention methods, and debunking common myths (2-hour sessions). On the basis of the qualitative data gathered during the planning stages, information, education and communication materials should be developed that are sensitive to the local culture and customs. Written materials in local languages are useful, but alternative materials using pictures should also be provided to account for different literacy rates and specifically to target children. Separate training for men and women should be available to encourage individuals to speak openly and ask questions. Children should receive special training in ICCs, in collaboration with child-protection officers (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

Peer education programmes can be initiated during more extended cantonment periods of four weeks or more, and during reinsertion. Peer education typically involves training and supporting a small group with the same background, experience and values to share knowledge and change behaviour patterns among their peers. Peer education is often used to bring about changes in the knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours at the individual level. However, the approach can also be used as part of efforts to create change at the group level or in society as a whole by modifying norms and stimulating collective action, both of which contribute to changes in policies and programmes. Globally, peer education is one of the most widely used strategies to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It increases the capacity and sustainability of HIV/AIDS awareness and sensitization efforts. HIV/AIDS peer education kits for uniformed services and additional material for awareness sessions for women and children are available from UNAIDS and Family Health International.<sup>8</sup> (See section 9.2 of this module.)

### 8.3. Syndromic management of STIs

Screening and treatment for STIs should be a standard component of health screening for participants. STIs indicate risk behaviour, and their presence increases the chances of con-

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tracting or transmitting HIV. Syndromic management is a cost-effective approach that allows health workers to diagnose STIs based on a patient's history and symptoms, without the need for laboratory analysis. Treatment normally includes the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics. Individuals with an STI should be strongly encouraged to bring their partners in for STI screening so that both can receive treatment in order to prevent reinfection (also see IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR).

#### 8.4. HIV counselling and testing

Counselling and testing as a way of allowing people to find out their HIV status is an integral element of prevention activities. Testing can be problematic in countries where ARVs are not yet easily available, and it is therefore important that any test is based on informed consent and that providers are transparent about benefits and options (for example, additional nutritional support for HIV-positive people from the World Food Programme, and treatment for opportunistic infections). The confidentiality of results shall also be assured. Even if treatment is not available, HIV-positive individuals can be provided with nutritional and other health advice to avoid opportunistic infections (also see IDDRS 5.50 on Food Aid Programmes in DDR). Their HIV status may also influence their personal planning, including vocational choices, etc. According to UNAIDS, the majority of people living with HIV do not even know that they are infected. This emphasizes the importance of providing DDR participants with the option to find out their HIV status. Indeed, it may be that demand for VCT at the local level will have to be generated through awareness and advocacy campaigns, as people may either not understand the relevance of, or be reluctant to have, an HIV-test.



Sudanese waiting outside a VCT facility in Rumbek, south Sudan, 2006. Photo: R. Bazergan, UNAIDS/DPKO

It is particularly important for pregnant women to know their HIV status, as this may affect the health of their baby. During counselling, information on mother-to-child-transmission, including short-course ARV therapy (to reduce the risk of transmission from an HIV-positive mother to the foetus), and guidance on breastfeeding can be provided. Testing technologies have improved significantly, cutting the time required to get a result and reducing the reliance on laboratory facilities. It is therefore more feasible to include testing and counselling in DDR. Testing and counselling for children associated with armed forces and groups should only be carried out in consultation with a child-protection officer with, where possible, the informed consent of the parent (see IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

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*Training and funding of HIV counsellors:* Based on an assessment of existing capacity, counsellors could include local medical personnel, religious leaders, NGOs and CBOs. Counselling capacity needs to be generated (where it does not already exist) and funded to ensure sufficient personnel to run VCT and testing being offered as part of routine health checks, either in cantonment sites or during community-based demobilization, and continued during reinsertion and reintegration (see section 10.1 of this module).

#### 8.4.1. Counselling

Counselling is generally offered before and after an HIV test in order to help individuals make an informed decision about whether they want a test and to understand their risk behaviour and cope with a possible positive result (including information on how to stay as healthy as possible and how to minimize the risk of transmission to others) and provide referrals to options for treatment, care and support within the national system. Counselling also helps those who are not infected to stay HIV-negative. Counselling on an individual basis is ideal but it can also be offered in group settings with individual follow up.

Individuals shall always be informed of their test result and post-test counselling should be provided for both an HIV-positive and an HIV-negative result, especially given the 'window period', the possibility for 'false negatives' and the need to impact on behaviour. HIV-positive individuals should be strongly encouraged to bring their partner(s) for testing. In all instances, participants should be provided with referrals to further services in their communities. (For psychological, medical and legal support to rape victims see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR.)

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#### 8.4.2. Testing

In countries with an estimated HIV prevalence of 5 percent or more, an HIV test (opt-in), with counselling and informed consent, should be routinely offered as part of standard health checks for ex-combatants, but this must be linked to provisions for treatment and/or other benefits. In opt-in testing, individuals in a defined group (in this case, DDR participants) are given counselling and are offered the option of having an HIV test. It must be explained that they have the right to decide whether or not they wish to undergo an HIV test, without any personal repercussions. Routinely offering a test respects human rights guidelines, while also reaching a larger population. In general, such an approach results in greater numbers of people finding out their HIV status.

Routine opt-in testing is suggested on the basis that DDR participants are a distinct and potentially high-risk group. However, VCT services for participants and beneficiaries should also be provided alongside any offer of testing as part of medicals. Voluntary testing is a client initiated process, whereby an individual chooses to go to a testing facility/provider to find out his/her HIV status.



Advances in testing technology mean that rapid tests can provide a test result within approximately 30 minutes.

Advances in testing technology mean that rapid tests can provide a test result within approximately 30 minutes and do not require blood to be drawn or laboratory facilities. HIV-positive results need to be confirmed

to rule out 'false positives'. If local laboratory facilities do not exist, a combination of two further different rapid tests should be used to confirm an HIV-positive result. The mapping exercise will have identified national capacities (also see IDDRS 5.70 on Health and DDR). Planners also need to consult national legislation regarding which HIV tests are accepted, particularly with regard to rapid tests.

◀▶ 5.70

### 8.5. Providing condoms

Male and female condoms should be available, and information regarding their correct use should be provided during the demobilization and in transitional packs. A range of contraception measures also need to be considered as part of basic reproductive health services to prevent unwanted pregnancies.

Many countries may not be familiar with female condoms. Post-conflict settings, however, have proved to be receptive environments for the introduction of female-controlled methods of HIV/STI prevention and contraception. It is important that any introduction of female condoms in DDR programmes be strongly linked to national/local initiatives. UNFPA and Population Services International can provide information on designing and running programmes to promote and supply female condoms. If female condoms are not available locally and there are no existing programmes, it may not be feasible or appropriate for DDR HIV/AIDS programmes to introduce and promote the use of female condoms, as it requires training and specifically tailored information campaigns.

### 8.6. Provision of post-exposure prophylaxis kits

Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits are a short-term antiretroviral treatment that reduces the likelihood of HIV infection after potential exposure to infected body fluids, such as through a needle-stick injury, or as a result of rape. The treatment should only be administered by a qualified health care practitioner. It essentially consists of taking high doses of ARVs for 28 days. To be effective, the treatment must start within 2 to 72 hours of the possible exposure; the earlier the treatment is started, the more effective it is. The patient should be counselled extensively before starting treatment, and advised to follow up with regular check-ups and HIV testing. PEP kits shall be available for all DDR staff and for victims of rape who present within the 72-hour period required (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

◀▶ 5.10

## 9. Reinsertion and reintegration phases

### 9.1. Planning and preparation in receiving communities

HIV/AIDS initiatives need to start in receiving communities before demobilization in order to support or create local capacity and an environment conducive to sustainable reintegration. HIV/AIDS activities are a vital part of, but not limited to, DDR initiatives. Whenever possible, planners should work with stakeholders and implementing partners to link these

activities with the broader recovery and humanitarian assistance being provided at the community level and the Strategy of the national AIDS Control Programme. People living with HIV / AIDS in the community should be consulted and involved in planning from the outset.

The DDR programme should plan and budget for the following initiatives:

- *Community capacity-enhancement and public information programmes:* These involve providing training for local government, NGOs / community-based organizations (CBOs) and faith-based organizations to support forums for communities to talk openly about HIV / AIDS and related issues of stigma, discrimination, gender and power relations; the issue of men having sex with men; taboos and fears. This enables communities to better define their needs and address concerns about real or perceived HIV rates among returning ex-combatants. Public information campaigns should raise awareness among communities, but it is important that communication strategies do not inadvertently increase stigma and discrimination. HIV / AIDS should be approached as an issue of concern for the entire community and not something that only affects those being demobilized;
- *Maintain counsellor and peer educator capacity:* training and funding is needed to maintain VCT and peer education programmes.



HIV/AIDS awareness hoarding in Liberia, 2005. Photo: R. Bazergan, UNAIDS/DPKO



## 9.2. Peer education programme

Peer education training (including behaviour-change communication strategies) should be initiated during the reinsertion and reintegration phases or, if started during cantonment, continued during the subsequent phases. Based on the feedback from the programmes to improve community capacity, training sessions should be extended to include both DDR participants and communities, in particular local NGOs.

During peer education programmes, it may be possible to identify among DDR participants those who have the necessary skills and personal profile to provide ongoing HIV/AIDS programmes in the communities and become 'change agents'. Planning and funding for vocational training should consider including such HIV/AIDS educators in broader initiatives within national HIV/AIDS strategies and the public health sector. It cannot be assumed, however, that all those trained will be sufficiently equipped to become peer educators. Trainees should be individually evaluated and supported with refresher courses in order to maintain levels of knowledge and tackle any problems that may arise.

During the selection of participants for peer education training, it is important to consider the different profiles of DDR participants and the different phases of the programme. For example, women associated with fighting forces would probably be demobilized before

Trainees should be individually evaluated and supported with refresher courses in order to maintain levels of knowledge and tackle any problems that may arise.

combatants and peer education programmes need to target them and NGOs working with women specifically. In addition, before using DDR participants as community HIV/AIDS workers, it is essential to identify whether they may be feared within the community because of the nature of the conflict in which they participated. If ex-combatants are highly

respected in their communities this can strengthen reintegration and acceptance of HIV-sensitization activities. Conversely, if involving them in HIV/AIDS training could increase stigma, and therefore undermine reintegration efforts, they should not be involved in peer education at the community level. Focus group discussions and local capacity-enhancement programmes that are started before reintegration begins should include an assessment of the community's receptiveness. An understanding of the community's views on the subject will help in the selection of people to train as peer educators.

## 9.3. Voluntary counselling and testing

Voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) should be available during the reinsertion and reintegration phases in the communities to which ex-combatants are returning. This is distinct from any routine offer of testing as part of medical checks. VCT can be provided through a variety of mechanisms, including through free-standing sites, VCT services integrated with other health services, VCT services provided within already established non-health locations and facilities, and mobile/outreach VCT services.

## 9.4. Condoms and PEP kits

Male and female condoms should continue to be provided during the reinsertion and reintegration phases to the DDR target groups. It is imperative, though, that such access to condoms is linked — and ultimately handed over to — local HIV initiatives as it would be unmanageable for the DDR programme to maintain the provision of condoms to former

combatants, associated groups and their families. Similarly, DDR planners should link with local initiatives for providing PEP kits, especially in instances of rape. (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR).

### 9.5. Vocational training

One of the major factors increasing vulnerability to HIV in post-conflict settings is the increased levels of commercial/survival sex in communities where unemployment rates are high. Poverty-reduction initiatives, including income-generation and vocational training programmes, should be seen as vital parts of overall community reconstruction, and also contribute to reducing the social risk factors for HIV transmission.

For HIV-negative DDR participants, the creation of livelihoods is, by extension, an important aspect of HIV prevention for them and their families. For those who may be HIV-positive, but otherwise healthy (i.e., have functioning immune systems and showing no symptoms), vocational counselling may need to consider health and risk issues, but shall not deny each individual's ability or right to be trained and have a livelihood. The long incubation period of the virus means that it can be many years before an HIV-positive individual develops AIDS, even if he/she is not on treatment.

### 9.6. Caring for people living with AIDS

Caring for people living with AIDS, especially in resource poor settings, can present a number of challenges, particularly the provision of even basic drugs and treatments. It also raises concerns about the extent to which families (some of who may already be affected by the disease) and communities are able or willing to commit themselves to caring for ex-combatants who may have been away for some time. Overall, the burden of care tends to fall on women in communities who will already be facing an increased burden of care with the return of ex-combatants. This will make the overall support and absorption of ex-combatants into civilian life more complicated. In addition, any differences in the types or levels of AIDS care and support provided to ex-combatants and communities is a very sensitive issue. It is extremely important to provide a balance in services, so that communities do not think that ex-combatants are receiving preferential treatment. Wherever possible, support should be provided to existing medical and hospice facilities, linking up with national and local programmes, with targeted support and referrals for families caring for ex-combatants suffering from AIDS.

## 10. Identifying existing capacities

National AIDS control programmes, where they exist, must be the first point of reference for, and key actors in, designing and running HIV/AIDS DDR programmes. UNAIDS country coordinators can give essential guidance and will have established networks with relevant NGOs/CBOs. The UN theme group is the main mechanism to coordinate HIV/AIDS initiatives among UN agencies and other partners.

### 10.1. Implementing partners

In many settings, key HIV/AIDS implementing partners, such as the International Rescue Committee and Family Health International, may already be working in the country, but

not necessarily in all the areas where demobilization and reinsertion/reintegration will take place. To initiate programmes, DDR officers should consider providing seed money to kick-start projects, for example covering the initial costs of establishing a basic VCT centre and training counsellors in a particular area, on the understanding that the implementing partner would assume the costs of running the facility for an agreed period of time. This is because it is often easier for NGOs to raise donor funds to maintain a project that has been shown to work than to set one up. Such an approach has the additional benefit of extending HIV facilities to local communities beyond the time-frame of DDR, and can provide a buffer for HIV-related services at the reinsertion stage for example if there are delays in the demobilization process such as time-lags between the demobilization of special groups and ex-combatants.

## **10.2. HIV-related support for peacekeeping missions**

*HIV/AIDS advisers.* Peacekeeping missions routinely have HIV / AIDS advisers, assisted by UN volunteers and international/national professionals, as a support function of the mission to provide awareness and prevention programmes for peacekeeping personnel and to integrate HIV / AIDS into mission mandated activities. HIV / AIDS advisers can facilitate the initial training of peer educators, provide guidance on setting up VCT, and assist with the design of information, education and communication materials. They should be involved in the planning of DDR from the outset.

*Peacekeepers.* Peacekeepers are increasingly being trained as HIV / AIDS peer educators, and therefore might be used to help support training. This role would, however, be beyond their agreed duties as defined in troop contributing country memorandums of understanding (MoUs), and would require the agreement of their contingent commander and the force commander. In addition, abilities vary enormously: the mission HIV / AIDS adviser should be consulted to identify those who could take part.

Many battalion medical facilities offer basic treatment to host populations, often treating cases of STIs, as part of 'hearts and minds' initiatives. Battalion doctors may be able to assist in training local medical personnel in the syndromic management of STIs, or directly provide treatment to communities. Again, any such assistance provided to host communities is not included in MoUs or self-sustainment agreements, and so would require the authorization of contingent commanders and the force commander, and the capability and expertise of any troop-contributing country doctor would have to be assessed in advance.

## Annex A: Terms, definitions and abbreviations

### Terms and definitions

**AIDS:** Acquired immune deficiency syndrome: the stage of HIV when the immune system is depleted, leaving the body vulnerable to one or more life-threatening diseases.

**Anti-retrovirals (ARVs):** Broad term for the main type of treatment for HIV and AIDS. ARVs are not a cure.

**Behaviour-change communication (BCC):** A participatory, community-level process aimed at developing positive behaviours; promoting and sustaining individual, community and societal behaviour change; and maintaining appropriate behaviours.

**False negative/positive:** HIV test result that is wrong, either giving a negative result when the person is HIV-positive, or a positive result when the person is HIV-negative.

**HIV:** Human immunodeficiency virus, the virus that causes AIDS.

**HIV confirmation tests:** According to WHO/UNAIDS recommendations, all positive HIV-test results (whether ELISA [enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay] or simple/rapid tests) should be confirmed using a second, different test to confirm accuracy, or two further different rapid tests if laboratory facilities are not available.

**HIV counselling:** Counselling generally offered before and after an HIV test in order to help individuals understand their risk behaviour and cope with an HIV-positive result or stay HIV-negative. The counselling service also links individuals to options for treatment, care and support, and provides information on how to stay as healthy as possible and how to minimize the risk of transmission to others. Test results shall be confidential. Usually a voluntary counselling and testing service package ensures that: the HIV test is voluntary; pre and post test counselling is offered; informed consent is obtained (agreement to a medical test or procedure after clear explanation of risks and benefits); and HIV tests are performed using approved HIV test kits and following testing protocols.

**HIV-negative result:** The HIV test did not detect any antibodies in the blood. This either means that the person is not infected with the virus at the time of the test or that he/she is in the 'window period' (i.e., false negative, see above). It does not mean that he/she is immune to the virus.

**HIV-positive result:** A positive HIV test result means that a person has the HIV antibodies in his/her blood and is infected with HIV. It does not mean that he/she has AIDS.

**HIV test:** Usually a test for the presence of antibodies. There are two main methods of HIV testing:

- *HIV ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) test:* This is the most efficient test for testing large numbers per day, but requires laboratory facilities with equipment, maintenance staff and a reliable power supply;
- *Simple/rapid HIV tests:* These do not require special equipment or highly trained staff and are as accurate as ELISA. Rapid tests will usually give results in approximately 30 minutes and are easy to perform. Suitable combinations of three simple/rapid tests are recommended by WHO where facilities for ELISA or ELISA/Western Blot testing are not available.

**Inconclusive (indeterminate) result:** A small percentage of HIV test results are inconclusive. This means that the result is neither positive nor negative. This may be due to a

number of factors that are not related to HIV infection, or it can be because of the person is in the early stages of infection when there are insufficient HIV antibodies present to give a positive result. If this happens the test must be repeated.

**Information, education and communication (IEC):** The development of communication strategies and support materials, based on formative research and designed to impact on levels of knowledge and influence behaviours among specific groups.

**Mandatory testing:** Testing or screening required by federal, state, or local law to compel individuals to submit to HIV testing without informed consent. Within those countries that conduct mandatory testing, it is usually limited to specific 'populations' such as categories of health care providers, members of the military, prisoners or people in high-risk situations.

**Nutritional requirements:** AIDS patients usually need a food intake that is 30 percent higher than standard recommended levels.

**Opportunistic infection (OI):** Infection that occurs when an immune system is weakened, but which might not cause a disease — or be as serious — in a person with a properly functioning immune system.

**Peer education:** A popular concept that variously refers to an approach, a communication channel, a methodology and/or an intervention strategy. Peer education usually involves training and supporting members of a given group with the same background, experience and values to effect change among members of that group. It is often used to influence knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours at the individual level. However, peer education may also create change at the group or societal level by modifying norms and stimulating collective action that contributes to changes in policies and programmes. Worldwide, peer education is one of the most widely used HIV / AIDS awareness strategies.

**Post-exposure prophylaxis/post-exposure prevention (PEP):** A short-term antiretroviral treatment that reduce the likelihood of HIV infection after potential exposure to infected body fluids, such as through a needle-stick injury or as a result of rape. The treatment should only be administered by a qualified health care practitioner. It essentially consists of taking high doses of ARVs for 28 days. To be effective, the treatment must start within 2 to 72 hours of the possible exposure; the earlier the treatment is started, the more effective it is. Its success rate varies.

**Routine opt-in testing:** Approach to testing whereby the individual is offered an HIV test as a standard part of a treatment/health check that he/she is about to receive. The individual is informed that he/she has the right to decide whether or not to undergo the test.

**Sentinel surveillance:** Surveillance based on selected population samples chosen to represent the relevant experience of particular groups.

**Sero-conversion:** The period when the blood starts producing detectable antibodies in response to HIV infection.

**Sero-positive:** Having HIV antibodies; being HIV-positive.

**Sexually transmitted infection (STI):** Disease that is commonly transmitted through vaginal, oral or anal sex. The presence of an STI is indicative of risk behaviour and also increases the actual risk of contracting HIV.

**STI syndromic management:** A cost-effective approach that allows health workers to diagnose sexually transmitted infections on the basis of a patient's history and symptoms, without

the need for laboratory analysis. Treatment normally includes the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics.

**Universal precautions:** Simple infection control measures that reduce the risk of transmission of blood borne pathogens through exposure to blood or body fluids among patients and health care workers. Under the ‘universal precaution’ principle, blood and body fluids from all persons should be considered as infected with HIV, regardless of the known or supposed status of the person.

- Use of new, single-use disposable injection equipment for all injections is highly recommended. Sterilising injection equipment should only be considered if single-use equipment is not available.
- Discard contaminated sharps immediately and without recapping in puncture- and liquid-proof containers that are closed, sealed and destroyed before completely full.
- Document the quality of the sterilization for all medical equipment used for percutaneous procedures.
- Wash hands with soap and water before and after procedures; use protective barriers such as gloves, gowns, aprons, masks and goggles for direct contact with blood and other body fluids.
- Disinfect instruments and other contaminated equipment.
- Handle properly soiled linen with care. Soiled linen should be handled as little as possible. Gloves and leak-proof bags should be used if necessary. Cleaning should occur outside patient areas, using detergent and hot water.

**Voluntary HIV testing:** A client-initiated HIV test whereby the individual chooses to go to a testing facility/provider to find out his/her HIV status.

**Window period:** The time period between initial infection with HIV and the body’s production of antibodies, which can be up to three months. During this time, an HIV test for antibodies may be negative, even though the person has the virus and can infect others.

## Abbreviations

ARV	anti-retroviral
BCC	behaviour-change communication
CBO	community-based organization
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICC	interim care centre
IDDRS	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/standards
IEC	information, education and communication
MoU	memorandum of understanding
NGO	non-governmental organization
PEP	post-exposure prophylaxis (also post-exposure prevention)
PLWHA	people/person living with HIV or AIDS
RH	reproductive health
SSR	security sector reform
STI	sexually transmitted infection

<b>TB</b>	tuberculosis
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAIDS</b>	Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS
<b>UNFPA</b>	UN Population Fund
<b>VCT</b>	voluntary counselling and testing
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization



## Annex B: Guidelines for HIV/AIDS interventions in emergency settings (matrix)

SECTORAL RESPONSE	EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS	MINIMUM RESPONSE (to be conducted even in the midst of an emergency)	COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE (Stabilized Phase)
1. Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Determine coordination structures</li> <li>■ Identify and list partners</li> <li>■ Establish network of resource persons</li> <li>■ Raise funds</li> <li>■ Prepare contingency plans</li> <li>■ Include HIV/AIDS in humanitarian action plans and train relief workers accordingly</li> </ul>	1.1 Establish coordination mechanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Continue fundraising</li> <li>■ Strengthen networks</li> <li>■ Enhance information sharing</li> <li>■ Build human capacity</li> <li>■ Link HIV emergency activities with development activities</li> <li>■ Work with authorities</li> <li>■ Assist government and non-state entities to promote and protect human rights.</li> </ul>
2. Assessment and monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Conduct capacity and situation analysis</li> <li>■ Develop indicators and tools</li> <li>■ Involve local institutions and beneficiaries</li> </ul>	2.1 Assess baseline data  2.2 Set up and manage a shared database   2.3 Monitor activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Maintain database.</li> <li>■ Monitor and evaluate all programs</li> <li>■ Assess data on prevalence, knowledge, attitudes and practice, and impact of HIV/AIDS</li> <li>■ Draw lessons from evaluations.</li> </ul>
3. Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Review existing protection laws and policies</li> <li>■ Promote human rights and best practices</li> <li>■ Ensure that humanitarian activities minimize the risk of sexual violence, exploitation and HIV-related discrimination</li> <li>■ Train uniformed forces and humanitarian workers on HIV/AIDS and sexual violence</li> </ul>	3.1 Prevent and respond to sexual violence and exploitation   3.2 Protect orphans and separated children   3.3 Ensure access to condoms for peacekeepers, military and humanitarian staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Involve authorities to reduce HIV-related discrimination.</li> <li>■ Expand prevention and response to sexual violence and exploitation</li> <li>■ Strengthen protection for orphans, separated children and young people</li> <li>■ Institutionalize training for uniformed forces on HIV/AIDS, sexual violence and exploitation, and non-discrimination</li> <li>■ Put in place HIV-related services for demobilized personnel</li> <li>■ Strengthen IDP/refugee response</li> </ul>
4. Water and Sanitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Train staff on HIV/AIDS, sexual violence, gender and non-discrimination</li> </ul>	4.1 Include HIV considerations in water/sanitation planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Establish water/sanitation management committees</li> <li>■ Organize awareness campaigns on hygiene and sanitation, targeting people affected by HIV</li> </ul>

SECTORAL RESPONSE	EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS	MINIMUM RESPONSE (to be conducted even in the midst of an emergency)	COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE (Stabilized Phase)
5. Food Security and Nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Contingency planning/preposition supplies</li> <li>■ Train staff on special needs of HIV/AIDS-affected populations</li> <li>■ Include information about nutritional care and support of people living with HIV/AIDS in community nutrition education programmes</li> <li>■ Support food security of HIV/AIDS-affected households</li> </ul>	<p>5.1 Target food aid to affected and at-risk households and communities</p> <p>5.2 Plan nutrition and food needs for populations with high HIV prevalence</p> <p>5.3 Promote appropriate care and feeding practices for people living with HIV/AIDS</p> <p>5.4 Support and protect food security of HIV/AIDS-affected and at-risk households and communities</p> <p>5.5 Distribute food aid to affected households and communities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Develop strategy to protect long-term food security of HIV-affected people</li> <li>■ Develop strategies and target vulnerable groups for agricultural extension programs</li> <li>■ Collaborate with community and home-based care programs in providing nutritional support</li> <li>■ Assist the government in fulfilling its obligation to respect the human right to food</li> </ul>
6. Shelter and site planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Ensure safety of potential sites</li> <li>■ Train staff on HIV/AIDS gender and non-discrimination</li> </ul>	6.1 Establish safely designed sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Plan orderly movement of displaced</li> </ul>
7. Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Map current services and practices</li> <li>■ Plan and stock medical and reproductive health supplies</li> <li>■ Adapt/develop protocols</li> <li>■ Train health personnel</li> <li>■ Plan quality assurance mechanisms</li> <li>■ Train staff on the issue of sexual and gender based violence and the link with HIV/AIDS</li> <li>■ Determine prevalence of injecting drug use</li> <li>■ Develop instruction leaflets on cleaning injection materials</li> <li>■ Map and support prevention and care Initiatives</li> <li>■ Train staff and peer educators</li> <li>■ Train health staff on reproductive health issues linked with emergencies and the use of reproductive health kits</li> <li>■ Assess current practices in the application of universal precautions</li> </ul>	<p>7.1 Ensure access to basic health care for the most vulnerable</p> <p>7.2 Ensure a safe blood supply</p> <p>7.3 Provide condoms</p> <p>7.4 Institute syndromic STI treatment</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Forecast longer-term needs; secure regular supplies; ensure training of the staff</li> <li>■ Palliative care and home-based care</li> <li>■ Treatment of opportunistic infections and TB control programmes</li> <li>■ Provision of ARV treatment</li> <li>■ Safe blood transfusion services</li> <li>■ Ensure regular supplies, include condoms with other reproductive health activities</li> <li>■ Reassess condoms based on demand</li> <li>■ Management of STI, including condoms</li> <li>■ Comprehensive sexual violence programme</li> </ul>

SECTORAL RESPONSE	EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS	MINIMUM RESPONSE (to be conducted even in the midst of an emergency)	COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE (Stabilized Phase)
		<p>7.5 Ensure intravenous drug use appropriate care</p> <p>7.6 Management of the consequences of sexual violence</p> <p>7.7 Ensure safe deliveries</p> <p>7.8 Universal precautions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Control drug trafficking in camp settings</li> <li>■ Use peer educators to provide counselling and education on risk-reduction strategies</li> <li>■ Voluntary counselling and testing</li> <li>■ Reproductive health services for young people</li> <li>■ Prevention of mother-to-child transmission</li> <li>■ Enable/monitor/reinforce universal precautions in health care</li> </ul>
8. Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Determine emergency education options for boys and girls</li> <li>■ Train teachers on HIV/AIDS, sexual violence and exploitation</li> </ul>	8.1 Ensure children's access to education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Educate girls and boys (formal and non-formal)</li> <li>■ Provide life skills-based HIV/AIDS education</li> <li>■ Monitor and respond to sexual violence and exploitation in educational settings</li> </ul>
9. Behaviour-communication change (BCC) and information education communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Prepare culturally appropriate messages in local languages</li> <li>■ Prepare a basic BCC/IEC strategy</li> <li>■ Involve key beneficiaries</li> <li>■ Conduct awareness campaigns</li> <li>■ Store key documents outside potential emergency areas</li> </ul>	9.1 Provide information on HIV/AIDS prevention and care	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Scale up BCC/IEC</li> <li>■ Monitor and evaluate activities</li> </ul>
10. HIV/AIDS in the Workplace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Review personnel policies regarding the management of people living with HIV/AIDS who work in humanitarian operations</li> <li>■ Develop new policies when there are none, aimed at minimising the potential for discrimination</li> <li>■ Stock materials for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)</li> </ul>	<p>10.1 Prevent discrimination by HIV status in staff management</p> <p>10.2 Provide PEP to humanitarian staff</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Build capacity of supporting groups for people living with HIV/AIDS and their families</li> <li>■ Establish workplace policies to eliminate discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS</li> <li>■ PEP for all humanitarian workers available on regular basis</li> </ul>

## Annex C: Reference material and resources

Family Health International resources available at <http://www.fhi.org/en/HIVAIDS/index.htm>.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings*, <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc>.

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## Endnotes

- 1 Bazergan, R., *Intervention and Intercourse: HIV/AIDS and peacekeepers*, Conflict, Security and Development, vol 3 no 1, April 2003, King's College, London, pp. 27–51.
- 2 <http://www.un.org/docs/sc/>.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings*, <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc>.
- 5 HIV risk in militaries is related to specific contexts, with a number of influencing factors, including the context in which troops are deployed. Many AIDS interventions by ministries of defence have been effective, and have reduced HIV infection rates in the uniformed services.
- 6 In many cases, ex-combatants who are set to join a uniformed service do not go through the DDR process. There would still be a potential benefit, however, in instances where HIV/AIDS awareness has started in the barracks/camps.
- 7 At the same time planners cannot assume that all fighting forces will have an organised structure in barracks with the associated logistical support. In some cases, combatants may be mixed with the population and hard to distinguish from the general population.
- 8 See <http://www.unaids.org> and <http://www.fhi.org/en/index.htm>.

# 5.70 Health and DDR

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#### **NOTE**

Each IDDRS module is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the IDDRS is periodically reviewed, users should consult the UN DDR Resource Centre web site for updates: <http://www.unddr.org>.

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# 5.70 Health and DDR

## Summary

This module is intended to assist operators and managers from other sectors who are involved in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), as well as health practitioners, to understand how health partners, like the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations (UN) Population Fund (UNFPA), Joint UN Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and so on, can make their best contribution to the short- and long-term goals of DDR. It provides a framework to support cooperative decision-making for health action rather than technical advice on health care needs. Its intended audiences are generalists who need to be aware of each component of a DDR process, including health actions; and health practitioners who, when called upon to support the DDR process, might need some basic guidance and reference on the subject to help contextualize their technical expertise. Because of its close interconnections with these areas, the module should be read in conjunction with IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR and IDDRS 5.50 on Food Aid Programmes in DDR.

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## 1. Module scope and objectives

This module is intended to assist operators and managers from other sectors who are involved in DDR, as well as health practitioners, to understand how health partners can make their best contribution to the short- and long-term goals of DDR. It provides a framework to support decision-making for health actions. The module highlights key areas that deserve attention and details the specific challenges that are likely to emerge when operating within a DDR framework. It cannot provide a response to all technical problems, but it provides technical references when these are relevant and appropriate, and it assumes that managers, generalists and experienced health staff will consult with each other and coordinate their efforts when planning and implementing health programmes.

As the objective of this module is to provide a platform for dialogue in support of the design and implementation of health programmes within a DDR framework, there are two intended audiences: generalists who need to be aware of each component of a DDR process, including health actions; and health practitioners who, when called upon to support the DDR process, might need some basic guidance and reference on the subject to help contextualize their technical expertise.

## 2. Terms, definitions and abbreviations

Annex A contains a list of the abbreviations used in this standard. A complete glossary of all the terms, definitions and abbreviations used in the series of integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) is given in IDDRS 1.20.

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In the IDDRS series, the words ‘shall’, ‘should’ and ‘may’ are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance with the standards laid down. This use is consistent with the language used in the International Organization for Standardization standards and guidelines:

- “a) ‘shall’ is used to indicated requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.
- b) ‘should’ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.
- c) ‘may’ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.”

### 3. Introduction

This module consolidates the lessons learned by WHO and its partners, including UNFPA, UNAIDS, ICRC, etc., in supporting DDR processes in a number of countries. UN technical agencies play a supportive role within a DDR framework, and WHO has a specific responsibility as far as health is concerned. The exact nature of this role may change in different situations, ranging from standards-setting to direct operational responsibilities such as contracting with and supervising non-governmental organizations (NGOs) delivering health care and health-related activities in assembly areas and demobilization sites, negotiating with conflicting parties to implement health programmes, and supporting the provision of health equipment and services in transit/cantonment areas.

The priority of public health partners in DDR is:

- to assess health situations and monitor levels of risk;
- to co-ordinate the work of health actors and others whose activities contribute to health (e.g., food programmes);
- to provide — or to ensure that others provide — key health services that may be lacking in particular contexts where DDR programmes are operating;
- to build capacity within national authorities and civil society.

Experience shows that, even with the technical support offered by UN and partner agencies, meeting these priorities can be difficult. Both in the initial demobilization phase and afterwards in the reintegration period, combatants, child soldiers, women associated with armed forces and groups, and their dependants may present a range of specific needs to which the national health sector is not always capable of responding. While the basic mechanisms governing the interaction between individuals and the various threats to their health are very much the same anywhere, what alters is the environment where these interactions take place, e.g., in terms of epidemiological profile, security and political context. In each country where a DDR process is being implemented, even without considering the different features of each process itself, a unique set of health needs will have to be met. Nonetheless, some general lessons can be drawn from the past:

- In DDR processes, the short-term planning that is part of humanitarian interventions also needs to be built into a medium- to long-term framework. This applies to health as well as to other sectors;<sup>1</sup>
- A clear understanding of the various phases laid out in the peace process in general and specified for DDR in particular is vital for the appropriate timing, delivery and targeting of health activities;<sup>2</sup>
- The capacity to identify and engage key stakeholders and build long-term capacity is essential for coordination, implementation and sustainability.

## 4. Guiding principles

Health action should always prioritize basic preventive and curative care to manage the entire range of health threats in the geographical area, and deal with the specific risks that threaten the target population. Health action within a DDR process should apply four key principles:

*Principle 1:* Health programmes/actions that are part of DDR should be devised in coordination with plans to rehabilitate the entire health system of the country, and to build local and national capacity; and they should be planned and implemented in cooperation and consultation with the national authorities and other key stakeholders so that resources are equitably shared and the long-term health needs of former combatants, women associated with armed groups and forces, their family members and communities of reintegration are sustainably met;

*Principle 2:* Health programmes/actions that are part of DDR should promote and respect ethical and internationally accepted human rights standards;

*Principle 3:* Health programmes/actions that are part of DDR should be devised after careful analysis of different needs and in consultation with a variety of representatives (male and female, adults, youth and children) of the various fighting factions; and services offered during demobilization should specifically deal with the variety of health needs presented by adult and young combatants and women associated with armed groups and forces;

*Principle 4:* In the reintegration part of DDR, as an essential component of community-based DDR in resource-poor environments, health programmes/actions should be open to all those in need, not only those formerly associated with armed groups and forces.

## 5. Health and DDR

### 5.1. Tensions between humanitarian and political objectives

DDR programmes result from political settlements negotiated to create the political and legal system necessary to bring about a transition from violent conflict to stability and peace. To contribute to these political goals, DDR processes use military, economic and humanitarian — including health care delivery — tools.

Thus, humanitarian work carried out within a DDR process is implemented as part of a political framework whose objectives are not specifically humanitarian. In such a situation, tensions can arise between humanitarian principles and the establishment of the overall political-strategic crisis management framework of integrated peace-building missions, which is the goal of the UN system. Offering health services as part of the DDR process can cause a conflict between the ‘partiality’ involved in supporting a political transition and the ‘impartiality’ needed to protect the humanitarian aspects of the process and humanitarian space.<sup>3</sup>

It is not within the scope of this module to explore all the possible features of such tensions. However, it is useful for personnel involved in the delivery of health care as part of DDR processes to be aware that political priorities can affect operations, and can result in tensions with humanitarian principles. For example, this can occur when humanitarian programmes aimed at combatants are used to create an incentive for them to ‘buy in’ to the peace process.<sup>4</sup>

## 5.2. Linking health action to DDR and the peace process

A good understanding of the various phases of the peace process in general, and of how DDR in particular will take place over time, is vital for the appropriate timing and targeting of health activities. Similarly, it must be clearly understood which national or international institutions will lead each aspect or phase of health care delivery within DDR, and the coordination mechanism needed to streamline delivery. Operationally, deciding on the timing and targeting of health interventions requires two things to be done.

First, an analysis of the political and legal terms and arrangements of the peace protocol and the specific nature of the situation on the ground should be carried out as part of the general assessment that will guide and inform the planning and implementation of health activities. For appropriate planning to take place, information must be gathered on the expected numbers of combatants, associates and dependants involved in the process; their gender- and age-specific needs; the planned length of the demobilization phase and its location (demobilization sites, assembly areas, cantonment sites, or other); and local capacities for the provision of health care services.

### Key questions for the pre-planning assessment:

- What are the key features of the peace protocols?
- Which actors are involved?
- How many armed groups and forces have participated in the peace negotiation? What is their make-up in terms of age and sex?
- Are there any foreign troops (e.g., foreign mercenaries) among them?
- Does the peace protocol require a change in the administrative system of the country? Will the health system be affected by it?
- What role did the UN play in achieving the peace accord, and how will agencies be deployed to facilitate the implementation of its different aspects?
- Who will coordinate the health-related aspects of integrated, inter-agency DDR efforts (ministry of health, WHO, medical services of peacekeeping mission, UNFPA, food agencies such as the World Food Programme [WFP], implementing partners, etc.)? Who will set up the UN coordinating mechanism, division of responsibilities, etc., and when?
- What national steering bodies/committees for DDR are planned (joint commission, transitional government, national commission on DDR, working groups, etc.)?
- Who are the members and what is the mandate of such bodies?
- Is the health sector represented in such bodies? Should it be?
- Is assistance to combatants set out in the peace protocol, and if so, what plans have been made for DDR?
- Which phases in the DDR process have been planned?
- What is the time-frame for each phase?
- What role, if any, can/should the health sector play in each phase?

Second, the health sector should be represented in all bodies established to oversee DDR from the earliest stages of the process possible. Early inclusion is essential if the guiding principles described above are to be applied in practice during operations. In particular:

- It can ensure that public health concerns are taken into account when key planning decisions are made, e.g., on the selection of locations for pick-up points or other assembly/transit areas, on the level of services that will be established there, and on the best way of dealing with different health needs;

- It can advocate in favour of vulnerable groups;
- It will establish a political, legislative and administrative link with national authorities, which is necessary to create the space for health actions in the short and medium/long term. For example, appropriate support for the health needs of specific groups, such as girl mothers or the war-disabled, can be provided only if the appropriate legislative/administrative frameworks have been set up and capacity-building begun;
- It will reduce the risk of creating *ad hoc* health services for former combatants, women associated with armed groups and forces, dependants and the communities to which they return. Health programmes in support of a DDR process can be highly visible, but they are seldom more than a limited part of all the health-related activities taking place in a country during a transition period;
- Careful cooperation with health and relevant non-health national authorities can result in the establishment of health programmes that start out in support of demobilization, but later, through coordination with the overall rehabilitation of the country strategy for the health sector, become a sustainable asset in the reintegration period and beyond;
- It can bring about the adoption at national level of specific health guidelines/protocols that are equitable, affordable by and accessible to all, and gender- and age-responsive.

It should be seen as a priority to encourage the collaboration of international and national health staff in all areas of health-related work, as this increases local ownership of health activities and builds capacity.

### 5.3. Health and the sequencing of DDR processes

The different aspects of DDR processes — disarmament, demobilization and reintegration — may not necessarily follow a fixed chronological order, and are closely interrelated. The extent of the contribution of health activities in each phase increases steadily, from assessment and planning to the actual delivery of health services. Health services, in turn, will evolve: starting by focusing on immediate, life-threatening conditions, they will at a later stage be required to support ex-combatants and those associated with them when they return to civilian life and take up civilian jobs as a part of reintegration.

Figure 1 **DDR: The importance of health activities in the different phases of the process**



Figure 1 provides a simplified image of the general direction in which the health sector has to move to best support a DDR process. Clearly, health actions set up to meet the specific needs of the demobilization phase, which will only last for a short period of time, must be planned as only the first steps of a longer-term, open-ended and comprehensive reintegration process. In what follows, some of the factors that will help the achievement of this long-term goal are outlined.

### 5.4. Health and the geographical dimensions of DDR

The geography of the country/region in which the DDR operation takes place should be taken into account when planning the health-related parts of the operation, as this will help


in the difficult task of identifying the stakeholders and the possible partners that will be involved, and to plan the network of fixed structures and outreach circuits designed to cater for first health contact and/or referral, health logistics, etc., all of which have to be organized at local, district, national or even international (i.e., possibly cross-border) levels.

Health activities in support of DDR processes must take into account the movements of populations within countries and across borders. From an epidemiological point of view, the mass movements of people displaced by conflict may bring some communicable diseases into areas where they are not yet endemic, and also speed up the spread of outbreaks of diseases that can easily turn into epidemics. Thus, health actors need to develop appropriate strategies to prevent or minimize the risk that these diseases will propagate and to allow for the early detection and containment of any possible epidemic resulting from the population movements. Those whom health actors will be dealing with include former combatants, associates and dependants, as well as the hosting communities in the transit areas and at the final destinations.

In cases where foreign combatants will be repatriated, cross-border health strategies should be devised in collaboration with the local health authorities and partner organizations in both the sending and receiving countries (also see IDDRS 5.40 on Cross-border Population Movements).

Figure 2 shows the likely movements of combatants and associates (and often their dependants) during a DDR process. It should be noted that the assembly/cantonment/transit area is the most important place (and probably the only place) where adult combatants come into contact with health programmes designed in support of the DDR process, because both before and after they assemble here, they are dispersed over a wide area. Children should receive health assistance at interim care centres (ICCs) after being released from armed groups and forces. Before and after the cantonment/transit period, combatants, associates and their dependants are mainly the responsibility of the national health system, which is likely to be degraded and in need of systematic, long-term support in order to do its work.

Figure 2 **DDR: Movements of combatants and associates**





## 6. Operational objectives for the health sector in the DDR process

The overall goal of health action is to reduce avoidable illness and death. In the context of DDR, this requires that the health programmes focus on providing:

- basic, preventive and curative, specifically designed and good-quality health care that is easily accessible at every stage of the process — in any transit stations, in demobilization/cantonment/assembly camps if they are used, in ICCs for children, and in the communities where combatants will live once they are demobilized;
- basic health care, including reproductive health care and psychosocial care, that is appropriate to the different needs of men, women, youth, girls and boys going through DDR. This service needs to be supported by effective referral systems and emergency back-up systems, e.g., to control outbreaks of infectious diseases or deal with immediate, life-threatening mental trauma. Health information and advice must be made available in language that can be understood by the different groups for which the health care is designed;
- training of camp managers on health-related matters, e.g., on the construction of appropriate areas for the registration and protection of vulnerable groups, the provision of food appropriate to different needs (e.g., for the sick, and for nursing mothers, infants and small children), problems with drug and alcohol addiction, water, shelter, sanitation, supplies of items needed for hygiene (soap, buckets), and fuel. Women and girls will need specific assistance to meet their hygiene needs, including menstrual supplies and clean birthing kits.

The overall goal of health action is to reduce avoidable illness and death.

## 7. The role of the health sector in the planning process

The health sector has three main areas of responsibility during the planning phase: (1) to assess the epidemiological profile in the areas and populations of interest; (2) to assess existing health resources; and (3) to advise on public health concerns in choosing the sites where combatants, women associated with armed groups and forces and/or dependants will be assembled. Planning to meet health needs should start as early as possible and should be constantly updated as the DDR process develops.

### 7.1. Assessing epidemiological profiles

Three key questions must be asked in order to create an epidemiological profile: (1) What is the health status of the targeted population? (2) What health risks, if any, will they face when they move during DDR processes? (3) What health threats might they pose, if any, to local communities near transit areas or those in which they reintegrate?

Assess the risks and plan accordingly.<sup>5</sup> Information that will be needed includes:

- the composition of target population (age and sex) and their general health status;
- the transit sites and the health care situation there;
- the places to which former combatants and the people associated with them will return and the capacity to supply health services there.

Epidemiological data, i.e., at least minimum statistics on the most prevalent causes of illness and death, are usually available from the national health authorities or the WHO



country office. These data are usually of poor quality in war-torn countries or those in transition into a post-conflict phase, and are often outdated. However, even a broad overview can provide enough information to start planning.

More detailed and updated information may be available from NGOs working in the area or the health services of the armed forces or groups. If possible, it should come from field assessments or rapid surveys.<sup>6</sup> The following guiding questions should be asked:

- What kinds of population movements are expected during the DDR process (not only movements of people associated with armed forces and groups, but also an idea of where populations of refugees and internally displaced persons might intersect/interact with them in some way)?
- What are the most prevalent health hazards (e.g., endemic diseases, history of epidemics) in the areas of origin, transit and destination?
- What is the size of groups (women combatants and associates, child soldiers, disabled people, etc.) with specific health needs?
- Are there specific health concerns relating to military personnel, as opposed to the civilian population?

## **7.2. Assessment of health resources**

After the completion of an assessment of the health needs to be met in a crisis, the capacity of the system to meet these needs should be examined. It is necessary to identify the system's main weaknesses and to make improvements so that they do not endanger the success of the DDR process.<sup>7</sup>

The following information is needed:

- What is the location and state of existing health infrastructure? What can be done to upgrade it quickly, if necessary?
- Do adequate storage facilities for health supplies exist nearby?
- Is there an adequate communications infrastructure/system with a good flow of information?
- What human resources are there (numbers, qualification and experience levels, and geographical distribution)?
- Where is the closest humanitarian and/or health organization? Is it ready to participate or offer support? Who will coordinate efforts?
- What material resources, including supplies, equipment and finances, have been established?
- What is the state of support systems, including transport, energy, logistics and administration?

After answering these questions and assessing the situation, it is possible to identify important gaps in the health system and to start taking steps to support the DDR process (e.g., rehabilitating a health centre in an area where troops will be assembled), and to identify stakeholders — national and international — who can form partnerships with the health sector.

When relevant and possible, the level of health expertise within armed groups and forces should be assessed to start identifying people who can be trained during the demobilization phase. Health expertise should be understood in a wide sense to include, when this is relevant and appropriate, traditional practitioners, and combatants and associates

who have experience of health work, even without formal education and training, provided that appropriate supervision is guaranteed.

### 7.3. Support in the identification of assembly areas

When assembly areas or cantonment sites are established to carry out demobilization and disarmament, health personnel should help with site selection and provide technical advice on site design. International humanitarian standards on camp design should apply, and gender-specific requirements should be taken into account (e.g., security, rape prevention, the provision of female-specific health care assistance). As a general rule, the area must conform with the Sphere standards for water supply and sanitation, drainage, vector control, etc. Locations and routes for medical and obstetric emergency referral must be pre-identified, and there should be sufficient capacity for referral or medical evacuation to cater for any emergencies that might arise, e.g., post-partum bleeding (the distance to the nearest health facility and the time required to get there are important factors to consider here).

When combatants are housed in military barracks or public buildings are restored for this purpose, these should also be assessed in terms of public health needs. Issues to consider include basic sanitary facilities, the possibility of health referrals in the surrounding area, and so on.

If nearby health facilities are to be rehabilitated or new facilities established, the work should fit in with medium- to long-term plans. Even though health care will be provided for combatants, associates and dependants during the DDR process only for a short time, facilities should be rehabilitated or established that meet the requirements of the national strategy for rehabilitating the health system and provide the maximum long-term benefit possible to the general population.

## 8. The role of health actions in the demobilization process

The concrete features of a DDR health programme will depend on the nature of a specific situation and on the key characteristics of the demobilization process (e.g., how long it is planned for). In all cases, at least the following must be guaranteed: a medical screening on first contact, ongoing access to health care and outbreak control. Supplementary or therapeutic feeding and other specific care should be planned for if pregnant or lactating women and girls, children or infants, and chronically ill patients are expected at the site.<sup>8</sup>

In all cases, at least the following must be guaranteed:  
a medical screening on first contact, ongoing access  
to health care and outbreak control.

Skilled workers, supplies, equipment and infrastructures will be needed inside, or within a very short distance from, the assembly area (within a maximum of one kilometre), to deliver, on a routine basis: (1) medical screening of newcomers; (2) basic health care; and, if necessary, (3) therapeutic feeding. Coordination with local health authorities and other sectors will ensure the presence of the necessary systems for medical evacuation, early detection of and response to disease outbreaks, and the equitable catering for people's vital needs.

### 8.1. Dealing with key health concerns during demobilization

Health concerns will vary greatly according to the geographical area where the demobilization occurs. Depending on location, health activities will normally include some or all of the following:

- providing medical screening and counselling for combatants and dependants;
- establishing basic preventive and curative health services. Priority should go to acute and infectious conditions (typically malaria); however, as soon as possible, measures should also be set in place for chronic and non-infectious cases (e.g., tuberculosis and diabetes, or epilepsy) and for voluntary testing and counselling services for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS;
- establishing a referral system that can cover medical, surgical and obstetric emergencies, as well as laboratory confirmation at least for diseases that could cause epidemics;
- adopting and adapting national standard protocols for the treatment of the most common diseases;<sup>9</sup>
- establishing systems to monitor potential epidemiological/nutritional problems within assembly areas, barracks, camps for dependants, etc. with the capacity for early warning and outbreak response;
- providing drugs and equipment including a system for water quality control and biological sample management;
- organizing public health information campaigns on STIs (including HIV/AIDS), water-borne disease, sanitation issues such as excreta disposal, food conservation and basic hygiene (especially for longer-term cantonment);
- establishing systems for coordination, communication and logistics in support of the delivery of preventive and curative health care;
- establishing systems for coordination with other sectors, to ensure that all vital needs and support systems are in place and functioning.



The Colombian Red Cross performs a medical examination of a combatant in Cordoba, Colombia, 1996. Photo: W. Torres, ICRC

Whenever people are grouped together in a temporary facility such as a cantonment site, there will be matters of specific concern to health practitioners. Issues to be aware of include:

- *Chronic communicable diseases:* Proper compliance with anti-TB treatment can be difficult to organize and sustain, but it should be considered a priority;
- *HIV/AIDS:* Screening of soldiers should be voluntary and carried out after combatants are given enough information about the screening process. The usefulness of screening when the system is not able to respond adequately (by providing anti-retroviral therapy and proper follow-up) should be carefully thought out. Combatants have the right to the confidentiality of the information collected;<sup>10</sup>
- *Violence/injury prevention:* Cantonment is a strategy for reducing violence, because it aims to contain armed combatants until their weapons can be safely removed. However, there is a strong likelihood of violence within cantonment sites, especially when abducted women or girls are separated from men. Specific care should be taken to avoid all possible situations that might lead to sexual violence;
- *Mental health, psychosocial support and substance abuse:*<sup>11</sup> While cantonment provides an opportunity to check for the presence of self-directed violence such as drug and alcohol abuse, a key principle is that the best way of improving the mental well-being of ex-combatants and their associates is through economic and social reintegration, with communities having the central role in developing and implementing the social support systems needed to achieve this. In the demobilization stage of DDR, the health services must have the capacity to detect and treat severe, acute and chronic mental disorders. An evidence-based approach to substance abuse in DDR processes has still to be developed.

## 8.2. An essential DDR health package in resource-poor settings

In sites where resources are limited, health planning to meet the needs of those going through the DDR process starts from a minimum package of medical screening, on-the-spot treatment, provision of condoms and medical evacuation/referral, which should be developed to cover, at least:

- early detection of and response to epidemic outbreaks;
- measles immunization + vitamin A for children aged 0–15 years;
- polio immunization for children under 5;
- treatment of severe, acute conditions (malaria, acute respiratory infections), diarrhoea, anaemia in pregnant women, acute malnutrition, dressing of wounds, STIs, etc.);
- uncomplicated deliveries;
- provision of long-lasting impregnated bed nets to prevent malaria;
- referral of serious cases to secondary/tertiary care facilities;
- voluntary testing and counselling for STIs, including HIV/AIDS;
- care and treatment for survivors of sexual violence, including testing and treatment for STIs.

The delivery of such services requires the following personnel and equipment in each cantonment site or assembly area:

- an average team of one doctor or mid-level health technician, 4–5 public health care nurses and 3–4 ancillary workers per camp; one midwife where necessary;

- essential medicines and equipment (for sterilization, stabilization, cold-chain, etc.);
- rapid tests and combined treatment for *P. Falciparum* malaria;
- means of transport, easy procedures and pre-positioned facilities for medical/obstetric evacuation;
- options — either locally or by referral — for the treatment of chronic conditions: at least TB and epilepsy should be covered;
- back-up systems — teams on call, easy-access procedures, transport and buffer stocks (including protective equipment) — for early detection and treatment of outbreaks;
- availability and adoption of national standard case definitions and case management protocols.<sup>12</sup>

WHO provides hospitals with emergency health kits and UNFPA can provide emergency reproductive health kits (which may include post-exposure prophylaxis kits, when appropriate) to individuals, clinics and hospitals, along with training on their use as and when this is appropriate (also see IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR).<sup>13</sup>

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### 8.3. Training of personnel

Training of local health personnel is vital in order to implement the complex health response needed during DDR processes. In many cases, the warring parties will have their own military medical staff who have had different training, roles, experiences and expectations. However, these personnel can all play a vital role in the DDR process. Their skills and knowledge will need to be updated and refreshed, since the health priorities likely to emerge in assembly areas or cantonment sites — or neighbouring villages — are different from those of the battlefield.

An analysis of the skills of the different armed forces' and groups' health workers is needed during the planning of the health programme, both to identify the areas in need of in-service training and to compare the medical knowledge and practices of different armed groups and forces. This analysis will not only be important for standardizing care during the demobilization phase, but will give a basic understanding of the capacities of military health workers, which will assist in their reintegration into civilian life, for example, as employees of the ministry of health.

The following questions can guide this assessment process:

- What kinds of capacity are needed for each health service delivery point (tent-to-tent active case finding and/or specific health promotion messages, health posts within camps, referral health centre/hospital)?
- Which mix of health workers and how many are needed at each of these delivery points? (The WHO recommended standard is 60 health workers for each 10,000 members of the target population.)
- Are there national standard case definitions and case management protocols available, and is there any need to adapt these to the specific circumstances of DDR?
- Is there a need to define or agree to specific public health intervention(s) at national level to respond to or prevent any public health threats (e.g., sleeping sickness mass screening to prevent the spread of the diseases during the quartering process)?

It is important to assume that no sophisticated tools will be available in assembly or transit areas. Therefore, training should be based on syndrome-based case definitions, individual treatment protocols and the implementation of mass treatment interventions.

## 8.4. Responding to the needs of vulnerable groups

Special arrangements will be necessary for vulnerable groups. WHO recommends planning for children, the elderly, chronically sick and disabled people, as well as for women and girls who are pregnant or lactating, and anyone who has survived sexual violence. Guiding questions to assess the specific needs of each of these groups are as follows:

- What are the specific health needs of these groups?
- Do they need special interventions?
- Are health personnel aware of their specific needs?
- Are health personnel trained to assist individuals who have survived extreme interpersonal violence and have symptoms that they may be unable or unwilling to describe (e.g., survivors of rape describing 'stomach pains')?

### 8.4.1. Children and adolescents associated with armed groups and forces

Boy and girl child and adolescent soldiers can range in age from 6 to 18. It is very likely that they have been exposed to a variety of physical and psychological traumas, including mental and sexual abuse, and that they have had very limited access to clinical and public health services. Child and adolescent soldiers, who are often brutally recruited from very poor communities, or orphaned, are already in a poor state of health before they face the additional hardship of life with an armed group or force. Their vulnerability remains high during the DDR process, and health services should therefore deal with their specific needs as a priority. Special attention should be given to problems that may cause the child fear, embarrassment or stigmatization, e.g.:

- child and adolescent care and support services should offer a special focus on trauma-related stress disorders, depression and anxiety;
- treatment should be provided for drug and alcohol addiction;
- there should be services for the prevention, early detection and clinical management of STIs and HIV/AIDS;
- special assistance should be offered to girls and boys for the treatment and clinical management of the consequences of sexual abuse, and every effort should be made to prevent sexual abuse taking place, with due respect for confidentiality.<sup>14</sup>

To decrease the risk of stigma, these services should be provided as a part of general medical care. Ideally, all health care providers should have training in basic counselling, with some having the capacity to deal with the most serious cases (also see IDDRS 5.20 on Youth and DDR and IDDRS 5.30 on Children and DDR).

5.20 ◀▶

5.30 ◀▶

### 8.4.2. Disabled or chronically ill people

To assist this group, DDR health practitioners and national authorities should agree on a system to respond to war disabilities in order for disabled people to gain entitlement to disability pensions and/or to join the social security system. An approach can be designed that measures an individual's physical impairment and how much the impairment limits his/her capacity to benefit from socio-economic reintegration.

### 8.4.3. Women

Women combatants and other women associated with armed forces and groups in non-combat roles require special measures to protect them throughout the cantonment or assembly



phase, in transit camps and while travelling to their reintegration locations. Camps must be designed to offer women security, privacy and protection. Women who are pregnant, lactating or caring for young children will require health services that cater for their specific needs. Those who have survived rape or other gender-based violence should receive access to the Minimal Initial Service Package for reproductive health.<sup>15</sup> Particular care should be taken to include women in the health team at assembly areas or cantonment sites (also see IDDRS 5.10 on Women, Gender and DDR and IDDRS 5.60 on HIV/AIDS and DDR).

◀▷ 5.10 ■ ▶▷ 5.60

## 9. The role of health services in the reintegration process

This section explains how to use the resources allocated to health action in DDR to reinforce and support the national health system in the medium and longer term.

It needs to be emphasized that after combatants are discharged, they come under the responsibility of the national health system. It is vital, therefore, for all the health actions carried out during the demobilization phase to be consistent with national protocols and regulation (e.g., the administration of TB drugs). Especially in countries emerging from long-lasting violent conflict, the capacity of the national health system may not be able to meet the needs of population, and more often than not, good health care is expensive. In this case, preferential or subsidized access to health care for former combatants and others associated with armed groups and forces can be provided if possible. It needs to be emphasized that the decision to create positive discrimination for former combatants is a political one.


## 10. Systems for programme implementation

The diagram in figure 3 (to be read from the top) shows how it is possible to systematize the various components, levels and executive lines of the health programme in a country emerging from conflict. Whatever the overall institutional setting in which DDR takes place, WHO, in consultation with the other agencies contributing to health service delivery, will be represented as member of the UN/Inter-Agency Standing Committee country team. The WHO country representatives will be in a position to: (1) ensure that the necessary lines of liaison and coordination with the national health authorities are set up and managed; and (2) provide health information to other sectors and agencies, in order to ensure cooperation among the different actors involved in different components of the DDR process.

In administering a DDR programme, the health sector is expected to supply both the technical guidance and the resources — personnel, supplies, funds, and administrative and logistic support — that are necessary for various partners to deliver coordinated and effective health preventive and curative care at the local level, i.e., in the assembly camps, etc., and beyond into the reintegration phase. In some instances, the military will be the main implementing partners at local level, with the support, in most cases, of medical NGOs and possibly the health units of peacekeeping forces.



Figure 3 **DDR: Health coordination, partners, systems, outputs and outcomes**



## Annex A: Abbreviations

<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>ICC</b>	interim care centre
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDDRS</b>	integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standard/ standards
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>STI</b>	sexually transmitted infection
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAIDS</b>	Joint UN Programme on AIDS
<b>UNFPA</b>	UN Population Fund
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## Endnotes

- 1 WHO/Emergency and Humanitarian Action, 'Preliminary Ideas for WHO Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', unpublished technical paper, WHO Office in WR, 2002.
- 2 Zagaria, N. and G. Arcadu, *What Role for Health in a Peace Process? The Case Study of Angola*, Rome, October 1997.
- 3 Eide, E. B., A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kent and K. von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspective and Recommendation*, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA (Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs) Core Group, May 2005, pp. 3 and 28.
- 4 In one example, in Angola during UN Verification Angola Mission III, the humanitarian entitlements for UNITA troops were much higher than the ones provided for their dependants.
- 5 For technical guidance, refer to WHO, *Communicable Disease Control in Emergencies: A Field Manual*, <http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-news/IDdocs/whocds200527/whocds200527chapters/index.htm>.
- 6 For short health profiles of many countries in crisis, and for guidelines on rapid health assessments, see WHO, <http://www.who.int/hac>.
- 7 The Sphere Project provides a wide range of standards that can provide useful points of reference for an assessment of the capacity of a local health system in a poor country (see Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, 2004, or <http://www.sphereproject.org>).
- 8 See Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, *Field-friendly Guide to Integrate Emergency Obstetric Care in Humanitarian Programs*, <http://www.rhrc.org/resources/general%5Ffieldtools/>.
- 9 Case definitions must be developed for each health event/disease/syndrome. Standard WHO case definitions are available, but these may have to be adapted according to the local situation. If possible, the case definitions of the host country's ministry of health should be used, if they are available. What is important is that all of those reporting to the monitoring/surveillance system, regardless of affiliation, use the same case definitions so that there is consistency in reporting.
- 10 See Reproductive Health Responses in Conflict Consortium, *Emergency Contraception for Conflict Affected Settings: A Reproductive Health Response in Conflict Consortium Distance Learning Module*, 2004, <http://www.rhrc.org/resources/general%5Ffieldtools/>.
- 11 See the Sphere Project, op. cit., pp. 291–293.
- 12 WHO/Emergency and Humanitarian Action, op. cit.
- 13 Emergency reproductive health (RH) kits were originally developed in 1996 by the members of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Refugee Situations to deliver RH services in emergency and refugee situations. To obtain these kits, the DDR practitioners/health experts should contact the WHO/UNFPA field office in that country or relevant implementing partners.
- 14 <http://www.who.int/child-adolescent-health>; see also WHO/UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *Clinical Management of Rape Survivors: Developing Protocols for Use with Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons*, revised edition, 2004, <http://www.rhrc.org/resources/general%5Ffieldtools/>.
- 15 See resources at the Reproductive Health in Conflict Consortium, <http://www.rhrc.org/resources/general%5Ffieldtools/>, especially the *Inter-agency Field Manual*.